The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been largely overlooked: Should the United States trim its East Asian commitments to reduce the odds of going to war with China?
The question of which commitments to keep and which to cut should come up whenever there are big shifts in the global balance of power. A rising power may be able to achieve previously unobtainable goals and embrace new goals, while the declining power may find that its existing commitments are becoming costlier and riskier to maintain.
Such is the case with China and the United States today. Beijing has acquired military capabilities that were far beyond its reach a couple of decades ago. It has built up its “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities, which are designed to prevent U.S. forces from operating close to Chinese territory. It now has a reasonable prospect of prevailing in a war over Taiwan and is acquiring the ability to sustain naval forces across the South China Sea. At the same time, its leaders are becoming more provocative and have made it exceedingly clear that unification with Taiwan is a pressing goal. China’s improved military capabilities reduce the United States’ ability to deter, and its increasingly intense maritime disputes raise the risk of accidents. As a result, a terrifying prospect is growing more likely: a major war between the world’s two foremost powers.
Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. The emerging debate over U.S. China policy, however, recognizes only half of the logic of decline. Officials and analysts understand that as its capabilities increase, China will increasingly challenge U.S. commitments, and the probability of war will rise. But they are forgetting the second part of the equation: that for the declining power, the best option may be to cut back on its commitments. In East Asia, that would mean giving Beijing greater leeway in the South China Sea, letting go of Taiwan, and accepting that the United States is no longer the dominant power it once was in the region. These are hard choices, but maintaining the status quo is also a choice—and an increasingly dangerous one.
COMMITMENT ISSUES To evaluate the United States’ commitments in East Asia, one must first rank the country’s interests there and estimate China’s capability to threaten them. All else being equal, Washington should be much more reluctant to reduce commitments that protect vital interests than ones that protect secondary interests. Fortunately, the one truly vital interest—the safety of the U.S. homeland—is not at risk. The United States and China are separated by a vast ocean, which makes conventional invasion virtually impossible. And even though China is modernizing its nuclear force, the U.S. arsenal is far bigger and more advanced. Washington will be able to maintain its deterrent capabilities with ease.
Next in this hierarchy of U.S. interests is the protection of East Asian allies—chief among them Japan and South Korea. For decades, the United States has cherished its security alliances with these large, rich, and strategically located countries. U.S. leaders still consider these relationships essential for preventing China from dominating its region, stopping South Korea and Japan from obtaining nuclear weapons, and preserving U.S. global leadership. Even scholars who advocate a more limited grand strategy of “offshore balancing” and wish to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe and the Persian Gulf maintain that U.S. alliances in Asia are necessary.
The prospects for defending these interests remain good. China’s ability to threaten U.S. allies is growing, but Japan, with U.S. help, should be able to fend off a Chinese attack. Invasion across several hundred miles of water has never been easy, and it is even harder today thanks to advanced surveillance technologies and accurate conventional weapons. Although China would have an easier time enacting a blockade designed to strangle and coerce Japan, that, too, would likely fail. Japan lies beyond the effective reach of China’s A2/AD capabilities and could thus be supplied from its eastern ports. South Korea, closer to China, is more vulnerable, but it, too, would likely prevail with U.S. help.
A terrifying prospect is growing more likely: a major war between the world ’s two foremost powers. Further down the hierarchy of U.S. interests is Taiwan. Since formally recognizing China in 1979, the United States has maintained unofficial relations with the Taiwanese government. Washington has signaled a somewhat ambiguous commitment to defend the island if China launches an unprovoked attack and has sold it tens of billions of dollars’ worth of arms. Compared with the U.S. commitment to Japan and South Korea, the obligation to Taiwan is much riskier. Beijing has both the motive and, increasingly, the means to forcibly bring Taiwan under its control. Chinese leaders consider the island part of China, and with only 110 miles separating Taiwan from the mainland, it is more vulnerable to Chinese conventional forces.
Taiwan is not a vital U.S. interest—its size and wealth put it at a rank below the major powers—but it is a vibrant democracy of 23 million people. Unlike Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is rarely framed in terms of U.S. security. Instead, the key rationales that U.S. officials offer for protecting the island are ideological and humanitarian: democracies in general should be defended, and Taiwan in particular is worthy of protection, since it is a precious success story that would no doubt be snuffed out were it to fall under China’s authoritarian control. Beginning in the 1980s, Beijing spoke of “one country, two systems,” the idea that Taiwan would be integrated with the mainland but governed under its own system. That notion was always a bit tenuous. China’s recent repression of Hong Kong has made it appear entirely unrealistic.
Although the ideological and humanitarian rationales for protecting Taiwan are sound, many analysts go further, arguing that basic U.S. security interests are at stake, too. If Washington were to terminate its commitment to Taiwan, they say, U.S. credibility across the region would suffer. China would question whether the United States would actually come to the defense of Japan or South Korea. Harboring the same doubts, U.S. allies might be tempted to bandwagon with Beijing. Some analysts make a second claim, contending that by controlling Taiwan, China could extend its military reach by basing both its attack submarines and its nuclear-armed submarines there. The ability of U.S. conventional forces to reach China would be reduced; China’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack, increased.
But there is good reason to doubt this doomsday scenario. Even if it ended its commitment to Taiwan, the United States could preserve its credibility with Japan and South Korea. These allies would no doubt understand that Taiwan was less important to the United States than they are and that the risks of protecting it were much higher. Letting go of Taiwan should suggest little, if anything, about the strength of Washington’s commitment to Tokyo and Seoul. What’s more, the United States could take action to reinforce these commitments—for example, stationing more troops in the Indo-Pacific and further integrating military planning and operations with allies.
For a declining power, the best option may be to cut back on its commitments. As for the effect that China’s control of Taiwan would have on its ability to fight the United States, there is likewise little cause for concern. Even if Chinese nuclear-armed submarines enjoyed newfound access to the Pacific Ocean, whose vast expanse might increase their survivability, the United States’ retaliatory capability would not be diminished. Its nuclear deterrent would remain highly effective. The conventional military threat is harder to assess, but again, there is evidence to suggest that the threat posed by Chinese submarines might be bigger, but not by much. China’s land- and sea-based forces already pose a threat to U.S. forces within range of China. Moreover, the U.S. Navy could likely deploy its antisubmarine warfare assets—attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and ocean surveillance ships—to greatly reduce the ability of Chinese submarines to leave Taiwan. All that said, even if Chinese conventional capabilities did grow as a result of control over Taiwan, it wouldn’t matter as much; because the United States would no longer be committed to protecting Taiwan, the odds of a major war with China would drop precipitously.
Below Taiwan in the hierarchy of U.S. interests in East Asia lies the South China Sea. In these waters, many analysts argue, Washington has an interest in preventing China from interrupting the flow of trade. The United States has long sworn to preserve freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, made ambiguous commitments to protect the Philippines’ maritime claims, and criticized China for building military bases in the Spratly Islands.
Again, the danger of ending this commitment is probably overstated. In peacetime, of course, all countries have an interest in keeping these sea- lanes open. But even in the midst of a war in which China managed to close off the South China Sea, shipping that usually entered that sea after passing through the Strait of Malacca could instead bypass the South China Sea, reaching Japan and South Korea via the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the Philippines. China, by contrast, would be in a much tighter spot. Goods coming to and from its major ports have little choice but to pass through the South China Sea. And even if China somehow managed to solve this problem, much of Chinese trade would still need to travel across the Indian Ocean, which would remain dominated by the U.S. Navy.
THE CASE FOR CONCESSIONS Not all interests are created equal, nor are the threats to them equivalent. So why should the United States treat its varied interests in East Asia the same way? The alliances with Japan and South Korea are both important and relatively low risk, so Washington should continue protecting them. But when it comes to the commitments to Taiwan and to the South China Sea, the logic of current policy is much less defensible. There is a strong case for cutting back on these commitments.
Concessions on these interests could take a variety of forms. The most attractive type would be a grand bargain, in which the United States agreed to end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for China agreeing to resolve its South China Sea disputes with the other claimants. Yet the time for such a geopolitical compromise has passed. China has hardened its positions on the South China Sea and on the U.S. role in East Asia.
Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a great deal of risk.That leaves a less attractive option: the unilateral shedding of U.S. commitments. One form that choice could take is appeasement—concessions that were granted with no expectation of reciprocity and designed to satisfy China’s interest in expansion. Appeasement, however, would now be a bad bet, given that a total U.S. withdrawal from East Asia might be required to satisfy Beijing. A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States could end its commitment to Taiwan and scale back its opposition to China’s assertive policies simply to avoid conflict. Washington would be seeking a clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or tertiary interests. Retrenchment’s success would not depend on whether China’s goals are limited or on whether China agreed with the United States on the purpose of the concessions.
What would this policy look like in practice? The United States would make its revised position public, thereby laying the foundation to minimize pressure from foreign policy elites and the public to intervene if China attacked Taiwan. It would continue to make clear that China’s use of force to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms, and it could even continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult. Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, Washington could boost spending to preserve and even enhance its capability to defend Japan and South Korea. These investments would send a clear signal to China and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the commitments it hasn’t cut.
HARD CHOICES Under the current strategy of preserving all U.S. commitments in East Asia, the risk of a major war with China is small (although growing). But unlikely events with massive consequences deserve to be taken seriously. The costs of a U.S.-Chinese war would be enormous, even catastrophic were it to go nuclear. And yet policymakers have shown little interest in scaling back the commitments that make such a war imaginable.
Retrenchment may not be getting the hearing it deserves because it clashes with the United States’ self-perception as the global superpower. For those who see the United States as the winner of the Cold War, the creator and leader of the liberal international order, and the protector of much of what is worth protecting, retrenchment is simply too jarring. This is a dangerous reflex. This attachment to a certain identity could act as a barrier to revising policy, leading the United States to insist on preserving the status quo when its material interests point in the opposite direction. Although China’s rise should not cause the United States to change its values, including respect for democracies, it should prompt it to update its self-image and accept some loss of status.
Most observers appear to believe that the United States is pursuing a cautious policy: after all, it is simply maintaining its existing commitments. Yet a declining power determined to preserve the status quo can in fact be engaging in very risky behavior. This is what the United States is doing today. Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a great deal of risk, clinging to old commitments as the balance of power in East Asia shifts. The burden for sustaining the current policy should lie with its proponents, who should acknowledge the risks and spell out why they are warranted. Without having this debate, the United States will continue, almost on autopilot, to preserve its commitments in the region, even though what is likely called for is a long-overdue change in course.
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】 : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington- avoiding- : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been : ...................
“Taiwan is like two feet from China,” Trump was quoted as saying to an unnamed Republican senator in 2019, according to the book by Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin. “We are eight thousand miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it.”
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】 : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington- avoiding- : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been : ...................
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】 : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington- avoiding- : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been : ...................
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】 : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ : : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington- avoiding- : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china : : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia : : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been : largely overlooked: Should the United States trim its East Asian commitments : to reduce the odds of going to war with China? : : The question of which commitments to keep and which to cut should come up : whenever there are big shifts in the global balance of power. A rising power : may be able to achieve previously unobtainable goals and embrace new goals, : while the declining power may find that its existing commitments are : becoming costlier and riskier to maintain. : : Such is the case with China and the United States today. Beijing has : acquired military capabilities that were far beyond its reach a couple of : decades ago. It has built up its “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) : capabilities, which are designed to prevent U.S. forces from operating close : to Chinese territory. It now has a reasonable prospect of prevailing in a : war over Taiwan and is acquiring the ability to sustain naval forces across : the South China Sea. At the same time, its leaders are becoming more : provocative and have made it exceedingly clear that unification with Taiwan : is a pressing goal. China’s improved military capabilities reduce the : United States’ ability to deter, and its increasingly intense maritime : disputes raise the risk of accidents. As a result, a terrifying prospect is : growing more likely: a major war between the world’s two foremost powers.: : Stay informed. : In-depth analysis delivered weekly. : The emerging debate over U.S. China policy, however, recognizes only half of : the logic of decline. Officials and analysts understand that as its : capabilities increase, China will increasingly challenge U.S. commitments, : and the probability of war will rise. But they are forgetting the second : part of the equation: that for the declining power, the best option may be : to cut back on its commitments. In East Asia, that would mean giving Beijing : greater leeway in the South China Sea, letting go of Taiwan, and accepting : that the United States is no longer the dominant power it once was in the : region. These are hard choices, but maintaining the status quo is also a : choice—and an increasingly dangerous one. : : COMMITMENT ISSUES : To evaluate the United States’ commitments in East Asia, one must first : rank the country’s interests there and estimate China’s capability to : threaten them. All else being equal, Washington should be much more : reluctant to reduce commitments that protect vital interests than ones that : protect secondary interests. Fortunately, the one truly vital interest— the : safety of the U.S. homeland—is not at risk. The United States and China are : separated by a vast ocean, which makes conventional invasion virtually : impossible. And even though China is modernizing its nuclear force, the U.S. : arsenal is far bigger and more advanced. Washington will be able to : maintain its deterrent capabilities with ease. : : Next in this hierarchy of U.S. interests is the protection of East Asian : allies—chief among them Japan and South Korea. For decades, the United : States has cherished its security alliances with these large, rich, and : strategically located countries. U.S. leaders still consider these : relationships essential for preventing China from dominating its region, : stopping South Korea and Japan from obtaining nuclear weapons, and : preserving U.S. global leadership. Even scholars who advocate a more limited : grand strategy of “offshore balancing” and wish to withdraw U.S. forces : from Europe and the Persian Gulf maintain that U.S. alliances in Asia are : necessary. : : The prospects for defending these interests remain good. China’s ability to : threaten U.S. allies is growing, but Japan, with U.S. help, should be able : to fend off a Chinese attack. Invasion across several hundred miles of water : has never been easy, and it is even harder today thanks to advanced : surveillance technologies and accurate conventional weapons. Although China : would have an easier time enacting a blockade designed to strangle and : coerce Japan, that, too, would likely fail. Japan lies beyond the effective : reach of China’s A2/AD capabilities and could thus be supplied from its : eastern ports. South Korea, closer to China, is more vulnerable, but it, too : , would likely prevail with U.S. help. : : A terrifying prospect is growing more likely: a major war between the world : ’s two foremost powers. : Further down the hierarchy of U.S. interests is Taiwan. Since formally : recognizing China in 1979, the United States has maintained unofficial : relations with the Taiwanese government. Washington has signaled a somewhat : ambiguous commitment to defend the island if China launches an unprovoked : attack and has sold it tens of billions of dollars’ worth of arms. Compared : with the U.S. commitment to Japan and South Korea, the obligation to Taiwan : is much riskier. Beijing has both the motive and, increasingly, the means : to forcibly bring Taiwan under its control. Chinese leaders consider the : island part of China, and with only 110 miles separating Taiwan from the : mainland, it is more vulnerable to Chinese conventional forces. : : Taiwan is not a vital U.S. interest—its size and wealth put it at a rank : below the major powers—but it is a vibrant democracy of 23 million people. : Unlike Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is rarely framed in terms of U.S. : security. Instead, the key rationales that U.S. officials offer for : protecting the island are ideological and humanitarian: democracies in : general should be defended, and Taiwan in particular is worthy of protection : , since it is a precious success story that would no doubt be snuffed out : were it to fall under China’s authoritarian control. Beginning in the 1980s : , Beijing spoke of “one country, two systems,” the idea that Taiwan would : be integrated with the mainland but governed under its own system. That : notion was always a bit tenuous. China’s recent repression of Hong Kong has : made it appear entirely unrealistic. : : Although the ideological and humanitarian rationales for protecting Taiwan : are sound, many analysts go further, arguing that basic U.S. security : interests are at stake, too. If Washington were to terminate its commitment : to Taiwan, they say, U.S. credibility across the region would suffer. China : would question whether the United States would actually come to the defense : of Japan or South Korea. Harboring the same doubts, U.S. allies might be : tempted to bandwagon with Beijing. Some analysts make a second claim, : contending that by controlling Taiwan, China could extend its military reach : by basing both its attack submarines and its nuclear-armed submarines there : . The ability of U.S. conventional forces to reach China would be reduced; : China’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack, increased. : : But there is good reason to doubt this doomsday scenario. Even if it ended : its commitment to Taiwan, the United States could preserve its credibility : with Japan and South Korea. These allies would no doubt understand that : Taiwan was less important to the United States than they are and that the : risks of protecting it were much higher. Letting go of Taiwan should suggest : little, if anything, about the strength of Washington’s commitment to : Tokyo and Seoul. What’s more, the United States could take action to : reinforce these commitments—for example, stationing more troops in the Indo : -Pacific and further integrating military planning and operations with : allies. : : For a declining power, the best option may be to cut back on its commitments. : As for the effect that China’s control of Taiwan would have on its ability : to fight the United States, there is likewise little cause for concern. Even : if Chinese nuclear-armed submarines enjoyed newfound access to the Pacific : Ocean, whose vast expanse might increase their survivability, the United : States’ retaliatory capability would not be diminished. Its nuclear : deterrent would remain highly effective. The conventional military threat is : harder to assess, but again, there is evidence to suggest that the threat : posed by Chinese submarines might be bigger, but not by much. China’s land- : and sea-based forces already pose a threat to U.S. forces within range of : China. Moreover, the U.S. Navy could likely deploy its antisubmarine warfare : assets—attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and ocean surveillance : ships—to greatly reduce the ability of Chinese submarines to leave Taiwan. : All that said, even if Chinese conventional capabilities did grow as a : result of control over Taiwan, it wouldn’t matter as much; because the : United States would no longer be committed to protecting Taiwan, the odds of : a major war with China would drop precipitously. : : Below Taiwan in the hierarchy of U.S. interests in East Asia lies the South : China Sea. In these waters, many analysts argue, Washington has an interest : in preventing China from interrupting the flow of trade. The United States : has long sworn to preserve freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, : made ambiguous commitments to protect the Philippines’ maritime claims, and : criticized China for building military bases in the Spratly Islands. : : Again, the danger of ending this commitment is probably overstated. In : peacetime, of course, all countries have an interest in keeping these sea-: lanes open. But even in the midst of a war in which China managed to close : off the South China Sea, shipping that usually entered that sea after : passing through the Strait of Malacca could instead bypass the South China : Sea, reaching Japan and South Korea via the archipelagic waters of Indonesia : and the Philippines. China, by contrast, would be in a much tighter spot. : Goods coming to and from its major ports have little choice but to pass : through the South China Sea. And even if China somehow managed to solve this : problem, much of Chinese trade would still need to travel across the Indian : Ocean, which would remain dominated by the U.S. Navy. : : THE CASE FOR CONCESSIONS : Not all interests are created equal, nor are the threats to them equivalent. : So why should the United States treat its varied interests in East Asia the : same way? The alliances with Japan and South Korea are both important and : relatively low risk, so Washington should continue protecting them. But when : it comes to the commitments to Taiwan and to the South China Sea, the logic : of current policy is much less defensible. There is a strong case for : cutting back on these commitments. : : Concessions on these interests could take a variety of forms. The most : attractive type would be a grand bargain, in which the United States agreed : to end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for China agreeing to resolve : its South China Sea disputes with the other claimants. Yet the time for such : a geopolitical compromise has passed. China has hardened its positions on : the South China Sea and on the U.S. role in East Asia. : : Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a great deal of risk. : That leaves a less attractive option: the unilateral shedding of U.S. : commitments. One form that choice could take is appeasement—concessions : that were granted with no expectation of reciprocity and designed to satisfy : China’s interest in expansion. Appeasement, however, would now be a bad : bet, given that a total U.S. withdrawal from East Asia might be required to : satisfy Beijing. A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States could : end its commitment to Taiwan and scale back its opposition to China’s : assertive policies simply to avoid conflict. Washington would be seeking a : clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or : tertiary interests. Retrenchment’s success would not depend on whether : China’s goals are limited or on whether China agreed with the United States : on the purpose of the concessions. : : What would this policy look like in practice? The United States would make : its revised position public, thereby laying the foundation to minimize : pressure from foreign policy elites and the public to intervene if China : attacked Taiwan. It would continue to make clear that China’s use of force : to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms, and it could even : continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult. : Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, Washington : could boost spending to preserve and even enhance its capability to defend : Japan and South Korea. These investments would send a clear signal to China : and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the : commitments it hasn’t cut. : : HARD CHOICES : Under the current strategy of preserving all U.S. commitments in East Asia, : the risk of a major war with China is small (although growing). But unlikely : events with massive consequences deserve to be taken seriously. The costs : of a U.S.-Chinese war would be enormous, even catastrophic were it to go : nuclear. And yet policymakers have shown little interest in scaling back the : commitments that make such a war imaginable. : : Retrenchment may not be getting the hearing it deserves because it clashes : with the United States’ self-perception as the global superpower. For those : who see the United States as the winner of the Cold War, the creator and : leader of the liberal international order, and the protector of much of what : is worth protecting, retrenchment is simply too jarring. This is a : dangerous reflex. This attachment to a certain identity could act as a : barrier to revising policy, leading the United States to insist on : preserving the status quo when its material interests point in the opposite : direction. Although China’s rise should not cause the United States to : change its values, including respect for democracies, it should prompt it to : update its self-image and accept some loss of status. : : Most observers appear to believe that the United States is pursuing a : cautious policy: after all, it is simply maintaining its existing : commitments. Yet a declining power determined to preserve the status quo can : in fact be engaging in very risky behavior. This is what the United States : is doing today. Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a : great deal of risk, clinging to old commitments as the balance of power in : East Asia shifts. The burden for sustaining the current policy should lie : with its proponents, who should acknowledge the risks and spell out why they : are warranted. Without having this debate, the United States will continue, : almost on autopilot, to preserve its commitments in the region, even though : what is likely called for is a long-overdue change in course.
【 在 harubashi (春橋) 的大作中提到: 】 : 明珠党的《求实》杂志都发话了，那就是要放弃了。 : : 【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】 : : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ : : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington- : avoiding- : : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china : : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia : : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is : a : : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with : : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses : on : : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies : : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to : blunt : : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been : : ...................
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】 : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington- avoiding- : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been : ...................
[在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到：] :僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ :https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-and-china :The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia :On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with :increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies :should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been :largely overlooked: Should the United States trim its East Asian commitments to reduce the odds of going to war with China? :The question of which commitments to keep and which to cut should come up :whenever there are big shifts in the global balance of power. A rising power may be able to achieve previously unobtainable goals and embrace new goals, while the declining power may find that its existing commitments are :becoming costlier and riskier to maintain. :..........
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】 : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？ : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington- avoiding- : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been : ...................
僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with
increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been
largely overlooked: Should the United States trim its East Asian commitments to reduce the odds of going to war with China?
The question of which commitments to keep and which to cut should come up
whenever there are big shifts in the global balance of power. A rising power may be able to achieve previously unobtainable goals and embrace new goals, while the declining power may find that its existing commitments are
becoming costlier and riskier to maintain.
Such is the case with China and the United States today. Beijing has
acquired military capabilities that were far beyond its reach a couple of
decades ago. It has built up its “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD)
capabilities, which are designed to prevent U.S. forces from operating close to Chinese territory. It now has a reasonable prospect of prevailing in a
war over Taiwan and is acquiring the ability to sustain naval forces across the South China Sea. At the same time, its leaders are becoming more
provocative and have made it exceedingly clear that unification with Taiwan is a pressing goal. China’s improved military capabilities reduce the
United States’ ability to deter, and its increasingly intense maritime
disputes raise the risk of accidents. As a result, a terrifying prospect is growing more likely: a major war between the world’s two foremost powers.
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The emerging debate over U.S. China policy, however, recognizes only half of the logic of decline. Officials and analysts understand that as its
capabilities increase, China will increasingly challenge U.S. commitments,
and the probability of war will rise. But they are forgetting the second
part of the equation: that for the declining power, the best option may be
to cut back on its commitments. In East Asia, that would mean giving Beijing greater leeway in the South China Sea, letting go of Taiwan, and accepting that the United States is no longer the dominant power it once was in the
region. These are hard choices, but maintaining the status quo is also a
choice—and an increasingly dangerous one.
COMMITMENT ISSUES
To evaluate the United States’ commitments in East Asia, one must first
rank the country’s interests there and estimate China’s capability to
threaten them. All else being equal, Washington should be much more
reluctant to reduce commitments that protect vital interests than ones that protect secondary interests. Fortunately, the one truly vital interest—the safety of the U.S. homeland—is not at risk. The United States and China are separated by a vast ocean, which makes conventional invasion virtually
impossible. And even though China is modernizing its nuclear force, the U.S. arsenal is far bigger and more advanced. Washington will be able to
maintain its deterrent capabilities with ease.
Next in this hierarchy of U.S. interests is the protection of East Asian
allies—chief among them Japan and South Korea. For decades, the United
States has cherished its security alliances with these large, rich, and
strategically located countries. U.S. leaders still consider these
relationships essential for preventing China from dominating its region,
stopping South Korea and Japan from obtaining nuclear weapons, and
preserving U.S. global leadership. Even scholars who advocate a more limited grand strategy of “offshore balancing” and wish to withdraw U.S. forces
from Europe and the Persian Gulf maintain that U.S. alliances in Asia are
necessary.
The prospects for defending these interests remain good. China’s ability to threaten U.S. allies is growing, but Japan, with U.S. help, should be able to fend off a Chinese attack. Invasion across several hundred miles of water has never been easy, and it is even harder today thanks to advanced
surveillance technologies and accurate conventional weapons. Although China would have an easier time enacting a blockade designed to strangle and
coerce Japan, that, too, would likely fail. Japan lies beyond the effective reach of China’s A2/AD capabilities and could thus be supplied from its
eastern ports. South Korea, closer to China, is more vulnerable, but it, too, would likely prevail with U.S. help.
A terrifying prospect is growing more likely: a major war between the world
’s two foremost powers.
Further down the hierarchy of U.S. interests is Taiwan. Since formally
recognizing China in 1979, the United States has maintained unofficial
relations with the Taiwanese government. Washington has signaled a somewhat ambiguous commitment to defend the island if China launches an unprovoked
attack and has sold it tens of billions of dollars’ worth of arms. Compared with the U.S. commitment to Japan and South Korea, the obligation to Taiwan is much riskier. Beijing has both the motive and, increasingly, the means
to forcibly bring Taiwan under its control. Chinese leaders consider the
island part of China, and with only 110 miles separating Taiwan from the
mainland, it is more vulnerable to Chinese conventional forces.
Taiwan is not a vital U.S. interest—its size and wealth put it at a rank
below the major powers—but it is a vibrant democracy of 23 million people. Unlike Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is rarely framed in terms of U.S.
security. Instead, the key rationales that U.S. officials offer for
protecting the island are ideological and humanitarian: democracies in
general should be defended, and Taiwan in particular is worthy of protection, since it is a precious success story that would no doubt be snuffed out
were it to fall under China’s authoritarian control. Beginning in the 1980s, Beijing spoke of “one country, two systems,” the idea that Taiwan would be integrated with the mainland but governed under its own system. That
notion was always a bit tenuous. China’s recent repression of Hong Kong has made it appear entirely unrealistic.
Although the ideological and humanitarian rationales for protecting Taiwan
are sound, many analysts go further, arguing that basic U.S. security
interests are at stake, too. If Washington were to terminate its commitment to Taiwan, they say, U.S. credibility across the region would suffer. China would question whether the United States would actually come to the defense of Japan or South Korea. Harboring the same doubts, U.S. allies might be
tempted to bandwagon with Beijing. Some analysts make a second claim,
contending that by controlling Taiwan, China could extend its military reach by basing both its attack submarines and its nuclear-armed submarines there. The ability of U.S. conventional forces to reach China would be reduced;
China’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack, increased.
But there is good reason to doubt this doomsday scenario. Even if it ended
its commitment to Taiwan, the United States could preserve its credibility
with Japan and South Korea. These allies would no doubt understand that
Taiwan was less important to the United States than they are and that the
risks of protecting it were much higher. Letting go of Taiwan should suggest little, if anything, about the strength of Washington’s commitment to
Tokyo and Seoul. What’s more, the United States could take action to
reinforce these commitments—for example, stationing more troops in the Indo-Pacific and further integrating military planning and operations with
allies.
For a declining power, the best option may be to cut back on its commitments.
As for the effect that China’s control of Taiwan would have on its ability to fight the United States, there is likewise little cause for concern. Even if Chinese nuclear-armed submarines enjoyed newfound access to the Pacific Ocean, whose vast expanse might increase their survivability, the United
States’ retaliatory capability would not be diminished. Its nuclear
deterrent would remain highly effective. The conventional military threat is harder to assess, but again, there is evidence to suggest that the threat
posed by Chinese submarines might be bigger, but not by much. China’s land- and sea-based forces already pose a threat to U.S. forces within range of
China. Moreover, the U.S. Navy could likely deploy its antisubmarine warfare assets—attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and ocean surveillance ships—to greatly reduce the ability of Chinese submarines to leave Taiwan. All that said, even if Chinese conventional capabilities did grow as a
result of control over Taiwan, it wouldn’t matter as much; because the
United States would no longer be committed to protecting Taiwan, the odds of a major war with China would drop precipitously.
Below Taiwan in the hierarchy of U.S. interests in East Asia lies the South China Sea. In these waters, many analysts argue, Washington has an interest in preventing China from interrupting the flow of trade. The United States
has long sworn to preserve freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,
made ambiguous commitments to protect the Philippines’ maritime claims, and criticized China for building military bases in the Spratly Islands.
Again, the danger of ending this commitment is probably overstated. In
peacetime, of course, all countries have an interest in keeping these sea-
lanes open. But even in the midst of a war in which China managed to close
off the South China Sea, shipping that usually entered that sea after
passing through the Strait of Malacca could instead bypass the South China
Sea, reaching Japan and South Korea via the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the Philippines. China, by contrast, would be in a much tighter spot.
Goods coming to and from its major ports have little choice but to pass
through the South China Sea. And even if China somehow managed to solve this problem, much of Chinese trade would still need to travel across the Indian Ocean, which would remain dominated by the U.S. Navy.
THE CASE FOR CONCESSIONS
Not all interests are created equal, nor are the threats to them equivalent. So why should the United States treat its varied interests in East Asia the same way? The alliances with Japan and South Korea are both important and
relatively low risk, so Washington should continue protecting them. But when it comes to the commitments to Taiwan and to the South China Sea, the logic of current policy is much less defensible. There is a strong case for
cutting back on these commitments.
Concessions on these interests could take a variety of forms. The most
attractive type would be a grand bargain, in which the United States agreed to end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for China agreeing to resolve
its South China Sea disputes with the other claimants. Yet the time for such a geopolitical compromise has passed. China has hardened its positions on
the South China Sea and on the U.S. role in East Asia.
Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a great deal of risk.That leaves a less attractive option: the unilateral shedding of U.S.
commitments. One form that choice could take is appeasement—concessions
that were granted with no expectation of reciprocity and designed to satisfy China’s interest in expansion. Appeasement, however, would now be a bad
bet, given that a total U.S. withdrawal from East Asia might be required to satisfy Beijing. A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States could end its commitment to Taiwan and scale back its opposition to China’s
assertive policies simply to avoid conflict. Washington would be seeking a
clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or
tertiary interests. Retrenchment’s success would not depend on whether
China’s goals are limited or on whether China agreed with the United States on the purpose of the concessions.
What would this policy look like in practice? The United States would make
its revised position public, thereby laying the foundation to minimize
pressure from foreign policy elites and the public to intervene if China
attacked Taiwan. It would continue to make clear that China’s use of force to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms, and it could even
continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult.
Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, Washington
could boost spending to preserve and even enhance its capability to defend
Japan and South Korea. These investments would send a clear signal to China and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the
commitments it hasn’t cut.
HARD CHOICES
Under the current strategy of preserving all U.S. commitments in East Asia, the risk of a major war with China is small (although growing). But unlikely events with massive consequences deserve to be taken seriously. The costs
of a U.S.-Chinese war would be enormous, even catastrophic were it to go
nuclear. And yet policymakers have shown little interest in scaling back the commitments that make such a war imaginable.
Retrenchment may not be getting the hearing it deserves because it clashes
with the United States’ self-perception as the global superpower. For those who see the United States as the winner of the Cold War, the creator and
leader of the liberal international order, and the protector of much of what is worth protecting, retrenchment is simply too jarring. This is a
dangerous reflex. This attachment to a certain identity could act as a
barrier to revising policy, leading the United States to insist on
preserving the status quo when its material interests point in the opposite direction. Although China’s rise should not cause the United States to
change its values, including respect for democracies, it should prompt it to update its self-image and accept some loss of status.
Most observers appear to believe that the United States is pursuing a
cautious policy: after all, it is simply maintaining its existing
commitments. Yet a declining power determined to preserve the status quo can in fact be engaging in very risky behavior. This is what the United States is doing today. Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a
great deal of risk, clinging to old commitments as the balance of power in
East Asia shifts. The burden for sustaining the current policy should lie
with its proponents, who should acknowledge the risks and spell out why they are warranted. Without having this debate, the United States will continue, almost on autopilot, to preserve its commitments in the region, even though what is likely called for is a long-overdue change in course.
🔥 最新回帖
最可能的剧本就是：
1。土鳖肌肉越来越发达，湾湾看着心里越来越发毛，不过又有一种情愫滋生，来吧，
捅一下也行
2。湾湾继续跟外人眉来眼去，土鳖终于警告无效后动粗，湾湾大惊：你真来啊？轻点
好吗，奴家身体经不住。一捅之下，湾湾眉开眼笑，反怪土鳖：为啥不早点
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 不看好土鳖，呵呵
: 1.土鳖没有能力扶持一个弯弯内部的亲土鳖政权，也就是说和平统一永无可能。
: 2.土鳖不敢武力犯台。
: 3.如果土鳖武力犯台，美国日本必定出兵干预。印度也会乘机在中印边境搞事。
不看好土鳖，呵呵
1.土鳖没有能力扶持一个弯弯内部的亲土鳖政权，也就是说和平统一永无可能。
2.土鳖不敢武力犯台。
3.如果土鳖武力犯台，美国日本必定出兵干预。印度也会乘机在中印边境搞事。
【 在 YourDad (YourDad) 的大作中提到: 】
: 不看好湾湾，呵呵
不看好湾湾，呵呵
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 土鳖敢炸弯弯，弯弯为啥不敢还手？
越战韩战时土鳖背后是苏联和整个社会主义阵营，美帝即使没占到便宜，也没有不经一战就放弃韩国南越。今天土鳖孤家寡人，美国在台海至少有日本澳洲和台湾自己三个最坚定的盟友，印度也大概率会在中印边境乘机搞事。韩战越战土鳖有毛泽东这样杰出的军事家和政治家，军队和将领也是身经百战。今天土鳖虽然硬件条件强了，软件却弱了。军队多年未实战，领导人和将领的水平也比韩战越战时更弱了。
【 在 fishbelly (fishbelly) 的大作中提到: 】
: 韩战越战那时候TG一穷二白，美帝也没占到便宜。今天TG羽翼渐满，你的结论美帝
: approve了吗
韩战越战那时候TG一穷二白，美帝也没占到便宜。今天TG羽翼渐满，你的结论美帝
approve了吗
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 南越南韩都搞过，我的结论是美帝不会不战放弃台湾，宁可战败不可投降。
🛋️ 沙发板凳
不放弃台湾，就要承担跟中国对抗产生的代价，放弃台湾，只要承担失去台湾的代价。
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-
avoiding-
: tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
: The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
: On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a
: greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with
: increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses
on
: questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
: should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to
blunt
: Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been
: ...................
智囊说了，台湾在美国东亚利益里只排到第三级，不重要
【 在 BigKings (大爷他爹) 的大作中提到: 】
: 不放弃台湾，就要承担跟中国对抗产生的代价，放弃台湾，只要承担失去台湾的代价。
: avoiding-
: a
: on
: blunt
海华长出一口气，上上签，大吉，美帝总算识破土鳖在台海对美军的图谋。。。
对鳖来说，统一台湾只是一个开始，而不是一个结束。鳖自己不想清楚，不会轻易做这件事情。
统一台湾并不困难，问题是统一了台湾之后，冲绳美军，驻日美军，到底怎么定位，中日关系，中澳关系，这些都是马上就摆在面前的问题。最起码一点，中美海空力量直接在冲绳面对面，到底是要求帝退到关岛还是夏威夷，这个之后的东亚秩序我鳖必须有一个起码的架构可以拿出来谈。相比较而言，驻韩美军和韩朝关系是个更简单的问题。
这些没有想清楚，先拿下台湾不够谨慎。我还是相信统一在五年之内发生。
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 智囊说了，台湾在美国东亚利益里只排到第三级，不重要
放到菌斑说有个蛋用。你让土狗党妈拿下台湾，老子求饶。否则我就是土狗他爹。
想太多了。中共可能也只能统一台湾。之后人口老化，中日韩都打不起仗了。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 对鳖来说，统一台湾只是一个开始，而不是一个结束。鳖自己不想清楚，不会轻易做这
: 件事情。
: 统一台湾并不困难，问题是统一了台湾之后，冲绳美军，驻日美军，到底怎么定位，中
: 日关系，中澳关系，这些都是马上就摆在面前的问题。最起码一点，中美海空力量直接
: 在冲绳面对面，到底是要求帝退到关岛还是夏威夷，这个之后的东亚秩序我鳖必须有一
: 个起码的架构可以拿出来谈。相比较而言，驻韩美军和韩朝关系是个更简单的问题。: 这些没有想清楚，先拿下台湾不够谨慎。我还是相信统一在五年之内发生。
欲擒故纵之计
诱使大陆心存幻想，不断哀求让利于台湾美国
大门完全关死，恐大陆破罐子破摔，不利于赚大陆钱
鳖已经没有选择权，美国外交决策已经被小巴塔克绑架，美国必将怂恿台湾动手，到时候鳖就不得不动手。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 对鳖来说，统一台湾只是一个开始，而不是一个结束。鳖自己不想清楚，不会轻易做这
: 件事情。
: 统一台湾并不困难，问题是统一了台湾之后，冲绳美军，驻日美军，到底怎么定位，中
: 日关系，中澳关系，这些都是马上就摆在面前的问题。最起码一点，中美海空力量直接
: 在冲绳面对面，到底是要求帝退到关岛还是夏威夷，这个之后的东亚秩序我鳖必须有一
: 个起码的架构可以拿出来谈。相比较而言，驻韩美军和韩朝关系是个更简单的问题。: 这些没有想清楚，先拿下台湾不够谨慎。我还是相信统一在五年之内发生。
老化个狗屁。
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 想太多了。中共可能也只能统一台湾。之后人口老化，中日韩都打不起仗了。
你全世界狼奔豕突到处淫乱的时候都戴套不戴
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 想太多了。中共可能也只能统一台湾。之后人口老化，中日韩都打不起仗了。
步子太大会扯着蛋，我帝红线画太远了，要被打脸的
“Taiwan is like two feet from China,” Trump was quoted as saying to an
unnamed Republican senator in 2019, according to the book by Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin. “We are eight thousand miles away. If they invade,
there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it.”
美国准备放弃台湾的声音已经开始了
早该如此。
统一台湾以后，最差的情况就是土鳖被踢出swift系统，美帝还没傻到为了台湾直接跟
憋军事冲突。其实踢出swift的可能性都微乎其微，一旦踢出，美帝P民日常支出会数量级的增长，不等土鳖把美帝干死美帝自己可能就把自己干死了。最可能的情况无非是找些个人或公司制裁一下，驱逐几个外交官什么的。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 对鳖来说，统一台湾只是一个开始，而不是一个结束。鳖自己不想清楚，不会轻易做这
: 件事情。
: 统一台湾并不困难，问题是统一了台湾之后，冲绳美军，驻日美军，到底怎么定位，中
: 日关系，中澳关系，这些都是马上就摆在面前的问题。最起码一点，中美海空力量直接
: 在冲绳面对面，到底是要求帝退到关岛还是夏威夷，这个之后的东亚秩序我鳖必须有一
: 个起码的架构可以拿出来谈。相比较而言，驻韩美军和韩朝关系是个更简单的问题。: 这些没有想清楚，先拿下台湾不够谨慎。我还是相信统一在五年之内发生。
空心菜看了会不会菊花一紧，高潮了？
这是先把台阶放好，到时候可以顺势而下。
当然只是出路之一，这是个deal， 看中国接不接招。
台湾统一，日韩必须和中国合作，东亚经济共同体
草拟吗的中国再老化能战之人也比你妈五眼加日韩绑起来都多
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 想太多了。中共可能也只能统一台湾。之后人口老化，中日韩都打不起仗了。
:
: 【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: : 对鳖来说，统一台湾只是一个开始，而不是一个结束。鳖自己不想清楚，不会轻易做这
: : 件事情。
: : 统一台湾并不困难，问题是统一了台湾之后，冲绳美军，驻日美军，到底怎么定位，中
: : 日关系，中澳关系，这些都是马上就摆在面前的问题。最起码一点，中美海空力量直接
: : 在冲绳面对面，到底是要求帝退到关岛还是夏威夷，这个之后的东亚秩序我鳖必须有一
: : 个起码的架构可以拿出来谈。相比较而言，驻韩美军和韩朝关系是个更简单的问题。
: : 这些没有想清楚，先拿下台湾不够谨慎。我还是相信统一在五年之内发生。
面对现实，从90年代的超级霸主的梦里赶紧醒来，顺势而为，是美国必须做的。否则帝国的崩塌会比想象的快的多。
梧桐台蛙之后，如果有经济制裁就内循环两年，坐等全世界进入经济危机，然后出手把有眼力见的友好国家拉出坑，顺便抄底全世界
【 在 realbug (WA) 的大作中提到: 】
: 统一台湾以后，最差的情况就是土鳖被踢出swift系统，美帝还没傻到为了台湾直接跟
: 憋军事冲突。其实踢出swift的可能性都微乎其微，一旦踢出，美帝P民日常支出会数量
: 级的增长，不等土鳖把美帝干死美帝自己可能就把自己干死了。最可能的情况无非是找
: 些个人或公司制裁一下，驱逐几个外交官什么的。
明珠党的《求实》杂志都发话了，那就是要放弃了。
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-
avoiding-
: tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
: The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
: On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a
: greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with
: increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses
on
: questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
: should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to
blunt
: Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been
: ...................
现在主动放弃，能从包子那里换到一堆好处，少说1000亿刀。
再过十年，就一份好处也拿不着了。
1000亿刀说到底还是美国人的羊毛
卖了台湾一辈子武器，
钱全给了中共
【 在 egaisi (worrying) 的大作中提到: 】
: 现在主动放弃，能从包子那里换到一堆好处，少说1000亿刀。
: 再过十年，就一份好处也拿不着了。
放弃台湾可以借来土鳖的美元
【 在 BigKings (大爷他爹) 的大作中提到: 】
: 不放弃台湾，就要承担跟中国对抗产生的代价，放弃台湾，只要承担失去台湾的代价。
: avoiding-
: a
: on
: blunt
早说了，我鳖在台海的目的是为了坑杀美日联军。。。。多数美国人算不清账。。。。
【 在 GoogIe (Google) 的大作中提到: 】
: 海华长出一口气，上上签，大吉，美帝总算识破土鳖在台海对美军的图谋。。。
美帝卖给个囼巴的武器，除了c5没有土鳖想要的。c5过几年土鳖自己也能弄出来。
美帝让囼巴老实谈判和平统一，给土鳖埋个大雷。土鳖给美帝免费修条新英格兰高铁算了。
【 在 dragonfly (小蜻蜓-一蛊国现在就是个万蛆攒动的屎坑，�) 的大作中提到: 】
: 1000亿刀说到底还是美国人的羊毛
: 卖了台湾一辈子武器，
: 钱全给了中共
我前阵子就说了，现在台湾就是土鳖套牢美帝的劫材，可以拿来耗死美帝以及美帝整个东亚的势力。
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-
avoiding-
: tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
: The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
: On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a
: greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with
: increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses
on
: questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
: should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to
blunt
: Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been
: ...................
全文基于一个前提：中国是rising power，美国是declining power。然后谈美国应该
如何同中国做交易。但目前美国政客好像有信心把中国变成declining power，这样美
国就不需要和中国做交易，美国可以予取予求了。
中国其实欢迎美帝在亚洲驻军的。只是要统一台湾而已，当年的条件甚至可以不在台湾驻军。大家不要乱想。
这个就是美帝跟土鳖怎么交易了。要是真打起来，美帝出不出兵都很尴尬，出兵了要是反被土鳖攻击日本，美帝损失大多了
【 在 singwind1 (liveforsun) 的大作中提到: 】
: 中国其实欢迎美帝在亚洲驻军的。只是要统一台湾而已，当年的条件甚至可以不在台湾
: 驻军。大家不要乱想。
文章的主要观点：
1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上升，因此要有取舍。
2. 中国对美国本土基本没有安全威胁。
3. 日韩在美国的帮助下，可以应对中国威胁。
4. 中国有收复台湾的意志和实力，美国在军事上也无力阻止。
5. 台湾不是美国的vital interest，而且放弃台湾不会引起盟友军心涣散，日韩跳船
。
那是当年的条件， 现在就没这种条件了。
【 在 singwind1 (liveforsun) 的大作中提到: 】
: 中国其实欢迎美帝在亚洲驻军的。只是要统一台湾而已，当年的条件甚至可以不在台湾
: 驻军。大家不要乱想。
说白了就是现在美帝也不好过，地主家没有余粮了，打算把小台子卖掉
目前美帝可以接受的交易方案的核心就两点：
1是日韩不要慌，美帝是不会放弃你们的
2是中国不要得寸进尺，交割筹码仅止台湾一地
接下来就看中国给的对价合不合适了。
台湾人现在可以清醒了，只要价钱合适，美国佬随时可以把你卖了。
说白了都是business，什么民主自由什么盟友情谊都是扯淡。
这个星球上，只有大陆还会跟台湾讲点民族情感。
美帝先卖台湾最重要的因素是有人肯花大价钱买，这个买家全球只有一个，就是中国。台湾人懂了吗？
【 在 optone (就等老熊来了) 的大作中提到: 】
: 文章的主要观点：
: 1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上升
: ，因此要有取舍。
: 2. 中国对美国本土基本没有安全威胁。
: 3. 日韩在美国的帮助下，可以应对中国威胁。
: 4. 中国有收复台湾的意志和实力，美国在军事上也无力阻止。
: 5. 台湾不是美国的vital interest，而且放弃台湾不会引起盟友军心涣散，日韩跳船
: 。
文章提到台湾显然不是美帝在东亚的核心利益，认为只要死死抓住日韩两只狗，还可以遏制中国在东亚称霸。蔡傻逼估计看到这篇文章经血从嘴里流出。还提到，即使大陆获得了呆湾的海军基地，目前土工的核潜艇也不会对美国构成多大的威胁，可能对他们的海上力量还是很自信的。而且，中美隔着大洋，中国的陆地力量对美国根本构不成任何威胁。
说实话这也是当下大陆的要求了，中共也没想着要现在就称霸。既然美国的求是杂志都吹风了，我估计这策略迟早会出来，别看现在美帝对呆湾各种小动作。
【 在 optone (就等老熊来了) 的大作中提到: 】
: 文章的主要观点：
: 1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上升
: ，因此要有取舍。
: 2. 中国对美国本土基本没有安全威胁。
: 3. 日韩在美国的帮助下，可以应对中国威胁。
: 4. 中国有收复台湾的意志和实力，美国在军事上也无力阻止。
: 5. 台湾不是美国的vital interest，而且放弃台湾不会引起盟友军心涣散，日韩跳船
: 。
他们想多了。他们自己都说自己是declining power。从睡舅的演讲就可以看出来，中
国这个中国那个，我们都落后了。一定在我任上保持No.1。哈哈。很像以前那些应试教育为主的版上一个同学突然从第十名考了慢慢练上来，在某些科目把第一名超过，然后第一名受不了，誓死要所有科目反超，眉毛鼻子一把抓。最后毛都没捞到。
【 在 optone (就等老熊来了) 的大作中提到: 】
: 全文基于一个前提：中国是rising power，美国是declining power。然后谈美国应该
: 如何同中国做交易。但目前美国政客好像有信心把中国变成declining power，这样美
: 国就不需要和中国做交易，美国可以予取予求了。
米帝说，嘿，我准备买配房丫鬟了，你出价呀
中帝说，一口价，打九折，台湾领导不好看。
再熬下去，台湾贴不够美国，得自己找上中帝。
【 在 narcotics07 (爱谁谁) 的大作中提到: 】
: 米帝说，嘿，我准备买配房丫鬟了，你出价呀
都他妈独生子。死了谁传香火？这个就砍90%了吧？
【 在 llsunspot (小小手) 的大作中提到: 】
: 草拟吗的中国再老化能战之人也比你妈五眼加日韩绑起来都多
: 做这
: ，中
: 直接
: 有一
该文有个不足之处。言下之意，自己不投入军力，台湾就一定没了。完全低估了台湾人决绝的独立意志，誓死捍卫民主投奔自由的坚强信念。应该放手让台湾人去做。
同意，台巴不用氢弹炸死个100 到 1000万，收回之后也是第二个香港
【 在 GoogIe (Google) 的大作中提到: 】
: 该文有个不足之处。言下之意，自己不投入军力，台湾就一定没了。完全低估了台湾人
: 决绝的独立意志，誓死捍卫民主投奔自由的坚强信念。应该放手让台湾人去做。
就盼着包子相信呢
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
:
: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-
avoiding-
: tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
:
: The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
:
: On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a
: greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with
: increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses
on
: questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
: should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to
blunt
: Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been
: largely overlooked: Should the United States trim its East Asian
commitments
: to reduce the odds of going to war with China?
:
: The question of which commitments to keep and which to cut should come up : whenever there are big shifts in the global balance of power. A rising
power
: may be able to achieve previously unobtainable goals and embrace new
goals,
: while the declining power may find that its existing commitments are
: becoming costlier and riskier to maintain.
:
: Such is the case with China and the United States today. Beijing has
: acquired military capabilities that were far beyond its reach a couple of : decades ago. It has built up its “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD)
: capabilities, which are designed to prevent U.S. forces from operating
close
: to Chinese territory. It now has a reasonable prospect of prevailing in a
: war over Taiwan and is acquiring the ability to sustain naval forces
across
: the South China Sea. At the same time, its leaders are becoming more
: provocative and have made it exceedingly clear that unification with
Taiwan
: is a pressing goal. China’s improved military capabilities reduce the
: United States’ ability to deter, and its increasingly intense maritime
: disputes raise the risk of accidents. As a result, a terrifying prospect
is
: growing more likely: a major war between the world’s two foremost powers.:
: Stay informed.
: In-depth analysis delivered weekly.
: The emerging debate over U.S. China policy, however, recognizes only half of
: the logic of decline. Officials and analysts understand that as its
: capabilities increase, China will increasingly challenge U.S. commitments,
: and the probability of war will rise. But they are forgetting the second
: part of the equation: that for the declining power, the best option may be
: to cut back on its commitments. In East Asia, that would mean giving
Beijing
: greater leeway in the South China Sea, letting go of Taiwan, and
accepting
: that the United States is no longer the dominant power it once was in the : region. These are hard choices, but maintaining the status quo is also a
: choice—and an increasingly dangerous one.
:
: COMMITMENT ISSUES
: To evaluate the United States’ commitments in East Asia, one must first
: rank the country’s interests there and estimate China’s capability to
: threaten them. All else being equal, Washington should be much more
: reluctant to reduce commitments that protect vital interests than ones
that
: protect secondary interests. Fortunately, the one truly vital interest—
the
: safety of the U.S. homeland—is not at risk. The United States and China
are
: separated by a vast ocean, which makes conventional invasion virtually
: impossible. And even though China is modernizing its nuclear force, the U.S.
: arsenal is far bigger and more advanced. Washington will be able to
: maintain its deterrent capabilities with ease.
:
: Next in this hierarchy of U.S. interests is the protection of East Asian
: allies—chief among them Japan and South Korea. For decades, the United
: States has cherished its security alliances with these large, rich, and
: strategically located countries. U.S. leaders still consider these
: relationships essential for preventing China from dominating its region,
: stopping South Korea and Japan from obtaining nuclear weapons, and
: preserving U.S. global leadership. Even scholars who advocate a more
limited
: grand strategy of “offshore balancing” and wish to withdraw U.S. forces
: from Europe and the Persian Gulf maintain that U.S. alliances in Asia are : necessary.
:
: The prospects for defending these interests remain good. China’s ability to
: threaten U.S. allies is growing, but Japan, with U.S. help, should be
able
: to fend off a Chinese attack. Invasion across several hundred miles of
water
: has never been easy, and it is even harder today thanks to advanced
: surveillance technologies and accurate conventional weapons. Although
China
: would have an easier time enacting a blockade designed to strangle and
: coerce Japan, that, too, would likely fail. Japan lies beyond the
effective
: reach of China’s A2/AD capabilities and could thus be supplied from its
: eastern ports. South Korea, closer to China, is more vulnerable, but it,
too
: , would likely prevail with U.S. help.
:
: A terrifying prospect is growing more likely: a major war between the
world
: ’s two foremost powers.
: Further down the hierarchy of U.S. interests is Taiwan. Since formally
: recognizing China in 1979, the United States has maintained unofficial
: relations with the Taiwanese government. Washington has signaled a
somewhat
: ambiguous commitment to defend the island if China launches an unprovoked : attack and has sold it tens of billions of dollars’ worth of arms.
Compared
: with the U.S. commitment to Japan and South Korea, the obligation to
Taiwan
: is much riskier. Beijing has both the motive and, increasingly, the means
: to forcibly bring Taiwan under its control. Chinese leaders consider the
: island part of China, and with only 110 miles separating Taiwan from the
: mainland, it is more vulnerable to Chinese conventional forces.
:
: Taiwan is not a vital U.S. interest—its size and wealth put it at a rank : below the major powers—but it is a vibrant democracy of 23 million people.
: Unlike Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is rarely framed in terms of U.S.
: security. Instead, the key rationales that U.S. officials offer for
: protecting the island are ideological and humanitarian: democracies in
: general should be defended, and Taiwan in particular is worthy of
protection
: , since it is a precious success story that would no doubt be snuffed out : were it to fall under China’s authoritarian control. Beginning in the
1980s
: , Beijing spoke of “one country, two systems,” the idea that Taiwan
would
: be integrated with the mainland but governed under its own system. That
: notion was always a bit tenuous. China’s recent repression of Hong Kong
has
: made it appear entirely unrealistic.
:
: Although the ideological and humanitarian rationales for protecting Taiwan
: are sound, many analysts go further, arguing that basic U.S. security
: interests are at stake, too. If Washington were to terminate its
commitment
: to Taiwan, they say, U.S. credibility across the region would suffer.
China
: would question whether the United States would actually come to the
defense
: of Japan or South Korea. Harboring the same doubts, U.S. allies might be
: tempted to bandwagon with Beijing. Some analysts make a second claim,
: contending that by controlling Taiwan, China could extend its military
reach
: by basing both its attack submarines and its nuclear-armed submarines
there
: . The ability of U.S. conventional forces to reach China would be reduced;
: China’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack, increased.
:
: But there is good reason to doubt this doomsday scenario. Even if it ended
: its commitment to Taiwan, the United States could preserve its credibility
: with Japan and South Korea. These allies would no doubt understand that
: Taiwan was less important to the United States than they are and that the : risks of protecting it were much higher. Letting go of Taiwan should
suggest
: little, if anything, about the strength of Washington’s commitment to
: Tokyo and Seoul. What’s more, the United States could take action to
: reinforce these commitments—for example, stationing more troops in the
Indo
: -Pacific and further integrating military planning and operations with
: allies.
:
: For a declining power, the best option may be to cut back on its
commitments.
: As for the effect that China’s control of Taiwan would have on its
ability
: to fight the United States, there is likewise little cause for concern.
Even
: if Chinese nuclear-armed submarines enjoyed newfound access to the
Pacific
: Ocean, whose vast expanse might increase their survivability, the United
: States’ retaliatory capability would not be diminished. Its nuclear
: deterrent would remain highly effective. The conventional military threat is
: harder to assess, but again, there is evidence to suggest that the threat
: posed by Chinese submarines might be bigger, but not by much. China’s
land-
: and sea-based forces already pose a threat to U.S. forces within range of
: China. Moreover, the U.S. Navy could likely deploy its antisubmarine
warfare
: assets—attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and ocean
surveillance
: ships—to greatly reduce the ability of Chinese submarines to leave
Taiwan.
: All that said, even if Chinese conventional capabilities did grow as a
: result of control over Taiwan, it wouldn’t matter as much; because the
: United States would no longer be committed to protecting Taiwan, the odds of
: a major war with China would drop precipitously.
:
: Below Taiwan in the hierarchy of U.S. interests in East Asia lies the
South
: China Sea. In these waters, many analysts argue, Washington has an
interest
: in preventing China from interrupting the flow of trade. The United States
: has long sworn to preserve freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,
: made ambiguous commitments to protect the Philippines’ maritime claims,
and
: criticized China for building military bases in the Spratly Islands.
:
: Again, the danger of ending this commitment is probably overstated. In
: peacetime, of course, all countries have an interest in keeping these sea-: lanes open. But even in the midst of a war in which China managed to close
: off the South China Sea, shipping that usually entered that sea after
: passing through the Strait of Malacca could instead bypass the South China
: Sea, reaching Japan and South Korea via the archipelagic waters of
Indonesia
: and the Philippines. China, by contrast, would be in a much tighter spot.
: Goods coming to and from its major ports have little choice but to pass
: through the South China Sea. And even if China somehow managed to solve
this
: problem, much of Chinese trade would still need to travel across the
Indian
: Ocean, which would remain dominated by the U.S. Navy.
:
: THE CASE FOR CONCESSIONS
: Not all interests are created equal, nor are the threats to them
equivalent.
: So why should the United States treat its varied interests in East Asia
the
: same way? The alliances with Japan and South Korea are both important and
: relatively low risk, so Washington should continue protecting them. But
when
: it comes to the commitments to Taiwan and to the South China Sea, the
logic
: of current policy is much less defensible. There is a strong case for
: cutting back on these commitments.
:
: Concessions on these interests could take a variety of forms. The most
: attractive type would be a grand bargain, in which the United States
agreed
: to end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for China agreeing to resolve : its South China Sea disputes with the other claimants. Yet the time for
such
: a geopolitical compromise has passed. China has hardened its positions on
: the South China Sea and on the U.S. role in East Asia.
:
: Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a great deal of
risk.
: That leaves a less attractive option: the unilateral shedding of U.S.
: commitments. One form that choice could take is appeasement—concessions
: that were granted with no expectation of reciprocity and designed to
satisfy
: China’s interest in expansion. Appeasement, however, would now be a bad : bet, given that a total U.S. withdrawal from East Asia might be required
to
: satisfy Beijing. A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States
could
: end its commitment to Taiwan and scale back its opposition to China’s
: assertive policies simply to avoid conflict. Washington would be seeking a
: clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or : tertiary interests. Retrenchment’s success would not depend on whether
: China’s goals are limited or on whether China agreed with the United
States
: on the purpose of the concessions.
:
: What would this policy look like in practice? The United States would make
: its revised position public, thereby laying the foundation to minimize
: pressure from foreign policy elites and the public to intervene if China
: attacked Taiwan. It would continue to make clear that China’s use of
force
: to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms, and it could even
: continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult.
: Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, Washington
: could boost spending to preserve and even enhance its capability to defend
: Japan and South Korea. These investments would send a clear signal to
China
: and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the
: commitments it hasn’t cut.
:
: HARD CHOICES
: Under the current strategy of preserving all U.S. commitments in East Asia,
: the risk of a major war with China is small (although growing). But
unlikely
: events with massive consequences deserve to be taken seriously. The costs
: of a U.S.-Chinese war would be enormous, even catastrophic were it to go
: nuclear. And yet policymakers have shown little interest in scaling back
the
: commitments that make such a war imaginable.
:
: Retrenchment may not be getting the hearing it deserves because it clashes
: with the United States’ self-perception as the global superpower. For
those
: who see the United States as the winner of the Cold War, the creator and : leader of the liberal international order, and the protector of much of
what
: is worth protecting, retrenchment is simply too jarring. This is a
: dangerous reflex. This attachment to a certain identity could act as a
: barrier to revising policy, leading the United States to insist on
: preserving the status quo when its material interests point in the
opposite
: direction. Although China’s rise should not cause the United States to
: change its values, including respect for democracies, it should prompt it to
: update its self-image and accept some loss of status.
:
: Most observers appear to believe that the United States is pursuing a
: cautious policy: after all, it is simply maintaining its existing
: commitments. Yet a declining power determined to preserve the status quo
can
: in fact be engaging in very risky behavior. This is what the United
States
: is doing today. Without acknowledging it, U.S. officials are accepting a
: great deal of risk, clinging to old commitments as the balance of power in
: East Asia shifts. The burden for sustaining the current policy should lie : with its proponents, who should acknowledge the risks and spell out why
they
: are warranted. Without having this debate, the United States will
continue,
: almost on autopilot, to preserve its commitments in the region, even
though
: what is likely called for is a long-overdue change in course.
你是土狗他爹，这事放在菌斑说有用？
【 在 manfredzhang (Manfred) 的大作中提到: 】
: 放到菌斑说有个蛋用。你让土狗党妈拿下台湾，老子求饶。否则我就是土狗他爹。
第五点不成立，美国卖了台湾，日韩绝对跳船。
【在 optone(就等老熊来了)的大作中提到：】
：文章的主要观点：
：1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上升，因此要有取舍。
这一点我同意。鳖不管是拿下了台湾，还是帝送了台湾给鳖。日韩的美军也好，航路也好，都在鳖的慈悲之下，所以台湾统一只是开始，一旦拿下，这些都是必须发生的后果。鳖决定要，那就是已经想清楚了未来东亚西太的格局并且已经有信心实现。
【 在 ridgwaymj (ridgwaymj) 的大作中提到: 】
: 第五点不成立，美国卖了台湾，日韩绝对跳船。
: ：文章的主要观点：
: ：1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上
: 升，因此要有取舍。
我鳖不给一个法可
我怀疑包子能想清楚任何事
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 这一点我同意。鳖不管是拿下了台湾，还是帝送了台湾给鳖。日韩的美军也好，航路也
: 好，都在鳖的慈悲之下，所以台湾统一只是开始，一旦拿下，这些都是必须发生的后果
: 。鳖决定要，那就是已经想清楚了未来东亚西太的格局并且已经有信心实现。
不敢说五年之内，但是十年之内肯定统一台湾了。统一之后的内政外交，没有十年安定不下来，而这些必须在大大还能理政的时间内做完。土鳖核电弹配无人隐形机的航母常年在台湾东侧海域巡航彻底封锁附近海空，我弟的驻军如果还是22/35这些弱鸡的话，
只有退避三舍了，否则那是自取其辱。美军一走，南日本算谁的地盘，都要商量商量了。其实美军可以去北日本，和驻韩美军成犄角之势，牵制俄国和围堵中国进入北极的航线，这是双方可以考虑的换手，让美军体面撤离而不是撕破脸，对谁都好。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 对鳖来说，统一台湾只是一个开始，而不是一个结束。鳖自己不想清楚，不会轻易做这
: 件事情。
: 统一台湾并不困难，问题是统一了台湾之后，冲绳美军，驻日美军，到底怎么定位，中
: 日关系，中澳关系，这些都是马上就摆在面前的问题。最起码一点，中美海空力量直接
: 在冲绳面对面，到底是要求帝退到关岛还是夏威夷，这个之后的东亚秩序我鳖必须有一
: 个起码的架构可以拿出来谈。相比较而言，驻韩美军和韩朝关系是个更简单的问题。: 这些没有想清楚，先拿下台湾不够谨慎。我还是相信统一在五年之内发生。
有道理，精辟。是个阴谋。
【 在 Mitaa (Mita) 的大作中提到: 】
: 欲擒故纵之计
: 诱使大陆心存幻想，不断哀求让利于台湾美国
: 大门完全关死，恐大陆破罐子破摔，不利于赚大陆钱
不为意识形态束缚，从实力出发，到实利结束，美国确实人才济济。
这个基本上是美国职业军方和外交的共识。
总结的不错。
【 在 optone (就等老熊来了) 的大作中提到: 】
: 文章的主要观点：
: 1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上升
: ，因此要有取舍。
: 2. 中国对美国本土基本没有安全威胁。
: 3. 日韩在美国的帮助下，可以应对中国威胁。
: 4. 中国有收复台湾的意志和实力，美国在军事上也无力阻止。
: 5. 台湾不是美国的vital interest，而且放弃台湾不会引起盟友军心涣散，日韩跳船
: 。
所以美帝不会卖台。一步错步步错，多米诺骨牌效应。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 这一点我同意。鳖不管是拿下了台湾，还是帝送了台湾给鳖。日韩的美军也好，航路也
: 好，都在鳖的慈悲之下，所以台湾统一只是开始，一旦拿下，这些都是必须发生的后果
: 。鳖决定要，那就是已经想清楚了未来东亚西太的格局并且已经有信心实现。
共和党的求是杂志是啥？
【 在 harubashi (春橋) 的大作中提到: 】
: 明珠党的《求实》杂志都发话了，那就是要放弃了。
:
: 【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: : 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
: : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-
: avoiding-
: : tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
: : The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
: : On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country
is
: a
: : greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met
with
: : increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses
: on
: : questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
: : should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to
: blunt
: : Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has
been
: : ...................
我也不信帝会卖台，主要是这个价，鳖不一定愿意负，因为肯定很贵。而远在价格落到鳖愿意付之前，鳖已经等不及动手了。
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 所以美帝不会卖台。一步错步步错，多米诺骨牌效应。
所以说你比较无知，语重心长地。
【 在 dlc (dalaocu) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我怀疑包子能想清楚任何事
李佳佳继续嘴硬，岛蛙一边喊要独立，结果一边又和大陆各种贸易，台积电号称几亿的投资最后缩水十倍以上，这样的狗就要杀了给日韩看看，做小弟别有二心。
【 在 ridgwaymj (ridgwaymj) 的大作中提到: 】
: 第五点不成立，美国卖了台湾，日韩绝对跳船。
: ：文章的主要观点：
: ：1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上
: 升，因此要有取舍。
二月的收缩推演里，也是表示土鳖打台湾不要管，主要保日韩。只有岛蛙轮子在意淫美帝会为一群黄皮子送死和土鳖开战。要是土鳖真自己动手收了台湾，美帝那才叫信用破产，根本就不会保护这种垃圾盟友还吹牛皮，日韩醒悟了跑得更快。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我也不信帝会卖台，主要是这个价，鳖不一定愿意负，因为肯定很贵。而远在价格落到
: 鳖愿意付之前，鳖已经等不及动手了。
又臭又长，典型的投降派理论，这个作者私下有没有收老共的钱都很难说，三妹子就不要挟洋自重了。
二战时期，绥靖主义者也放任纳粹德国吞并奥地利、捷克，。。。一直到波兰被吞并才醒过神来，但已经挡不住德国人，纳粹席卷了整个欧洲，反法西斯国家牺牲了上亿人口才打败纳粹德国。二战的教训在于，对于纳粹德国，一开始就要争锋相对，要不就会付出惨重的代价。
天朝就是现代版的纳粹德国，是对西方民主社会最大的威胁，台湾就类似于于奥地利，放弃了台湾，投降派（应当说是美奸）又会找理由发文章说，隔着浩瀚的太平洋，韩国和日本也不是美国的利益所在云云，最终，美国遭受第二次珍珠港袭击，到时后悔也来不及了。对付现代版的纳粹，老美一开始就不能软弱，软弱只会使自己付出更加惨重的代价。
所以更不需要commitment啊
【 在 GoogIe (Google) 的大作中提到: 】
: 该文有个不足之处。言下之意，自己不投入军力，台湾就一定没了。完全低估了台湾人
: 决绝的独立意志，誓死捍卫民主投奔自由的坚强信念。应该放手让台湾人去做。
小将们拿个洋垃圾的破文章就开始意淫。
当年萨达姆也是轻信美国会放任他吞并科威特，结果大家都知道了，天朝不要步老萨的后尘才是。
不可能的。土工拿下台湾，潜艇就可以从高雄出发，靠近美国本土
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-
avoiding-
: tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
: The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
: On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a
: greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with
: increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses
on
: questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
: should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to
blunt
: Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been
: ...................
这不是廊坊监狱内参吗？foreignaffairs专门喂廊坊监狱里螂五的。
[在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到：]
:僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
:The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
:On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with :increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses on questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
:should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to blunt Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been :largely overlooked: Should the United States trim its East Asian
commitments to reduce the odds of going to war with China?
:The question of which commitments to keep and which to cut should come up
:whenever there are big shifts in the global balance of power. A rising
power may be able to achieve previously unobtainable goals and embrace new
goals, while the declining power may find that its existing commitments are :becoming costlier and riskier to maintain.
:..........
不是支出上涨，而是根本买不到东西。土鳖对台动手肯定是突袭，金马，澎湖，东沙同时动手，争取一周结束战斗。美国肯定来不及囤货，全世界其他国家也来不及反应，到时候要么用数字人民币系统替代支付，这等于自己掘了swift的坟墓
【 在 realbug (WA) 的大作中提到: 】
: 统一台湾以后，最差的情况就是土鳖被踢出swift系统，美帝还没傻到为了台湾直接跟
: 憋军事冲突。其实踢出swift的可能性都微乎其微，一旦踢出，美帝P民日常支出会数量
: 级的增长，不等土鳖把美帝干死美帝自己可能就把自己干死了。最可能的情况无非是找
: 些个人或公司制裁一下，驱逐几个外交官什么的。
现阶段，一个台积电就让美国没法割舍台湾
taiwan is too big to lose
【 在 sundevil072 (sundevil) 的大作中提到: 】
: 李佳佳继续嘴硬，岛蛙一边喊要独立，结果一边又和大陆各种贸易，台积电号称几亿的
: 投资最后缩水十倍以上，这样的狗就要杀了给日韩看看，做小弟别有二心。
哈哈，那就看我们的五年赌约究竟是谁赢。说实话十年我还真不一定敢赌，五年我觉得我的赢面比你大。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我也不信帝会卖台，主要是这个价，鳖不一定愿意负，因为肯定很贵。而远在价格落到
: 鳖愿意付之前，鳖已经等不及动手了。
看看日本占台湾就知道，台湾是最好驯化的，比韩国容易多了。至于香港，这次连奥斯卡都不敢播，说实话，连一次真正的抗争都没有，只敢和港府小闹半年而已，全消停了。中国人就这样，最好统治。
【 在 Carraway (核弹共振掀翻美西板块原创者) 的大作中提到: 】
: 同意，台巴不用氢弹炸死个100 到 1000万，收回之后也是第二个香港
这是忽悠螂五国开战，和当初忽悠金一胖一样，然后金一胖就被打出了屎。
日本才是美国在东亚的真正战略支撑点，但是一旦失去了台湾，日本就成了死棋，被围在了东北亚一角，美国的第一岛链彻底破功。巴士海峡被鳖攥在手里，虽然美国联合印，澳可以威胁马六甲，但是中国控制巴士海峡和台湾东部海域，等于卡住日本的脖子。美国在冲绳，与那国等地的军事基地也基本废掉了。关岛从二线成了一线。东南亚各国也就不用挣扎了。
我也觉得你的赢面大。不过没有大到不值得赌的程度。10年你一定输
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 哈哈，那就看我们的五年赌约究竟是谁赢。说实话十年我还真不一定敢赌，五年我觉得
: 我的赢面比你大。
力量对比变了，相关方都知道，该放手就放吧。
岛蛙到处骗人到最后自己也骗，一个中国边上的破岛愣是觉得是美帝第一优先考虑对象
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: taiwan is too big to lose
对，丢掉台湾就类似于阴蒂丢掉苏伊士运河，watershed moment，韩国肯定跳船，但是朝韩统一很快会实现。美军会很快退出冲绳，没有美军日本就基本废了，谁也不关心他跳不跳船。
【 在 ridgwaymj (ridgwaymj) 的大作中提到: 】
: 第五点不成立，美国卖了台湾，日韩绝对跳船。
: ：文章的主要观点：
: ：1. 中国是rising power，美国是declining power。美国维持现有义务的成本不断上
: 升，因此要有取舍。
CCP 花了多少钱，老美阴，两头赚钱。。
丢掉南越的时候台湾没跳船。
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 对，丢掉台湾就类似于阴蒂丢掉苏伊士运河，watershed moment，韩国肯定跳船，但是
: 朝韩统一很快会实现。美军会很快退出冲绳，没有美军日本就基本废了，谁也不关心他
: 跳不跳船。
楼上的几个轮子又故意转移话题，用奇葩逻辑瞎扯淡。
等5年赌完了，如果你履约。可以再赌5年嘛。哈哈。
【 在 Subway4321 (塞百胃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我也觉得你的赢面大。不过没有大到不值得赌的程度。10年你一定输
南越美军浴血奋战过，死了5万多人。实在搞不定才撤的。美军不会不经一战直接卖台
。打了，打不过，那没办法。但决不能被吓死。
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 丢掉南越的时候台湾没跳船。
打输了不是更加证实美帝不行了吗？不打还能继续充老大
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 南越美军浴血奋战过，死了5万多人。实在搞不定才撤的。美军不会不经一战直接卖台
: 。打了，打不过，那没办法。但决不能被吓死。
鼠食，越南也有核武器，越南挨了美国轰炸也有反击能力的。
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 南越美军浴血奋战过，死了5万多人。实在搞不定才撤的。美军不会不经一战直接卖台
: 。打了，打不过，那没办法。但决不能被吓死。
不打小弟都会跳船，也会助长敌人的气焰。
【 在 YourDad (YourDad) 的大作中提到: 】
: 打输了不是更加证实美帝不行了吗？不打还能继续充老大
中国出兵朝鲜时，美国也是有核武器的，中国挨了美国轰炸没有反击能力的。即使如此中国还是出了。现在中美都有核武器，美国为啥要怕中国的核武器？
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 鼠食，越南也有核武器，越南挨了美国轰炸也有反击能力的。
擦，你不要把我们自由民主的美国跟独裁的毛共相提并论。
白等主席和川皇敢不敢讲这话？
美国的原子讹诈，吓不倒中国人民。我国有六亿人口，有九百六十万平方公里的土地。美国那点原子弹，消灭不了中国人。即使美国的原子弹威力再大，投到中国来，把地球打穿了，把地球炸毁了，对于太阳系说来，还算是一件大事情，但对整个宇宙说来，也算不了什么。
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 中国出兵朝鲜时，美国也是有核武器的，中国挨了美国轰炸没有反击能力的。即使如此
: 中国还是出了。现在中美都有核武器，美国为啥要怕中国的核武器？
不打可以找借口，反正美帝最强的是嘴皮子
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 不打小弟都会跳船，也会助长敌人的气焰。
美苏冷战时双方都有核弹，美国也没怕过苏联。土鳖现在的那点核弹，还不够毛子的零头。而且土鳖的战争意志显然比毛子软弱得多。
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 擦，你不要把我们自由民主的美国跟独裁的毛共相提并论。
: 白等主席和川皇敢不敢讲这话？
: 美国的原子讹诈，吓不倒中国人民。我国有六亿人口，有九百六十万平方公里的土地。
: 美国那点原子弹，消灭不了中国人。即使美国的原子弹威力再大，投到中国来，把地球
: 打穿了，把地球炸毁了，对于太阳系说来，还算是一件大事情，但对整个宇宙说来，也
: 算不了什么。
小弟不是傻子。
【 在 YourDad (YourDad) 的大作中提到: 】
: 不打可以找借口，反正美帝最强的是嘴皮子
这倒是鼠食。三藩换上海，明显美国赚了。三藩加上LA还是美国赚。
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美苏冷战时双方都有核弹，美国也没怕过苏联。土鳖现在的那点核弹，还不够毛子的零
: 头。而且土鳖的战争意志显然比毛子软弱得多。
大哥的里子比面子还是更重要，美帝很清楚的
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 小弟不是傻子。
早该放弃了。美国没意识到自己会被台湾这个议题拖下霸权宝座。放手台湾换中美和平共处，解决的越晚代价越大
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 僵君们怎么看，主何凶吉？
: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-
avoiding-
: tough-questions-taiwan-and-china
: The Case for Reconsidering U.S. Commitments in East Asia
: On China, U.S. policymakers have reached a near consensus: the country is a
: greater threat than it seemed a decade ago, and so it must now be met with
: increasingly competitive policies. What little debate does exist focuses
on
: questions about how to enhance U.S. credibility, what role U.S. allies
: should play in balancing against China, and whether it is possible to
blunt
: Beijing’s economic coercion. But the most consequential question has been
: ...................
理智的领导人都不会动用核弹。
【 在 SandersTrump (TrumpSanders) 的大作中提到: 】
: 这倒是鼠食。三藩换上海，明显美国赚了。三藩加上LA还是美国赚。
问题是卖台后大哥威信扫地，小弟纷纷跳船。大哥位置肯定不保。不如奋力一战，即使战败，也是兑现了承诺，反而大哥位置不会受到威胁。
【 在 YourDad (YourDad) 的大作中提到: 】
: 大哥的里子比面子还是更重要，美帝很清楚的
以地事秦，犹如抱薪救火。土鳖兵不血刃拿下台湾，胃口只会越来越大，下一步就是冲绳日本南海乃至整个印太。
【 在 fishbelly (fishbelly) 的大作中提到: 】
: 早该放弃了。美国没意识到自己会被台湾这个议题拖下霸权宝座。放手台湾换中美和平
: 共处，解决的越晚代价越大
: avoiding-
: a
: on
: blunt
美帝战败了那就做实了自己是老二，小弟难道不会纷纷跳船？弄不好日本就被土鳖直接轰平了，小弟还不哭死。
美帝和平放弃台湾，还能吹吹自己是为了和平，也不会丢了日本。
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 问题是卖台后大哥威信扫地，小弟纷纷跳船。大哥位置肯定不保。不如奋力一战，即使
: 战败，也是兑现了承诺，反而大哥位置不会受到威胁。
照你的逻辑，土鳖一直要到吞并地球才罢手？
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 以地事秦，犹如抱薪救火。土鳖兵不血刃拿下台湾，胃口只会越来越大，下一步就是冲
: 绳日本南海乃至整个印太。
美帝在越南也战败了，在朝鲜也没赢。但是敢战总比不战而降要强得多。
和平放弃台湾，只会助长土鳖的气焰实力和野心。也会让日韩离心离德。
打一仗，即使失败了，也能把中日台都打个稀巴烂，再趁机制裁封锁土鳖。美帝自己实力不受大的损失。仍能维持老大地位。
【 在 YourDad (YourDad) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美帝战败了那就做实了自己是老二，小弟难道不会纷纷跳船？弄不好日本就被土鳖直接
: 轰平了，小弟还不哭死。
: 美帝和平放弃台湾，还能吹吹自己是为了和平，也不会丢了日本。
说明你们鼓吹的多米诺理论根本不成立。
【 在 ridgway (ridgway) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美帝在越南也战败了，在朝鲜也没赢。
至少整个印太吧，然后如果真到了那个地步，也不会收手的。野心是随着实力膨胀的。土鳖实力弱的时候，对南海钓鱼岛乃至台湾也只是嘴炮而已。
【 在 YourDad (YourDad) 的大作中提到: 】
: 照你的逻辑，土鳖一直要到吞并地球才罢手？