When President Barack Obama joined Silicon Valley’s top luminaries for dinner in California last February, each guest was asked to come with a question for the president.
But as Steve Jobs of Apple spoke, Obama interrupted with an inquiry of his own: What would it take to make iPhones in the United States? Not long ago, Apple boasted that its products were made in America. Today, few are. Almost all of the 70 million iPhones, 30 million iPads and 59 million other products Apple sold last year were manufactured overseas.
Why can’t that work come home? Obama asked.
Jobs’ reply was unambiguous. “Those jobs aren’t coming back,” he said, according to another dinner guest.
The president’s question touched upon a central conviction at Apple. It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad. Rather, Apple’s executives believe the vast scale of overseas factories as well as the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers have so outpaced their U.S. counterparts that “Made in the USA” is no longer a viable option for most Apple products.
Apple has become one of the best-known, most admired and most imitated companies on Earth, in part through an unrelenting mastery of global operations. Last year, it earned over $400,000 in profit per employee, more than Goldman Sachs, Exxon Mobil or Google.
However, what has vexed Obama as well as economists and policy makers is that Apple -- and many of its high-technology peers -- are not nearly as avid in creating U.S. jobs as other famous companies were in their heydays.
Apple employs 43,000 people in the United States and 20,000 overseas, a small fraction of the more than 400,000 U.S. workers at General Motors in the 1950s, or the hundreds of thousands at General Electric in the 1980s. Many more people work for Apple’s contractors: An additional 700,000 people engineer, build and assemble iPads, iPhones and Apple’s other products. But almost none of them work in the United States. Instead, they work for foreign companies in Asia, Europe and elsewhere, at factories that almost every electronics designer relies upon to build their wares.
“Apple’s an example of why it’s so hard to create middle-class jobs in the U.S. now,” said Jared Bernstein, who until last year was an economic adviser to the White House.
“If it’s the pinnacle of capitalism, we should be worried.”
But while Apple is far from alone, it offers a window into why the success of some prominent companies has not translated into large numbers of domestic jobs. What’s more, the company’s decisions pose broader questions about what corporate America owes Americans as the global and national economies are increasingly intertwined.
“Companies once felt an obligation to support American workers, even when it wasn’t the best financial choice,” said Betsey Stevenson, the chief economist at the Labor Department until last September. “That’s disappeared. Profits and efficiency have trumped generosity.”
‘I WANT A GLASS SCREEN’
In 2007, a little more than a month before the iPhone was scheduled to appear in stores, Jobs beckoned a handful of lieutenants into an office. For weeks, he had been carrying a prototype of the device in his pocket.
Jobs angrily held up his iPhone, angling it so everyone could see the dozens of tiny scratches marring its plastic screen, according to someone who attended the meeting. He then pulled his keys from his jeans.
People will carry this phone in their pocket, he said. People also carry their keys in their pocket. “I won’t sell a product that gets scratched,” he said tensely. The only solution was using unscratchable glass instead. “I want a glass screen, and I want it perfect in six weeks.”
After one executive left that meeting, he booked a flight to Shenzhen, China. If Jobs wanted perfect, there was nowhere else to go.
For more than two years, the company had been working on a project that presented the same questions at every turn: How do you completely reimagine the cellphone? And how do you design it at the highest quality -- with an unscratchable screen, for instance -- while also ensuring that millions can be manufactured quickly and inexpensively enough to earn a significant profit? The answers, almost every time, were found outside the United States.
In its early days, Apple usually didn’t look beyond its own backyard for manufacturing solutions. But by 2004, Apple had largely turned to foreign manufacturing. Guiding that decision was Apple’s operations expert, Timothy D. Cook, who replaced Jobs as chief executive last August, six weeks before Jobs’ death. Most other U.S. electronics companies had already gone abroad, and Apple, which at the time was struggling, felt it had to grasp every advantage.
In part, Asia was attractive because the semi-skilled workers there were cheaper. But that wasn’t driving Apple. For technology companies, the cost of labor is minimal compared with the expense of buying parts and managing supply chains that bring together components and services from hundreds of companies.
For Cook, the focus on Asia “came down to two things,” said one former high-ranking Apple executive. Factories in Asia “can scale up and down faster” and “Asian supply chains have surpassed what’s in the U.S.” The result is that “we can’t compete at this point,” the executive said.
The impact of such advantages became obvious as soon as Jobs demanded glass screens in 2007.
For years, cellphone makers had avoided using glass because it required precision in cutting and grinding that was extremely difficult to achieve. Apple had already selected a U.S. company, Corning Inc., to manufacture large panes of strengthened glass. But figuring out how to cut those panes into millions of iPhone screens required finding an empty cutting plant, hundreds of pieces of glass to use in experiments and an army of midlevel engineers. It would cost a fortune simply to prepare.
Then a bid for the work arrived from a Chinese factory.
When an Apple team visited, the Chinese plant’s owners were already constructing a new wing. “This is in case you give us the contract,” the manager said, according to a former Apple executive. The Chinese government had agreed to underwrite costs for numerous industries, and those subsidies had trickled down to the glass-cutting factory. It had a warehouse filled with glass samples available to Apple, free of charge. The owners made engineers available at almost no cost. They had built on-site dormitories so employees would be available 24 hours a day.
The Chinese plant got the job.
“The entire supply chain is in China now,” said another former high- ranking Apple executive. “You need a thousand rubber gaskets? That’s the factory next door. You need a million screws? That factory is a block away. You need that screw made a little bit different? It will take three hours.”
It is difficult to estimate how much more it would cost to build iPhones in the United States. However, various academics and manufacturing analysts estimate that because labor is such a small part of technology manufacturing, paying U.S. wages would add up to $65 to each iPhone’s expense. Since Apple’s profits are often hundreds of dollars per phone, building domestically, in theory, would still give the company a healthy reward.
But such calculations are, in many respects, meaningless because building the iPhone in the United States would demand much more than hiring Americans -- it would require transforming the national and global economies. Apple executives believe there simply aren’t enough U.S. workers with the skills the company needs or factories with sufficient speed and flexibility. Other companies that work with Apple, like Corning, also say they must go abroad.
“Our customers are in Taiwan, Korea, Japan and China,” said James B. Flaws, Corning’s vice chairman and chief financial officer. “We could make the glass here, and then ship it by boat, but that takes 35 days. Or, we could ship it by air, but that’s 10 times as expensive. So we build our glass factories next door to assembly factories, and those are overseas.”
INNOVATION’S LOSERS
Toward the end of Obama’s dinner last year with Jobs and other Silicon Valley executives, as everyone stood to leave, a crowd of photo seekers formed around the president. A slightly smaller scrum gathered around Jobs. Rumors had spread that his illness had worsened, and some hoped for a photograph with him, perhaps for the last time.
Eventually, the orbits of the men overlapped. “I’m not worried about the country’s long-term future,” Jobs told Obama, according to one observer. “This country is insanely great. What I’m worried about is that we don’t talk enough about solutions.”
In the last decade, technological leaps in solar and wind energy, semiconductor fabrication and display technologies have created thousands of jobs. But while many of those industries started in America, much of the employment has occurred abroad.
Companies have closed major facilities in the U.S. to reopen in China. By way of explanation, executives say they are competing with Apple for shareholders. If they cannot rival Apple’s growth and profit margins, they won’t survive.
The pace of innovation, say executives from a variety of industries, has been quickened by businessmen like Jobs. GM went as long as half a decade between major auto redesigns. Apple, by comparison, has released five iPhones in four years, doubling the devices’ speed and memory while dropping the price that some consumers pay.
Before Obama and Jobs said goodbye, the Apple executive pulled an iPhone from his pocket to show off a new application -- a driving game -- with incredibly detailed graphics. The device reflected the soft glow of the room’s lights.
The other executives, whose combined worth exceeded $69 billion, jostled for position to glance over his shoulder. The game, everyone agreed, was wonderful.
面对美国总统川普宣布取消香港特殊待遇，虽中共中央尚未提出"必要反制措施"，但中国大陆商务部今早率先鸣枪，宣布维持对原产于美国和欧盟的进口四氯乙烯的反倾销措施，也就是说将继续自美进口的该类产品，征收高达71.8%的反倾销税。
d3519903.jpg
中国商务部表示，依照期终复审调查结果，自2020年5月31日起，对原产于欧盟和美国
的进口四氯乙烯继续征收反倾销税，实施期限5年。
在此之前，中国商务部是在2014年5月，对原产于欧盟和美国的进口四氯乙烯开始实施
反倾销措施，并于2019年5月，应中国国内产业申请，发起了本次期终复审调查；当时
，中国商务部在调查后，宣布自2019年5月1日起，对上述产品继续加征惩罚性关税，美国被加征71.8%，欧盟则为27.6%，原订期限到2020年5月30日止。
值得注意的，中国商务部昨（29）日亦已发布公告称，决定对原产于美国、日本、韩国和马来西亚的进口聚苯硫醚进行反倾销调查的期限，再继续延长6个月，至2020年11月
30日止。显示中美贸易摩擦仍然持续。
另面对川普召开"关于中国"的记者会，宣布取消对香港特殊待遇、中止与世界卫生组织（WHO）关系前，中国大陆外交部发言人赵立坚曾在昨日的记者会上警告，对于外部势
力干预香港事务的错误行径，"我们将采取必要措施予以坚决反制。"
四氯乙烯是一个被广泛用于工业金属表面油脂去除和乾洗溶剂，是衣物乾洗剂、新型环保制冷剂等产品的主要原料，而中国大陆是该石油溶剂的最大进口国。
美孚刚刚跑到中国投资了几百亿美元，建了个大乙烯厂
【 在 ziganwu (自带干粮五毛) 的大作中提到: 】
: 面对美国总统川普宣布取消香港特殊待遇，虽中共中央尚未提出"必要反制措施"，但中
: 国大陆商务部今早率先鸣枪，宣布维持对原产于美国和欧盟的进口四氯乙烯的反倾销措
: 施，也就是说将继续自美进口的该类产品，征收高达71.8%的反倾销税。
: d3519903.jpg
: 中国商务部表示，依照期终复审调查结果，自2020年5月31日起，对原产于欧盟和美国
: 的进口四氯乙烯继续征收反倾销税，实施期限5年。
: 在此之前，中国商务部是在2014年5月，对原产于欧盟和美国的进口四氯乙烯开始实施
: 反倾销措施，并于2019年5月，应中国国内产业申请，发起了本次期终复审调查；当时
: ，中国商务部在调查后，宣布自2019年5月1日起，对上述产品继续加征惩罚性关税，美
: 国被加征71.8%，欧盟则为27.6%，原订期限到2020年5月30日止。
: ...................
WTO仲裁机构已经被美国搞黄了，以后有枪就是草头王了
【 在 ziganwu (自带干粮五毛) 的大作中提到: 】
: 面对美国总统川普宣布取消香港特殊待遇，虽中共中央尚未提出"必要反制措施"，但中
: 国大陆商务部今早率先鸣枪，宣布维持对原产于美国和欧盟的进口四氯乙烯的反倾销措
: 施，也就是说将继续自美进口的该类产品，征收高达71.8%的反倾销税。
: d3519903.jpg
: 中国商务部表示，依照期终复审调查结果，自2020年5月31日起，对原产于欧盟和美国
: 的进口四氯乙烯继续征收反倾销税，实施期限5年。
: 在此之前，中国商务部是在2014年5月，对原产于欧盟和美国的进口四氯乙烯开始实施
: 反倾销措施，并于2019年5月，应中国国内产业申请，发起了本次期终复审调查；当时
: ，中国商务部在调查后，宣布自2019年5月1日起，对上述产品继续加征惩罚性关税，美
: 国被加征71.8%，欧盟则为27.6%，原订期限到2020年5月30日止。
: ...................
美国佬准备贸易战翻篇儿，习总反打回来了
这是协议的一部分
帮川普整在中国投资的公司
【 在 ziganwu (自带干粮五毛) 的大作中提到: 】
: 面对美国总统川普宣布取消香港特殊待遇，虽中共中央尚未提出"必要反制措施"，但中
: 国大陆商务部今早率先鸣枪，宣布维持对原产于美国和欧盟的进口四氯乙烯的反倾销措
: 施，也就是说将继续自美进口的该类产品，征收高达71.8%的反倾销税。
: d3519903.jpg
: 中国商务部表示，依照期终复审调查结果，自2020年5月31日起，对原产于欧盟和美国
: 的进口四氯乙烯继续征收反倾销税，实施期限5年。
: 在此之前，中国商务部是在2014年5月，对原产于欧盟和美国的进口四氯乙烯开始实施
: 反倾销措施，并于2019年5月，应中国国内产业申请，发起了本次期终复审调查；当时
: ，中国商务部在调查后，宣布自2019年5月1日起，对上述产品继续加征惩罚性关税，美
: 国被加征71.8%，欧盟则为27.6%，原订期限到2020年5月30日止。
: ...................
美孚的厂建在中国，就是为了中国市场
产品直接被中国下游厂商买走，这是不用交进口关税的
整你妈蛋啊整，整在中国投资的公司怎么还跑中国投资上百亿建厂来了
【 在 jjdw (金角大王) 的大作中提到: 】
: 这是协议的一部分
: 帮川普整在中国投资的公司
【 在 jjdw (金角大王) 的大作中提到: 】
: 这是协议的一部分
: 帮川普整在中国投资的公司
你个傻逼睁开狗眼看看
世界石油巨头埃克森美孚投资中国100亿美元 中国仍是世界资本投资首选
4月22日上午，埃克森美孚公司董事长兼首席执行官伍德伦在美国达拉斯市会场，通过
视频连线的形式在“两国三地”共同出席项目开工仪式。11时许，埃克森美孚广东惠州乙烯项目开工，项目建设正式拉开帷幕，本次投资高达100亿美元。这是大流行以来海
外资本对华最大的单笔投资，代表中国仍是世界资本投资首选
打开腾讯新闻，看更多高清图片
埃克森美孚是全球最大石油天然气开发商之一、世界最大的非政府 石油天然气生产商
、世界五百强前十强的巨头、年营业额高达2902亿美元国际财团，在全球疫情非常严重的状况，全球资本巨头、全球石油巨头埃克森美孚总公司投资中国100亿美元，说明中
国仍然是全球资本和全球巨头投资的首选地
化工和金融一样，本来都没有外资的份，而且这个项目是2017年贸易战之前签订的。估计为了装门面，开出的条件不会在特斯拉之下。据说实际使用资金来自广州。
【 在 greendot (清风抚山岗) 的大作中提到: 】
: 你个傻逼睁开狗眼看看
: 世界石油巨头埃克森美孚投资中国100亿美元 中国仍是世界资本投资首选
: 4月22日上午，埃克森美孚公司董事长兼首席执行官伍德伦在美国达拉斯市会场，通过
: 视频连线的形式在“两国三地”共同出席项目开工仪式。11时许，埃克森美孚广东惠州
: 乙烯项目开工，项目建设正式拉开帷幕，本次投资高达100亿美元。这是大流行以来海
: 外资本对华最大的单笔投资，代表中国仍是世界资本投资首选
: 打开腾讯新闻，看更多高清图片
: 埃克森美孚是全球最大石油天然气开发商之一、世界最大的非政府 石油天然气生产商
: 、世界五百强前十强的巨头、年营业额高达2902亿美元国际财团，在全球疫情非常严重
: 的状况，全球资本巨头、全球石油巨头埃克森美孚总公司投资中国100亿美元，说明中
: ...................
是不是说一些美国产业资本选了中国？
现在看金融资本怎么站队了
昨天川普已经吹了美资总撤退的集结号。
【 在 umner (jhq) 的大作中提到: 】
: 是不是说一些美国产业资本选了中国？
: 现在看金融资本怎么站队了
美资不听他的咋办
lol
【 在 fireroad (地狱之路) 的大作中提到: 】
: 昨天川普已经吹了美资总撤退的集结号。
搞不懂
但是好像大规模资本撤退，恐怕不是几个命令就那么容易实现的吧
要不然叫了快十年的资本回流，怎么成效不大呢
【 在 fireroad (地狱之路) 的大作中提到: 】
: 昨天川普已经吹了美资总撤退的集结号。
小手把裤子都脱了，你就给他看这个？
【 在 ziganwu (自带干粮五毛) 的大作中提到: 】
: 面对美国总统川普宣布取消香港特殊待遇，虽中共中央尚未提出"必要反制措施"，但中
: 国大陆商务部今早率先鸣枪，宣布维持对原产于美国和欧盟的进口四氯乙烯的反倾销措
: 施，也就是说将继续自美进口的该类产品，征收高达71.8%的反倾销税。
: d3519903.jpg
: 中国商务部表示，依照期终复审调查结果，自2020年5月31日起，对原产于欧盟和美国
: 的进口四氯乙烯继续征收反倾销税，实施期限5年。
: 在此之前，中国商务部是在2014年5月，对原产于欧盟和美国的进口四氯乙烯开始实施
: 反倾销措施，并于2019年5月，应中国国内产业申请，发起了本次期终复审调查；当时
: ，中国商务部在调查后，宣布自2019年5月1日起，对上述产品继续加征惩罚性关税，美
: 国被加征71.8%，欧盟则为27.6%，原订期限到2020年5月30日止。
: ...................
请川大大跟进
大概率是我鳖出钱，美孚建厂。
【 在 greendot (清风抚山岗) 的大作中提到: 】
: 你个傻逼睁开狗眼看看
: 世界石油巨头埃克森美孚投资中国100亿美元 中国仍是世界资本投资首选
: 4月22日上午，埃克森美孚公司董事长兼首席执行官伍德伦在美国达拉斯市会场，通过
: 视频连线的形式在“两国三地”共同出席项目开工仪式。11时许，埃克森美孚广东惠州
: 乙烯项目开工，项目建设正式拉开帷幕，本次投资高达100亿美元。这是大流行以来海
: 外资本对华最大的单笔投资，代表中国仍是世界资本投资首选
: 打开腾讯新闻，看更多高清图片
: 埃克森美孚是全球最大石油天然气开发商之一、世界最大的非政府 石油天然气生产商
: 、世界五百强前十强的巨头、年营业额高达2902亿美元国际财团，在全球疫情非常严重
: 的状况，全球资本巨头、全球石油巨头埃克森美孚总公司投资中国100亿美元，说明中
: ...................
“叫了快十年的资本回流”
LOL，差点儿就信了
【 在 umner (jhq) 的大作中提到: 】
: 搞不懂
: 但是好像大规模资本撤退，恐怕不是几个命令就那么容易实现的吧
: 要不然叫了快十年的资本回流，怎么成效不大呢
取消香港的特殊地位基本相当于告诉所有人美帝这次是玩真的。89六四制裁，包括现在的贸易战，绝大部分人都认为是演戏，因为香港的后门还在。
【 在 umner (jhq) 的大作中提到: 】
: 搞不懂
: 但是好像大规模资本撤退，恐怕不是几个命令就那么容易实现的吧
: 要不然叫了快十年的资本回流，怎么成效不大呢
别笑，请指正吧
不是奥巴马就要产业资本回流，把制造业工作带回来么？
【 在 moot (tor) 的大作中提到: 】
: “叫了快十年的资本回流”
: LOL，差点儿就信了
Apple’s Jobs to Obama: “jobs aren’t coming back” to U.S.
https://www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20120123/News/605191697/SH
When President Barack Obama joined Silicon Valley’s top luminaries for
dinner in California last February, each guest was asked to come with a
question for the president.
But as Steve Jobs of Apple spoke, Obama interrupted with an inquiry of his
own: What would it take to make iPhones in the United States? Not long ago, Apple boasted that its products were made in America. Today, few are. Almost all of the 70 million iPhones, 30 million iPads and 59 million other
products Apple sold last year were manufactured overseas.
Why can’t that work come home? Obama asked.
Jobs’ reply was unambiguous. “Those jobs aren’t coming back,” he said,
according to another dinner guest.
The president’s question touched upon a central conviction at Apple. It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad. Rather, Apple’s executives
believe the vast scale of overseas factories as well as the flexibility,
diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers have so outpaced their U.S. counterparts that “Made in the USA” is no longer a viable option for
most Apple products.
Apple has become one of the best-known, most admired and most imitated
companies on Earth, in part through an unrelenting mastery of global
operations. Last year, it earned over $400,000 in profit per employee, more than Goldman Sachs, Exxon Mobil or Google.
However, what has vexed Obama as well as economists and policy makers is
that Apple -- and many of its high-technology peers -- are not nearly as
avid in creating U.S. jobs as other famous companies were in their heydays.
Apple employs 43,000 people in the United States and 20,000 overseas, a
small fraction of the more than 400,000 U.S. workers at General Motors in
the 1950s, or the hundreds of thousands at General Electric in the 1980s.
Many more people work for Apple’s contractors: An additional 700,000 people engineer, build and assemble iPads, iPhones and Apple’s other products.
But almost none of them work in the United States. Instead, they work for
foreign companies in Asia, Europe and elsewhere, at factories that almost
every electronics designer relies upon to build their wares.
“Apple’s an example of why it’s so hard to create middle-class jobs in
the U.S. now,” said Jared Bernstein, who until last year was an economic
adviser to the White House.
“If it’s the pinnacle of capitalism, we should be worried.”
But while Apple is far from alone, it offers a window into why the success
of some prominent companies has not translated into large numbers of
domestic jobs. What’s more, the company’s decisions pose broader questions about what corporate America owes Americans as the global and national
economies are increasingly intertwined.
“Companies once felt an obligation to support American workers, even when
it wasn’t the best financial choice,” said Betsey Stevenson, the chief
economist at the Labor Department until last September. “That’s
disappeared. Profits and efficiency have trumped generosity.”
‘I WANT A GLASS SCREEN’
In 2007, a little more than a month before the iPhone was scheduled to
appear in stores, Jobs beckoned a handful of lieutenants into an office. For weeks, he had been carrying a prototype of the device in his pocket.
Jobs angrily held up his iPhone, angling it so everyone could see the dozens of tiny scratches marring its plastic screen, according to someone who
attended the meeting. He then pulled his keys from his jeans.
People will carry this phone in their pocket, he said. People also carry
their keys in their pocket. “I won’t sell a product that gets scratched,” he said tensely. The only solution was using unscratchable glass instead.
“I want a glass screen, and I want it perfect in six weeks.”
After one executive left that meeting, he booked a flight to Shenzhen, China. If Jobs wanted perfect, there was nowhere else to go.
For more than two years, the company had been working on a project that
presented the same questions at every turn: How do you completely reimagine the cellphone? And how do you design it at the highest quality -- with an
unscratchable screen, for instance -- while also ensuring that millions can be manufactured quickly and inexpensively enough to earn a significant
profit? The answers, almost every time, were found outside the United States.
In its early days, Apple usually didn’t look beyond its own backyard for
manufacturing solutions. But by 2004, Apple had largely turned to foreign
manufacturing. Guiding that decision was Apple’s operations expert, Timothy D. Cook, who replaced Jobs as chief executive last August, six weeks before Jobs’ death. Most other U.S. electronics companies had already gone abroad, and Apple, which at the time was struggling, felt it had to grasp every
advantage.
In part, Asia was attractive because the semi-skilled workers there were
cheaper. But that wasn’t driving Apple. For technology companies, the cost of labor is minimal compared with the expense of buying parts and managing
supply chains that bring together components and services from hundreds of
companies.
For Cook, the focus on Asia “came down to two things,” said one former
high-ranking Apple executive. Factories in Asia “can scale up and down
faster” and “Asian supply chains have surpassed what’s in the U.S.” The result is that “we can’t compete at this point,” the executive said.
The impact of such advantages became obvious as soon as Jobs demanded glass screens in 2007.
For years, cellphone makers had avoided using glass because it required
precision in cutting and grinding that was extremely difficult to achieve.
Apple had already selected a U.S. company, Corning Inc., to manufacture
large panes of strengthened glass. But figuring out how to cut those panes
into millions of iPhone screens required finding an empty cutting plant,
hundreds of pieces of glass to use in experiments and an army of midlevel
engineers. It would cost a fortune simply to prepare.
Then a bid for the work arrived from a Chinese factory.
When an Apple team visited, the Chinese plant’s owners were already
constructing a new wing. “This is in case you give us the contract,” the
manager said, according to a former Apple executive. The Chinese government had agreed to underwrite costs for numerous industries, and those subsidies had trickled down to the glass-cutting factory. It had a warehouse filled
with glass samples available to Apple, free of charge. The owners made
engineers available at almost no cost. They had built on-site dormitories so employees would be available 24 hours a day.
The Chinese plant got the job.
“The entire supply chain is in China now,” said another former high-
ranking Apple executive. “You need a thousand rubber gaskets? That’s the
factory next door. You need a million screws? That factory is a block away. You need that screw made a little bit different? It will take three hours.”
It is difficult to estimate how much more it would cost to build iPhones in the United States. However, various academics and manufacturing analysts
estimate that because labor is such a small part of technology manufacturing, paying U.S. wages would add up to $65 to each iPhone’s expense. Since
Apple’s profits are often hundreds of dollars per phone, building
domestically, in theory, would still give the company a healthy reward.
But such calculations are, in many respects, meaningless because building
the iPhone in the United States would demand much more than hiring Americans -- it would require transforming the national and global economies. Apple
executives believe there simply aren’t enough U.S. workers with the skills the company needs or factories with sufficient speed and flexibility. Other companies that work with Apple, like Corning, also say they must go abroad.
“Our customers are in Taiwan, Korea, Japan and China,” said James B. Flaws, Corning’s vice chairman and chief financial officer. “We could make the glass here, and then ship it by boat, but that takes 35 days. Or, we could
ship it by air, but that’s 10 times as expensive. So we build our glass
factories next door to assembly factories, and those are overseas.”
INNOVATION’S LOSERS
Toward the end of Obama’s dinner last year with Jobs and other Silicon
Valley executives, as everyone stood to leave, a crowd of photo seekers
formed around the president. A slightly smaller scrum gathered around Jobs. Rumors had spread that his illness had worsened, and some hoped for a
photograph with him, perhaps for the last time.
Eventually, the orbits of the men overlapped. “I’m not worried about the
country’s long-term future,” Jobs told Obama, according to one observer.
“This country is insanely great. What I’m worried about is that we don’t talk enough about solutions.”
In the last decade, technological leaps in solar and wind energy,
semiconductor fabrication and display technologies have created thousands of jobs. But while many of those industries started in America, much of the
employment has occurred abroad.
Companies have closed major facilities in the U.S. to reopen in China. By
way of explanation, executives say they are competing with Apple for
shareholders. If they cannot rival Apple’s growth and profit margins, they won’t survive.
The pace of innovation, say executives from a variety of industries, has
been quickened by businessmen like Jobs. GM went as long as half a decade
between major auto redesigns. Apple, by comparison, has released five
iPhones in four years, doubling the devices’ speed and memory while
dropping the price that some consumers pay.
Before Obama and Jobs said goodbye, the Apple executive pulled an iPhone
from his pocket to show off a new application -- a driving game -- with
incredibly detailed graphics. The device reflected the soft glow of the room’s lights.
The other executives, whose combined worth exceeded $69 billion, jostled for position to glance over his shoulder. The game, everyone agreed, was
wonderful.
There wasn’t even a tiny scratch on the screen.