The question of further expansion is more complex. The issue goes back over 30 years, to when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was collapsing. There were extensive negotiations among Russia, the U.S. and Germany. (The core issue was German unification.) Two visions were presented. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a Eurasian security system from Lisbon to Vladivostok with no military blocs. The U.S. rejected it: NATO stays, Russia’s Warsaw Pact disappears.
For obvious reasons, German reunification within a hostile military alliance is no small matter for Russia. Nevertheless, Gorbachev agreed to it, with a quid pro quo: No expansion to the East. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker agreed.In their words to Gorbachev: “Not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well, it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.”
“East” meant East Germany. No one had a thought about anything beyond, at least in public. That’s agreed on all sides. German leaders were even more explicit about it. They were overjoyed just to have Russian agreement to unification, and the last thing they wanted was new problems.
There is extensive scholarship on the matter — Mary Sarotte, Joshua Shifrinson, and others, debating exactly who said what, what they meant, what’s its status, and so on. It is interesting and illuminating work, but what it comes down to, when the dust settles, is what I quoted from the declassified record.
President H.W. Bush pretty much lived up to these commitments. So did President Bill Clinton at first, until 1999, the 50th anniversary of NATO; with an eye on the Polish vote in the upcoming election, some have speculated. He admitted Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO. President George W. Bush — the lovable goofy grandpa who was celebrated in the press on the 20th anniversary of his invasion of Afghanistan — let down all the bars. He brought in the Baltic states and others. In 2008, he invited Ukraine to join NATO, poking the bear in the eye. Ukraine is Russia’s geostrategic heartland, apart from intimate historic relations and a large Russia-oriented population. Germany and France vetoed Bush’s reckless invitation, but it’s still on the table. No Russian leader would accept that, surely not Gorbachev, as he made clear.
As in the case of deployment of offensive weapons on the Russian border, there is a straightforward answer. Ukraine can have the same status as Austria and two Nordic countries throughout the whole Cold War: neutral, but tightly linked to the West and quite secure, part of the European Union to the extent they chose to be.
The U.S. adamantly rejects this outcome, loftily proclaiming its passionate dedication to the sovereignty of nations, which cannot be infringed: Ukraine’s right to join NATO must be honored. This principled stand may be lauded in the U.S., but it surely is eliciting loud guffaws in much of the world, including the Kremlin. The world is hardly unaware of our inspiring dedication to sovereignty, notably in the three cases that particularly enraged Russia: Iraq, Libya and Kosovo-Serbia.
先看一篇讨论北约是否向俄国承认不会东扩的文章：
https://posts.careerengine.us/p/6221b9f0c9cfc4230b1bc406?from=latestPostSidePanel
这篇文章的大意是北约没有向俄国做出过不会东扩的承诺，甚至根本没有讨论过东欧国家是否可以加入北约的问题（因此上贴简称为“北约无辜论”）。
本贴就从这里开始。
先说俺这几天略读过的两段文章（基辛格的和乔姆斯基的）的印象：俄国反应激烈，北约有责任（姑且这么说，俺没细读，也没记住，也懒得再查证）。
再看到上面这篇文章。
两者对比。
抛除戈氏与普京基辛格等人的分歧，假设说北约东扩有条约记录的人都错了，只有本贴引文中的戈氏是对的，事实是唯一的，准确的。那么，北约与俄乌之战是不是完全没有关系呢？
只看北约无辜论，从政治、历史、地理、语言几方面来看。
政治上，北约是什么意思？武装同盟。
在历史上，在有关东德的协议达成时，北约的武力存在到达东德已经是俄国能接受的上限。而且只有德国的武力部署在东德才被接受。
地理上，后来加入北约的国家已经远远超过了东德。
在语言上：“只有德国武装力量可以部署东德”是什么意思？是德国武力可以部署到东德，而其他国家可以前出到东德更东的部分？-----这种理解相当于说你不能拿刀在他家院子外头站着，但是可以持刀进到院子里。如果玩儿语言游戏，爱怎么说都行。如果读到里边的政治考量，就会清楚：
俄国为什么不许别国武力部署到东德？北约为什么同意别国武力与核武不部署到东德？因为东德是双方同意的边界。
根据“北约无辜论”，协议没有说到华约国家加入北约的情况。假设真的如此，为什么没讨论？不知道。也许当时谁也没想到。也许有人想到了，但就是不想挑明。
但无论挑明与否，有无承诺，只看公认协议部分，就可以明白：北约与俄双方都清楚他们说的是什么，为什么这么说，又为什么达成这个协议。也就是说，双方同意，北约最东线与俄国之间，至少隔两层国家。
东德以东怎么算？语言解读空间很大。但仅从“北约无辜论”中提到的正式协议内容来看，当时双方把北约边界定在东德最东这种共识是不能抹杀的。否则，双方当时不可能把边界定得这么明确，这么细致。
现在有人归罪于北约，又有人拿协议替北约开脱说北约没有正式承诺。“北约无辜论”也是这个调子。
俺没有看过总统才能看的原始材料，不知道当时有没有任何形式的承诺。
所以，如果有人拿语言做文章，那么在假设“北约无辜论”的事实全部准确而且唯一准确的前提下，北约确实不必承担违反书面承诺的罪名。
但这是语言游戏的规则，不是政治游戏的规则。
如上所说，从可知的正式协议中关于东德武力部署的条款来看，在政治上，双方达成的势力分界共识就是北约东线止于东德。
“北约无辜论”引戈氏采访记录说，东欧国家加入北约问题“没有被讨论”。
无辜论的观点似乎是“没有被讨论”那么北约当然可以随意接收这些国家。
这又是语言游戏，而且是一厢情愿的语言游戏。
因为依同样的“没有被讨论”北约东扩就合理的逻辑，俄国后来明确提出的不要再东扩也是合理的。
这两个合理的诉求冲突了，为什么一定是北约的诉求是正当的？
（这里可能有同学说，东欧主权国家自主要求加入，不关北约。但是对不起，在俄国和北约的水平上来说，这些国家都不过是交易筹码。收与不收，还是北约做主。乌国申请的情况就说明一切）
再退一百步：语言游戏是铁则，协约签了，且解释的权力全归北约。
是不是俄国违约，北约就没有责任了呢？
那就从政治+历史来看。大国政治，从来都是力量平衡。任何协议，都只是在力量失衡时用来撕毁的。从古到今，从来没有变过。
也就是说，协议语言如果是铁则，实力与野心则是火则。铁则遇到火则就没有用了。
这一点，北约清楚，俄国也清楚，任何有过两百年以上历史的国家的政治人物都清楚。
平民想遵守书面协议尽管想，尽管遵守。
而政治人物之所以成为政治人物，很大的原因，就是他的想法跟平民不一样。实力变化，任何协议都挡不住野心变化。
这是政治规则。
明白这个政治规则，北约东扩，无论有没有协议，都可以理解。
同样地，俄国反对，无论有没有协议，也一样都可以理解。
注意，俺说的是可以理解。俺不支持北约东扩，也不支持俄国发动战争。可以理解的意思，就是明白它是怎么回事。
如果你不想谈政治，只想谈法理，谈情怀，谈语言游戏，谈乌国百姓，那么俄国确实坏透了。
但如果你想谈政治，那么俄国的反应就与北约的行为密切相关。
再注意，俺并不是说“俄国应该侵略”，而是说规律如此。比如你生病了，俺说这很自然与天气相关。这不是俺支持你生病或者应该生病；也不是说天气不应该这样，而是说互相作用，规律如此。
北约是本能，俄国也是本能。
如果说到这儿还不清楚，那就再换一个说法：俄乌之战，俺不认为俄国正义，也不认为北约无辜。
* 地图取自知乎（https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/472871022）
更多我的博客文章>>> 放下情感，聊聊政治：从北约是否向俄承诺不东扩说起 站队贴为啥喜欢扯：三说俄乌战争的评论贴 当撒旦向耶酥许诺地上的万国，耶酥却让他退去 政治论题中的宗教情怀：再说站队贴现象 站队的归站队，讲理的归讲理，动情的归动情：给俄乌战争的评论贴归个类
The question of further expansion is more complex. The issue goes back over 30 years, to when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was collapsing. There were extensive negotiations among Russia, the U.S. and Germany. (The core issue was German unification.) Two visions were presented. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a Eurasian security system from Lisbon to Vladivostok with no military blocs. The U.S. rejected it: NATO stays, Russia’s Warsaw Pact disappears.
For obvious reasons, German reunification within a hostile military alliance is no small matter for Russia. Nevertheless, Gorbachev agreed to it, with a quid pro quo: No expansion to the East. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker agreed. In their words to Gorbachev: “Not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well, it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.”
“East” meant East Germany. No one had a thought about anything beyond, at least in public. That’s agreed on all sides. German leaders were even more explicit about it. They were overjoyed just to have Russian agreement to unification, and the last thing they wanted was new problems.
There is extensive scholarship on the matter — Mary Sarotte, Joshua Shifrinson, and others, debating exactly who said what, what they meant, what’s its status, and so on. It is interesting and illuminating work, but what it comes down to, when the dust settles, is what I quoted from the declassified record.
President H.W. Bush pretty much lived up to these commitments. So did President Bill Clinton at first, until 1999, the 50th anniversary of NATO; with an eye on the Polish vote in the upcoming election, some have speculated. He admitted Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO. President George W. Bush — the lovable goofy grandpa who was celebrated in the press on the 20th anniversary of his invasion of Afghanistan — let down all the bars. He brought in the Baltic states and others. In 2008, he invited Ukraine to join NATO, poking the bear in the eye. Ukraine is Russia’s geostrategic heartland, apart from intimate historic relations and a large Russia-oriented population. Germany and France vetoed Bush’s reckless invitation, but it’s still on the table. No Russian leader would accept that, surely not Gorbachev, as he made clear.
As in the case of deployment of offensive weapons on the Russian border, there is a straightforward answer. Ukraine can have the same status as Austria and two Nordic countries throughout the whole Cold War: neutral, but tightly linked to the West and quite secure, part of the European Union to the extent they chose to be.
The U.S. adamantly rejects this outcome, loftily proclaiming its passionate dedication to the sovereignty of nations, which cannot be infringed: Ukraine’s right to join NATO must be honored. This principled stand may be lauded in the U.S., but it surely is eliciting loud guffaws in much of the world, including the Kremlin. The world is hardly unaware of our inspiring dedication to sovereignty, notably in the three cases that particularly enraged Russia: Iraq, Libya and Kosovo-Serbia.
但那可能只是一家之言。
别的有承诺论，也可能只是一家之言。
美俄所有相关文件公开之前，俺哪个也不相信。
满意了吧
别概括俺的话了。
差也。北约东扩只不过是一个方便的借口而已，问题的关键是普京认为乌克兰根本就不是一个正常的国家，因为文化和传统相近，再加上历史上的种种原因（比如列宁的错误等等），在普京的心目中乌克兰本来应当是俄国的一部分，至少应当是俄国的一个附庸国，作为一个附庸国，其重要的国策都要必须要由俄国来钦定（比如和谁交朋友，参加那个组织等等）。但是乌克兰大多数人不这么看，在他们看来乌克兰是一个独立的国家，既然是一个独立的国家，乌克兰就理所当然地享有一个一个独立的国家应该有的一切权力。
或者是被强迫入侵的爱的感情？这恨或者爱得到什么程度，才能让一个国家和执政者发动一场侵略战争？
石凳，建议你多出去走走，少上网：），和普通的街坊邻居交流，然后静下心来想想自己为什么来或还在美国而不选择留在中国或去俄罗斯。也许你已经选择海归，和我一些同学一样，那就祝福你的选择。
我的观点是美国有很多很多很多的缺点，但其他国家有过之而无不及，而且我认为我这个家是拥有自我纠错的能力的：）
忍不住说一句，如果你觉得很过分，请你原谅。
索性多说两句政治不正确的话，也许我潜意识里的确不喜欢俄罗斯。它是侵占中国领土最多的国家，记得金庸在香港回归的时候说过一句话说不去问俄罗斯要那些比香港面积多的多的多的领土。斯大林曾经承诺毛主席要归还一部分沙俄侵占的土地，最后也没有兑现承诺。当然，要那么土地干什么，也是累赘，先把人养活。日俄战争时，俄国兵在东北的一些作为可以说和日本鬼子一样的坏。后来好像中国建国初期的饥荒也与苏联有关。这两个国家是中国的邻居，一向有虎狼之象，只是日本被美国牵制，不敢造次。前几天的空难让我想起小时候听说的另一架东方航空公司的空难，由于是在白令海域靠近俄罗斯的地方出事，机长先要求迫降俄罗斯被拒，后来迫降美军基地，美军给予了极大的援助，这是有史以来第一次民用飞机允许降落军事基地。苏联，还有乌克兰的技术人员都帮助过中国很多，不会忘记。
本贴只是说政治，原理。
北约是其他人加入，没有扩。
苏联灰飞烟灭，恶裸丝和武克烂 都是新主权国。
(发自我的文学城离线浏览器)
但这和俺对俄乌之战的观感无关。
没有放弃感情。
俺只是不想谈感情。好伐
你去听听普京发动侵略的演讲，感情充沛，气冲云霄啊！
俺志在空谈。
空谈就是俺的人设，别的都是借口
把感情也变成空谈
目前只想祸害政治话题
与其说这溯源的话题，保不齐您就能溯源到上帝造人上面去，不如给你支持的俄军出出主意，这现代战争应该怎么打啊，俄军的军事有点落后啊。有时候如果一个人权利太大，下面的人就只会拣好听的说，别是普京被下面的人给忽悠了吧。
北约应该感谢中国没有在军事上支援俄罗斯，凭中国的军事实力如导弹和无人机的精准，如果支持了俄罗斯就不会是现在这个样子。烧高香吧。
中美是既得利益者，觉得祖国在处理这些事物上面的能力更上了一层楼，不像以前一根筋了：）
乌克兰政府应该保持中立。
去联合国提
俺都赞同，但俺接受不起