https://onwisconsin.uwalumni.com/features/great-fall-of-china/ Why Is the Uyghur Population Shrinking? Yi FuxianJul 12, 2022 GREG BAKER/AFP via Getty Images MADISON, WISCONSIN – After becoming the Communist Party of China’s chief of Xinjiang Province in 2016, Chen Quanguo oversaw a security crackdown that led to a drop in births so sharp that it shocked the world. Some observers accused China’s leadership of committing genocide against the province’s mostly Muslim Uyghur population through forced sterilization and abortion. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the allegations as “fake news,” arguing that Xinjiang’s Uyghur population had grown steadily to 12.7 million in 2018, an increase of 25% from 2010 – and higher than the 14% increase in the province’s total population. But recently released 2020 census figures have delivered what amounts to a slap in the foreign ministry’s face. The data show that in 2020, Xinjiang’s Uyghur population had grown by only 16% since 2010, to 11.6 million, compared to a 19% increase in Xinjiang’s total population. Even more shocking, the Uyghur population aged 0-4 was only 36% the size of that aged 5-9. The only comparable antecedent to this plunge in births was in Shandong Province in the early 1990s, where some Party officials tried to launch a campaign to go “newborn-free in 100 days.” By 2000, the population of 5-9 year olds in Tai’an, a city in Shandong, was only 28% the size of the cohort aged 10-14. Back in 1980, when Chinese authorities were discussing the one-child policy, there was even a creepy proposal to have a “newborn-free year” every few years. To understand why Xinjiang’s births have plummeted, it helps to review the history of population control in the province. China implemented family planning nationwide in 1973 and imposed the one-child policy in 1980. But for ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, family planning came later. Starting in 1989, minority urban couples in Xinjiang were allowed two children. Rural couples were allowed two as well, and were less likely to be forced to have abortions and sterilizations. Those “lenient” policies, combined with lagging education, led to higher fertility rates among Uyghurs. For example, the national fertility rates in 1989, 2000, and 2010 were 2.3, 1.22, and 1.18 children per woman, respectively, and 4.31, 2.0, and 1.84 for Uyghur women. Chen’s predecessor, Zhang Chunxian, was keen on population control when he was CPC secretary of Hunan Province from 2005 to 2010. Arguing that “to grasp family planning is to grasp productivity,” he launched a campaign to strengthen family planning in Hunan in 2006. The campaign swept up my cousin-in-law, who was forced to abort her first child a few days before her due date because she had not applied for a birth permit in time. In 2010, Zhang was reassigned to Xinjiang, and Hunan’s new governor, Xu Shousheng, arrived with plans to launch another campaign to strengthen population control in the province. In January 2011, I posted an “Open Letter to the Secretary and Governor of Hunan on Family Planning” online, euphemistically criticizing Zhang and Xu. In response, the Hunan authorities invited me to lecture on the topic in Hunan, and Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur economist and award-winning human-rights defender, joined me in calling for an end to family planning for the Uyghurs. Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Year Ahead 2023 Our annual fourth-quarter magazine is here, and available only to Digital Plus and Premium subscribers. Subscribe to Digital Plus today, and save $15. Subscribe Now Then, on July 31, 2014, Zhang published an essay in the CPC journal Seeking Truth, arguing that Xinjiang must“implement a family-planning policy that is equal for all ethnic groups” and must “lower and stabilize fertility at a moderate level.” I was so concerned that in March 2015, I published a peer-reviewed response in the journal Population and Society, entitled “The urgency of stopping population control in view of the low fertility rates of ethnic minorities.” In the event, Zhang did not strengthen family planning in Xinjiang. Births in the province remained stable during his tenure. But we now know that, under Chen’s rule, births plummeted from 389,695 in 2017 to 267,250 in 2018, and to 159,528 in 2021, implying three-quarters of a million fewer births in 2018-21. Since Chinese authorities have long been notorious for mandating abortion, sterilization, and intrauterine devices, it is natural to assume that the dramatic decline in births in Xinjiang reflects such measures. But matters are not so simple, because there were slightly fewer abortions and IUDs in Xinjiang in 2017-20 than in 2013-16; and though there were 70,000 more sterilizations, that figure is still an order of magnitude smaller than the drop in births. Given that couples in Xinjiang can legally have two or three children, it is unlikely that the authorities systematically forced abortions, ligations, and IUDs on women who had only one or two children. Why, then, was the Uyghur fertility rate in 2020 only one child per woman? Most likely, it is because Chen’s brutal crackdown both undermined Uyghur fertility habits (under the pretext of fighting Islamic extremism) and reduced the resources for parenting, through economic recession and rising unemployment. As rural Xinjiang suffered severe cultural repression and economic deprivation, the fertility rate in 2020 fell to an unusually low level compared to the province’s urban areas. Moreover, improved education has also contributed partly to the decline in births, by leading more women to delay marriage and childbearing. Chinese authorities have invested heavily to provide 15 years of free compulsory education in Xinjiang, compared with nine years nationwide. As a result, Xinjiang’s high-school gross enrollment rate increased from 69% in 2010 to 99% in 2020, while the nationwide rate rose from 83% to just 91%. Uyghurs have suffered from forced sterilization, of course. But it is this forced cultural shift that appears to have had more serious consequences for the birth rate. While the Chinese authorities have been very effective at lowering fertility rates, they have proved to be far less competent at boosting them. The recent “two-child” and “three-child” policies have both been abject failures. Looking ahead, every effort to encourage procreation in Xinjiang will fail if the region’s socioeconomic vitality continues to decline. This failure will cause China to lose its geopolitical advantage in Central Asia, where it is in a struggle for influence with Russia. China’s rulers have heaped praise on Chen, but they have yet to recognize that his security crackdown in Xinjiang sowed the seeds of severe long-term problems.
计划生育的目的终于达到了。
🔥 最新回帖
其实人口多了也一样。资源都被上面占着。下面只有造反了。
其实指的就是养体制内的。
中国政府公务员加上事业单位目前的退休人员应该有几千万人,再加上未来二十年就要进入退休序列的,这些人总量估计很快上亿,他们的养老是需要有人掏钱的。
假设以后每年出生几百万,假设到了2060年以后,那时候的工作人口20-60岁总共40年的总量才三亿人,这里面还包括了病残,无工作不能缴纳养老金的。而未来体制内的退休人员就得一亿多。而且这些人有可靠的医疗网络,未来预期寿命会到100岁左右的。所以才会有1.5个劳动人口负担一位老人的说法,基本无法持续。其主要原因还是2000年前的出生人口太庞大,每年都是近三千万的规模,而又赶上了中国事业单位大爆发的红利,政府,教育、科技、文化、卫生养活了太多的人。而东北有些县区,满打满算只有几万人,而一大套县级政府机构以及学校医院等事业单位,就有几千人。很怀疑那些地方的经济,可能只是靠政府生存的。
所以得抓紧时间种韭菜。
中国什么时候有过社会福利网络,除了体制内的有福利之外?
🛋️ 沙发板凳
一会儿人多力量大要多生,一会儿只生一个好要堕胎;一会儿坚决清零不动摇,一会儿快速过峰为祖国🐑,纯属一bipolar 神经病
只有4亿人,没问题。
问题是,怎么降到4亿?
我觉得大陆6亿人口刚刚好,
1949年之前的中华民国人口才4亿多吧.
随着人工智能的发展,对工人的需求越来越少.
人少,生活的也轻松一 些
“折腾人”这个一直是传统,并不是什么新玩意。
《商君书》驭民五术,如下: 1,愚民:统一思想。 2,弱民:国强民弱,治国之道,务在弱民。 3,疲民:为民寻事,疲于奔命,使民无瑕顾及他事。 4,辱民:一是无自尊自信;二是唆之相互检举揭发,终日生活于恐惧氛围中。 5,贫民:除了生活必须,剥夺余银余财(即通货膨胀或狂印钞票);人穷志短。 五者若不灵,杀之。
你看看这五条,有咩有恍然的感觉。
就这样还有一帮人斯德哥尔摩发作,啥都要唱赞歌。
大外宣拿工资的。
哎,土共就会搞简单粗暴的。
其实之前早就说过,增加高考数学物理难度, 增加职场女性福利(每月5天带薪例假,产假带薪2年),这样就可以提高生育率,降低失业率
不可能 -- 北欧女性福利不可谓不好,女性地位不可谓不高,然而出生率极低,全靠移民甚至是难民撑着。现代工业化社会就是反生育的。
真有的话不知道这个年龄线会划在哪里...
降到四亿没问题,问题是年龄配比如何。
所以有人评论,“治大国如翻大饼”
哪怕用一般智商也不难算啊。国内一年平均死亡人数1000万,月均80万左右。新冠放开是12月份的事情了,多出了的21万基本都是12月中下旬的数,跟月均80万比很合理,有啥不能细想的,还是你压根不会想?
我家乡下那边都支撑不了每村一个小学,小孩子如果不去城里,就全部去乡小学寄宿
接着算别停,你算算火葬场全负荷工作,还需要排出去一个月。那之前有多少冗余?
不懂就问。为什么增加高考数学物理难度会提高生育率?降低失业率?
大约5年前甚至更早开始,连北京都有小学关停了。要不怎么会放开原来的计划生育政策? 生育率早就不行了,当时人口虽然没有负增长,但是人口结构已经很不健康了。太多人口学家说中国是世界上唯一一个“未富先老”的国家。
顶锅盖说一句,我的理解是增加数理难度会让比较多的女同学没学可上,只能回家生娃。本来就不上班,也就无所谓失业率。
这种事情自己想一想就行了,很多事看破不说破。
21万是年轻人不结婚了,
你如果看抖音就知道,大陆年轻人的结婚率一直在下降
我也是这样理解的,但我想了想我初中高中班里学习好的女的比男的多。这个最后会导致男的出来没工作,有时间回家带娃。
人口减少不可怕,可怕的是中国这样未富先老。老年人口比例越来越大,新生人口越来越少,又不可能有大量移民,这样整个社会要出问题的。
米国和中国面积差不多,想象一下人口如果也和中国差不多。。
米国可以靠移民解决人口结构问题,不肯生的白人换成肯生的墨墨。。中国不想开放移民的话确实只能靠人工智能了
更何况现在中国的自然生育率比美国还低了,还没有移民,还不如发达国家富裕。感觉再过几年可能比日本的情况还惨。
你这个想法就和这个 最近 北京某工地的大哥
说的类似,说得容易
我可不希望我家人成为这个 减少的统计数字
https://twitter.com/whyyoutouzhele/status/1610420464735719425?s=46&t=owSoWBq7513gMJ0t4EmKgw
真的有可能。中国政府的人口计算是有假定一定比例的黑户。这么多年各级政府监控下,黑户比例应该减少了很多,但那个假定的比例据说几十年没变过
想到这些 我还是暂时待在美国吧 为了孩子
Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Year Ahead 2023 Our annual fourth-quarter magazine is here, and available only to Digital Plus and Premium subscribers. Subscribe to Digital Plus today, and save $15. Subscribe Now Then, on July 31, 2014, Zhang published an essay in the CPC journal Seeking Truth, arguing that Xinjiang must“implement a family-planning policy that is equal for all ethnic groups” and must “lower and stabilize fertility at a moderate level.” I was so concerned that in March 2015, I published a peer-reviewed response in the journal Population and Society, entitled “The urgency of stopping population control in view of the low fertility rates of ethnic minorities.” In the event, Zhang did not strengthen family planning in Xinjiang. Births in the province remained stable during his tenure. But we now know that, under Chen’s rule, births plummeted from 389,695 in 2017 to 267,250 in 2018, and to 159,528 in 2021, implying three-quarters of a million fewer births in 2018-21. Since Chinese authorities have long been notorious for mandating abortion, sterilization, and intrauterine devices, it is natural to assume that the dramatic decline in births in Xinjiang reflects such measures. But matters are not so simple, because there were slightly fewer abortions and IUDs in Xinjiang in 2017-20 than in 2013-16; and though there were 70,000 more sterilizations, that figure is still an order of magnitude smaller than the drop in births. Given that couples in Xinjiang can legally have two or three children, it is unlikely that the authorities systematically forced abortions, ligations, and IUDs on women who had only one or two children. Why, then, was the Uyghur fertility rate in 2020 only one child per woman? Most likely, it is because Chen’s brutal crackdown both undermined Uyghur fertility habits (under the pretext of fighting Islamic extremism) and reduced the resources for parenting, through economic recession and rising unemployment. As rural Xinjiang suffered severe cultural repression and economic deprivation, the fertility rate in 2020 fell to an unusually low level compared to the province’s urban areas. Moreover, improved education has also contributed partly to the decline in births, by leading more women to delay marriage and childbearing. Chinese authorities have invested heavily to provide 15 years of free compulsory education in Xinjiang, compared with nine years nationwide. As a result, Xinjiang’s high-school gross enrollment rate increased from 69% in 2010 to 99% in 2020, while the nationwide rate rose from 83% to just 91%. Uyghurs have suffered from forced sterilization, of course. But it is this forced cultural shift that appears to have had more serious consequences for the birth rate. While the Chinese authorities have been very effective at lowering fertility rates, they have proved to be far less competent at boosting them. The recent “two-child” and “three-child” policies have both been abject failures. Looking ahead, every effort to encourage procreation in Xinjiang will fail if the region’s socioeconomic vitality continues to decline. This failure will cause China to lose its geopolitical advantage in Central Asia, where it is in a struggle for influence with Russia. China’s rulers have heaped praise on Chen, but they have yet to recognize that his security crackdown in Xinjiang sowed the seeds of severe long-term problems.
锅太小了掉灶台上?
那个层主说的是数学物理,你这个说明难度还是不够。你看看清华男生多还是女生多?MOP男生多还是女生多。
现代人口相比30年前已经是大爆炸了,别看现在增幅减小,但是看看30年前才多少人,大吃一惊 还增长的话,世界大战也不远了 100年前,每当人口爆炸,中国马上就要农民起义,然后人口迅速减半
好久没看过这么无知的言论了。你咋不说两百年前认字的都是男的,认字这个难度够了吧。
北欧职场女性福利够厉害吧,生育率还是不行啊,哦对是因为北欧没有高考,北欧人也没有中国人聪明行了吧。
中共施行了那么多反自然,反人类的政策,是要付出代价的。哪有啥人定胜天,只是报应来的早晚的问题。
恍然!
中国政府这次应该是把家底摸清楚了,各种码,各种核酸筛查,上到百岁老人,下到初生婴儿,都被纳入管理了。没有码的人寸步难行,连快递都买不到,估计把各种黑户,流浪人口都纳入管理了。
总人口数,应该从核酸报告上就能看出来了。至于是不是统计局说了实话,见仁见智。
人口下降和老龄化的过程,就只能苦一苦百姓了
真的假的?预言帝啊 张国荣是03年死的吧
我觉得上边就是这么想的,听以前同事说起谁谁家老人新冠死了,后面都要加一句每个月退休金就上万呢可惜了。
还有说只有8亿的。 这个是个迷, 没啥用
这个预测真实牛X!
2022年绝对的!
记得MIT确实女生比较多
主要是很多老干部都清零了,干休所这种死了很多90以上的老干部,省了很多医疗费用,要知道国内的医保被干部保健都快榨干了。
新生儿男女比呢
比人口统计简单。
都是服务器电脑数据库,发了多少出生证和死亡证,一键即知。
实际上,12月死亡的很多还没统计,但是结论是对的。
不是劳动力的问题,是消费力的问题。劳动力缺的也是最顶尖的技术人才和最底层的苦力(这个不容易被机器取代,机器成本太高),中层劳动力很可能是过剩的,工作并不好找。就算机器能取代所有人的工作,按照当今社会经济靠的是消费的趋势,人口降低消费降低,对经济的影响会非常强烈。
+1
尤其是这些人的一部分最近叛变革命了,动辄习大大开倒车云云。那是没看到邓爷爷的狠。
我看小红书上各种不婚不育保平安的帖子
国家不改变政策 生育率很难上去啊
你想一想 ,家暴不打死不管,属于家事 虐童也属于家事 生娃,做家务 还得上班,一样不能少
国家说要多生,你要是敢做家庭妇女,一旦被离婚,连娃都没有,因为你没有收入 更别指望抚养费了
房子要是男方出大头,就算写你的名字,离了婚还是男方的
就这种环境,生一个可以靠自己强大 不怕被离 生几个,那只能靠男方有良心,娘家强大了
怎么想都还是不生 少生为妙 啊
增加高考数学物理难度会拦住一部分女生(具体参考中国奥数得奖的男女比例)。别杠,杠就是你对
增加女性工作福利,会让雇主在招聘的时候就不选女生。也不存在什么失业率了,大量女性失去受高等教育机会,再失去工作机会,只有回家嫁人生娃。
这用的是柔性办法,不是简单粗暴的强制受精
对,这个是普遍规律,再加上各国各自不同国情。中国是还有超高房价的影响。韩国有女权和男权的冲突对立。
新加坡也是想尽办法,各种好的福利制度,同样收效甚微。因为女性收到教育以后,自我觉醒,就很自然的要进入社会,争取工作和独立的机会,从而很难兼顾生孩子养育孩子的责任。
美国是移民国家,老龄化慢一些。中国降到4亿,老龄化的问题要更快更严重。
这样才好说让老百姓为了国家使劲生啊
中国耕地面积其实比印度还少
婆家有钱或者娘家强大的都跑国外生去了吧,上的是国外户口
还是韭菜馅的
这些黑历史永远洗不干净,把人当牲口,不让你生就给你打掉,想让你生就180度转弯开始舆论施压,别说不尊重妇女,连对8个月胎儿生命都没有起码的敬畏之心
我上大学的时候一个室友的表嫂在农村,怀孕期间东躲西藏,到底在7个多月的时候被抓到了,强制引产。 生下来一个男孩,被打了针没多久就死了。
什么瞎注意!非洲那个地方就不适合人类生存,放开这些人当然愿意来啊,以他们的生育率最后就是全部黑了,华人又斗不过这些蛮荒之地出来的人
中国是monoethnic国家,老百姓心理上不太可能接受大规模黑人移民
此人认为增加高考数学物理的难度就能够淘汰掉很多女性,从而让这些被淘汰的女性不会忙于工作,TA认为这样就能让女性愿意生孩子