In her presentation, Ms. Meng stated, among other things, that Huawei’s relationship with Skycom was “normal business cooperation” and “normal and controllable business cooperation,” and she described Skycom as a “ partner,” a “business partner of Huawei,” and a “third party Huawei works with” in Iran. Those statements were untrue because, as Ms. Meng knew, Skycom was not a business partner of, or a third party working with, Huawei; instead, Huawei controlled Skycom, and Skycom employees were really Huawei employees. It would have been material to Financial Institution 1 to know that Huawei controlled Skycom. In addition, Ms. Meng stated that Huawei “was once a shareholder of Skycom” but had “sold all its shares in Skycom.” Those statements were untrue, because, as Ms. Meng knew, Huawei had “sold” its shares to an entity that Huawei controlled. Specifically, Huawei transferred Skycom shares from a Huawei subsidiary (Hua Ying) to another entity that was controlled by Huawei (Canicula). It would have been material to Financial Institution 1 to know that Skycom was transferred from one Huawei controlled entity to another. Finally, Ms. Meng stated that Huawei “operates in Iran in strict compliance with applicable laws, regulations and sanctions” and that “there has been no violation of export control regulations” by “Huawei or any third party Huawei works with.” These statements were untrue because Huawei’s operation of Skycom, which caused the Financial Institutions to provide prohibited services, including banking services, for Huawei’s Iran-based business while Huawei concealed Skycom’s link to Huawei, was in violation of the U.S.Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560. Moreover, during the Relevant Time Period, Huawei caused Skycom to conduct approximately $100 million worth of U.S.-dollar transactions through Financial Institution 1 that cleared through the United States, at least some of which supported its work in Iran in violation of U.S. law, including $7.5 million for Iran-based contractors from the U.K. staffing company to do work in Iran.
最核心，也是网上争论最多的这一段，有些人更是由此认定孟晚舟出卖了华为。看看具体内容。
In her presentation, Ms. Meng stated, among other things, that Huawei’s
relationship with Skycom was “normal business cooperation” and “normal
and controllable business cooperation,” and she described Skycom as a “
partner,” a “business partner of Huawei,” and a “third party Huawei
works with” in Iran. Those statements were untrue because, as Ms. Meng knew, Skycom was not a business partner of, or a third party working with,
Huawei; instead, Huawei controlled Skycom, and Skycom employees were really Huawei employees. It would have been material to Financial Institution 1 to know that Huawei controlled Skycom. In addition, Ms. Meng stated that Huawei “was once a shareholder of Skycom” but had “sold all its shares in
Skycom.” Those statements were untrue, because, as Ms. Meng knew, Huawei
had “sold” its shares to an entity that Huawei controlled. Specifically,
Huawei transferred Skycom shares from a Huawei subsidiary (Hua Ying) to
another entity that was controlled by Huawei (Canicula). It would have been material to Financial Institution 1 to know that Skycom was transferred from one Huawei controlled entity to another. Finally, Ms. Meng stated that
Huawei “operates in Iran in strict compliance with applicable laws,
regulations and sanctions” and that “there has been no violation of export control regulations” by “Huawei or any third party Huawei works with.”
These statements were untrue because Huawei’s operation of Skycom, which
caused the Financial Institutions to provide prohibited services, including banking services, for Huawei’s Iran-based business while Huawei concealed
Skycom’s link to Huawei, was in violation of the U.S.Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Iranian Transactions and
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560. Moreover, during the Relevant
Time Period, Huawei caused Skycom to conduct approximately $100 million
worth of U.S.-dollar transactions through Financial Institution 1 that
cleared through the United States, at least some of which supported its work in Iran in violation of U.S. law, including $7.5 million for Iran-based
contractors from the U.K. staffing company to do work in Iran.
以下部分为微软翻译结果：
孟女士在演讲中表示，除其他事项外，华为与Skycom的关系是"正常的业务合作"和"正
常和可控的业务合作"，她形容Skycom是"合作伙伴"，"华为的商业伙伴"，以及"华为在伊朗合作的第三方"。这些说法是不真实的，因为孟女士知道，Skycom不是华为的业务
合作伙伴，也不是与华为合作的第三方：相反，华为控制了天通，而天通员工确实是华为员工。知道华为控制了Skycom，对金融机构1来说，这本来是实质性的。此外，孟女
士还表示，华为"曾经是Skycom的股东"，但"出售了其在Skycom的所有股份"。这些说法是不真实的，因为正如孟女士所知，华为已经将其股份"出售"给华为控制的一家实体。具体来说，华为将Skycom的股份从华为子公司（华英）转让给华为（卡努拉）控制的另一家实体。知道Skycom从华为控股的实体转移到另一家，对金融机构1来说，这本来是
实质性的。最后，孟女士表示，华为"严格按照相关法律、法规和制裁措施在伊朗开展
业务"，"华为或华为与任何第三方合作""没有违反出口管制规定"。这些说法是不真实
的，因为华为运营Skycom，导致金融机构为华为在伊朗的业务提供被禁止的服务，包括银行服务，而华为隐瞒了Skycom与华为的联系，违反了美国财政部外国资产管制办公室的《伊朗交易和制裁条例》，即C.F.R.第560部分。此外，在相关期间，华为还让
Skycom通过通过美国清算的金融机构1进行价值约1亿美元的交易，其中至少部分交易支持其在伊朗的工作违反了美国法律，其中包括750万美元用于伊朗承包商英国员工公司
在伊朗工作。
------------------------
孟晚舟早已在法庭承认，做了华为和skycom关系的虚假陈述，如果说这是认罪，那法庭早就应该根据这个判刑了。但事实上法庭没有因此做出审判，原因在于，汇丰其实根本不是因为孟晚舟的虚假陈述而做出的错误判断，汇丰从头至尾一直是知道华为控股
skycom的，因此，美国方面给不出证据说汇丰是因为孟晚舟的虚假陈述而提供了银行服务。至于用这个去告华为，更是无稽之谈了，华为在伊朗进行商业活动人尽皆知，如果说要告华为，那得告他违反了出口管制规定。如果华为违反出口管制说明不成立，那么汇丰为华为提供银行服务就是合法的。如果华为违反出口管制说明成立，那所有给华为的伊朗业务提供银行服务都有问题，就不需要用孟晚舟误导汇丰这个烂梗。