有年头了，对现实也有借鉴反思的意义。看看下面的评论也非常有意思。我们每个人都是只见树木，不见森林，尤其是现在这个照片，视频，音频都能AI制作的年代，真相有时越来越难以接近。也许要等10年，20年之后吧，才能慢慢看到全貌。我们能做的，就是 be nice to each other，互相包容爱护， 不要轻信，也不要互相恐惧，敌对，即使是以“健康”的名义。
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., by the al-Qaeda terrorist group, a number of investigations were conducted to determine what intelligence may have existed before the attacks and whether this information was ignored by authorities.
Another warning came from Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, in April 2001 in a speech before the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, in which he asked for humanitarian aid for the people of Afghanistan. Massoud told the parliament that his intelligence agents had gained limited knowledge about a large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil being imminent. Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda two days before the 9/11 attacks on September 9, 2001.[3]
In the book MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service, Gordon Corera says that Britain's spy chiefs had known a terrorist attack was coming. Later, Richard Dearlove said that "the fact that a large-scale terrorist event occurred was not a surprise," and that "the fear was that it would be an attack against American interests probably not in the mainland". Eliza Manningham-Buller recalled that "we had prior intelligence that summer of Al-Qaeda planning a major attack" but that "we didn't know, nor did the Americans, where it was going to take place."[4]
Nebulous reports had coagulated and then dissipated over the summer; in June 2001, British and American intelligence held one of their joint summits, according to Richard Dearlove "the primary topic of discussion was a major terrorist event," and that a routine meeting "turned into something not routine...there was an increase in chatter [intercepted communications], an increase in indicators." That month, the British passed on details that a senior Al Qaeda figure was planning car-bomb attacks against US targets in Saudi Arabia in the coming weeks, but the attack did not happen. A British report from 6 July 2001 read: "the most likely location for such an attack on western interests by UBL (Usama Bin Laden) and those that share his agenda is the Gulf States or the wider middle east." A JIC report that month said that attacks were in their final stage of preparation.[5]
On 23 August 2001, the Mossad gave the CIA a list of 19 names of suspects living in the US who were believed to be mounting an attack. Only four of the names are known — Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi — and it is not known if the list had 19 names by coincidence or if it had all the hijackers who would partake in the attacks.[6]
The head of the Algerian state intelligence service DRS, General Mohamed Mediène, known as 'Toufik', had close ties with his counterparts in the US intelligence community, having been received at the Pentagon and CIA headquarters.
A few days before the attacks of 11 September 2001, he went on a confidential mission to the US. With his American interlocutors, he spoke of an imminent large-scale attack against the United States based on a secret memo sent on September 6, 2001 by Smaïn Lamari, the number two in the DRS at the time.
Shortly after the attacks, only two civilian planes were authorized to take off: the one carrying members of the Saudi royal family and people close to Bin Laden, and the one bringing Toufik to Algiers.[7][8]
这不是某个社交媒体扯淡八卦地点。这是英国伦敦市中心河边的一个纪念和哀悼地点。二十多万，不少了。英格兰针对COVID也是采取了很多措施的，任何一个负责任的政府都要做些什么，隔离，疫苗，口罩，等等，而不是网民磨牙扯淡打嘴仗。
希望万一下次这样的事情再发生时，亡羊补牢，措施能更得力更果断更有效
严了要被人骂，松了同样被人骂。
打疫苗被人怼，不打疫苗也被人怼。
猪八戒照镜子，。。里外不是人。
换成咱当总桶，就让大伙自定，想打疫苗的咱有疫苗，想口罩的咱也有，想方仓的咱也有。
想自由猓奔的也允许。。摸石头过河，各按天命，谁也别怨谁。
House of Numbers
有年头了，对现实也有借鉴反思的意义。看看下面的评论也非常有意思。我们每个人都是只见树木，不见森林，尤其是现在这个照片，视频，音频都能AI制作的年代，真相有时越来越难以接近。也许要等10年，20年之后吧，才能慢慢看到全貌。我们能做的，就是 be nice to each other，互相包容爱护， 不要轻信，也不要互相恐惧，敌对，即使是以“健康”的名义。
但无论如何，政府不太可能不作为任由传染病肆虐，总要顶着一部分不满意不同意的人做出TOUGH DECISION
让大伙自己定恐怕够呛，你真让那些瞎JB叫唤自己定的等到出了问题还是要找政府来管
不服谁试试。。。
殊人群
这个社会里有些人真的是plain stupid ，你无法与这类人讲道理的。
比如我，直到今天还在盼望中国足球出线世界杯
不过回过头来看，我个人观察，各国的措施的效果还是有些区别的。这里确有不同的国情，很难整齐划一，但是，以美国雄厚的财力，以巨大的临床和基础研究的如此巨大的规模，却有那么多人感染那么多人死亡，我认为不应该。我个人观察亚洲的日本南朝鲜香港台湾这些比较发达的国家遭遇的损失明显小于美国。当然了这其中的原因三言两语讲不清楚
不用讲道理有二个办法：
1. 强制执行
2. 无为而治
各有利弊。 咱认可2. 各凭天命。
1. 强制执行---没见今早有位反疫苗的说嘛，要人权和自由，强制等同纳粹希特勒。哈哈
2. 无为而治--- 疫情当疫苗还没出来时，那帮又骂草芥人命。
怎么都不是，真难伺候唉，
1，美国的生命到底值不值钱。按说答案是很明显的，美国的人命当然值钱。但是既然值钱，怎么会死掉那么多人。
2，钱重要还是银子重要，这个问题可能并没有那么简单的回答。经济垮掉了命不也就完了？可是，为了银子敢不敢说以三分之一的人感染和死掉一百万人为代价？估计谁也不敢这样直说。
3，政府政策重要还是个人的自由重要？这个可能更是一个难以直接回答的问题。我发现美国的一些人真的为了自己不受管制而付出巨大的健康甚至生命代价。
美国人崇尚自由，不喜欢被人管，带不带口罩做不做防护是个人的自由，商店可以按百分比开，医院可以做核酸，但不可拒收不做核酸的病人，也不可以强制做核酸，包括工作人员，可以用自身的疾病和宗教等不打疫苗，宗教保护一切。
一个歌星可以动员很多家长不给小朋友打疫苗，包括麻疹疫苗，说她儿子打了自闭，人就是这么随性，听歌星的不听专家的。
黑民贵也是，记得当年的打砸抢烧么？这样的运动十几年就来一次，60年代嬉皮士运动，更早期的共产党运动，都一个德性。
疫情早期，口罩和防护服捐的捐，抢的抢，成吨的送到中国，听说当时美国要急用，还有很多在港口囤积等送出去，这个好像不只美国，其他国家都遭同样的劫难。而这些抢物质的人呆家里不出门或者物质备的齐全，回个头来骂美国没本事，不会抄中国的作业，2023年中国怎么放开的？死了多少人？
执政党也不是啥玩意，就以加拿大的土豆，疫情初期，一帮人不戴口罩专门跑去温哥华唐人街吃饭，那个谭女士一直为新冠辩护，我看着她就来气。这些政客为了政治正确不把人命当回事。
美国人命值钱，看那个拯救大兵ryan，为一个人死了多少人？还有911,听说FBI事先知道的，但不想无辜怀疑人就不下令撤出，美加澳和欧洲一些好的西方国家，总有一天会被他们自己折腾死，那些国外居住国的华人会如愿以偿，倒是他们的下一代下下一代连中文都不会说还是杂交的，咋办？回中国？到时中国会要他们？
“还有911,听说FBI事先知道的”，这个猜测有点过于大胆。什么是信息，什么是情报，什么是事实，什么是社交媒体上的闲聊，这其中有重大区别。
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., by the al-Qaeda terrorist group, a number of investigations were conducted to determine what intelligence may have existed before the attacks and whether this information was ignored by authorities.
Clinton era report[edit]In December 1998, the CIA's Counterterrorist Center reported to President Bill Clinton that al-Qaeda was preparing for attacks in the U.S. that might include hijacking aircraft.[1][2]
April 2001 Massoud speech[edit]Another warning came from Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, in April 2001 in a speech before the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, in which he asked for humanitarian aid for the people of Afghanistan. Massoud told the parliament that his intelligence agents had gained limited knowledge about a large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil being imminent. Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda two days before the 9/11 attacks on September 9, 2001.[3]
British intelligence[edit]In the book MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service, Gordon Corera says that Britain's spy chiefs had known a terrorist attack was coming. Later, Richard Dearlove said that "the fact that a large-scale terrorist event occurred was not a surprise," and that "the fear was that it would be an attack against American interests probably not in the mainland". Eliza Manningham-Buller recalled that "we had prior intelligence that summer of Al-Qaeda planning a major attack" but that "we didn't know, nor did the Americans, where it was going to take place."[4]
Nebulous reports had coagulated and then dissipated over the summer; in June 2001, British and American intelligence held one of their joint summits, according to Richard Dearlove "the primary topic of discussion was a major terrorist event," and that a routine meeting "turned into something not routine...there was an increase in chatter [intercepted communications], an increase in indicators." That month, the British passed on details that a senior Al Qaeda figure was planning car-bomb attacks against US targets in Saudi Arabia in the coming weeks, but the attack did not happen. A British report from 6 July 2001 read: "the most likely location for such an attack on western interests by UBL (Usama Bin Laden) and those that share his agenda is the Gulf States or the wider middle east." A JIC report that month said that attacks were in their final stage of preparation.[5]
Israeli intelligence[edit]On 23 August 2001, the Mossad gave the CIA a list of 19 names of suspects living in the US who were believed to be mounting an attack. Only four of the names are known — Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi — and it is not known if the list had 19 names by coincidence or if it had all the hijackers who would partake in the attacks.[6]
Algerian intelligence[edit]The head of the Algerian state intelligence service DRS, General Mohamed Mediène, known as 'Toufik', had close ties with his counterparts in the US intelligence community, having been received at the Pentagon and CIA headquarters.
A few days before the attacks of 11 September 2001, he went on a confidential mission to the US. With his American interlocutors, he spoke of an imminent large-scale attack against the United States based on a secret memo sent on September 6, 2001 by Smaïn Lamari, the number two in the DRS at the time.
Shortly after the attacks, only two civilian planes were authorized to take off: the one carrying members of the Saudi royal family and people close to Bin Laden, and the one bringing Toufik to Algiers.[7][8]
如果每看到一个情报就做出反应，那么一年到头你也不用干别的了，就应对恐怖袭击吧。实际情况是，绝大多数都没出现。事后再去翻后账没有任何意义。
这就跟地震一样。每次地震后，就会有人痛心疾首地讲我早就预报了但是那些昏庸的政府机构不听我的结果造成巨大损失。可是，你真的问他“那你告诉我下一次什么时候在哪发生”，他又答不上来。