Trump should be clear: the U.S. will come to Taiwan's aid if it is attacked.
By Joseph Bosco June 14, 2017
At their meeting at Mar-a-Lago, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping supposedly became new best friends. As a result, Trump said he would not, for now, declare China a currency manipulator and impose new trade sanctions, as he had promised to do during the campaign.
In exchange for this forbearance, Beijing would presumably use its unique leverage to pressure North Korea to end the nuclear and ballistic missile programs China has supported and enabled for over two decades.
Shortly after their meeting, Trump seemed to throw in a further concession, this one on Taiwan. He said he would have to check with Xi before having another phone conversation with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen — after his unprecedented first one had angered Beijing and confounded China experts. Trump thus linked North Korea and Taiwan, two East Asian flashpoints that threaten to ignite U.S.-China conflict.
Regarding the third potential crisis-generator — China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea — nothing was said publicly by either capital during or after the Florida meeting. China’s militarization of its artificial islands continued apace.
Trump was uncharacteristically silent on the subject, but his actions spoke louder than words. He unleashed the U.S. Navy to conduct full-fledged freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s illegal territorial claims, a contrast to the Obama administration’s watered-down innocent passages.
Now it is time for the president also to address two other matters long-neglected by his predecessors, both affecting the security of Taiwan. The first is the question of arms sales to Taiwan, administration action mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979.
Passage of the TRA by veto-proof margins reflected congressional anger at the Carter administration’s severing diplomatic relations with Taipei in favor of Beijing and termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. Ever since, Congress has pushed successive administrations to fulfill U.S. legal obligations to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to defend itself against Chinese aggression. The executive branch has often demurred, delayed, and denied Taiwan’s requests, sometimes for good reason, such as inadequate strategic planning, technical proficiency, or committed funding.
But every sale, no matter how large or how advanced the weaponry involved, inevitably meets with fierce opposition from the People’s Republic, threatening to jeopardize the entire U.S.-China relationship. And Washington, ever-sensitive to Beijing’s moods, has been on the defensive about Taiwan’s defensive arms.
That was particularly true of the Obama administration, which shelved a package of essential arms that had long been pending. Now the Trump team is reported to be putting together an even more robust arms deal but is delaying its announcement for fear of interrupting China’s promised help with North Korea.
The problem is that despite its rhetoric, Beijing, again, is not delivering, and Pyongyang knows it still has China’s indulgence to move ahead with its weapons programs. Trump should show China that he cannot be strung along and approve the Taiwan arms sale expeditiously.
While he is at it, the president should correct a decades-long mistake in U.S. policy: the unwillingness to state forthrightly that America will defend its democratic ally against any aggressive moves by China. That means abandoning the outdated doctrine of strategic ambiguity, which states that we might or might not defend Taiwan “depending on the circumstances.”
Since 1995, when the official equivocation was explicitly declared by the State Department as a cautionary amber light, China has read it instead as an inviting green light to build up its surface and underwater fleets and ballistic missile arsenal to create “the circumstances” that would keep the United States away from a cross-strait conflict.
The Chinese deterrent strategy, known as anti-access and area denial, shows signs of working: if Washington is reluctant to do all it can to help Taiwan defend itself, why should Beijing expect that the United States will itself step directly into the fray?
Only a straightforward declaration by the U.S. president will convince China of that commitment. Donald Trump is the one best positioned to provide China, Taiwan, the region, and the world with the strategic clarity that this Asian flashpoint requires.
Joseph Bosco is a former China country director in the office of the secretary of defense, 2005-2006.
THE DEBATETrump should be clear: the U.S. will come to Taiwan's aid if it is attacked.
By Joseph Bosco June 14, 2017At their meeting at Mar-a-Lago, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping supposedly became new best friends. As a result, Trump said he would not, for now, declare China a currency manipulator and impose new trade sanctions, as he had promised to do during the campaign.
In exchange for this forbearance, Beijing would presumably use its unique leverage to pressure North Korea to end the nuclear and ballistic missile programs China has supported and enabled for over two decades.
Shortly after their meeting, Trump seemed to throw in a further concession, this one on Taiwan. He said he would have to check with Xi before having another phone conversation with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen — after his unprecedented first one had angered Beijing and confounded China experts. Trump thus linked North Korea and Taiwan, two East Asian flashpoints that threaten to ignite U.S.-China conflict.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.Regarding the third potential crisis-generator — China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea — nothing was said publicly by either capital during or after the Florida meeting. China’s militarization of its artificial islands continued apace.
Trump was uncharacteristically silent on the subject, but his actions spoke louder than words. He unleashed the U.S. Navy to conduct full-fledged freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s illegal territorial claims, a contrast to the Obama administration’s watered-down innocent passages.
Now it is time for the president also to address two other matters long-neglected by his predecessors, both affecting the security of Taiwan. The first is the question of arms sales to Taiwan, administration action mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979.
Passage of the TRA by veto-proof margins reflected congressional anger at the Carter administration’s severing diplomatic relations with Taipei in favor of Beijing and termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. Ever since, Congress has pushed successive administrations to fulfill U.S. legal obligations to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to defend itself against Chinese aggression. The executive branch has often demurred, delayed, and denied Taiwan’s requests, sometimes for good reason, such as inadequate strategic planning, technical proficiency, or committed funding.
But every sale, no matter how large or how advanced the weaponry involved, inevitably meets with fierce opposition from the People’s Republic, threatening to jeopardize the entire U.S.-China relationship. And Washington, ever-sensitive to Beijing’s moods, has been on the defensive about Taiwan’s defensive arms.
That was particularly true of the Obama administration, which shelved a package of essential arms that had long been pending. Now the Trump team is reported to be putting together an even more robust arms deal but is delaying its announcement for fear of interrupting China’s promised help with North Korea.
The problem is that despite its rhetoric, Beijing, again, is not delivering, and Pyongyang knows it still has China’s indulgence to move ahead with its weapons programs. Trump should show China that he cannot be strung along and approve the Taiwan arms sale expeditiously.
While he is at it, the president should correct a decades-long mistake in U.S. policy: the unwillingness to state forthrightly that America will defend its democratic ally against any aggressive moves by China. That means abandoning the outdated doctrine of strategic ambiguity, which states that we might or might not defend Taiwan “depending on the circumstances.”
Since 1995, when the official equivocation was explicitly declared by the State Department as a cautionary amber light, China has read it instead as an inviting green light to build up its surface and underwater fleets and ballistic missile arsenal to create “the circumstances” that would keep the United States away from a cross-strait conflict.
The Chinese deterrent strategy, known as anti-access and area denial, shows signs of working: if Washington is reluctant to do all it can to help Taiwan defend itself, why should Beijing expect that the United States will itself step directly into the fray?
Only a straightforward declaration by the U.S. president will convince China of that commitment. Donald Trump is the one best positioned to provide China, Taiwan, the region, and the world with the strategic clarity that this Asian flashpoint requires.
Joseph Bosco is a former China country director in the office of the secretary of defense, 2005-2006.
http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/time-to-end-us-strategic-ambiguity-on-taiwan/
逼着他承认台湾
首頁 > 國際發稿時間：2017/06/15 03:45
最新更新：2017/06/15 03:45
字級：
（中央社記者鄭崇生華盛頓14日專電）美國國務卿提勒森今天說，儘管美、中對「一中政策」有不同解釋，但重要的是，美中交往時，美方完全信守「台灣關係法」，並依照台灣關係法履行所有對台承諾。
聯邦眾議院外交委員會上午召開國務院的預算案聽證會，共和黨籍聯邦眾議員夏波（Steve Chabot）提到台灣與巴拿馬斷交，並認為這是北京壓迫台灣的最新事件，要求提勒森說明美國總統川普政府的對台立場，提勒森回答時做上述表示。
提勒森先說，他認同夏波對目前中國與台灣關係現況的描述，而美中關係過去50年來基於「我們的『一中政策』」，雙方也基於「一中政策」達成許多協定；他還說，中方對「一中政策」自有解釋，美方也有自己的表述，而雙方容許對方各自表述，造就這一地區50年來的穩定，也避免衝突，讓亞太地區經濟大幅成長，美方也受惠。
他指出，當川普政府開始與中國領導層對話時，雖然早期曾有對「一中政策」的質疑，但川普已重申美國信守「我們的『一中政策』」，而「我們也完全信守台灣關係法，並履行基於此一法律下，對台灣的所有承諾」。
提勒森表示，美中現在也討論未來50年後的雙邊關係是什麼樣的情況？如何進入一個穩定、不衝突的時代，對中國而言，台灣「很清楚的」是討論的一部分；但重要的是，當美中交流時，美方能履行對台灣的承諾，而美國完全有意這麼做。
他還說，問題在於「一中政策」能否在未來50年可持續發展，而現在的相關討論在很多方面是非常複雜的，而川普政府尋求在未來50年、在亞太地區建立「穩定、不衝突」的美中關係，台灣、北韓議題都是重要一環，另外，包括中國造島及軍事化人工島礁也是重要議題，這些都在美中雙邊討論中，以確保未來50年的美中關係是不衝突與穩定的。
夏波則說，台灣是美國的親密盟友，但「很慚愧地」，美國也自我設限、按中國要求見或不見台灣的哪些官員，而巴拿馬和台灣斷交的事件，正是中國不斷封鎖台灣國際空間及施壓台灣又一例證。
夏波認為，因為有「台灣關係法」，美國才得以維繫台海和平穩定，然而，台灣海峽仍是潛在熱點，他強調，當北京持續施壓，美國必須正告中華人民共和國，美國會支持台灣。1060614
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/201706150011-1.aspx
读之余还可申请台湾奖助金, Taiwan fellowship
http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/how-trump-can-strike-the-right-tone-with-xi-and-china/
with Beijing & Taiwan.
等到纠结完了，天下大变几度了－～
从2015大选开始以来尤为明显，行政效率低下。无论这位前高管的观点对不对，都不可能付诸施行
这次高调跟TG建交有点让人吃惊。不过应该是看到trump上任后中美关系热络，赶紧抓紧时间跳船，甩了台湾。否则等那天中美关系冷淡下来，巴拿马想跟台湾断交都不行。
中国人早在越南战争朝鲜战争时就与美国认真的交过手！记住台湾海峡现在是够得着的情况了