关于光刻机的底线思维

w
wadaxiwa
楼主 (未名空间)

昨天谢博士说中国搞不出光刻机。我老一夜都没睡好

觉得光刻机这个问题要有底线思维。做最坏打算

如果中国永远搞不出5纳米光刻机。怎么办

答案是,没关系

就像大英帝国如果烧不出瓷器,可以用塑料碗

要发展出新技术,弯道超车

用技术创新,bypass先进国家形成的技术壁垒

k
killfox

属实, 可以手磨芯片, 吊打光刻
【 在 wadaxiwa (囼巴canhelp!) 的大作中提到: 】
: 昨天谢博士说中国搞不出光刻机。我老一夜都没睡好
: 觉得光刻机这个问题要有底线思维。做最坏打算
: 如果中国永远搞不出5纳米光刻机。怎么办
: 答案是,没关系
: 就像大英帝国如果烧不出瓷器,可以用塑料碗
: 要发展出新技术,弯道超车
: 用技术创新,bypass先进国家形成的技术壁垒

m
matrice

28nm足够用
中国市场这么大
全世界造那么多5nm给谁用?

现在一心一意把核弹头数量搞上来才是正道

【 在 wadaxiwa (囼巴canhelp!) 的大作中提到: 】
: 昨天谢博士说中国搞不出光刻机。我老一夜都没睡好
: 觉得光刻机这个问题要有底线思维。做最坏打算
: 如果中国永远搞不出5纳米光刻机。怎么办
: 答案是,没关系
: 就像大英帝国如果烧不出瓷器,可以用塑料碗
: 要发展出新技术,弯道超车
: 用技术创新,bypass先进国家形成的技术壁垒

w
wadaxiwa

手磨芯片这个技术路线已经失败了。再想想还有什么新方法?

比如,通过云计算,绕开高性能手机芯片的瓶颈。通过高速无线传输,实现弯道超车

【 在 killfox (见狐杀狐) 的大作中提到: 】
: 属实, 可以手磨芯片, 吊打光刻

w
wadaxiwa

这个思路好

【 在 matrice (好狗远山飘) 的大作中提到: 】
: 28nm足够用
: 中国市场这么大
: 全世界造那么多5nm给谁用?
: 现在一心一意把核弹头数量搞上来才是正道

T
Texcat

造不出没关系,统一后西方不卖都不行。

d
dinassor

属实老毛子从来也没有光刻机的烦恼,
另辟蹊径模拟电路生活的更美好

【 在 wadaxiwa (囼巴canhelp!) 的大作中提到: 】
: 昨天谢博士说中国搞不出光刻机。我老一夜都没睡好
:
: 觉得光刻机这个问题要有底线思维。做最坏打算
:
: 如果中国永远搞不出5纳米光刻机。怎么办
:
: 答案是,没关系
:
: 就像大英帝国如果烧不出瓷器,可以用塑料碗
:
: 要发展出新技术,弯道超车
:
: 用技术创新,bypass先进国家形成的技术壁垒
T
TheMatrix

技术路线是可以不同。我们看看哪些是必须的。硅片上的数字集成电路,这个是目标,应该是必须的。要搞集成电路,不用光刻行不行?

【 在 wadaxiwa (囼巴canhelp!) 的大作中提到: 】
: 昨天谢博士说中国搞不出光刻机。我老一夜都没睡好
: 觉得光刻机这个问题要有底线思维。做最坏打算
: 如果中国永远搞不出5纳米光刻机。怎么办
: 答案是,没关系
: 就像大英帝国如果烧不出瓷器,可以用塑料碗
: 要发展出新技术,弯道超车
: 用技术创新,bypass先进国家形成的技术壁垒

s
swjtuer

28nm的光刻机是自产吗,人家要禁运咋办
【 在 matrice (好狗远山飘) 的大作中提到: 】
: 28nm足够用
: 中国市场这么大
: 全世界造那么多5nm给谁用?
: 现在一心一意把核弹头数量搞上来才是正道

k
killfox

根本不是自产, 美国要搞死, 分分秒秒
【 在 swjtuer (码农的小船说翻就翻) 的大作中提到: 】
: 28nm的光刻机是自产吗,人家要禁运咋办

s
swjtuer

再问一句,现在能自产的,不需要国外核心零件的,能到啥水平
【 在 killfox (见狐杀狐) 的大作中提到: 】
: 根本不是自产, 美国要搞死, 分分秒秒

b
brighteye

China’s semiconductor ambition just had its first ponzi scheme fully
exposed: Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Manufacturing (HSMC).

The HSMC ponzi scheme was led by a trio of characters, who have zero
expertise in semiconductor (or anything tech related), but are experts in
manipulating local government subsidies, construction contractors, a
renowned but gullible former TSMC executive, and China’s desperate need for homegrown chips to pull of a heist so large it makes Theranos look amateur.

Details of this scheme, documented and exposed in this 36Kr article (in
Chinese; hat tip: Jordan Schneider), illuminates a bigger structural problem in China, where the central government’s desires, and the local
governments’ desire to satisfy those desires, can produce ripe
opportunities to scammers to steal and profit on a monumental scale.

(Note: during the course of writing this article this week, the 36Kr report was deleted.)

The Heist
Let’s first summarize the major elements of the HSMC heist that unfolded
between late 2017 and early 2021 (which may read like a movie script, not
real life):

Part I -- the Trap:

Throughout 2017, a man by the name of Cao Shan traveled across China looking for a local government to invest in his semiconductor scheme. (“Cao Shan” is actually a fake name this person uses, because his real name is already tainted by the scams he used to do back in his hometown.)
Cao eventually found an accomplice, Mr. Long Wei, who worked his connections to get the City of Wuhan’s East-West Lake District Government to provide
land and investment.
Long brought another close friend into the fold: Ms. Li Xueyan, a small
business owner who has opened restaurants and sold Chinese rice liquor.
The trio -- Cao, Long, Li -- formed the board of directors of what became
HSMC.
Part II -- the Money:

Throughout 2018, the trio worked to secure two sources of “income”: direct subsidies from the East-West Lake District Government (aka taxpayer money) and deposits from construction contractors who want to build the HSMC
factory.
Sourcing both government subsidies and contractor deposits is a strategy for scam factory projects to increase the amount of money to be scammed.
The East-West Lake District Government decided to invest in HSMC partly
because of its jealousy of a local rival district, which attracted and
incubated a successful flash storage manufacturer.
To make themselves look important and powerful, the trio would spread false rumors about their personal background. Long was rumored to be the grandson of some high-level official, while Li would pretend to be the sister of some other political figure.
By May 2019, HSMC has received 6.5 billion RMB (~$1 billion USD) of
investment from the district government. Cao and Long have quit the board,
giving Li and her cronies full control. Cao began going to other provinces
to set up similar ponzi schemes.
Part III -- Chiang Shang-Yi, TSMC, and ASML:

By June 2019, the trio targeted and successfully persuaded Chiang Shang-Yi, the legendary founding CTO of TSMC, to join HSMC as its CEO.
To convince Chiang, HSMC spread false rumors publicly that it has already
attracted 100 billion RMB (~$15 billion USD) of investments. They also took advantage of Chiang’s gullibility and professional insecurities. (At the
time, Chiang was a consultant at SMIC, China’s largest chip foundry, with
relatively little influence.)
Using Chiang’s aura, HSMC started aggressively poaching engineers from TSMC with salary packages worth 2 to 2.5x more than what they were earning.
Chiang also used his industry reputation to convince ASML, the Dutch company and world’s leading manufacturer of lithography equipment, to sell one DUV equipment to HSMC. (DUV is not the most advanced equipment, but this is
still a huge coup given heavy US pressure at the time on the Dutch
government to not sell to China.)
By December 2019, the ASML equipment was delivered to HSMC amidst huge
fanfare. The company also secured more investment due to this accomplishment from the district government, totaling 15.3 billion RMB (~$2.4 billion USD).
One month later, the same equipment was offered as collateral to a local
Wuhan commercial bank for a 580 million RMB loan (~$90 million USD) --
another new source of “income” for the heist.
Part IV -- HSMC Collapses, Heist Completed:

During the first half of 2020, while Wuhan was ravaged by the coronavirus,
the trio began siphoning HSMC money away.
One of its primary methods was conducting employee training programs with a company run by Li’s younger brother.
HSMC also refused to pay its construction contractors money, owing tens of
millions of dollars.
By July 2020, it became clear that HSMC was a scam. Chiang left the company. The Wuhan city government started leaking news that HSMC is running out of money.
By November 2020, Li was pushed out of the company and the East-West Lake
District Government took full ownership of HSMC.
By January 2021, Chiang rejoined SMIC. HSMC furloughed all its employees for 40 days and reduced salaries across the board.
This is a timeline (in Chinese) of the major events put together by the 36Kr team:

Central and Local
While the HSMC saga may read like a movie script and an isolated incident,
it’s a symptom of a structural problem. This symptom is amplified by the
high-profile nature of China’s need to produce its own semiconductors.

From the outside, a common stereotype and myth about China is that Beijing’s central government is omnipresent and omnipotent. In reality, the dynamic is more of a call-and-response; the central government calls with directives, local governments respond with implementation plans.

I described the importance of understanding this dynamic last year in Part
II of my “Open Source in China” series. I emphasized the role that
provincial governments play in aligning and allocating resources according
to the central government’s desires, in order to compete for star projects and build new companies. Local officials are motivated to deliver results
for political advancement.

In a recent piece by Matt Sheehan of the think tank MarcoPolo, he also
illustrated this relationship when analyzing China’s plans around “5G+
Industrial Internet.” Four months after the central government issued its
“5G+ Industrial Internet” guidance, the Guangdong provincial government
issued its implementation plan, and the city of Huizhou in the Guangdong
province soon issued its own plan to align with the provincial government’s plan. What tangibly resulted was Guangdong (the province) offering a 30%
public cloud discount to push businesses to move to the cloud, while Huizhou (the city) pledging 100 million yuan (~$14 million USD) in subsidies to
attract so-called “intelligent manufacturing projects” to set up shop
there.

HSMC is the archetypal child of this system -- a new shiny company with a
rockstar legendary CEO that would’ve done wonders for the political future of officials in Wuhan and the East-West Lake District, if it had succeeded. The allure was so strong that no one from the district government bothered
to scrutinize the outlandish promise that Cao pitched -- HSMC will start
producing 14nm chips right away, then quickly advance to 7nm chips and
compete directly with TSMC and Samsung. (A more realistic timeline would be to start with 65nm chips, move to 40nm, and then progressively to denser
chips; a process that could take at least a decade.) Cao knew nothing about semiconductor production, but he did know that the smaller the chip, the
more advanced it is, and the more investment he could scam by promising it.

Herein lies a more vexing problem.

The same reasons that make semiconductor manufacturing hard also make it
easy to scam. Few people have the knowledge to oversee and pinpoint why a
project failed, which party should be responsible, and how to prevent
similar failures. This ignorance extends all the way to the top. When the
National Development and Reform Commission, the central government regulator, learned of HSMC’s failing, its official response was “谁支持,谁负责” (whoever supported the project is responsible). There’s not much more it
could do.

Furthermore, such a failure in the high-profiled semiconductor space is so
embarrassing publicly for the local government that there’s no incentive to litigate the truth, because an honest investigation would inevitably
uncover gross incompetence by local officials. As a case in point, according to 36Kr’s report (now deleted), after the district government took over
ownership of HSMC, it did not spend time inspecting wrongdoings, but instead traveled to Shanghai and other places to try to sell what remains of HSMC
to salvage this failed investment (so far without any success).

For professional scammers like Cao, Long, and Li, semiconductor projects are ripe targets -- low risk, high reward, too complicated for most people to
understand, and too embarrassing to investigate if projects fail.

That’s why Cao, instead of sitting in jail, has formed several other “
semiconductor factory projects” in cities like Jinan and Zhuhai. He is
still out there, trying to replicate other HSMC’s.

Shooting Yourself in the Foot
Last October, I wrote a column “What Can $1.4 Trillion Buy” for The Wire
China, where I identified the two main chokepoints to China’s semiconductor ambition: access to advanced equipment, hiring technical talent. The greed of the “HSMC trio” has managed to shoot China in the foot in both areas,
permanently damaging the prospect of other semiconductor upstarts that may
actually be trying to make chips.

Regarding advanced equipment access, by luring Chiang and using his
reputation to buy ASML’s DUV equipment (only to loan it off for more cash), ASML may never sell to another Chinese semiconductor startup, with or
without sanctions. ASML’s reputation is damaged by this transaction. It
doesn’t sell to any company that has the money to buy; it evaluates the
buyer’s technical capabilities first to make sure the buyer can make proper use of its product. ASML toured HSMC prior to agreeing to sell its
equipment, and lauded HSMC’s team as the best it has seen in Mainland China, mostly on the strength of Chiang’s reputation and the engineers he was
able to attract. ASML now must feel like a fool. But the bigger fool here is China. ASML had a record 2020, selling 258 lithography equipment, primarily to TSMC. ASML doesn’t need the Mainland China market; China urgently needs ASML’s products.

Regarding hiring technical talent, a chilling effect will permeate the
industry, where experienced engineers from Taiwan will think twice about
joining a mainland startup, since even the reputation and judgment of Chiang cannot protect you from scam artists. This situation cuts off the best and most obvious source of talent, given the cultural and language similarities between Mainland China and Taiwan. Poaching talent from South Korea and the United States would be much harder. And training domestic talent will take
much (much) longer.

HSMC isn’t the only semiconductor startup that failed in 2020. Last May, a startup in Chengdu failed after two years of operation and supposedly
attracted $10 billion USD in investment. Last July, another startup based in Nanjing filed for bankruptcy after four years of operation, with a supposed investment size of $3 billion USD. We don’t know yet why these startups
failed.

And that’s the key question: why?

According to a report from Caixin (in Chinese), in just the last three years, the number of semiconductor startups in China have increased by more than 50%. Moreover, the amount of investment has increased 6-times, from $946
million USD in 2018 to $6.16 billion USD in 2019. For the first half of 2020, investment has reached $8.46 billion USD.

Source: https://finance.sina.com.cn/tech/2021-01-04/doc-iiznezxt0546437.
shtml
Undoubtedly, not all of these investors know what they are investing in;
most of them don’t. Similarly, not all of these startups will succeed; most of them won’t.

Failures are inevitable for something as hard as semiconductor manufacturing. Learning about why failures happen is an important necessity to a new
industry’s growth and maturity. But what did China’s fledgling
semiconductor industry learn from the HSMC experience?

Based on 36Kr’s calculation, the “HSMC trio” stole in total 12.4 billion RMB (~$2 billion USD) in three years from the three-course meal of district government investment, contractor deposits, and bank loans. (In comparison, Theranos evaporated roughly $1.4 billion USD of its gullible investors’
money in about 15 years.)

The HSMC heist has managed to make Theranos look somewhat benign. If HSMC
isn’t treated as a criminal act (like Theranos) but as just another failed startup in a frothy market, it will likely not be China’s only “
semiconductor Theranos.”
k
killfox

取决于禁运有多严格, 基本上是国外淘汰制程的水平
【 在 swjtuer (码农的小船说翻就翻) 的大作中提到: 】
: 再问一句,现在能自产的,不需要国外核心零件的,能到啥水平