Pisky, a Russian TOS-1A violently explodes after being hit by a Ukrainian FPV loitering munition from the 59th Motorized Brigade. pic.twitter.com/ox7TWh2as1 — OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) October 20, 2023
The Israeli military said that a blast Thursday night on the St. Porphyrius Greek Orthodox Church campus in Gaza City was the result of its airstrike. The blast resulted in the collapse of a building adjacent to the church where dozens of people were sheltering and killed two people. Hundreds were sheltering on the campus of the church. The Israeli military said a wall of a church in the area was damaged. “The incident is under review,” it said. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem didn''t respond to request for comment Friday. On Thursday, it denounced the incident as an Israeli bombing. 教堂好好的。边上的房子倒了。目标不是教堂。
The Israeli military said that a blast Thursday night on the St. Porphyrius Greek Orthodox Church campus in Gaza City was the result of its airstrike. The blast resulted in the collapse of a building adjacent to the church where dozens of people were sheltering and killed two people. Hundreds were sheltering on the campus of the church. The Israeli military said a wall of a church in the area was damaged. “The incident is under review,” it said. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem didn''t respond to request for comment Friday. On Thursday, it denounced the incident as an Israeli bombing. 教堂好好的。边上的房子倒了。目标不是教堂。 Dohremi 发表于 2023-10-20 13:43
On 19 October 2023, four Israeli missiles struck nearby the campus where at least 400-500 Palestinians were taking shelter.[8][9][10] The airstrike was confirmed by church officials to have struck two halls providing shelter to civilians, causing the collapse of at least one building.[11][12] Between 16-18 fatalities have thus far been confirmed from the attack, with an unknown number of victims still trapped under rubbl 目标不是教堂，是教堂收容难民的建筑
黑暗不同很好解释，摄像机不一样嘛。一个是监控，一个是职业摄像机。 你的摄像时间对不上，至少得说明吧？哪里出来的，有人认领是他们的吗？摄像机对的地点的经纬度有吗？都没有，凭空而来。你说摄像头的中心是医院就是医院？有第三者验证过吗？ 我贴的 al jazeera 的是geoconfirmed, 1：34秒非常清楚完整连续， 时间地点跟al jazeera 电视上的和他们自己发布的视频都是对得上的，没有人会敢去篡改伪造因为在事情发生的时候就实时传出去给公众了。 你举了这么多例子，看了这么多照片，每次都得找新理由自圆其说（弹坑小是小导弹，也许是空爆，也许是DIME, 视频时间不对是时区。。。）这么多视频截图也没法证明 al jazeera 那个是假的。al jazeera 能做到的就是把它剪短了，隐瞒了细节。 我说过以色列那个截获的所谓录音我听都不听，没一点说服力。是同样可能伪造剪辑的。 KISS, 这个摄像就最可能是真象，这么多天了，没人能discredit it. 再仔细看一遍去吧？不是拦截，以色列拦截的视频都是在火箭滑行时拦截的，上升阶段在加沙干嘛拦截，落到哪里都是未知数。 https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1714390254935851272 法国说了什么我不管，反正我贴的那个视频简单明洁，有时间地点，没飞机没干扰弹，zoom in 火多大都看得到，没有what if buts 说明不是飞机炸弹，也没见到导弹，很可能不是以色列干的 end of story. 至于是谁干的，没有铁打的证据，没法定论， 所以大家暂时不吱声。有啥新证据再定论。 楼主应该把标题改了。
On 19 October 2023, four Israeli missiles struck nearby the campus where at least 400-500 Palestinians were taking shelter.[8][9][10] The airstrike was confirmed by church officials to have struck two halls providing shelter to civilians, causing the collapse of at least one building.[11][12] Between 16-18 fatalities have thus far been confirmed from the attack, with an unknown number of victims still trapped under rubbl 目标不是教堂，是教堂收容难民的建筑 Mintcafe 发表于 2023-10-20 13:57
这个我昨天已经讲过了，没啥说服力， al jazeera 自己在做damage control and didn''t work. https://huaren.us/showtopic.html?forumid=398&topicid=2960556&postid=98652483#98652483
半岛电视台的分析视频 (992) Was the Gaza hospital attack caused by a failed rocket launch? | Bird’s Eye View - YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyNLvL_8SeY&t=206s
不完全和你一致，我找到的： Founded in 1988 during the First Intifada as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas set two long-term goals, articulated in its charter: *the end of the Jewish state* and *the creation of an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas_Charter#:~:text=The%20original%20Charter%20identified%20Hamas,the%20face%20of%20the%20oppressors.%22 The 2017 charter accepted for the first time the idea of a Palestinian state within the borders that existed before 1967 and rejects recognition of Israel which it terms as the “Zionist enemy”. It advocates such a state as *transitional* but also advocates “liberation of all of Palestine”， The new document also states that the group doesn''t seek war with the Jewish people but only against Zionism which it holds responsible for "occupation of Palestine". wiki 的分析结论是这样的： The updated 2017 charter attempts to moderate Hamas''s image by stating that Hamas is not anti-Jewish but anti-Zionist, but retains the goal of completely eliminating Israel 你有哈马斯比以上更新的说“不存在灭以色列国的”链接吗？
At least 5,700 people have been killed in the war on both sides, including at least 1,400 Israeli civilians and soldiers and 32 Americans. The Hamas-run Gaza health ministry claims at least 4,385 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza and the West Bank and more than 13,561 wounded. At least 10 Americans are feared to be held captive by Hamas
Prof. John Mearsheimer: What Has Changed Since Publication of The Israel Lobby and What the New Administration Can Do Differently Janet McMahon: Hello. I’m Janet McMahon, the managing editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. I was out at the registration table trying to help sign people in when Dale started speaking, so I don’t know if he told you that the Washington Report will be 35 years old next month. And we have been following the Israel lobby since our very first issue in 1982, so it’s a special pleasure to introduce our first keynote speaker—Prof. John Mearsheimer. He is the R. Wendell Harrison distinguished service professor of political science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago. In March of 2006 he and Prof. Stephen Walt of Harvard published an article in the London Review of Books entitled “The Israel Lobby.” The article had originally been commissioned by The Atlantic monthly, but that American publication decided not to publish it after all. Instead it found a home overseas. The paper’s publication caused an uproar, in no small part because it shed light on what AIPAC operative Steve Rosen described as a night flower that “thrives in the dark and shrivels up in the sunlight.” Harvard posted the paper on its website, but removed its logo. Attacks on Mearsheimer and Walt ranged from naïve—that’s from Noam Chomsky—to—and this will shock you—anti-Semites. The following year their article evolved into the book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, which has since been translated into 22 languages. Professor Mearsheimer, by the way, will be signing copies of his book at 12:15 at the registration table where you signed in. I’m also particularly glad that he is joining us today because every year people ask us if he is going to be speaking at our conference. So it’s been a great pleasure this year to be able to say, “Of course he is!” Today he will be discussing what, if anything, has changed in the decade since The Israel Lobby was published. Please join me in welcoming Prof. John Mearsheimer. John Mearsheimer: Thank you for the kind introduction. It’s a great pleasure to be here today to speak before this distinguished audience. I would like to thank IRmep and the Washington Report for inviting me to give this talk. Of course, I thank all of you for coming out to hear me, and the other speakers. I would like to focus my talk on what has transpired regarding the Israel lobby and the U.S.-Israeli relationship in the 10 years since Steve Walt and I wrote The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. My talk is comprised of four parts. I’ll begin by briefly restating the core arguments in our book. I’ll then describe four major changes that have taken place regarding the lobby and the U.S.-Israeli relationship over the past decade. I will then describe what has not changed and conclude by speculating about the future. The central argument in the book is that the United States has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in modern history and it is almost wholly due to the lobby. What makes Israel’s relationship with the United States extraordinary is not simply the fact that Israel has received more foreign aid than any other country, or that Washington almost always backs Israel diplomatically. What makes it truly special is that the aid is given unconditionally. In other words, Israel gets this aid even when it does things that the United States opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank. This discussion raises the obvious question: why does the United States give Israel so much aid and without any conditions? Israel supporters sometimes argue that it is because Israel is a vital strategic asset. This is not a serious argument. In fact, giving Israel nearly unconditional support is one of the reasons we have a terrorism problem. Others argue that there’s a moral rationale for this special relationship. Israel is said to be a democracy that shares our values. The two countries certainly share some values, but Israel is a Jewish state which clearly privileges its Jewish citizens. Non-Jews are second-class citizens in both theory and practice. The United States, on the other hand, is a liberal democracy that works hard to treat all of its citizens equally. It certainly is not a Christian state that treats non-Christians as second-class citizens. Indeed, that kind of discrimination, which is part of Israel’s essence, is antithetical to the American way of life. Furthermore, Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied territories is sharply at odds with U.S. values. Finally, there’s the claim that the American people have such a favorable view of Israel that they demand their politicians back the special relationship. This argument, however, is not persuasive. If you look at the survey data on how the American public thinks about Israel, as Grant made clear before I spoke, there’s no question that Americans have a generally favorable image of Israel in part because media coverage tends to be favorable. But as poll after poll shows, that support is not especially deep or wide. So what explains the special relationship if there is no strategic or moral imperative and if most Americans do not favor it? Our answer, of course, is the lobby. What exactly is the lobby? Steve and I argue that it’s a loose coalition of individuals and groups who actively work to influence U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. It’s not a centralized organization, and the groups that make up the lobby do not agree on every issue. It includes organizations like AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League, the Conference of Presidents [of Major American Jewish Organizations], the Zionist Organization of America, and Christians United for Israel, just to name a few. It also includes think tanks like WINEP [Washington Institute for Near East Policy] and the American Enterprise Institute, and publications like The Weekly Standard and Commentary. It certainly is not a cabal or a conspiracy that “controls” U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it’s a powerful interest group like the NRA, the farm lobby, the Cuba lobby, or the AARP, and it operates pretty much the same way those other interest groups do. Very importantly, the lobby is not synonymous with Jewish Americans. Surveys suggest that about a third of American Jews do not care that much about Israel. Others do not support the lobby’s positions. Some groups that work on Israel’s behalf, such as the so-called Christian Zionists, are not Jewish. In short, the lobby is defined by its political agenda, not by ethnicity or religion. Finally, we argue that the lobby has pushed policies that are in neither Israel’s nor America’s national interest. In particular, we maintain that it would have been much better for both countries if the United States had long ago pressured Israel to stop building settlements and allow for the creation of a viable Palestinian state. But this did not happen—and it will not happen—because the lobby makes it impossible for American leaders to use the leverage at their disposal to pressure Israel. In essence, that’s the story Steve and I tell. Let me now switch gears and talk about what has changed regarding Israel and the lobby since the book was first published in 2007. I think that there have been four noteworthy changes. First there’s been a fundamental change in how Americans think and talk about Israel, the special relationship, and the lobby. When we initially wrote our book, there was much ignorance about these subjects. My sense is that most people who read our book, or who have read our book, thought there was a large element of truth in what we said, but that we had nevertheless exaggerated the lobby’s influence. There was also a great deal of ignorance in the American body politic about Israeli policies, especially toward the Palestinians, and little understanding of the special relationship. This is hardly surprising, because one of the lobby’s main goals is to prevent an open conversation in the media about Israeli policy, the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and the lobby itself. It was successful for a long time, but my sense from talking to many people about these matters, and from closely following the public discourse, is that those days are over. For example, it’s commonplace, even in the mainstream media, to talk about the lobby, using just that word. I cannot tell you how many people have said to me that, if anything, Steve and I just scratched the surface in our discussion of the lobby’s power and influence. I might add that there’s now more discussion of Israel’s policies and actions in the American media. If you read the comment section that follow many newspaper stories, you will see that there are a substantial number of Americans who are critical of Israeli behavior, especially toward the Palestinians. Only someone who is blind and deaf would not recognize that the United States is deeply committed to defending Israel’s behavior at almost every turn. In short, there is much more awareness of these critical issues today than there was a decade ago. What has caused this change? I think that our original article and the book helped. Both attracted an enormous amount of attention. Indeed, the Lobby book made the New York Times bestseller list and, because of the Internet, the article on which the book was based was widely read all over the world. But I think that, ultimately, our arguments would not have had much impact were it not for a number of other factors. First, the actions of Israel and the lobby over the past decade have done much to substantiate many of the claims we made in the book. Just to take one example, consider how Israel and the lobby responded to the Iran nuclear deal. Prime Minister [Binyamin] Netanyahu went to extraordinary lengths to sabotage the agreement, going so far as to give a speech to a joint session of Congress on March 3, 2015 that not only sought to undermine the deal but was also an indirect attack on President [Barack] Obama. Of course, he was aided by AIPAC, which went all out to defeat the deal. This nasty fight between Netanyahu and the lobby on one hand, and the Obama administration on the other hand, played out in full public view. The second factor behind the increased awareness of Israeli policy and the lobby is the Internet and social media. There are now all sorts of places on the Internet one can go to for information about these subjects. The website Mondoweiss, which I’m sure everyone in this room knows about, is a case in point. It posts a steady stream of stories that reveal important information about Israeli policy and the lobby’s activities, not to mention critical assessments of those matters. Mondoweiss, which is now 11 years old, had eight million visits to its site in 2016. Of course there are other sites that provide valuable information like the Electronic Intifada, which is run by Ali Abunimah, and the site for the Israeli magazine +972. Another important source of information on the Internet is Haaretz, the liberal Israeli newspaper which often runs pieces that take a critical perspective on Israel, as well as the lobby. And in the age of Twitter, important pieces that appear on these sites are immediately spread around the world to huge numbers of people. These same pieces are also circulated on e-mail lists that go to hundreds, if not thousands, of interested readers. Third, there are hosts of organizations that are willing to criticize Israel and the lobby. IRmep is a case in point, as it has played an important role in exposing the lobby’s activities over time. There are also a number of organizations that are deeply committed to Israel which, nevertheless, are willing to take Israel to task when they disapprove of its behavior. They include J Street, Jewish Voice for Peace, Americans for Peace Now, and the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, among others. Finally, there are some important voices in the mainstream media who have taken to speaking critically about Israeli policy and the lobby. The most important person in this regard is Peter Beinart, who wrote a very influential article in the June 2010 issue of the New York Review of Books entitled “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” which is critical of the lobby for aiding and abetting Israel’s misguided policies in the occupied territories. He has continued to write and speak about these matters since this article appeared. Before Beinart, there was the late Tony Judt, who offered searing criticisms of Israel and its American defenders. Of course, there are a number of other key figures in the mainstream media who have occasionally taken aim at both Israel and the lobby over the past decade. They would include Roger Cohen, Thomas Friedman and Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times, as well as Jon Stewart of “Daily Show” fame. In sum, I think there has been a significant change in how Americans think and talk about Israel since our book appeared. The second big change is that Israel’s image in the West, especially in the United States, has suffered serious damage over the past decade. This is due in part to the fact that information about Israel is more readily available now than it was in the past, thanks in good part to the Internet and social media. But it is also as a result of the fact that things have been changing inside of Israel in recent years. For starters, the political center of gravity in Israel has been moving steadily rightward for decades, and it has now reached the point where government ministers occasionally make racist comments about Palestinians and write legislation that is directly at odds with basic liberal values. The recent legislation banning individuals who support BDS from entering Israel is the latest example of this phenomenon. All indications are that this rightward shift will continue for the foreseeable future and Israel will become an increasingly illiberal country, even toward its own citizens. But the key stain on Israel’s reputation is its brutal treatment of the Palestinians and the fact that it has become an apartheid state. Until recently, Israel and its supporters were able to maintain the fiction that there would eventually be a legitimate Palestinian state living side by side with Israel, but it is now clear that there is virtually no chance that will happen, and Greater Israel is here to stay. That Greater Israel, as Richard Falk and Virginia Tilley make clear in an important new U.N. study, is already an apartheid state. Israel and its defenders vehemently deny that fact, but even among Israelis it’s not unusual to hear Israel described as an apartheid state. For example, two former Israeli prime ministers, Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, have said that if there is no two-state solution, Israel will—to quote Olmert—“face a South African-style struggle.” Well, there is no two-state solution. Speaking of South Africa, there are a number of individuals who were well acquainted with the situation in that racist state before it collapsed who believe that the situation in Israel is worse. John Dugard, the eminent South African law professor, says that the crimes against the Palestinians are, to quote him, “infinitely worse than those committed by the apartheid regime in South Africa.” He is hardly the lone voice in that regard. For anyone who doubts how bad life can be for the Palestinians living under Israeli control, one only has to consider what happened in Israel’s three major assaults against Gaza over the past decade: Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense, and Operation Protective Edge. Because of time constraints, I will focus exclusively on the first of those operations, Cast Lead, which took place in the weeks before President Obama was inaugurated in 2009. Israeli forces killed about 1,400 Palestinians, of whom roughly 1,200 were civilians; 350 of those civilians were children. In contrast, 13 Israelis were killed. The ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed in that operation is 108:1. That’s not a war in my lexicon—that’s a massacre. I might add that 6,300 Palestinian homes were destroyed, contributing to the 600,000 tons of rubble that littered Gaza when the shooting ended. The U.N. commissioned an investigation in the wake of that conflict which was headed by the distinguished South African jurist Richard Goldstone. The final report concluded that Israel had engaged in “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population.” It went on to accuse Israel of committing war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. There are other signs of serious trouble in Israel. Especially worrisome are the racist attitudes among large segments of Jewish Israeli youth. Given these attitudes, it is hardly surprising that a year ago today a young Israeli soldier shot and killed a wounded and defenseless Palestinian. Equally unsurprising, there was a huge outcry in Israel when he was indicted and later convicted of the reduced charge of manslaughter. Press reports from Israel make it clear that many Israelis thought his behavior was justified, and that it was hardly an isolated incident. He simply had the misfortune of getting caught on film. The fact that the shooting was captured on film virtually guaranteed that it would go viral on social media and further damage Israel’s image. The bottom line is that the days when Israel was seen as a morally upright David taking on an evil Goliath are over. The damage to Israel’s reputation probably started in 1982, when it invaded Lebanon, but it has accelerated at a marked pace over the past decade. The third big change involves changes within the American Jewish community. One of the most important developments in recent years is a shift in the balance of power between the mainstream organizations and the lobby that reflexively support Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians, and a more progressive set of organizations that are determined to find a way to make peace between the two sides. The divide between those groups has long been present, but the balance of power between them has always been lopsided in favor of the organizations that support Israel no matter what it does. That situation, however, has begun to change, especially with the rise of J Street, which was created in November 2007 as a home for individuals with progressive views on Israel. It not only has a high profile, but it also is willing to criticize Israeli policies in the occupied territories and actually take on the hard-line organizations in the lobby. J Street is surely not as powerful as an organization like AIPAC, but the mere fact that it has survived and is thriving shows that times are changing. After all, a similar organization called Breira was established in 1973, but the mainline forces in the lobby quickly crushed it. Not only has J Street survived, but there is good reason to think that it will grow in strength over time as increasing numbers of American Jews look to join institutions that challenge Israel’s repressive policies toward the Palestinians. In addition to these changes in the Jewish establishment, there are changes taking place in the broader American Jewish community that do not bode well for either the lobby or Israel. In particular, it seems clear that younger Jews are not as committed to Israel as their parents and grandparents. For example, a Pew survey from 2013 found that among Jews who are 65 years or older, 53 percent say that caring about Israel is essential to being what Jewish means to me. That’s 65 years or older, 53 percent. In contrast, 32 percent of American Jews under the age of 30 held a similar view. That is a gap of 21 percentage points. It seems likely that support for Israel in the American Jewish community, which has been weakening over the past decade, will weaken even more in the years ahead as generational change continues. Lastly, there’s been an important change in Israel’s support within the United States. For purposes of background, it’s important to re-emphasize that public support for Israel in the United States has never been particularly strong. One way that the lobby deals with this thin support is to have significant influence both inside the Democratic and Republican parties. In essence, the lobby has worked hard to make sure that Israel enjoys strong bipartisan support and is not strongly backed in one of the major parties but not the other. The lobby was successful in this regard for a long time, but that bipartisan support has begun to erode over the past decade as support for Israel inside the Democratic Party has plummeted. At the same time, it has grown substantially inside the Republican Party. In a Pew poll from this past January, only 33 percent of Democrats said they sympathize more with the Israelis than the Palestinians, while 74 percent of Republicans said they sympathize more with Israel than the Palestinians. This is a gap of 41 percentage points. In short, there has been a marked erosion in support for Israel within the Democratic Party in recent years, which raises serious questions as to whether the lobby will be able to maintain bipartisan support for the special relationship in the years ahead. Let me switch gears again and now focus on what has not changed over the past decade. Three things have not changed. First, the lobby is as powerful as ever. One might be tempted to see the lobby’s defeat on the Iran nuclear issue as evidence that its power is waning, but that would be a mistake. The lobby does not win every time, and it is most likely to lose when it is pushing the United States to do something that might get it into a war. The Iran deal fits squarely in that category. Its failure to make a deal with Tehran would have sharply increased the chances that the United States would have attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities. Where the lobby almost always wins is on matters relating to the Palestinians and financial support for Israel. The fact that the Obama administration could do virtually nothing to get Israel to move toward a two-state solution, yet still opted to provide Israel with $38 billion in aid over the next decade is clear evidence that the lobby remains very powerful. It’s important to understand that the key to the lobby’s success is that it focuses mainly on influencing high-level policymakers and opinion makers, as well as the elites in both political parties—not the rank and file. I noted earlier that there has been a significant decrease in support for Israel within the Democratic Party. The reason that change has had little effect on policy is that the elites in the Democratic Party remain deeply committed to the special relationship. They fear the lobby will target them if there is any evidence they are wavering in their support for Israel. One might think that politicians who are supposed to place the American national interest above the interest of all other countries would stand up to the lobby when it pushes policies that they know are not good for the United States. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explains why this does not happen: “I saw most of Congress as uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling their basic constitutional responsibility, micro-managerial, parochial, hypocritical, egotistical, thin-skinned”—here are the key words—“and prone to put self and re-election before country.” The second big non-change is that U.S. policy toward Israel remains the same as it has been for the past decade. The special relationship, in other words, is firmly intact. Of course, this continuity is hardly surprising, given that there has been no diminishment in the power of the lobby. As many of you probably remember, there was a brief moment during the recent presidential election where it looked like candidate [Donald] Trump might favor a more even-handed approach to dealing with Israel and the Palestinians. But he quickly reversed field and made it clear that he would go to great lengths to be even more pro-Israel than President Obama. Naturally, Hillary Clinton made the same pledge. Thus, there is no good reason to think that American policy toward Israel is going to change in a meaningful way any time soon. Finally, there is hardly any sustained criticism of Israel in the American foreign policy establishment. This, too, is unsurprising, since the lobby is as powerful as ever and, as I emphasized, it focuses most of its attention on keeping the country’s elites in line. Anyone who wants to be a serious player in the making of U.S. foreign policy understands full well that if he or she criticizes Israel, there will be a price to pay. The result is that there is no serious debate about Israel or the special relationship in Congress, the mainstream media, or prominent think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations. This is not to deny, however, that there is an open and vigorous discussion of Israel and its relationship with the United States outside of these establishment institutions. Let me conclude by talking about where we go from here. I believe dark times are ahead for both Israel and the lobby. There is no reason to think Israel is going to move toward a two-state solution. Greater Israel is here to stay, and that state is and will remain an apartheid state. That brute fact will become increasingly clear to people all over the world, especially now that it’s clear the Palestinians are not going to get a state of their own. Moreover, the Palestinians, who already comprise almost half of the population of Greater Israel, will continue to resist their oppression, which will force Israel to escalate the repressive policies that have already badly tarnished its image. The Palestinians’ most potent weapon in this fight will be BDS, which is a global movement that aims to generate significant economic and political pressure on Israel that will ultimately force it to give the Palestinians equal rights. Israel and its supporters in the West view BDS as an existential threat, because it not only has the potential to delegitimize Israel, but it might ultimately lead to Israel’s undoing. After all, the Palestinians, if they were given equal rights, Israel would cease to be a Jewish state, as there eventually will be more Palestinians than Jews inside of Greater Israel. There are good reasons to think that BDS might succeed, at least when it comes to delegitimizing Israel. First, it takes dead aim at apartheid, which is a morally repugnant political system that is universally condemned. Apartheid South Africa eventually disappeared. Why should Israel be any different? Second, the call to give the Palestinians equal rights is fully consistent with basic Western values. It’s a demand that will surely resonate in Western Europe and the United States, causing all sorts of problems for Israel and its supporters. Of course, Israel and its supporters are counting on the lobby to stymie BDS. Over time, however, that will become an increasingly difficult task, simply because there is no good defense for apartheid, which is a reprehensible political system. Nevertheless, the lobby is extraordinarily powerful, and it will go to enormous lengths to protect Israel at every turn. It’s difficult to say where this conflict will lead in the decades ahead. Many Israelis will surely be interested in expelling the Palestinians from Greater Israel if they have the opportunity, thereby eliminating the need for apartheid. But that outcome is unlikely, because there are now more than six million Palestinians living within Greater Israel’s borders, and they would surely put up fierce resistance if Israel tried to expel them from their homes. Moreover, massive ethnic cleansing would be an enormous and everlasting stain on Israel’s reputation. It’s more likely that Israel will simply remain an apartheid state and, with the help of the lobby, just hunker down and accept the fact that most of the world considers it a pariah state. Finally, there is the possibility that BDS will carry the day and Greater Israel will become a legitimate liberal democracy. If that were to happen, which is not likely, it would undoubtedly come after much bloodshed, as most Israeli Jews would fervently oppose this outcome, since it would mean the end of the Zionist dream. Again, it’s hard to say which one of these outcomes will carry the day. It will probably take another 20 or 30 years before we understand how this conflict will ultimately be resolved, or maybe not resolved. Regardless of the outcome, I’m deeply sad to say that the decades ahead promise abundant trouble for Israel, and especially for the Palestinians. The United States will not be spared either, simply because the lobby will be working overtime to protect Israel and preserve the special relationship, which is likely to harm America’s intellectual life, as well as its politics. Thank you. Questions & Answers Janet McMahon: Thank you very much, Dr. Mearsheimer. We have several questions. I want to start with one of my own. When you talk about the deteriorating image in the United States, do you think that’s because people think it’s because Israel has a right-wing government, and if it didn’t have a right-wing government these things wouldn’t be happening? John Mearsheimer: Well, I think at a very general level the deteriorating image is due to two factors. One is exposure because of alternative media. Number two, because of what’s happening inside Israel. I think that in part what’s happening inside Israel is that the politicians who now are beginning to dominate the discourse there are unattractive from a liberal American point of view. Since the vast majority of American Jews are liberal, they’re deeply bothered by what these politicians are saying. But I think that’s not the key. I think the key is that it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Israel is an apartheid state, and that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is simply unacceptable to large numbers of people. My argument is that, as time goes by, that will be more and more the case. Janet McMahon: So now we’ll get to some questions from the audience. Here are two related ones, I think. Your 2006 book largely attributed the U.S. decision to invade Iraq to the Israel lobby. But many of the neoconservative policymakers involved in that decision were not particularly loyal to Israel, including Donald Rumsfeld. What is the evidence that the lobby was the primary cause? Another question. To what extent would you say that the Israel lobby was responsible for the attacks on various Middle East countries, such as Iraq? John Mearsheimer: With regard to the Iraq War, our basic argument was that of course George Bush and Vice President [Dick] Cheney had to be in favor of the war for it to happen, and that neither one of them is part of the Israel lobby. Our argument in the book, and of course in the article as well, is that the lobby was deeply interested in getting Iraq and taking Saddam Hussain down for a long time before the actual invasion on March 19, 2003. The lobby, and here we’re talking especially about the neoconservatives, were pushing very hard for a war against Iraq. In the wake of what looked like a stunning military victory in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, we came to the conclusion—falsely, of course—that we had the magic formula for taking down regimes and getting out of town quickly so that we could march on to the next target. This is what the Bush doctrine was all about. So what you had in 2002 and early 2003 was a situation where we thought we could win a quick and easy victory in Iraq, point number one. Number two, you had this group of neoconservatives who were deeply committed to taking down Saddam Hussain, who had a huge amount of influence in the media and in the Bush administration, who pushed very hard. Therefore, we argued, they were the main driving force. But there’s no question that they alone could not have made the war happen. They needed President Bush, and Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and they all went along because they basically bought the neoconservative arguments which were of course not simply couched in terms of doing something that was good for Israel, right? They bought the argument, and they thought that we could go in and win a quick and decisive victory. They were wrong. We jumped into a quagmire. Furthermore, they were wrong in the sense that we had not won a decisive victory in Afghanistan. We had won a temporary victory. And the Taliban eventually came back from the dead. So we had two huge disasters on our hands, which still exist today—one being Afghanistan, two being Iraq. Of course, as a result of the Iraq War, in part, Syria has turned into a disaster as well. Janet McMahon: Here is a question about your professional career. What has been the evolution or impact of your book, and your principled and outspoken views, on your career? Has your university been uniformly supportive of your academic freedom? John Mearsheimer: I think that there’s no question that for both Steve at Harvard and for me at the University of Chicago, we’ve not been punished in any significant way, at either Harvard or at the University of Chicago. Both universities have fully supported our right to speak out on this issue and other issues. American universities are actually excellent when it comes to freedom of speech issues in almost all cases. Not every case, but in almost all cases. We were taken care of in that regard. Larry Summers was the president of Harvard at the time, and he defended Steve down the line. The key officials at Chicago did the same with me. It’s very hard to say exactly how much of an impact writing that book had on our professional lives. I would note that, just in my own case, I’ve written a number of other controversial pieces on controversial subjects that have got me into trouble. For example, I argue that with regard to the present crisis in U.S.-Russian relations, that we—the United States—are principally responsible for creating that crisis. [APPLAUSE] The Ukraine crisis was not the result of Vladimir Putin’s doing. It had to do with the fact that the West, and especially the United States, were very interested in making Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s doorstep. The Russians had long made it clear that that was unacceptable. It was our policies that led to the crisis. You can agree or disagree with that, but that view is a minority view. I can tell you there are probably about five people in the United States who believe that. So there are a lot of people who are angry at me for that, right? It’s hard to tell how much of the trouble I have getting speaking engagements here and there, or getting put on this board or that board, is due to the fact that I wrote The Israel Lobby, or due to the fact that I have been controversial on other issues as well. But I think just in general, without going into any details, there are surely a number of opportunities that we were not afforded because we wrote the article and the book. Janet McMahon: I think we’re out of time. I’m tempted to ask you more questions, but I think we’re On a pretty tight schedule. So thank you so very much, again.
French military intelligence says Israeli strike not behind Gaza hospital blast By John Irish October 21, 20237:37 AM GMT+8Updated 21 hours ago
Aftermath of hospital blast in Gaza City People inspect the area of Al-Ahli hospital where hundreds of Palestinians were killed in a blast that Israeli and Palestinian officials blamed on each other, and where Palestinians who fled... Acquire Licensing Rights Read more PARIS, Oct 20 (Reuters) - A blast at a Gaza hospital was not the result of an Israeli missile strike, but likely caused by a misfiring Palestinian rocket, the French military intelligence directorate (DRM) said on Friday. Palestinian officials said 471 people were killed in the blast at Al-Ahli al-Arabi Hospital on Tuesday. Gaza''s health ministry blamed an Israeli air strike, while Israel said the blast was caused by a failed rocket launch by militants. "There is nothing that allows us to say that it is an Israeli strike, but the most likely (scenario) is a Palestinian rocket that had a firing incident," the DRM said. An unclassified U.S. intelligence report seen by Reuters on Thursday said it judged that Israel was not responsible for the blast and estimated the death toll at 100-300 people. According to the DRM, the impact crater was too small to have been caused by an Israeli missile.
方舟子从一个生化博士沦为一条狗。
这就是他在海外各种媒体上被攻击得最多最严厉的主要原因。
贸易战不跪，反腐，限制了一些过度的资本投机，特别是处理了一批留一屁股债在国内却想把钱都卷国外当寓公的各路首富.....是他在国内社交媒体上被诟病“走文革老路”的主要原因。 当然国内那些财金时政博主公知大V不会直接拿上述他做的事找茬，而是扯什么连任独裁，干涉市场自由，不国际接轨，要闭关锁国，走文革老路什么什么的
制度是为现实政治服务的，你视为天条所谓任期制也是制度本身规定的，制度能定就能改，走了流程有啥问题？你不服你可以走流程改成你喜欢的样子嘛。
你可以把自己喜欢的规则当铁律，别人遵守了该遵守的规则就不是天条？
算了吧，我看到的是各种私搭乱建，厂房改出租屋，易燃物危险品仓库跟出租屋混在一栋楼......各种违法不符合消防和其他安全的规定的住房出了死很多人的事故被清理整治而已。被海外简中网污蔑成简单的一句清理低端人口你就信？
北京上海广州深圳现在没有一百万也有200万甚至更多你所谓的低端人口在生活？不然商场超市菜场家政餐厅环卫快递工厂大小公司的底层白领文员.....根本无法运转。
听别人说话，自己说话先过过脑，没人说你迟钝
实在看不下去了，中国拿炸弹炸自己的老百姓了？中国用水泥封老百姓的水井了？就算是湾湾要给以色列洗地，也请说点靠谱的话。说北京和以色列一样真是太不要脸了。
那次就是北京一个易燃品仓库失火楼上烧死了了人，然后整治清理有安全隐患的非法私改出租屋，被国内外的别有用心者歪曲成驱赶低端人口。 世界上任何城市没有所谓低端人口根本无法运转，GCD不傻，造谣的也不傻，信谣传谣的傻。信了还气得义愤填膺的傻的三次方打不住
说MK84的都是军盲，2000磅航弹不管地爆还是空爆，哪里是这个样子？
是不是以色列空军用SDB或者其他装药量更小的炸弹炸的？我不敢排除，但是2000磅航弹是绝对不可能的。各方的视频我看了很多遍，现场除了炸弹/火箭弹爆炸，肯定还有燃烧的推进剂
哈哈，我真得不知道MK84是2000磅，不过我自己查得资料就是 SDB, DIME
我还贴了这个视频，这个就是SDB, 这个非常恐怖，没有弹坑，架子都没倒。
系统提示：若遇到视频无法播放请点击下方链接
https://www.youtube.com/embed/rmiELSNtuUs
你这老实的，这还用算？炸弹它有个炸字在里面，爆炸是有爆有炸，它得有冲击波。新闻刚出来时以为炸了医院建筑物，第二天一看就停车场，地砖都没被破坏，就那个小坑，多辆车被烧毁，但动都没动，车的结构也没变形。这啥当量的炸弹一点冲击波都没有？不管是大的爆炸，还是小的IED, 爆炸的能是这画风？明显是燃烧为主。不管谁干的，这基本的事实很容易看出来啊。
现在的人为了政治立场，不光只听自己想听的，甚至睁着眼瞎说，更有故意传播错误信息的。大概这就是乱世的征兆吧。群魔乱舞。
你是用得机器人翻译看得？
拜托，那不是更证明，空袭医院都是类似得方法？其实只要知道那个模式，飞机投弹时会扔闪光弹，声音是什么，基本上就知道了。 其实某个视频都很难说是什么，但我看到死的人状况，大概猜倒是啥， 是DIME, SDE之类的(我查类似效果的就只有这些描述)。就是弹坑小，建筑没伤害，但是人死亡特别严重。
真正能确定的是这个视频：
武器都升级多少代了， 还拘泥于炸弹字面的意思 。。。
当然有冲击波，因为不是在地面引爆的，而是在空中就爆炸了
小黄楼的法式玻璃窗连窗框都震没了，只剩下几个黑洞
车子都被拍得陷在水泥砖下了，这个力量有多大。有视频分析过车顶的钢板是向下凹陷的
说“地砖都没被破坏，就那个小坑”的，是没有把图放大再看， 那个坑向下凹陷了起码40CM, 破坏的面积也有3辆车那么大的直径。 地面没有产生一个天洞，因为地砖是鱼骨形铺排的，这样的结构不容易产生折断和撕裂， 所以是力量由地砖传导到地表，整个下沉，产生了没有被破坏的错觉。 另外车子的钢板也吸收了冲击
仔细再看一遍，有不同意见再讨论
取消任期制真的能洗。
取消任期制取消的是国家主席，国家主席在中国体制中是个吉祥物，并没有什么权力。 你知道华国锋后面到江泽民之前的两任国家主席是谁吗？
中共从建国开始，最高权力领袖一直都是领导班子核心，这个核心并不唯一。
邓小平确定国家主席任期制，并约定要把军委主席和总书记一起交出去，就是为了解决掉这个中共最高领导不唯一不确定的问题。
实际上没有。
胡温时期，领导核心是他们俩？
江泽民用事实证明，哪怕不用这三个至高位，哪怕他不在政治局，他依然可以当太上皇。
邓公确定国家主席任期并没有解决最高核心唯一确定这个问题，反而是滋生出了其他混乱。
那就不如取消掉这个吉祥物的任期，让三大至高位一直在一个人身上，并且他就是最高权力核心。
你可以说这可能会独裁，但它会解决最高核心不明确不唯一这个制度弊端。
习之后，想要做核心，就拿到这三位，这就是玉玺，不用偷偷摸摸做太上皇。
最后，制度没有好坏，只有合适不合适。
我也是研究了之后，觉得现在这样的三位一体的在幕前掌权，比退休后把着个中央军委主席做垂帘听政的太上皇更合理。另外现在世界格局瞬息万变，有经验的领导人有有利的地方。要是能成功收复台湾，就完美了
前一两年，搞个活动就来十几个外国领导人； 没有一个长期的上层，可能就放弃一带一路了。 哪知道两个高铁修好了，整个一带一路就明了了，谁知道这东西要十多年才有效果，两个任期迫于国内外压力，就放弃了，也看不到150个国家领导人一起聚会
这个炸人不炸建筑很正常， 实验爆炸的当量小呗， 太正常了
看当时视频里是熊熊大火，根本不是高爆炸弹的火光一现。 随便在油管里看看火箭发射失败就这火光效果，燃料瞬间烧起来，并且持续一阵
这个mm好牛啊，谢谢
以我看俄乌战场的各种视频的丰富经验，这个爆炸当量肯定大于155炮弹，肯定小于500磅航弹，到底是啥不清楚但绝对不可能是什么2000磅航弹空爆。俄军/乌军随便一个自行火炮吃到自杀无人机的动静都比这大多了，都有肉眼可见的冲击波
另外现场的损害除了爆炸还有火灾，是土火箭残余燃料还是现场有弹药或者什么别的东西堆放，不清楚。我还是觉得再让子弹飞一会，不过这么久了，哈马斯这边没有放出什么新的证据，比如弹片之类的，应该是说明了一些问题
江泽民的第一任都在老邓的shadow下，一举一动都不敢出格，毕竟老邓干掉他的三个前任了（华国锋/胡耀邦/赵紫阳）。等到邓去世后，他终于掌权了，多年媳妇熬成婆，却用同样的方式对付胡锦涛。这里佩服的是胡，干干脆脆地裸退，才方便习继承权利。但习第一任也花了多少力气清除各派政敌。要是以后换届时能免去这些前任的制肘，每一任最高领导人能十打十的做满10年或者15年，才有机会实施推行自己的一些纲领，保证政策的稳定性。
要弹片有什么难的， 加沙城里一大堆，哈马斯随便捡下放医院就行了
问题就是，所有的人体模型都死了。
如果有其他弹药，会有二次爆炸，第三次爆炸，就和烟花一样。 你发布了那么多次弹药库被炸得视频，难道不记得了？
因为堆放弹药爆炸，引爆时间不同，很容易分辨。还有火灾 不是造成死亡得主要原因，死的人没有烧伤，这个视频你可以在巴勒斯坦在中国微博的官方号上面看到。 不是烧死的，弹坑小，伤亡大，呼啸声； 确实是一种航弹，是SDE的一种，但是又用了新材料，总之杀人的武器真的进化很快，俄罗斯和乌克拉都没有这么厉害的武器。 俄罗斯有空爆弹，声称的效果，多少米以内的人都死了，但是实际效果没这么好。不管什么武器，打到热闹集市才死十几个人。
最厉害的是以色列空军，第一时间发推特说，很多小孩会安乐死。其实我还是宁愿相信是误伤，如果通过监控无人机发现，睡了那么多人，还故意打的，太邪恶了。 实际效果还就是以色列空军说的安乐死，很多小孩都没来得及痛苦就死了，拍的视频，现场连一点哭声都没有，一片死寂。
又看你不懂装懂，人家叫SDB
到底是SDB还是火箭弹，是不是真的死了500多人，都是存疑的，我不急着下结论。不过现在的视频对哈马斯一方很不利，去推上或者相关的电报群里看看也是一样的说法
有没有肉眼能够分辨的二次爆炸要看现场到底堆放了什么东西，炸/烧的是火箭残余燃料还是什么别的。贴一个自行火箭炮吃自杀无人机的视频，30枚火箭弹加在一起大概相当于一发2000磅航弹，一次性大爆炸，仔细看看周围屋顶全部被掀，绝对不可能连树叶子都炸不掉，太阳能电池板都是好好的。巴勒斯坦医院这个爆炸最多200磅，火箭弹或者SDB都有可能
原来是纠结于字母啊，我之前还没打错呢， 我还以为我发错呢，不是SOB，是SDB,你自己不还是把O改成D了，没来得及截图你就改了。 可以翻成小口径炸弹，Small Diameter Bomb，哈哈，不过我不知道自己为啥打了SDE
谢谢mm这么用心的解释 给大家带来事情的真相。
别贴这个了吧，时间对不上。根本不上同一时间发生的事，拍的地点也没有。真正有时间地点的是这个al jazeera 自己的完整的实时视频录像：
https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1714390254935851272
你贴的这个，我自己早就讨论过了，那个最后炸的，不是火箭弹，只是有火箭弹被拦截了。飞的方向压根都不同。 这三个视频，我早就贴过了，我说了，如果不是看到现场死者的状况，我也会认为是哈马斯自己打的。
你告诉我这个视频哪里有时间?
你想当然了，火箭上升，还在加沙上空，为啥去拦截？以色列只拦截那些可能打到有人区的才会拦截的。
你的截图，麻烦把时间先改好了再贴吧。
火是来自车啊 那个地方趴了十几辆车啊 车上有汽油啊
你有没有想过？ 为什么7点比8点还显得黑那么多？我这个截图是从twitter上截的，是你给的那个推特。 我给的那个摄像头的地理位置，摄像头的中心还真就是医院，很多人会纠结时间，我不知道为啥， 机器内部设置，还有夏令时设置，都有可能提早和推迟一个小时。
今天法国的表态，已经证明是谁了，只是现在谁也不能说是以色列了，就和北溪爆炸一样，都要装傻了。 以色列的那些证据，真的是能推理结果的话，我估计很多人都可以宣布是哈马斯了，为啥，现场的状况完全不同啊，起码还要更多信息。
你去看看 al jazeera 自己的digital investigation 视频就是了。是 10/17/2023 18:5X 你的截图是 10/17/2023 19:5X 你也去查查事情发生到底是当地时间17号几时几分
右下角，18：59 https://youtu.be/yyNLvL_8SeY?t=52
弹片可不能算证据。加沙估计满地都是弹片。
国际上管那里叫加沙地带（Gaza Strip），其形状类似于一个长方形，加沙地带长 41 公里，宽 6 至 12 公里，总面积 365 公里，比北京的丰台区稍微要大一点（丰台区306平方公里）。它与以色列有 51 公里的边界，与埃及有 11 公里的边界，所以它并不是有人想象的被以色列完全封锁住。
该地区在1947年的联合国巴以分治方案中原属于巴勒斯坦国的一部分，但1948年在以色列宣布成立后，阿拉伯联军对以色列发动第一次中东战争，阿拉伯各国不认可联合国要求建立的巴勒斯坦国，所以战后该地区被埃及所吞并，直到1967年六日战争后又被以色列所占领。
以色列占领各地区后，一方面发展该地区的柑橘种植业，一方面安排建立定居点让新到以色列的犹太移民到那里生活，共修建了21个定居点。由于雇佣大量当地的巴勒斯坦人为以色列人工作和开发加沙地区带动基建产业发展，1967年至1982年加沙的经济平均增长率达到9.7%，当然以色列对该地区的发展有一定的限制性措施，例如巴勒斯坦人对柑橘种植出口要听从以色列的统一安排等等。
1994年，根据奥斯陆协议，以色列将69%的加沙土地的自治权交给巴勒斯坦民族权力机构，至于为什么只还了69%，因为另外31%的地区已经修建了以色列定居点，该定居点的居民反对奥斯陆协议，死活不搬，按我们的话讲就是钉子户。
根据奥斯陆协议以色列对加沙领空拥有完全控制权，并将继续监控加沙地带水域。不过以色列划分出一块水域巴勒斯坦人可以在此捕鱼。并有两条高速公路连接巴勒斯坦控制的约旦河西岸和加沙地区。
在2006年1月25日举行的巴勒斯坦议会选举中，哈马斯赢得了总选票42.9%的多数票和132个席位中的74个席位（56%）。 由于哈马斯的纲领和目标就是消灭以色列，以色列和联合国要求哈马斯在掌权后接受之前的所有协议，承认以色列的生存权，并放弃暴力。但哈马斯拒绝了，此后哈马斯通过加沙之战用暴力从国际承认的巴勒斯坦政权法塔赫手中夺得加沙地带的控制权，自此法塔赫仅控制约旦河西岸地区，而加沙地带由哈马斯控制，在此期间共有近千人在巴勒斯坦内部的互相残杀中死亡。而以色列则在哈马斯完全控制加沙后宣布对加沙地带的边境、海岸与领空实施全面封锁。2007年开始实施全面封锁。
因为埃及、沙特阿拉伯和约旦宣布阿巴斯组建的约旦河西岸内阁为“唯一合法的巴勒斯坦政府”。不承认哈马斯政权，所以埃及也同时关闭了加沙地带南部的边界。对加沙的封锁不光是以色列还包括埃及。
另外说下自从哈马斯上台后，就不再在加沙地区实行选举了。
但并不是说加沙的人在封锁后就活不下去了。
首先封锁并不包括能源，实际上加沙在很大程度上依赖以色列提供电力和燃料。以色列电力公司供应的电力占巴勒斯坦的电力消耗的63%，但以色列的电量供应一直限制在 120 兆瓦以内，因为这是以色列根据《奥斯陆协议》承诺向加沙出售的电量。以色列也一直放行提供人道主义援助物资，因为以色列表示只要哈马斯控制加沙，其官方政策就是：“没有发展，没有繁荣，但也没有人道主义危机。”
目前加沙地带行政当局的大部分资金来自外部援助，其中很大一部分由联合国组织直接用于教育和粮食供应。援助的大部分资金是由美国和欧盟提供的，另外一少部分是由阿拉伯联盟提供的。而哈马斯的行政开支的来源主要是伊朗和卡塔尔。
从另一方面也能看出加沙的人并不是活不下去，因为加沙青年文盲率低于1%，根据联合国的数据，在加沙一共有640所学校，包括36所私立学校，总共可为441,452名学生提供服务。
截止到 2018 年，加沙地区有 9 所大学对外开放，共有学生6000人，可提供40多个专业的高等教育。
加沙有相对完善医院和其他医疗设施。死亡率是世界上最低的国家和地区之一，每年为 0.315%。婴儿死亡率在 224 个国家和地区中排名第 105 位，每 1,000 名新生儿中有 16.55 人死亡。
根据人类贫困指数，加沙地带在 135 个国家中排名第 24 位。2009年人均年收入估计为3100美元，位居世界第164位。大多数加沙家庭拥有收音机和电视，大约20%拥有个人电脑。居住在加沙的人们可以自由收看卫星电视节目和巴勒斯坦广播公司、以色列广播局、以色列第二广播局的电视节目。
最明显的指标就是人口数，根据联合国数据在2010 年大约有 160 万人居住在加沙地带，其中近 100 万是联合国登记的难民。 此后该地区的人口持续增长，到2013 年平均每名妇女会生 4.4 个孩子，最新的不完全数据在加沙的人口已经达到约二百万人左右，其中43.5%的人口年龄在18岁以下。
准确的说加沙的经济情况和生活水平完全由以色列来决定，因为经济发展主要靠贸易活动，而加沙地区的主要的贸易对象为以色列、埃及和约旦河西岸地区，当地人相对的高薪资工作都是要当以色列那边去工作，所以每当以色列在遭受恐怖袭击后关闭加沙边境，加沙的经济就会萎缩约三分之一左右。
而每当以色列改变对加沙的政策减轻封锁，如1998减缓对巴勒斯坦货物和劳工运输的限制，加沙的经济就连续恢复了三年，但2000年巴勒斯坦人大起义，以色列重新封锁，2001年加沙经济再次下降35%，人均收入下降到每年625美元，但仍然比邻国埃及的人均收入要高。
以色列驻伦敦大使馆发言人表示，“加沙人民是恐怖组织哈马斯的囚犯。加沙的局势是哈马斯统治和优先事项的直接结果。”
人体模型倒下就算死了？ 连震碎的都没有， 放几头猪也更有说服力，你可能真是对爆炸没啥概念
别使劲洗涤了
就冲以色列人这次封锁水电物资 无差别攻击平民 南北加沙同时开火 二十四小时就让北部撤退 鬼才信这个文章
重点看上面给你转的第4段到第10段:
“ 该地区在1947年的联合国巴以分治方案中原属于巴勒斯坦国的一部分，但1948年在以色列宣布成立后，阿拉伯联军对以色列发动第一次中东战争，阿拉伯各国不认可联合国要求建立的巴勒斯坦国，所以战后该地区被埃及所吞并，直到1967年六日战争后又被以色列所占领。
以色列占领各地区后，一方面发展该地区的柑橘种植业，一方面安排建立定居点让新到以色列的犹太移民到那里生活，共修建了21个定居点。由于雇佣大量当地的巴勒斯坦人为以色列人工作和开发加沙地区带动基建产业发展，1967年至1982年加沙的经济平均增长率达到9.7%，当然以色列对该地区的发展有一定的限制性措施，例如巴勒斯坦人对柑橘种植出口要听从以色列的统一安排等等。
1994年，根据奥斯陆协议，以色列将69%的加沙土地的自治权交给巴勒斯坦民族权力机构，至于为什么只还了69%，因为另外31%的地区已经修建了以色列定居点，该定居点的居民反对奥斯陆协议，死活不搬，按我们的话讲就是钉子户。
根据奥斯陆协议以色列对加沙领空拥有完全控制权，并将继续监控加沙地带水域。不过以色列划分出一块水域巴勒斯坦人可以在此捕鱼。并有两条高速公路连接巴勒斯坦控制的约旦河西岸和加沙地区。
在2006年1月25日举行的巴勒斯坦议会选举中，哈马斯赢得了总选票42.9%的多数票和132个席位中的74个席位（56%）。 由于哈马斯的纲领和目标就是消灭以色列，以色列和联合国要求哈马斯在掌权后接受之前的所有协议，承认以色列的生存权，并放弃暴力。但哈马斯拒绝了，此后哈马斯通过加沙之战用暴力从国际承认的巴勒斯坦政权法塔赫手中夺得加沙地带的控制权，自此法塔赫仅控制约旦河西岸地区，而加沙地带由哈马斯控制，在此期间共有近千人在巴勒斯坦内部的互相残杀中死亡。而以色列则在哈马斯完全控制加沙后宣布对加沙地带的边境、海岸与领空实施全面封锁。2007年开始实施全面封锁。
因为埃及、沙特阿拉伯和约旦宣布阿巴斯组建的约旦河西岸内阁为“唯一合法的巴勒斯坦政府”。不承认哈马斯政权，所以埃及也同时关闭了加沙地带南部的边界。对加沙的封锁不光是以色列还包括埃及。
另外说下自从哈马斯上台后，就不再在加沙地区实行选举了。”
哈哈，看笑了
准确的说加沙的经济情况和生活水平完全由以色列来决定。
以色列驻伦敦大使馆发言人表示，“加沙人民是恐怖组织哈马斯的囚犯。加沙的局势是哈马斯统治和优先事项的直接结果。”
死了几十个人，他们都以为躲教堂会安全。搞得人突然觉得死几十个人，都不是什么大轰炸了。 估计这几年，乌克兰得新闻，没有核武器，大家都懒得看了，打了几年，都没见过这种新闻。
从战争得角度来看，不管是俄罗斯还是乌克兰，都还是尽量避免平民伤亡。两个国家都算是仁义之师了，如果和以色列比起来。
G7, 五眼什么的，中国都被排除在圈子外。偶尔其他组织应邀参加，也是故意把你晾一边，不理不睬。不受欢迎没关系，那我们就自己组个更热闹的party玩。世界舞台上还有其他有一大帮子在西方眼里就是invisible 的国家，难得有人邀请人家也是很高兴的应邀参加。现在轮到西方翻白眼了。
机器翻译：(credit Jonathan Cook)
对于那些兜售以色列不是火箭袭击加沙医院的幕后黑手的人来说，以下所有内容都必须为真：
1. 巴勒斯坦团体成功绕过以色列的围困，在以色列完全没有发现的情况下获得了高科技武器。
2. 他们决定直到昨晚才使用这些武器。
3.他们第一次尝试使用这种武器时，它没有发射，并且恰好落在了一家医院上。
4. 几天前，以色列袭击了同一家医院，警告必须疏散该医院，这纯属巧合。
当BBC要求专家发表评论时，大多数人“不愿意对所发生的事情发表看法”。
其实最近这个party很有意思，所以，能看到这种景象，这不是去开会，只是一些国家领导人想到居然去商场买便宜东西。 普通车都没见过这种阵势，都赶快靠边。清一色L5,几十辆，以前国宾车队，就几辆红旗。
哪个？今天刚有人贴了某个所谓被炸了的教堂。好着呢。 战争期间，啥消息都先等一下吧。
华尔街日报都报道了 你自己Google一下不就什么都有了吗？
这个报纸是大纪元的那个还是哪里的？ 找到英文的了，等会截图，华尔街日报的消息是，已经死了17人，巴勒斯坦说有几十人伤亡。
The Israeli military said that a blast Thursday night on the St. Porphyrius Greek Orthodox Church campus in Gaza City was the result of its airstrike. The blast resulted in the collapse of a building adjacent to the church where dozens of people were sheltering and killed two people. Hundreds were sheltering on the campus of the church. The Israeli military said a wall of a church in the area was damaged. “The incident is under review,” it said. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem didn''t respond to request for comment Friday. On Thursday, it denounced the incident as an Israeli bombing.
教堂好好的。边上的房子倒了。目标不是教堂。
这次房子都炸垮了， 才炸死十几个， 医院那次房子就破了点玻璃， 花花草草都是好的， 一下炸死千人， 是不是太魔幻了
On 19 October 2023, four Israeli missiles struck nearby the campus where at least 400-500 Palestinians were taking shelter.[8][9][10] The airstrike was confirmed by church officials to have struck two halls providing shelter to civilians, causing the collapse of at least one building.[11][12] Between 16-18 fatalities have thus far been confirmed from the attack, with an unknown number of victims still trapped under rubbl
目标不是教堂，是教堂收容难民的建筑
一堆人还被压在下面呢，医院空袭死亡上千不到，加沙给出的数字是400多个，美国说调查后大概在100-300中间。魔幻的是在这个年代还有针对平民的大规模空袭，而世界绝大多数国家不敢哼半个不字吧🤔️
以色列通讯部长什洛莫·卡希（Shlomo Karhi）带头通过了这一决定，已关闭半岛电视台新闻频道，他认为该频道损害了以国家安全。卡希表示，以色列在海陆空以及公共外交方面都处于战争状态，以色列不允许媒体以任何方式危害国家安全，半岛电视台的报道构成针对以色列的煽动，帮助哈马斯进行宣传。
直接原因是半岛电视台揭穿了以色列当局的谎言。 10月17日晚以色列轰炸了浸信会医院造成数百人死亡以后，当局曾引用半岛电视台的画面，称半岛发布的录像证明是哈马斯火箭弹炸的医院。 结果半岛电视台直接把回旋镖扔它脸上，用那段视频逐帧详细分析了为什么不可能是杰哈德火箭弹炸的医院，真相是医院是被高空战机轰炸。
视频连接：
系统提示：若遇到视频无法播放请点击下方链接
https://www.youtube.com/embed/yyNLvL_8SeY
黑暗不同很好解释，摄像机不一样嘛。一个是监控，一个是职业摄像机。
你的摄像时间对不上，至少得说明吧？哪里出来的，有人认领是他们的吗？摄像机对的地点的经纬度有吗？都没有，凭空而来。你说摄像头的中心是医院就是医院？有第三者验证过吗？
我贴的 al jazeera 的是geoconfirmed, 1：34秒非常清楚完整连续， 时间地点跟al jazeera 电视上的和他们自己发布的视频都是对得上的，没有人会敢去篡改伪造因为在事情发生的时候就实时传出去给公众了。
你举了这么多例子，看了这么多照片，每次都得找新理由自圆其说（弹坑小是小导弹，也许是空爆，也许是DIME, 视频时间不对是时区。。。）这么多视频截图也没法证明 al jazeera 那个是假的。al jazeera 能做到的就是把它剪短了，隐瞒了细节。
我说过以色列那个截获的所谓录音我听都不听，没一点说服力。是同样可能伪造剪辑的。
KISS, 这个摄像就最可能是真象，这么多天了，没人能discredit it. 再仔细看一遍去吧？不是拦截，以色列拦截的视频都是在火箭滑行时拦截的，上升阶段在加沙干嘛拦截，落到哪里都是未知数。
https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1714390254935851272
法国说了什么我不管，反正我贴的那个视频简单明洁，有时间地点，没飞机没干扰弹，zoom in 火多大都看得到，没有what if buts 说明不是飞机炸弹，也没见到导弹，很可能不是以色列干的 end of story. 至于是谁干的，没有铁打的证据，没法定论， 所以大家暂时不吱声。有啥新证据再定论。
楼主应该把标题改了。
让子弹飞一会儿吧。反正我啥都不敢信了。 两边都不是省油的灯。全是骗子。
小土豆硬起来了！
这个我昨天已经讲过了，没啥说服力， al jazeera 自己在做damage control and didn''t work.
https://huaren.us/showtopic.html?forumid=398&topicid=2960556&postid=98652483#98652483
哈马斯的导弹都在民居那边发射。你来说说打仗时怎么端掉这些？谁去和哈马斯聊聊，把导弹搬到别处去？ 我不懂为什么美国和以色列放着在卡塔尔的哈马斯领导人不动。卡塔尔当然也一声不吭。 两边都没想真正停火。辣鸡。 美国总统辣鸡中的辣鸡。
前天刚宣布驱逐40名印度外交官。哈哈
你网上视频还是看少了 网上还是有不少以色列的铁穹系统在哈马斯火箭弹的各个飞行阶段拦截住的视频的
都说了 上千难民以为医院很安全，晚上露天睡在医院外面停车场周边的草地上
你看了前面给你转的第5段和第13段就明白了：
“1）感觉许多人不了解加沙的情况，以为在那里生活的巴勒斯坦人都是类似于二战中集中营里的生活，这里给大家展示下实际的加沙情况，虽然不是一个正常的地方，但也并不是人间地狱。
2）国际上管那里叫加沙地带（Gaza Strip），其形状类似于一个长方形，加沙地带长 41 公里，宽 6 至 12 公里，总面积 365 公里，比北京的丰台区稍微要大一点（丰台区306平方公里）。它与以色列有 51 公里的边界，与埃及有 11 公里的边界，所以它并不是有人想象的被以色列完全封锁住。
4）该地区在1947年的联合国巴以分治方案中原属于巴勒斯坦国的一部分，但1948年在以色列宣布成立后，阿拉伯联军对以色列发动第一次中东战争，阿拉伯各国不认可联合国要求建立的巴勒斯坦国，所以战后该地区被埃及所吞并，直到1967年六日战争后又被以色列所占领。
5）以色列占领各地区后，一方面发展该地区的柑橘种植业，一方面安排建立定居点让新到以色列的犹太移民到那里生活，共修建了21个定居点。由于雇佣大量当地的巴勒斯坦人为以色列人工作和开发加沙地区带动基建产业发展，1967年至1982年加沙的经济平均增长率达到9.7%，当然以色列对该地区的发展有一定的限制性措施，例如巴勒斯坦人对柑橘种植出口要听从以色列的统一安排等等。
6）1994年，根据奥斯陆协议，以色列将69%的加沙土地的自治权交给巴勒斯坦民族权力机构，至于为什么只还了69%，因为另外31%的地区已经修建了以色列定居点，该定居点的居民反对奥斯陆协议，死活不搬，按我们的话讲就是钉子户。
7）根据奥斯陆协议以色列对加沙领空拥有完全控制权，并将继续监控加沙地带水域。不过以色列划分出一块水域巴勒斯坦人可以在此捕鱼。并有两条高速公路连接巴勒斯坦控制的约旦河西岸和加沙地区。
9）在2006年1月25日举行的巴勒斯坦议会选举中，哈马斯赢得了总选票42.9%的多数票和132个席位中的74个席位（56%）。 由于哈马斯的纲领和目标就是消灭以色列，以色列和联合国要求哈马斯在掌权后接受之前的所有协议，承认以色列的生存权，并放弃暴力。但哈马斯拒绝了，此后哈马斯通过加沙之战用暴力从国际承认的巴勒斯坦政权法塔赫手中夺得加沙地带的控制权，自此法塔赫仅控制约旦河西岸地区，而加沙地带由哈马斯控制，在此期间共有近千人在巴勒斯坦内部的互相残杀中死亡。而以色列则在哈马斯完全控制加沙后宣布对加沙地带的边境、海岸与领空实施全面封锁。2007年开始实施全面封锁。
10）因为埃及、沙特阿拉伯和约旦宣布阿巴斯组建的约旦河西岸内阁为“唯一合法的巴勒斯坦政府”。不承认哈马斯政权，所以埃及也同时关闭了加沙地带南部的边界。对加沙的封锁不光是以色列还包括埃及。
11）另外说下自从哈马斯上台后，就不再在加沙地区实行选举了。
12）但并不是说加沙的人在封锁后就活不下去了。
13）首先封锁并不包括能源，实际上加沙在很大程度上依赖以色列提供电力和燃料。以色列电力公司供应的电力占巴勒斯坦的电力消耗的63%，但以色列的电量供应一直限制在 120 兆瓦以内，因为这是以色列根据《奥斯陆协议》承诺向加沙出售的电量。以色列也一直放行提供人道主义援助物资，因为以色列表示只要哈马斯控制加沙，其官方政策就是：“没有发展，没有繁荣，但也没有人道主义危机。”
14）目前加沙地带行政当局的大部分资金来自外部援助，其中很大一部分由联合国组织直接用于教育和粮食供应。援助的大部分资金是由美国和欧盟提供的，另外一少部分是由阿拉伯联盟提供的。而哈马斯的行政开支的来源主要是伊朗和卡塔尔。
15）从另一方面也能看出加沙的人并不是活不下去，因为加沙青年文盲率低于1%，根据联合国的数据，在加沙一共有640所学校，包括36所私立学校，总共可为441,452名学生提供服务。
16）截止到 2018 年，加沙地区有 9 所大学对外开放，共有学生6000人，可提供40多个专业的高等教育。
17）加沙有相对完善医院和其他医疗设施。死亡率是世界上最低的国家和地区之一，每年为 0.315%。婴儿死亡率在 224 个国家和地区中排名第 105 位，每 1,000 名新生儿中有 16.55 人死亡。
18）根据人类贫困指数，加沙地带在 135 个国家中排名第 24 位。2009年人均年收入估计为3100美元，位居世界第164位。大多数加沙家庭拥有收音机和电视，大约20%拥有个人电脑。居住在加沙的人们可以自由收看卫星电视节目和巴勒斯坦广播公司、以色列广播局、以色列第二广播局的电视节目。
19）最明显的指标就是人口数，根据联合国数据在2010 年大约有 160 万人居住在加沙地带，其中近 100 万是联合国登记的难民。 此后该地区的人口持续增长，到2013 年平均每名妇女会生 4.4 个孩子，最新的不完全数据在加沙的人口已经达到约二百万人左右，其中43.5%的人口年龄在18岁以下。
20）准确的说加沙的经济情况和生活水平完全由以色列来决定，因为经济发展主要靠贸易活动，而加沙地区的主要的贸易对象为以色列、埃及和约旦河西岸地区，当地人相对的高薪资工作都是要当以色列那边去工作，所以每当以色列在遭受恐怖袭击后关闭加沙边境，加沙的经济就会萎缩约三分之一左右。
21）而每当以色列改变对加沙的政策减轻封锁，如1998减缓对巴勒斯坦货物和劳工运输的限制，加沙的经济就连续恢复了三年，但2000年巴勒斯坦人大起义，以色列重新封锁，2001年加沙经济再次下降35%，人均收入下降到每年625美元，但仍然比邻国埃及的人均收入要高。
22）以色列驻伦敦大使馆发言人表示，“加沙人民是恐怖组织哈马斯的囚犯。加沙的局势是哈马斯统治和优先事项的直接结果。”
——加沙经济一开始是以色列开发发展起来的，加沙能源的大部份是以色列供应的
(992) Was the Gaza hospital attack caused by a failed rocket launch? | Bird’s Eye View - YouTube
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyNLvL_8SeY&t=206s
最后整个北约都应该会说不是以色列炸的，就和北溪一样。 结果到哪一天还会说，是路过的中国民航客机丢的炸弹，相信我一点都不要奇怪。
其实法国情报部门已经推责了，法国情报部门说的是： 根据那个弹坑，是一枚11磅TNT炸药的火箭弹。 (￣▽￣)"， 只证明这个弹坑可能是多大的火箭造成的，至于死那么多人，到底是什么，和他们没联系了。
如果不是看到那些小孩的死状，我比较倾向于莫斯科79说的，有可能是小当量的火箭，引爆了大量火箭弹，就和TOS-1被引爆一样。只是没看到2次爆炸，但是也有可能火箭弹容易瞬间引爆。
没啥新证据就别又扯开到中国了 既然没定论，现在的标题就不合适
现在说北溪的爆炸，中国的油轮有重大嫌疑，(￣▽￣)"，这就是现实，真不是玩笑。 就是昨天，还严厉谴责中国在新疆对维族的种族灭绝呢，后面最大的支持者居然是以色列，以前世维会两大金主，土耳其，以色列；现在却连土耳其都不屑于去参加声明。
是英国牵头，51个国家，有视穆斯林为人形动物的以色列。除了阿尔巴尼亚人口穆斯林占58%勉强沾点边，一个伊斯兰国家都木有啊都木有！ 连东突视为祖国的土耳其都木有。要知道土耳其也很泛突厥还明里暗里支持东突哈。
总之，昂撒犹太控制的所谓世界主流媒体企图给蓝星灌输的是一个很荒诞的画面，有的人就是沉迷于荒诞不能自拔，没办法。
名单： 阿尔巴尼亚、安道尔、澳大利亚、奥地利、比利时、保加利亚、加拿大、克罗地亚、捷克、丹麦、爱沙尼亚、斯威士兰、斐济、芬兰、法国、德国、危地马拉、冰岛、爱尔兰、以色列、意大利、日本、拉脱维亚、利比里亚、列支敦士登、 立陶宛、卢森堡、摩尔多瓦、摩纳哥、黑山、瑙鲁、荷兰、北马其顿、新西兰、挪威、帕劳、巴拉圭、波兰、葡萄牙、马绍尔群岛共和国、罗马尼亚、圣马力诺、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、 图瓦卢、乌克兰、美国和发起国英国。
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, North Macedonia, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Marshall Islands, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United States, and the United Kingdom.
就是 法国总统就是个弄臣一样的跳梁小丑！如果说美国是被寄生的僵尸，法国就是被寄生的小狗。怎么可能跳出来
系统提示：若遇到视频无法播放请点击下方链接
https://www.youtube.com/embed/k8Mgdm_6-e0?si=nkybcVixDljXt8Fl
美国西方主导的国际社会依然是强权即公理，我是流氓我怕谁。心里有数就行。可笑的是一帮黄犹还要替强权做道德辩护，反抗被占领被圈禁杀了平民有罪，镇压反抗者有理；炸医院难民营联合国机构情有可原，那怕是以色列一面之词的抵抗组织误炸自己人也罪不可赦......
哈马斯的目标和纲领就是以色列灭国，换了你是以色列碰上哈马斯这号的你怎么办呢？
“1）感觉许多人不了解加沙的情况，以为在那里生活的巴勒斯坦人都是类似于二战中集中营里的生活，这里给大家展示下实际的加沙情况，虽然不是一个正常的地方，但也并不是人间地狱。
2）国际上管那里叫加沙地带（Gaza Strip），其形状类似于一个长方形，加沙地带长 41 公里，宽 6 至 12 公里，总面积 365 公里，比北京的丰台区稍微要大一点（丰台区306平方公里）。它与以色列有 51 公里的边界，与埃及有 11 公里的边界，所以它并不是有人想象的被以色列完全封锁住。
4）该地区在1947年的联合国巴以分治方案中原属于巴勒斯坦国的一部分，但1948年在以色列宣布成立后，阿拉伯联军对以色列发动第一次中东战争，阿拉伯各国不认可联合国要求建立的巴勒斯坦国，所以战后该地区被埃及所吞并，直到1967年六日战争后又被以色列所占领。
5）以色列占领各地区后，一方面发展该地区的柑橘种植业，一方面安排建立定居点让新到以色列的犹太移民到那里生活，共修建了21个定居点。由于雇佣大量当地的巴勒斯坦人为以色列人工作和开发加沙地区带动基建产业发展，1967年至1982年加沙的经济平均增长率达到9.7%，当然以色列对该地区的发展有一定的限制性措施，例如巴勒斯坦人对柑橘种植出口要听从以色列的统一安排等等。
6）1994年，根据奥斯陆协议，以色列将69%的加沙土地的自治权交给巴勒斯坦民族权力机构，至于为什么只还了69%，因为另外31%的地区已经修建了以色列定居点，该定居点的居民反对奥斯陆协议，死活不搬，按我们的话讲就是钉子户。
7）根据奥斯陆协议以色列对加沙领空拥有完全控制权，并将继续监控加沙地带水域。不过以色列划分出一块水域巴勒斯坦人可以在此捕鱼。并有两条高速公路连接巴勒斯坦控制的约旦河西岸和加沙地区。
9）在2006年1月25日举行的巴勒斯坦议会选举中，哈马斯赢得了总选票42.9%的多数票和132个席位中的74个席位（56%）。 由于哈马斯的纲领和目标就是消灭以色列，以色列和联合国要求哈马斯在掌权后接受之前的所有协议，承认以色列的生存权，并放弃暴力。但哈马斯拒绝了，此后哈马斯通过加沙之战用暴力从国际承认的巴勒斯坦政权法塔赫手中夺得加沙地带的控制权，自此法塔赫仅控制约旦河西岸地区，而加沙地带由哈马斯控制，在此期间共有近千人在巴勒斯坦内部的互相残杀中死亡。而以色列则在哈马斯完全控制加沙后宣布对加沙地带的边境、海岸与领空实施全面封锁。2007年开始实施全面封锁。
10）因为埃及、沙特阿拉伯和约旦宣布阿巴斯组建的约旦河西岸内阁为“唯一合法的巴勒斯坦政府”。不承认哈马斯政权，所以埃及也同时关闭了加沙地带南部的边界。对加沙的封锁不光是以色列还包括埃及。
11）另外说下自从哈马斯上台后，就不再在加沙地区实行选举了。
12）但并不是说加沙的人在封锁后就活不下去了。
13）首先封锁并不包括能源，实际上加沙在很大程度上依赖以色列提供电力和燃料。以色列电力公司供应的电力占巴勒斯坦的电力消耗的63%，但以色列的电量供应一直限制在 120 兆瓦以内，因为这是以色列根据《奥斯陆协议》承诺向加沙出售的电量。以色列也一直放行提供人道主义援助物资，因为以色列表示只要哈马斯控制加沙，其官方政策就是：“没有发展，没有繁荣，但也没有人道主义危机。”
14）目前加沙地带行政当局的大部分资金来自外部援助，其中很大一部分由联合国组织直接用于教育和粮食供应。援助的大部分资金是由美国和欧盟提供的，另外一少部分是由阿拉伯联盟提供的。而哈马斯的行政开支的来源主要是伊朗和卡塔尔。
15）从另一方面也能看出加沙的人并不是活不下去，因为加沙青年文盲率低于1%，根据联合国的数据，在加沙一共有640所学校，包括36所私立学校，总共可为441,452名学生提供服务。
16）截止到 2018 年，加沙地区有 9 所大学对外开放，共有学生6000人，可提供40多个专业的高等教育。
17）加沙有相对完善医院和其他医疗设施。死亡率是世界上最低的国家和地区之一，每年为 0.315%。婴儿死亡率在 224 个国家和地区中排名第 105 位，每 1,000 名新生儿中有 16.55 人死亡。
18）根据人类贫困指数，加沙地带在 135 个国家中排名第 24 位。2009年人均年收入估计为3100美元，位居世界第164位。大多数加沙家庭拥有收音机和电视，大约20%拥有个人电脑。居住在加沙的人们可以自由收看卫星电视节目和巴勒斯坦广播公司、以色列广播局、以色列第二广播局的电视节目。
19）最明显的指标就是人口数，根据联合国数据在2010 年大约有 160 万人居住在加沙地带，其中近 100 万是联合国登记的难民。 此后该地区的人口持续增长，到2013 年平均每名妇女会生 4.4 个孩子，最新的不完全数据在加沙的人口已经达到约二百万人左右，其中43.5%的人口年龄在18岁以下。
20）准确的说加沙的经济情况和生活水平完全由以色列来决定，因为经济发展主要靠贸易活动，而加沙地区的主要的贸易对象为以色列、埃及和约旦河西岸地区，当地人相对的高薪资工作都是要当以色列那边去工作，所以每当以色列在遭受恐怖袭击后关闭加沙边境，加沙的经济就会萎缩约三分之一左右。
21）而每当以色列改变对加沙的政策减轻封锁，如1998减缓对巴勒斯坦货物和劳工运输的限制，加沙的经济就连续恢复了三年，但2000年巴勒斯坦人大起义，以色列重新封锁，2001年加沙经济再次下降35%，人均收入下降到每年625美元，但仍然比邻国埃及的人均收入要高。
22）以色列驻伦敦大使馆发言人表示，“加沙人民是恐怖组织哈马斯的囚犯。加沙的局势是哈马斯统治和优先事项的直接结果。”
——加沙经济一开始是以色列开发发展起来的，加沙能源的大部份是以色列供应的。
然后以色列和阿拉伯国家老大沙特和谈快谈成了，哈马斯用自杀式恐怖攻击给搅黄了。
如果你是以色列碰到哈马斯这号的，你怎么办？
说句政治不正确的，感觉这种东西其实就类似人/地球整个机体上的一个溃疡脓包，让它发作出来然后切割掉就是了，重要的是控制不要感染到整个机体（非常难）。当然只是个人感觉而已。
楼下的kalevy很好玩啊，回完我就拉黑是什么操作？胆怯了？
基本事实我只说两点， 哈马斯1987年才成立，1947到1987以色列占了多少土地杀了多少巴勒斯坦人？ 哈马斯愿意以1967年的实控线建国，留给以色列的土地已经远大于1947年联合国巴以分治时的“合法”领土。不存在你说的灭国。
确实有意思，他在回复我前就拉黑我了，回复后又拉黑了，而且同一篇狗屁不通的帖子到处乱发，加沙地带的贫困率跟世界最贫困的国家划等号，最少三分之一人极度贫困，被一再的封锁基本靠全世界接济过活，使用水电都得不到满足，一个大型集中营被他描述的简直是人家乐土🤣，真讽刺啊，一个比犹太人自称的历史还要长久多了的古城被活活糟蹋成这个样子。
TA这么赞美加沙，我们只能祝福TA和TA的子孙后代都长长久久地住在加沙里了
看来是惯犯，哈哈。 立场不同掌握的事实有异正常得很，用这种小伎俩来公众空间给大家布道，演这种滑稽戏至于吗？
咱就就事论事说现在的问题 - 不是说反对恐怖主义么，那么就看看谁，做了什么能算恐怖主义的事，以及做到什么程度。
最直接的衡量就是，谁杀了多少平民吧？看看哈马斯杀没杀平民，杀了多少？ 再看看以色列杀没杀平民，杀了多少？
至于他们都是为什么杀的，这个不重要吧？要纠缠这个为什么，大家都有的是理儿呢，就没完了。。。当然，这些理儿的本质都是：我真正的目标不是平民，但为了我的方便，我不得不杀。
另外，至于具体是怎么杀的，也不太重要吧？从来没听说过用某种方式杀就不算恐怖主义，另一种就算的 - 当然，咱不玩文字游戏啊，比如“让对方老死”这个大概真不算。
所以就比谁杀平民多，谁就是更大的恐怖主义者，这个标准有问题么？
不完全和你一致，我找到的：
Founded in 1988 during the First Intifada as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas set two long-term goals, articulated in its charter: *the end of the Jewish state* and *the creation of an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea*
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas_Charter#:~:text=The%20original%20Charter%20identified%20Hamas,the%20face%20of%20the%20oppressors.%22
The 2017 charter accepted for the first time the idea of a Palestinian state within the borders that existed before 1967 and rejects recognition of Israel which it terms as the “Zionist enemy”. It advocates such a state as *transitional* but also advocates “liberation of all of Palestine”， The new document also states that the group doesn''t seek war with the Jewish people but only against Zionism which it holds responsible for "occupation of Palestine".
wiki 的分析结论是这样的： The updated 2017 charter attempts to moderate Hamas''s image by stating that Hamas is not anti-Jewish but anti-Zionist, but retains the goal of completely eliminating Israel
你有哈马斯比以上更新的说“不存在灭以色列国的”链接吗？
你小时候的时候中国大使馆被北约用三枚导弹给炸了
https://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2023/10/20/125237960.html
Prof. John Mearsheimer: What Has Changed Since Publication of The Israel Lobby and What the New Administration Can Do Differently Janet McMahon: Hello. I’m Janet McMahon, the managing editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. I was out at the registration table trying to help sign people in when Dale started speaking, so I don’t know if he told you that the Washington Report will be 35 years old next month. And we have been following the Israel lobby since our very first issue in 1982, so it’s a special pleasure to introduce our first keynote speaker—Prof. John Mearsheimer. He is the R. Wendell Harrison distinguished service professor of political science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago.
In March of 2006 he and Prof. Stephen Walt of Harvard published an article in the London Review of Books entitled “The Israel Lobby.” The article had originally been commissioned by The Atlantic monthly, but that American publication decided not to publish it after all. Instead it found a home overseas. The paper’s publication caused an uproar, in no small part because it shed light on what AIPAC operative Steve Rosen described as a night flower that “thrives in the dark and shrivels up in the sunlight.” Harvard posted the paper on its website, but removed its logo. Attacks on Mearsheimer and Walt ranged from naïve—that’s from Noam Chomsky—to—and this will shock you—anti-Semites. The following year their article evolved into the book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, which has since been translated into 22 languages. Professor Mearsheimer, by the way, will be signing copies of his book at 12:15 at the registration table where you signed in.
I’m also particularly glad that he is joining us today because every year people ask us if he is going to be speaking at our conference. So it’s been a great pleasure this year to be able to say, “Of course he is!”
Today he will be discussing what, if anything, has changed in the decade since The Israel Lobby was published. Please join me in welcoming Prof. John Mearsheimer.
John Mearsheimer: Thank you for the kind introduction. It’s a great pleasure to be here today to speak before this distinguished audience. I would like to thank IRmep and the Washington Report for inviting me to give this talk. Of course, I thank all of you for coming out to hear me, and the other speakers.
I would like to focus my talk on what has transpired regarding the Israel lobby and the U.S.-Israeli relationship in the 10 years since Steve Walt and I wrote The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. My talk is comprised of four parts. I’ll begin by briefly restating the core arguments in our book. I’ll then describe four major changes that have taken place regarding the lobby and the U.S.-Israeli relationship over the past decade. I will then describe what has not changed and conclude by speculating about the future.
The central argument in the book is that the United States has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in modern history and it is almost wholly due to the lobby. What makes Israel’s relationship with the United States extraordinary is not simply the fact that Israel has received more foreign aid than any other country, or that Washington almost always backs Israel diplomatically. What makes it truly special is that the aid is given unconditionally. In other words, Israel gets this aid even when it does things that the United States opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank.
This discussion raises the obvious question: why does the United States give Israel so much aid and without any conditions? Israel supporters sometimes argue that it is because Israel is a vital strategic asset. This is not a serious argument. In fact, giving Israel nearly unconditional support is one of the reasons we have a terrorism problem. Others argue that there’s a moral rationale for this special relationship. Israel is said to be a democracy that shares our values.
The two countries certainly share some values, but Israel is a Jewish state which clearly privileges its Jewish citizens. Non-Jews are second-class citizens in both theory and practice. The United States, on the other hand, is a liberal democracy that works hard to treat all of its citizens equally. It certainly is not a Christian state that treats non-Christians as second-class citizens. Indeed, that kind of discrimination, which is part of Israel’s essence, is antithetical to the American way of life. Furthermore, Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied territories is sharply at odds with U.S. values.
Finally, there’s the claim that the American people have such a favorable view of Israel that they demand their politicians back the special relationship. This argument, however, is not persuasive. If you look at the survey data on how the American public thinks about Israel, as Grant made clear before I spoke, there’s no question that Americans have a generally favorable image of Israel in part because media coverage tends to be favorable. But as poll after poll shows, that support is not especially deep or wide.
So what explains the special relationship if there is no strategic or moral imperative and if most Americans do not favor it? Our answer, of course, is the lobby.
What exactly is the lobby? Steve and I argue that it’s a loose coalition of individuals and groups who actively work to influence U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. It’s not a centralized organization, and the groups that make up the lobby do not agree on every issue. It includes organizations like AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League, the Conference of Presidents [of Major American Jewish Organizations], the Zionist Organization of America, and Christians United for Israel, just to name a few.
It also includes think tanks like WINEP [Washington Institute for Near East Policy] and the American Enterprise Institute, and publications like The Weekly Standard and Commentary. It certainly is not a cabal or a conspiracy that “controls” U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it’s a powerful interest group like the NRA, the farm lobby, the Cuba lobby, or the AARP, and it operates pretty much the same way those other interest groups do.
Very importantly, the lobby is not synonymous with Jewish Americans. Surveys suggest that about a third of American Jews do not care that much about Israel. Others do not support the lobby’s positions. Some groups that work on Israel’s behalf, such as the so-called Christian Zionists, are not Jewish.
In short, the lobby is defined by its political agenda, not by ethnicity or religion.
Finally, we argue that the lobby has pushed policies that are in neither Israel’s nor America’s national interest. In particular, we maintain that it would have been much better for both countries if the United States had long ago pressured Israel to stop building settlements and allow for the creation of a viable Palestinian state. But this did not happen—and it will not happen—because the lobby makes it impossible for American leaders to use the leverage at their disposal to pressure Israel. In essence, that’s the story Steve and I tell.
Let me now switch gears and talk about what has changed regarding Israel and the lobby since the book was first published in 2007. I think that there have been four noteworthy changes. First there’s been a fundamental change in how Americans think and talk about Israel, the special relationship, and the lobby. When we initially wrote our book, there was much ignorance about these subjects. My sense is that most people who read our book, or who have read our book, thought there was a large element of truth in what we said, but that we had nevertheless exaggerated the lobby’s influence.
There was also a great deal of ignorance in the American body politic about Israeli policies, especially toward the Palestinians, and little understanding of the special relationship. This is hardly surprising, because one of the lobby’s main goals is to prevent an open conversation in the media about Israeli policy, the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and the lobby itself. It was successful for a long time, but my sense from talking to many people about these matters, and from closely following the public discourse, is that those days are over. For example, it’s commonplace, even in the mainstream media, to talk about the lobby, using just that word. I cannot tell you how many people have said to me that, if anything, Steve and I just scratched the surface in our discussion of the lobby’s power and influence.
I might add that there’s now more discussion of Israel’s policies and actions in the American media. If you read the comment section that follow many newspaper stories, you will see that there are a substantial number of Americans who are critical of Israeli behavior, especially toward the Palestinians. Only someone who is blind and deaf would not recognize that the United States is deeply committed to defending Israel’s behavior at almost every turn. In short, there is much more awareness of these critical issues today than there was a decade ago.
What has caused this change? I think that our original article and the book helped. Both attracted an enormous amount of attention. Indeed, the Lobby book made the New York Times bestseller list and, because of the Internet, the article on which the book was based was widely read all over the world. But I think that, ultimately, our arguments would not have had much impact were it not for a number of other factors.
First, the actions of Israel and the lobby over the past decade have done much to substantiate many of the claims we made in the book. Just to take one example, consider how Israel and the lobby responded to the Iran nuclear deal. Prime Minister [Binyamin] Netanyahu went to extraordinary lengths to sabotage the agreement, going so far as to give a speech to a joint session of Congress on March 3, 2015 that not only sought to undermine the deal but was also an indirect attack on President [Barack] Obama. Of course, he was aided by AIPAC, which went all out to defeat the deal. This nasty fight between Netanyahu and the lobby on one hand, and the Obama administration on the other hand, played out in full public view.
The second factor behind the increased awareness of Israeli policy and the lobby is the Internet and social media. There are now all sorts of places on the Internet one can go to for information about these subjects. The website Mondoweiss, which I’m sure everyone in this room knows about, is a case in point. It posts a steady stream of stories that reveal important information about Israeli policy and the lobby’s activities, not to mention critical assessments of those matters. Mondoweiss, which is now 11 years old, had eight million visits to its site in 2016.
Of course there are other sites that provide valuable information like the Electronic Intifada, which is run by Ali Abunimah, and the site for the Israeli magazine +972. Another important source of information on the Internet is Haaretz, the liberal Israeli newspaper which often runs pieces that take a critical perspective on Israel, as well as the lobby. And in the age of Twitter, important pieces that appear on these sites are immediately spread around the world to huge numbers of people. These same pieces are also circulated on e-mail lists that go to hundreds, if not thousands, of interested readers.
Third, there are hosts of organizations that are willing to criticize Israel and the lobby. IRmep is a case in point, as it has played an important role in exposing the lobby’s activities over time. There are also a number of organizations that are deeply committed to Israel which, nevertheless, are willing to take Israel to task when they disapprove of its behavior. They include J Street, Jewish Voice for Peace, Americans for Peace Now, and the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, among others.
Finally, there are some important voices in the mainstream media who have taken to speaking critically about Israeli policy and the lobby. The most important person in this regard is Peter Beinart, who wrote a very influential article in the June 2010 issue of the New York Review of Books entitled “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” which is critical of the lobby for aiding and abetting Israel’s misguided policies in the occupied territories. He has continued to write and speak about these matters since this article appeared.
Before Beinart, there was the late Tony Judt, who offered searing criticisms of Israel and its American defenders. Of course, there are a number of other key figures in the mainstream media who have occasionally taken aim at both Israel and the lobby over the past decade. They would include Roger Cohen, Thomas Friedman and Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times, as well as Jon Stewart of “Daily Show” fame. In sum, I think there has been a significant change in how Americans think and talk about Israel since our book appeared.
The second big change is that Israel’s image in the West, especially in the United States, has suffered serious damage over the past decade. This is due in part to the fact that information about Israel is more readily available now than it was in the past, thanks in good part to the Internet and social media. But it is also as a result of the fact that things have been changing inside of Israel in recent years. For starters, the political center of gravity in Israel has been moving steadily rightward for decades, and it has now reached the point where government ministers occasionally make racist comments about Palestinians and write legislation that is directly at odds with basic liberal values. The recent legislation banning individuals who support BDS from entering Israel is the latest example of this phenomenon. All indications are that this rightward shift will continue for the foreseeable future and Israel will become an increasingly illiberal country, even toward its own citizens.
But the key stain on Israel’s reputation is its brutal treatment of the Palestinians and the fact that it has become an apartheid state. Until recently, Israel and its supporters were able to maintain the fiction that there would eventually be a legitimate Palestinian state living side by side with Israel, but it is now clear that there is virtually no chance that will happen, and Greater Israel is here to stay. That Greater Israel, as Richard Falk and Virginia Tilley make clear in an important new U.N. study, is already an apartheid state. Israel and its defenders vehemently deny that fact, but even among Israelis it’s not unusual to hear Israel described as an apartheid state. For example, two former Israeli prime ministers, Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, have said that if there is no two-state solution, Israel will—to quote Olmert—“face a South African-style struggle.” Well, there is no two-state solution.
Speaking of South Africa, there are a number of individuals who were well acquainted with the situation in that racist state before it collapsed who believe that the situation in Israel is worse. John Dugard, the eminent South African law professor, says that the crimes against the Palestinians are, to quote him, “infinitely worse than those committed by the apartheid regime in South Africa.” He is hardly the lone voice in that regard.
For anyone who doubts how bad life can be for the Palestinians living under Israeli control, one only has to consider what happened in Israel’s three major assaults against Gaza over the past decade: Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense, and Operation Protective Edge.
Because of time constraints, I will focus exclusively on the first of those operations, Cast Lead, which took place in the weeks before President Obama was inaugurated in 2009. Israeli forces killed about 1,400 Palestinians, of whom roughly 1,200 were civilians; 350 of those civilians were children. In contrast, 13 Israelis were killed. The ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed in that operation is 108:1. That’s not a war in my lexicon—that’s a massacre. I might add that 6,300 Palestinian homes were destroyed, contributing to the 600,000 tons of rubble that littered Gaza when the shooting ended.
The U.N. commissioned an investigation in the wake of that conflict which was headed by the distinguished South African jurist Richard Goldstone. The final report concluded that Israel had engaged in “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population.” It went on to accuse Israel of committing war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.
There are other signs of serious trouble in Israel. Especially worrisome are the racist attitudes among large segments of Jewish Israeli youth. Given these attitudes, it is hardly surprising that a year ago today a young Israeli soldier shot and killed a wounded and defenseless Palestinian. Equally unsurprising, there was a huge outcry in Israel when he was indicted and later convicted of the reduced charge of manslaughter. Press reports from Israel make it clear that many Israelis thought his behavior was justified, and that it was hardly an isolated incident. He simply had the misfortune of getting caught on film. The fact that the shooting was captured on film virtually guaranteed that it would go viral on social media and further damage Israel’s image.
The bottom line is that the days when Israel was seen as a morally upright David taking on an evil Goliath are over. The damage to Israel’s reputation probably started in 1982, when it invaded Lebanon, but it has accelerated at a marked pace over the past decade.
The third big change involves changes within the American Jewish community. One of the most important developments in recent years is a shift in the balance of power between the mainstream organizations and the lobby that reflexively support Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians, and a more progressive set of organizations that are determined to find a way to make peace between the two sides. The divide between those groups has long been present, but the balance of power between them has always been lopsided in favor of the organizations that support Israel no matter what it does.
That situation, however, has begun to change, especially with the rise of J Street, which was created in November 2007 as a home for individuals with progressive views on Israel. It not only has a high profile, but it also is willing to criticize Israeli policies in the occupied territories and actually take on the hard-line organizations in the lobby. J Street is surely not as powerful as an organization like AIPAC, but the mere fact that it has survived and is thriving shows that times are changing. After all, a similar organization called Breira was established in 1973, but the mainline forces in the lobby quickly crushed it. Not only has J Street survived, but there is good reason to think that it will grow in strength over time as increasing numbers of American Jews look to join institutions that challenge Israel’s repressive policies toward the Palestinians.
In addition to these changes in the Jewish establishment, there are changes taking place in the broader American Jewish community that do not bode well for either the lobby or Israel. In particular, it seems clear that younger Jews are not as committed to Israel as their parents and grandparents. For example, a Pew survey from 2013 found that among Jews who are 65 years or older, 53 percent say that caring about Israel is essential to being what Jewish means to me. That’s 65 years or older, 53 percent. In contrast, 32 percent of American Jews under the age of 30 held a similar view. That is a gap of 21 percentage points. It seems likely that support for Israel in the American Jewish community, which has been weakening over the past decade, will weaken even more in the years ahead as generational change continues.
Lastly, there’s been an important change in Israel’s support within the United States. For purposes of background, it’s important to re-emphasize that public support for Israel in the United States has never been particularly strong. One way that the lobby deals with this thin support is to have significant influence both inside the Democratic and Republican parties. In essence, the lobby has worked hard to make sure that Israel enjoys strong bipartisan support and is not strongly backed in one of the major parties but not the other. The lobby was successful in this regard for a long time, but that bipartisan support has begun to erode over the past decade as support for Israel inside the Democratic Party has plummeted. At the same time, it has grown substantially inside the Republican Party.
In a Pew poll from this past January, only 33 percent of Democrats said they sympathize more with the Israelis than the Palestinians, while 74 percent of Republicans said they sympathize more with Israel than the Palestinians. This is a gap of 41 percentage points. In short, there has been a marked erosion in support for Israel within the Democratic Party in recent years, which raises serious questions as to whether the lobby will be able to maintain bipartisan support for the special relationship in the years ahead.
Let me switch gears again and now focus on what has not changed over the past decade. Three things have not changed. First, the lobby is as powerful as ever. One might be tempted to see the lobby’s defeat on the Iran nuclear issue as evidence that its power is waning, but that would be a mistake. The lobby does not win every time, and it is most likely to lose when it is pushing the United States to do something that might get it into a war. The Iran deal fits squarely in that category. Its failure to make a deal with Tehran would have sharply increased the chances that the United States would have attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Where the lobby almost always wins is on matters relating to the Palestinians and financial support for Israel. The fact that the Obama administration could do virtually nothing to get Israel to move toward a two-state solution, yet still opted to provide Israel with $38 billion in aid over the next decade is clear evidence that the lobby remains very powerful. It’s important to understand that the key to the lobby’s success is that it focuses mainly on influencing high-level policymakers and opinion makers, as well as the elites in both political parties—not the rank and file.
I noted earlier that there has been a significant decrease in support for Israel within the Democratic Party. The reason that change has had little effect on policy is that the elites in the Democratic Party remain deeply committed to the special relationship. They fear the lobby will target them if there is any evidence they are wavering in their support for Israel. One might think that politicians who are supposed to place the American national interest above the interest of all other countries would stand up to the lobby when it pushes policies that they know are not good for the United States. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explains why this does not happen: “I saw most of Congress as uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling their basic constitutional responsibility, micro-managerial, parochial, hypocritical, egotistical, thin-skinned”—here are the key words—“and prone to put self and re-election before country.”
The second big non-change is that U.S. policy toward Israel remains the same as it has been for the past decade. The special relationship, in other words, is firmly intact. Of course, this continuity is hardly surprising, given that there has been no diminishment in the power of the lobby. As many of you probably remember, there was a brief moment during the recent presidential election where it looked like candidate [Donald] Trump might favor a more even-handed approach to dealing with Israel and the Palestinians. But he quickly reversed field and made it clear that he would go to great lengths to be even more pro-Israel than President Obama. Naturally, Hillary Clinton made the same pledge. Thus, there is no good reason to think that American policy toward Israel is going to change in a meaningful way any time soon.
Finally, there is hardly any sustained criticism of Israel in the American foreign policy establishment. This, too, is unsurprising, since the lobby is as powerful as ever and, as I emphasized, it focuses most of its attention on keeping the country’s elites in line. Anyone who wants to be a serious player in the making of U.S. foreign policy understands full well that if he or she criticizes Israel, there will be a price to pay. The result is that there is no serious debate about Israel or the special relationship in Congress, the mainstream media, or prominent think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations. This is not to deny, however, that there is an open and vigorous discussion of Israel and its relationship with the United States outside of these establishment institutions.
Let me conclude by talking about where we go from here. I believe dark times are ahead for both Israel and the lobby. There is no reason to think Israel is going to move toward a two-state solution. Greater Israel is here to stay, and that state is and will remain an apartheid state. That brute fact will become increasingly clear to people all over the world, especially now that it’s clear the Palestinians are not going to get a state of their own. Moreover, the Palestinians, who already comprise almost half of the population of Greater Israel, will continue to resist their oppression, which will force Israel to escalate the repressive policies that have already badly tarnished its image.
The Palestinians’ most potent weapon in this fight will be BDS, which is a global movement that aims to generate significant economic and political pressure on Israel that will ultimately force it to give the Palestinians equal rights. Israel and its supporters in the West view BDS as an existential threat, because it not only has the potential to delegitimize Israel, but it might ultimately lead to Israel’s undoing. After all, the Palestinians, if they were given equal rights, Israel would cease to be a Jewish state, as there eventually will be more Palestinians than Jews inside of Greater Israel.
There are good reasons to think that BDS might succeed, at least when it comes to delegitimizing Israel. First, it takes dead aim at apartheid, which is a morally repugnant political system that is universally condemned. Apartheid South Africa eventually disappeared. Why should Israel be any different? Second, the call to give the Palestinians equal rights is fully consistent with basic Western values. It’s a demand that will surely resonate in Western Europe and the United States, causing all sorts of problems for Israel and its supporters.
Of course, Israel and its supporters are counting on the lobby to stymie BDS. Over time, however, that will become an increasingly difficult task, simply because there is no good defense for apartheid, which is a reprehensible political system. Nevertheless, the lobby is extraordinarily powerful, and it will go to enormous lengths to protect Israel at every turn.
It’s difficult to say where this conflict will lead in the decades ahead. Many Israelis will surely be interested in expelling the Palestinians from Greater Israel if they have the opportunity, thereby eliminating the need for apartheid. But that outcome is unlikely, because there are now more than six million Palestinians living within Greater Israel’s borders, and they would surely put up fierce resistance if Israel tried to expel them from their homes. Moreover, massive ethnic cleansing would be an enormous and everlasting stain on Israel’s reputation. It’s more likely that Israel will simply remain an apartheid state and, with the help of the lobby, just hunker down and accept the fact that most of the world considers it a pariah state.
Finally, there is the possibility that BDS will carry the day and Greater Israel will become a legitimate liberal democracy. If that were to happen, which is not likely, it would undoubtedly come after much bloodshed, as most Israeli Jews would fervently oppose this outcome, since it would mean the end of the Zionist dream.
Again, it’s hard to say which one of these outcomes will carry the day. It will probably take another 20 or 30 years before we understand how this conflict will ultimately be resolved, or maybe not resolved. Regardless of the outcome, I’m deeply sad to say that the decades ahead promise abundant trouble for Israel, and especially for the Palestinians. The United States will not be spared either, simply because the lobby will be working overtime to protect Israel and preserve the special relationship, which is likely to harm America’s intellectual life, as well as its politics. Thank you.
Questions & Answers
Janet McMahon: Thank you very much, Dr. Mearsheimer. We have several questions. I want to start with one of my own. When you talk about the deteriorating image in the United States, do you think that’s because people think it’s because Israel has a right-wing government, and if it didn’t have a right-wing government these things wouldn’t be happening?
John Mearsheimer: Well, I think at a very general level the deteriorating image is due to two factors. One is exposure because of alternative media. Number two, because of what’s happening inside Israel. I think that in part what’s happening inside Israel is that the politicians who now are beginning to dominate the discourse there are unattractive from a liberal American point of view. Since the vast majority of American Jews are liberal, they’re deeply bothered by what these politicians are saying. But I think that’s not the key. I think the key is that it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Israel is an apartheid state, and that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is simply unacceptable to large numbers of people. My argument is that, as time goes by, that will be more and more the case.
Janet McMahon: So now we’ll get to some questions from the audience. Here are two related ones, I think. Your 2006 book largely attributed the U.S. decision to invade Iraq to the Israel lobby. But many of the neoconservative policymakers involved in that decision were not particularly loyal to Israel, including Donald Rumsfeld. What is the evidence that the lobby was the primary cause? Another question. To what extent would you say that the Israel lobby was responsible for the attacks on various Middle East countries, such as Iraq?
John Mearsheimer: With regard to the Iraq War, our basic argument was that of course George Bush and Vice President [Dick] Cheney had to be in favor of the war for it to happen, and that neither one of them is part of the Israel lobby. Our argument in the book, and of course in the article as well, is that the lobby was deeply interested in getting Iraq and taking Saddam Hussain down for a long time before the actual invasion on March 19, 2003. The lobby, and here we’re talking especially about the neoconservatives, were pushing very hard for a war against Iraq. In the wake of what looked like a stunning military victory in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, we came to the conclusion—falsely, of course—that we had the magic formula for taking down regimes and getting out of town quickly so that we could march on to the next target. This is what the Bush doctrine was all about.
So what you had in 2002 and early 2003 was a situation where we thought we could win a quick and easy victory in Iraq, point number one. Number two, you had this group of neoconservatives who were deeply committed to taking down Saddam Hussain, who had a huge amount of influence in the media and in the Bush administration, who pushed very hard. Therefore, we argued, they were the main driving force. But there’s no question that they alone could not have made the war happen. They needed President Bush, and Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and they all went along because they basically bought the neoconservative arguments which were of course not simply couched in terms of doing something that was good for Israel, right? They bought the argument, and they thought that we could go in and win a quick and decisive victory.
They were wrong. We jumped into a quagmire. Furthermore, they were wrong in the sense that we had not won a decisive victory in Afghanistan. We had won a temporary victory. And the Taliban eventually came back from the dead. So we had two huge disasters on our hands, which still exist today—one being Afghanistan, two being Iraq. Of course, as a result of the Iraq War, in part, Syria has turned into a disaster as well.
Janet McMahon: Here is a question about your professional career. What has been the evolution or impact of your book, and your principled and outspoken views, on your career? Has your university been uniformly supportive of your academic freedom?
John Mearsheimer: I think that there’s no question that for both Steve at Harvard and for me at the University of Chicago, we’ve not been punished in any significant way, at either Harvard or at the University of Chicago. Both universities have fully supported our right to speak out on this issue and other issues. American universities are actually excellent when it comes to freedom of speech issues in almost all cases. Not every case, but in almost all cases. We were taken care of in that regard. Larry Summers was the president of Harvard at the time, and he defended Steve down the line. The key officials at Chicago did the same with me.
It’s very hard to say exactly how much of an impact writing that book had on our professional lives. I would note that, just in my own case, I’ve written a number of other controversial pieces on controversial subjects that have got me into trouble. For example, I argue that with regard to the present crisis in U.S.-Russian relations, that we—the United States—are principally responsible for creating that crisis. [APPLAUSE] The Ukraine crisis was not the result of Vladimir Putin’s doing. It had to do with the fact that the West, and especially the United States, were very interested in making Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s doorstep. The Russians had long made it clear that that was unacceptable. It was our policies that led to the crisis.
You can agree or disagree with that, but that view is a minority view. I can tell you there are probably about five people in the United States who believe that. So there are a lot of people who are angry at me for that, right? It’s hard to tell how much of the trouble I have getting speaking engagements here and there, or getting put on this board or that board, is due to the fact that I wrote The Israel Lobby, or due to the fact that I have been controversial on other issues as well. But I think just in general, without going into any details, there are surely a number of opportunities that we were not afforded because we wrote the article and the book.
Janet McMahon: I think we’re out of time. I’m tempted to ask you more questions, but I think we’re On a pretty tight schedule. So thank you so very much, again.
这个标准单一了。如果比谁的底线低，谁能更大程度的舍弃自己百姓的生命，谁就更有理了。如果我使用百姓做人体炸弹，那你就应该自动把路让开，否则我的百姓死了责任就在你了？所以要具体情况具体对待，不能一条线划出对错。对待百姓的生命不同人看法不同。我们肯定觉得百姓生命最大，宗教极端份子可能觉得百姓为信仰可以舍弃生命
你知道加沙人口密度多高吗？ 恐怖份子无论在哪里都会被你们说人肉炸弹的 当年日军也这么说游击队 像你这么爱洗白侵略者 日军可能会赏你一碗大米饭
哈哈，人民内部矛盾
两娃都抓住了重点，还挺不容易的。
我是懒得跟你辩经，事情列出来就行了——你扯东扯西半天，我前面给你的问题你还没回答呢：
哈马斯的目标和纲领就是以色列灭国，换了你是以色列碰上哈马斯这号的你怎么办？
——加沙经济一开始是以色列开发发展起来的，加沙能源的大部份是以色列供应的。
然后以色列和阿拉伯国家老大沙特和谈快谈成了，哈马斯用自杀式恐怖攻击给搅黄了。
如果你是以色列碰到哈马斯这号的，你怎么办？
“1）感觉许多人不了解加沙的情况，以为在那里生活的巴勒斯坦人都是类似于二战中集中营里的生活，这里给大家展示下实际的加沙情况，虽然不是一个正常的地方，但也并不是人间地狱。
2）国际上管那里叫加沙地带（Gaza Strip），其形状类似于一个长方形，加沙地带长 41 公里，宽 6 至 12 公里，总面积 365 公里，比北京的丰台区稍微要大一点（丰台区306平方公里）。它与以色列有 51 公里的边界，与埃及有 11 公里的边界，所以它并不是有人想象的被以色列完全封锁住。
4）该地区在1947年的联合国巴以分治方案中原属于巴勒斯坦国的一部分，但1948年在以色列宣布成立后，阿拉伯联军对以色列发动第一次中东战争，阿拉伯各国不认可联合国要求建立的巴勒斯坦国，所以战后该地区被埃及所吞并，直到1967年六日战争后又被以色列所占领。
5）以色列占领各地区后，一方面发展该地区的柑橘种植业，一方面安排建立定居点让新到以色列的犹太移民到那里生活，共修建了21个定居点。由于雇佣大量当地的巴勒斯坦人为以色列人工作和开发加沙地区带动基建产业发展，1967年至1982年加沙的经济平均增长率达到9.7%，当然以色列对该地区的发展有一定的限制性措施，例如巴勒斯坦人对柑橘种植出口要听从以色列的统一安排等等。
6）1994年，根据奥斯陆协议，以色列将69%的加沙土地的自治权交给巴勒斯坦民族权力机构，至于为什么只还了69%，因为另外31%的地区已经修建了以色列定居点，该定居点的居民反对奥斯陆协议，死活不搬，按我们的话讲就是钉子户。
7）根据奥斯陆协议以色列对加沙领空拥有完全控制权，并将继续监控加沙地带水域。不过以色列划分出一块水域巴勒斯坦人可以在此捕鱼。并有两条高速公路连接巴勒斯坦控制的约旦河西岸和加沙地区。
9）在2006年1月25日举行的巴勒斯坦议会选举中，哈马斯赢得了总选票42.9%的多数票和132个席位中的74个席位（56%）。 由于哈马斯的纲领和目标就是消灭以色列，以色列和联合国要求哈马斯在掌权后接受之前的所有协议，承认以色列的生存权，并放弃暴力。但哈马斯拒绝了，此后哈马斯通过加沙之战用暴力从国际承认的巴勒斯坦政权法塔赫手中夺得加沙地带的控制权，自此法塔赫仅控制约旦河西岸地区，而加沙地带由哈马斯控制，在此期间共有近千人在巴勒斯坦内部的互相残杀中死亡。而以色列则在哈马斯完全控制加沙后宣布对加沙地带的边境、海岸与领空实施全面封锁。2007年开始实施全面封锁。
10）因为埃及、沙特阿拉伯和约旦宣布阿巴斯组建的约旦河西岸内阁为“唯一合法的巴勒斯坦政府”。不承认哈马斯政权，所以埃及也同时关闭了加沙地带南部的边界。对加沙的封锁不光是以色列还包括埃及。
11）另外说下自从哈马斯上台后，就不再在加沙地区实行选举了。
12）但并不是说加沙的人在封锁后就活不下去了。
13）首先封锁并不包括能源，实际上加沙在很大程度上依赖以色列提供电力和燃料。以色列电力公司供应的电力占巴勒斯坦的电力消耗的63%，但以色列的电量供应一直限制在 120 兆瓦以内，因为这是以色列根据《奥斯陆协议》承诺向加沙出售的电量。以色列也一直放行提供人道主义援助物资，因为以色列表示只要哈马斯控制加沙，其官方政策就是：“没有发展，没有繁荣，但也没有人道主义危机。”
14）目前加沙地带行政当局的大部分资金来自外部援助，其中很大一部分由联合国组织直接用于教育和粮食供应。援助的大部分资金是由美国和欧盟提供的，另外一少部分是由阿拉伯联盟提供的。而哈马斯的行政开支的来源主要是伊朗和卡塔尔。
15）从另一方面也能看出加沙的人并不是活不下去，因为加沙青年文盲率低于1%，根据联合国的数据，在加沙一共有640所学校，包括36所私立学校，总共可为441,452名学生提供服务。
16）截止到 2018 年，加沙地区有 9 所大学对外开放，共有学生6000人，可提供40多个专业的高等教育。
17）加沙有相对完善医院和其他医疗设施。死亡率是世界上最低的国家和地区之一，每年为 0.315%。婴儿死亡率在 224 个国家和地区中排名第 105 位，每 1,000 名新生儿中有 16.55 人死亡。
18）根据人类贫困指数，加沙地带在 135 个国家中排名第 24 位。2009年人均年收入估计为3100美元，位居世界第164位。大多数加沙家庭拥有收音机和电视，大约20%拥有个人电脑。居住在加沙的人们可以自由收看卫星电视节目和巴勒斯坦广播公司、以色列广播局、以色列第二广播局的电视节目。
19）最明显的指标就是人口数，根据联合国数据在2010 年大约有 160 万人居住在加沙地带，其中近 100 万是联合国登记的难民。 此后该地区的人口持续增长，到2013 年平均每名妇女会生 4.4 个孩子，最新的不完全数据在加沙的人口已经达到约二百万人左右，其中43.5%的人口年龄在18岁以下。
20）准确的说加沙的经济情况和生活水平完全由以色列来决定，因为经济发展主要靠贸易活动，而加沙地区的主要的贸易对象为以色列、埃及和约旦河西岸地区，当地人相对的高薪资工作都是要当以色列那边去工作，所以每当以色列在遭受恐怖袭击后关闭加沙边境，加沙的经济就会萎缩约三分之一左右。
21）而每当以色列改变对加沙的政策减轻封锁，如1998减缓对巴勒斯坦货物和劳工运输的限制，加沙的经济就连续恢复了三年，但2000年巴勒斯坦人大起义，以色列重新封锁，2001年加沙经济再次下降35%，人均收入下降到每年625美元，但仍然比邻国埃及的人均收入要高。
22）以色列驻伦敦大使馆发言人表示，“加沙人民是恐怖组织哈马斯的囚犯。加沙的局势是哈马斯统治和优先事项的直接结果。”
——说句政治不正确的，感觉这种东西其实就类似人/地球整个机体上的一个溃疡脓包，让它发作出来然后切割掉就是了，重要的是控制不要感染到整个机体（非常难）。当然只是个人感觉而已。
同祝福她 她也拉黑我了
Aftermath of hospital blast in Gaza City People inspect the area of Al-Ahli hospital where hundreds of Palestinians were killed in a blast that Israeli and Palestinian officials blamed on each other, and where Palestinians who fled... Acquire Licensing Rights Read more
PARIS, Oct 20 (Reuters) - A blast at a Gaza hospital was not the result of an Israeli missile strike, but likely caused by a misfiring Palestinian rocket, the French military intelligence directorate (DRM) said on Friday.
Palestinian officials said 471 people were killed in the blast at Al-Ahli al-Arabi Hospital on Tuesday. Gaza''s health ministry blamed an Israeli air strike, while Israel said the blast was caused by a failed rocket launch by militants.
"There is nothing that allows us to say that it is an Israeli strike, but the most likely (scenario) is a Palestinian rocket that had a firing incident," the DRM said.
An unclassified U.S. intelligence report seen by Reuters on Thursday said it judged that Israel was not responsible for the blast and estimated the death toll at 100-300 people.
According to the DRM, the impact crater was too small to have been caused by an Israeli missile.
还是我讲的最好多国一起调查清楚，否则只能说不是我干的
这次终于第三方官方情报分析了
“纽约时报以色列记者伊莎贝尔·克什纳近日问37岁的以色列陆军坦克驾驶员沙依·列维，以色列即将入侵加沙的目的是什么，他的回答引起了我的注意。是要“为以色列挽回尊严”，他说。“国民指望我们击败哈马斯，一劳永逸地解除来自加沙的威胁。”
我之所以会注意，因为多年来，我了解到，在中东地区，最危险的四个字就是“一劳永逸”。
所有的伊斯兰主义/圣战运动——塔利班、哈马斯、ISIS、基地、巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战、真主党、胡塞武装——都在他们的社会中有着深厚的文化、社会、宗教和政治渊源。社会源源不断地向它们提供受到欺辱的年轻男性，其中许多人从未拥有过工作、权力或恋爱的经历：这是个致命的组合，让他们很容易被动员起来制造混乱。
这就是为什么这些运动至今没有一个被一劳永逸地消灭。但是它们是可以被孤立、削弱、剥夺合法性和除掉主脑的——美国对ISIS和基地组织都这么做过。不过那需要耐心、精准、许多的盟友，以及在这些年轻人所在社会中具有合法性的替代方案。
因此，让我大声而明确地说出我在过去几篇专栏文章中悄悄说过的话：我赞同拜登总统在《60分钟》节目上所说的，以色列“再次占领加沙”将是一个“重大错误”。
我相信，此举可能会将以色列在战术上惨败于哈马斯（包括后者令人难以想象的野蛮行径）的耻辱转变为长期的道德和军事战略危机。这场战争可能会把以色列困在加沙，把美国拖入另一场中东战争，并破坏美国目前最重要的外交政策利益：帮助乌克兰摆脱俄罗斯并加入西方，塑造一个包括埃及、以色列、温和的阿拉伯国家和沙特阿拉伯在内的亲美集团，从而制衡伊朗，对抗激进伊斯兰教的全球威胁。
如果以色列现在进入加沙，它将破坏《亚伯拉罕协议》，进一步破坏埃及和约旦的稳定，这两个国家都是美国最重要的盟友之一；并使与沙特阿拉伯的关系正常化成为不可能——这是巨大的战略挫折。这也将使哈马斯能够真正煽起约旦河西岸的怒火，并在犹太定居者和巴勒斯坦人之间发动一场牧羊人战争。总之，这将直接符合伊朗的战略——把以色列拖入帝国扩张的泥潭，并从内部削弱犹太民主。
伊朗对以色列的头号战略目标一直是确保以色列继续深陷约旦河西岸，被卷入对黎巴嫩南部的重新占领，重新占领加沙——后者是伊朗最疯狂的梦想。这样的以色列在道德上、经济上和军事上都将变得孱弱，从而根本无法威胁到伊朗的核计划和霸权野心。
以色列应该做些什么来确保哈马斯发动的袭击不再发生？我现在还不知道。我只知道，无论答案是什么，都不是动员36万备受创伤的以色列预备役人员，在世界上人口最稠密的地方之一发动一场城市战争。这将摧毁以色列的经济及其国际地位。
所有这些困境必须促使拜登在这场危机中更加坚定自己的立场。
拜登必须意识到，本雅明·内塔尼亚胡不适合作为一个理性的参与者来管理这场战争。经历了如此巨大的失败之后，内塔尼亚胡能做的最有力、最能团结人心的事情就是在六到九个月内举行新的以色列选举——并宣布他自己不会参选；他即将结束自己的政治生涯，因此以色列人可以相信，无论他现在就加沙和哈马斯做出什么决定，都会只考虑以色列的国家利益；他不会考虑自己不想因腐败指控而入狱的私利，要避免那个下场，他就需要追求一些重大的、短期的军事胜利，可以把这些胜利带到以色列选民面前，作为对刚刚发生的失败的补偿，从而保住政府中的右翼狂热分子的支持（他们实际上在幻想以色列重新占领加沙，并在那里重建以色列定居点）。
以色列最优秀的军事作家之一、《国土报》的阿莫斯·哈雷尔上周五写道：“以色列高层是一个不寻常的组合。一方面是一位不称职的总理，一个近乎莎士比亚式的人物，他个人面临着为自己辉煌的职业生涯画上一个不光彩句号的危险。他对面是一群被内疚感打击和吞噬的军方高官（如果内塔尼亚胡愿意表现出一点点内疚感就好了）。这不是一个做出深思熟虑的决策的完美配方。”
如果以色列今天宣布，它已经决定暂时放弃对加沙的入侵，并将寻求以更为精准的手段来消灭或逮捕哈马斯的领导层，同时试图策划一场交易，换取哈马斯所扣押的150多名以色列和其他国家的人质，那么它不仅可以避免进一步伤害自己的社会以及加沙的巴勒斯坦平民；这也将给以色列及其盟友时间，来思考如何与巴勒斯坦人一起建立一个替代哈马斯的合法组织。
此举将为以色列在全球赢得大量支持，并使世界看清哈马斯的真面目：巴勒斯坦领土上的ISIS。
“在当今世界，战场上发生的任何事情都可能在信息领域被推翻，所以讲故事的战争和地面战同样重要，”已退休的海军研究生院战略学教授约翰·阿奎拉说。“如果以色列在加沙反应过度，就会耗尽对以色列残存的好感，这是哈马斯的一大赌注。以色列建设了这么多东西，享有这么多东西，为世界做出了这么多贡献，而且还能做出更多的贡献。赌上这一切，采取一种不会从根本上改变其战略困境的报复或愤怒行动，是非常不明智的。”
但是正如我说的，如果以色列还是认为必须进入加沙，抓捕并杀死哈马斯的领导人，那么必须做到有一个合法的巴勒斯坦领导层来取代哈马斯——而不是由以色列永远掌管那里。如果真是那样，每一个太阳没有照耀加沙、水不能流动、电力不能供应、饥饿或疾病肆虐的日子，都会是每一个以色列人乃至全世界每一个犹太人的错。以色列有背负这个罪责的准备吗？
拜登支持以色列没有错，但他必须现在就从内塔尼亚胡那里得到回答，否则就晚了：一旦以色列推翻哈马斯，谁来治理加沙？如果以色列打算接手，它能出钱重建由它毁掉的基础设施吗？如果它不出，谁来出？以色列打算让加沙南部正在出现的人道危机持续多久？以色列有在加沙建定居点的计划吗？以色列是否尊重加沙的边境？它是否有帮助重建约旦河西岸巴勒斯坦权力机构的计划？
由马哈茂德·阿巴斯领导的西岸巴勒斯坦权力机构是个软弱而腐败的组织，正日渐失去合法性；它连西岸都管不好，何况加沙——这就是内塔尼亚胡想要的效果，他随时可以说他没有和谈的合作伙伴。
不过也不能全落在内塔尼亚胡身上。不管大家信不信，巴勒斯坦人也是有自主性的，而巴勒斯坦权力机构所容忍的腐败，以及阿巴斯赶走迄今最能干的领导人——前总理萨拉姆·法耶兹——这一事实，也起到了很大作用——这件事，每一个巴勒斯坦人的朋友都应该大声说出来，不能只是归罪于以色列。
但说到底，以色列还是需要彻底重新思考自己与西岸巴勒斯坦人的关系——同时也包括整个定居者运动——如果它打算在加沙取代哈马斯的话。如果在以色列政界中对可为与不可为的界定仍然取决于定居者运动，那么西岸还会有灾难发生。
我的底线？只需要问这个问题：如果以色列今天宣布暂时放弃全面入侵加沙的计划，谁会高兴，谁会松一口气，谁会不高兴？伊朗肯定会非常沮丧，真主党会失望，哈马斯会伤心欲绝——它的全盘战争计划落空了——弗拉基米尔·普京会受重挫，因为以色列不会消耗美国本应送往乌克兰的大量弹药和武器了。西岸定居者会怒不可遏。
与此同时，每一个以色列士兵和每一个以色列人质的父母会如释重负，加沙的每一个被卷入战火的巴勒斯坦人会如释重负，以色列在世界上的每一个朋友和盟友——首先就包括约瑟夫·R·拜登——会如释重负。我要说的就这么多。”
——————— 写得非常好。
然而，还是我在上面问bin2bin的那个问题：如果你是以色列，碰到哈马斯这号把以色列灭国作为目的和纲领的，你怎么办呢？
已经结下杀全家的血海深仇了，没办法解了。以色列有能耐就把加沙的人全杀光，留一个人就有一个哈马斯，留两个人就有两个哈马斯。