Fair summary, but I think this only summarizes the 3-party positions for the last 30-40 years, not what has changed in the last 10 years, and the more fundamental bigger picture.
Here is what I think, right or wrong, for everyone's discussion.
The fundamental conflict between US and China is not Taiwan itself, but the boundary of core interest. Let me explain:
If Taiwan is China's "Core Interest", then what is NOT China's Core Interest? If China gets her Core Interest of Taiwan, would China merge into the Western alliance system, join the wars with traditional Western enemies that disrupt world trade and democracy? Would China form good relationships with Japan, SK, Australia, etc.? Would China be peaceful in South China Sea?
Taiwan has been China's declared "core interests" for decades, even in Deng and Mao's time, when US and China relationship were very different. What changed in last decade is China's declared core interest expanded from Taiwan to South China Sea.
The United States does not have a core interest in Taiwan, but in South China Sea and the Pacific. If China is truly just claiming TW and not expand, it is plausible for a grand bargain to draw the line at Taiwan: US effectively gives up Taiwan protection (as it has done in Vietnam and Afghanistan), in return for China's commitment to be an de facto ally in other world affair.
But that means Taiwan is truly the ONLY core interest for China. When you have a core interest, it means that's your core, and other things are marginal and less important, but if you don't define a boundary and start declaring more and more as your core interest, that becomes expansion to world-wide dominance.
Take Israel expansion into Sinai for example. The US allowed it, and it didn't lose any creditability to its European allies that US will defend those allies like Germany against potential Israeli invasions. Why? Because nobody believes Israel will invade Germany. Then, why will US lose creditability if it fails to protect Taiwan against China? Because its Asian allies suspect China can invade them after Taiwan.
The current situation is similar to Taiwan-China-US-USSR during the Korean War. The US publicly declared Pacific defense line outside of Taiwan and Korea. Then the Korean War started. The US assessment was that the Korean invasion is the first domino of further expansion in Asia that must be countered and stopped. Thus, instead of giving up Korea that was OUTSIDE its defense line, it expanded its Pacific defense to include Taiwan and Korea to stop perceived USSR expansion. And that's what stopped China from unifying Taiwan in the 1950's, and the Koreans from having one unified country.
Today, it would appear to the US that if it stops protecting Taiwan, China will take Taiwan, and its other core interests like South China Sea, and then it may declare more core interests further into the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Thus the core conflict of interests in the so-called Taiwan issue is not Taiwan, but what is the boundary of China's core interest? The US core interest is clearly defined, it is its allies throughout the world (which does NOT include Taiwan) . Ultimately, this could be just a local provincial unification issue, or it could be the first domino of US-China world domination game. If it is the latter, it will be an urban warfare, fought in every street and every building.
最近风卷云涌、国际大事不断，我龟缩一隅，倒是处身世外，看的冷静一点。
最近也在用功读书，看了不少杂志，我个人最喜欢看两个期刊，《经济学人》和《外交》
这俩杂志的目标读者不是给中国人，目标读者和主要的订户是美国所谓精英们。
感觉目前中，美，台之间，非常的微妙。
我算是写篇读后感，试着还原下美国“精英”们认为的三方关系。
美国在台湾问题上，还是个面子问题。美国在台湾上，有利益，但是核心利益与其说是台湾提供的，还不如说，台湾的最大作用是牵制中国。如果放弃台湾，台湾无疑会背大陆拿走，那么美国就再一次在他的众多盟友面前，在军事，外交，都丢了脸。甚至可以变相承认了中国在西太的霸主地位，之后墙头草的韩日也会愉快的贴过去。
美国的难处在三方面
1，大陆别挑战我军事和政治的霸权，我要留着台湾牵制大陆。但是大陆在西太军力很
强了，坐视不管，中国必然会在区域取得军事优势，以后想管台湾也不可得了。
2，台湾一直想独立，独立的筹码就是把美国爸爸拉下水，但是美国爸爸真的真的不愿
意被台湾绑死。为他跟另一个核大国大仗真没那个必要。毕竟台湾也不是美国亲儿子。3，美国需要中国的合作，也不能让台湾胡来，真惹毛了中共，愣打起来，也不是个事。
美国会采取的具体他选择，恐怕只能是想办法榨取台湾最后的利益，同时严厉的管制台湾，不要出格，不要没事刺激大陆。我相信不久的将来，台湾会想办法恢复与大陆的对话。
关于台湾方面，也说三个问题吧
1，其实独立与否，是一回事，关键是怎么样能有选票，有了选票就有权利和票子了。
台湾上上下下的绿营，操作统独都是为了年轻人的选票。
2，台湾的年轻人，过着小确信的生活，说这最狠的话，干着最怂的事。他们不认为会
有战争，即使有战争也是别人的事。台湾本地的年轻人，淡定到不能理解。他们会把选票给符合他们意识形态的人。
3，美国爸爸的爱，会越来越严厉，想跟大陆改善关系应付下美国，但是，有怨在心口
难开。
台湾未来会如何？其实反而是台湾没啥话语权，棋子，不需要发表意见。
明年又地方选举了，又要开始闹了。
大陆也说三个情况：
1，军事力量的提升和拒阻战力的不断提高，让大陆更有底气，同时，民意上多数人支
持统一台湾，其中多数还支持梧桐。唯一的区别就是要不要抓到台湾独立再打。或是，统一时间表由大陆制定。
2，改革进入深水区，经济竞争和转型的完成，还是需要一个稳定的国际环境，中国跟
自己比，的确强大了。和美国比，还有差距。
3，习大大的历史定位和政治遗产，特别是几个百年就要到来。有统一的动力和压力。
中国的变数，永远是老大的想法，决心是他下的。我希望他要冷静，不要把自己的什么历史定位或者政治遗产看的太重。
最后，我说说我的想法。
台湾是中国的核心利益。为了统一，可以说不惜代价。（这也是中共统治合法性的保障之一）
当中国的军事，经济能力，提高到一定水平，特别是拒阻作战的能力显著提高后，
作为现实主义的集大成者，血液里流淌着商人血液的美国人，会再次添无廉耻的再次出卖自己的盟友和小弟，
会把台湾出卖给大陆换取去美国自己的利益。
现在最大的问题，是加码如何？
以下贴上经济学人杂志关于大陆台湾的军事实力分析。还有解放军拒阻作战的实力。我就不翻译了。老生常谈，没啥新东西。
本站合作媒体：admiral_wb 留园网
上站次数：[69]
发文数： [908]
五矛，美国可以自由表达意见，你可以么？
Fair summary, but I think this only summarizes the 3-party positions for the last 30-40 years, not what has changed in the last 10 years, and the more
fundamental bigger picture.
Here is what I think, right or wrong, for everyone's discussion.
The fundamental conflict between US and China is not Taiwan itself, but the boundary of core interest. Let me explain:
If Taiwan is China's "Core Interest", then what is NOT China's Core Interest? If China gets her Core Interest of Taiwan, would China merge into the
Western alliance system, join the wars with traditional Western enemies that disrupt world trade and democracy? Would China form good relationships with
Japan, SK, Australia, etc.? Would China be peaceful in South China Sea?
Taiwan has been China's declared "core interests" for decades, even in Deng and Mao's time, when US and China relationship were very different. What
changed in last decade is China's declared core interest expanded from
Taiwan to South China Sea.
The United States does not have a core interest in Taiwan, but in South
China Sea and the Pacific. If China is truly just claiming TW and not expand, it is plausible for a grand bargain to draw the line at Taiwan: US
effectively gives up Taiwan protection (as it has done in Vietnam and
Afghanistan), in return for China's commitment to be an de facto ally in
other world affair.
But that means Taiwan is truly the ONLY core interest for China. When you
have a core interest, it means that's your core, and other things are
marginal and less important, but if you don't define a boundary and start
declaring more and more as your core interest, that becomes expansion to
world-wide dominance.
Take Israel expansion into Sinai for example. The US allowed it, and it didn't lose any creditability to its European allies that US will defend those
allies like Germany against potential Israeli invasions. Why? Because nobody believes
Israel will invade Germany. Then, why will US lose creditability if it
fails to
protect Taiwan against China? Because its Asian allies suspect China can
invade them after Taiwan.
The current situation is similar to Taiwan-China-US-USSR during the Korean
War. The US publicly declared Pacific defense line outside of Taiwan and
Korea. Then the Korean War started. The US assessment was that the Korean
invasion is the first domino of further expansion in Asia that must be
countered and stopped.
Thus, instead of giving up Korea that was OUTSIDE its defense line, it
expanded its Pacific defense to include Taiwan and Korea to stop perceived
USSR expansion. And that's what stopped China from unifying Taiwan in the
1950's, and the Koreans from having one unified country.
Today, it would appear to the US that if it stops protecting Taiwan, China
will take Taiwan, and its other core interests like South China Sea, and
then it may declare more core interests further into the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Thus the core conflict of interests in the so-called Taiwan issue is not
Taiwan, but what
is the boundary of China's core interest? The US core interest is
clearly defined, it is its allies throughout the world (which does NOT
include Taiwan)
. Ultimately, this could be just a local provincial unification issue, or it could be the first domino of US-China world domination game. If it is the
latter, it will be an urban warfare, fought in every street and every
building.
【 在 gingging () 的大作中提到: 】
: 最近风卷云涌、国际大事不断，我龟缩一隅，倒是处身世外，看的冷静一点。
: 最近也在用功读书，看了不少杂志，我个人最喜欢看两个期刊，《经济学人》和《外交》
: 这俩杂志的目标读者不是给中国人，目标读者和主要的订户是美国所谓精英们。
: 感觉目前中，美，台之间，非常的微妙。
: 我算是写篇读后感，试着还原下美国“精英”们认为的三方关系。
: 美国在台湾问题上，还是个面子问题。美国在台湾上，有利益，但是核心利益与其说是
: 台湾提供的，还不如说，台湾的最大作用是牵制中国。如果放弃台湾，台湾无疑会背大
: 陆拿走，那么美国就再一次在他的众多盟友面前，在军事，外交，都丢了脸。甚至可以
: 变相承认了中国在西太的霸主地位，之后墙头草的韩日也会愉快的贴过去。
: 美国的难处在三方面
: ...................