不仅如此，学校export control office还对我的组和本系的另外一个教授做了非常歧 视的审查。仅仅因为我组里国际学生多，随意调查我的NIH和DOD资助的基础研究( fundamental research)项目。对每一个我组里的国际学生盘问他们有没有跟本国的任 何人联系，对于中国学生，还会问他们有没有跟国内的以前的导师联系过。现在的项目都做过什么内容，有没有把这些内容跟国内的仍和人说起过。把这些学生搞得惶惶不安。
U.S. intelligence agencies are encouraging American research universities to develop protocols for monitoring students and visiting scholars from Chinese state-affiliated research institutions, as U.S. suspicion toward China spreads to academia.
Since last year, FBI officials have visited at least 10 members of the Association of American Universities, a group of 62 research universities, with an unclassified list of Chinese research institutions and companies.
Universities have been advised to monitor students and scholars associated with those entities on American campuses, according to three administrators briefed at separate institutions. FBI officials have also urged universities to review ongoing research involving Chinese individuals that could have defense applications, the administrators say.
"We are being asked what processes are in place to know what labs they are working at or what information they are being exposed to," Fred Cate, vice president of research at Indiana University, tells NPR. "It's not a question of just looking for suspicious behavior — it's actually really targeting specific countries and the people from those countries."
In a statement responding to NPR's questions, the FBI said it "regularly engages with the communities we serve. As part of this continual outreach, we meet with a wide variety of groups, organizations, businesses, and academic institutions. The FBI has met with top officials from academia as part of our ongoing engagement on national security matters."
While law enforcement agents have discussed university monitoring of other nationalities as well, these FBI briefings addressed visitors from China in particular who are involved in science, technology, engineering and math.
Such FBI requests are advisory, not mandatory. Administrators say the universities briefed by the FBI have not yet implemented additional monitoring protocols. They say they have pushed back because of skepticism of the threat level and because the FBI requests lack specificity in implementation.
Separately, intelligence officers have also briefed hundreds of American CEOs, investors and think tank experts on Chinese cybersecurity and espionage threats. "What we provide them is the classified information that we get from the collection priorities of China specifically: What they're trying to collect on, what they're interested in our campuses," William Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, told NPR.
This March, U.S. intelligence officials briefed about 70 college administrators of the American Council on Education, according to university participants. The officials said the presidents should increase oversight of Chinese researchers and avoid research funding from Chinese firms like Huawei.
The presidents were "skeptical of many of the claims, but many of them receive U.S. government research money," says a participant briefed at the meeting and who is not authorized to speak publicly.
The nation's primary biomedical research agency, the National Institutes of Health, is now investigating grant recipients for not disclosing collaboration or funding from China and for sharing peer-review grant material with Chinese researchers. "Foreign entities have mounted systematic programs to influence NIH researchers and peer reviewers," warned NIH Director Francis Collins in a memo sent to more than 10,000 research institutions last August.
In May, the Commerce Department put Huawei on a trade blacklist, which prevents U.S. companies from selling products to the Chinese telecom firm without federal authorization. But the pressure to divest from research collaborations with Huawei and ZTE, another telecom company, began early last year, said three university administrators.
"For months up until [May], government officials were saying, 'We really don't think you should be doing business with Huawei,' " says Cate. "We said, 'Why don't you put them on a list and then we won't do business?' And they're like, 'Oh, the list process is way too slow.' "
The FBI visits have caused uncertainty among U.S. academics about whether to accept federal grants for research that may involve Chinese scholars. "We don't say you can't, because we don't have any legal authority to say they can't," Cate says. "But we say you should be aware there may be some sensitivity about this."
Several university presidents have issued statements this year reaffirming their commitment to Chinese researchers and students.
Last month, Yale University's president, Peter Salovey, said he was "working with my presidential colleagues in the Association of American Universities (AAU) to urge federal agencies to clarify concerns they have about international academic exchanges. The AAU has encouraged agencies to use the tools already in place, such as export controls, while affirming the principle of open academic exchange for basic research."
Salovey's office declined to comment further when contacted by NPR.
Universities and companies use software that automatically reviews international research collaborations, commercial transactions and other exchanges and then matches them up with existing blacklists to ensure they do not violate export control laws.
Numerous universities, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University and the University of Illinois, have already cut off research collaborations with Huawei.
Besides Huawei, no other Chinese entities singled out to universities by the FBI are currently on a trade blacklist, according to the three university administrators.
That means any monitoring of specific Chinese individuals at the university level would have to be done manually, when admitting or employing them, possibly leaving a wide margin of error during evaluation.
"You're really looking at compliance systems that have to be rolled out on a department-by-department basis and person-by-person level to see if you're sticking research data in an envelope and mailing it to China," Cate says.
The Trump administration has long accused China of stealing American technology, a key factor behind the trade war between the two countries.
FBI Director Christopher Wray addresses the Council on Foreign Relations on April 26 in Washington, D.C. Wray spoke about "the FBI's role in protecting the United States from today's global threats." As the mood in Washington, D.C., becomes more aggressive toward China, intelligence agencies have been visiting not just universities but also American tech companies to dissuade them from collaborations with Chinese entities.
"We have to wake this country up to what China is doing," Sen. Mark Warner, Va.-D, said at the Brookings Institution last month. "For this reason, I have been convening meetings between the intelligence community and outside stakeholders in business and academia to ensure they have the full threat picture and, hopefully, make different decisions about Chinese partnerships."
Chinese students have come under particular suspicion. More than 340,000 were studying in the U.S. last year, according to the Department of Homeland Security. Since last July, Chinese students studying, in particular, science and technology fields must undergo additional screening, resulting in delayed visas for hundreds of students.
In May, Republicans introduced legislation in the House and Senate that would deny visas to Chinese researchers affiliated with Chinese military institutions.
"The Chinese intelligence services strategically use every tool at their disposal — including state-owned businesses, students, researchers and ostensibly private companies — to systematically steal information and intellectual property," FBI Director Christopher Wray said at the Council on Foreign Relations in April.
Former FBI agents say the bureau's recent visits to universities are merely an extension of long-running efforts to collaborate with the private sector and academia on national security issues.
"What the FBI has been doing is really more of an outreach and education program," says Todd K. Hulsey, a former counterintelligence official who retired from the FBI in 2014. Hulsey explained that such meetings began as early as two decades ago over concerns that Chinese student associations were fronts for Chinese intelligence recruiting: "It's to let these universities know that there is an existing threat to our economy."
National security concerns at universities increased after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which sent a wave of former Soviet bloc researchers to the U.S., says Edward Shaw, a former FBI special agent who retired in 2014.
Even back then, however, government agencies contacted universities with specific individuals of concern rather than presenting a broad list of institutions.
"It's casting a wide net," says Shaw. "When you're getting information from various government agencies and other trusted sources that a specific person is in the country and you are more targeted, you're using your resources better." 【 在 justicefight (justicefight) 的大作中提到: 】 : 我和我的同事都认为他们就跟警察抓超速罚单一样有个名额目标。用假定有罪原则毫无 : 根据的去做审查。他们花了这么大力气，最后自己打自己的脸。
俄亥俄州立大学的research compliance office让联邦调查局随意access学校任何人的工作,因此还拿了一个奖。https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/partnerships_and_outreach/
community_outreach/dcla/2014/cincinnati
不仅如此，学校export control office还对我的组和本系的另外一个教授做了非常歧
视的审查。仅仅因为我组里国际学生多，随意调查我的NIH和DOD资助的基础研究(
fundamental research)项目。对每一个我组里的国际学生盘问他们有没有跟本国的任
何人联系，对于中国学生，还会问他们有没有跟国内的以前的导师联系过。现在的项目都做过什么内容，有没有把这些内容跟国内的仍和人说起过。把这些学生搞得惶惶不安。
我现在只知道本系的另外一个教授的组也受到了这种莫名其妙的调查。我们想找到更多俄亥俄州立学校其他受到任何不公正的类似调查的学生学者，希望我们能团结起来抵制他们这种非常歧视的对待。
如果你也遭受了不平等的待遇或者知道身边的人有此类似的经历，请回站内邮件。希望我们能集中大家的力量来反对这些不平等的待遇。
支持告！
说不定能发一笔横财
【 在 justicefight () 的大作中提到: 】
: 俄亥俄州立大学的research compliance office让联邦调查局随意access学校任何人的
: 工作,因此还拿了一个奖。
: https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/partnerships_and_outreach/
: community_outreach/dcla/2014/cincinnati
: 不仅如此，学校export control office还对我的组和本系的另外一个教授做了非常歧
: 视的审查。仅仅因为我组里国际学生多，随意调查我的NIH和DOD资助的基础研究(
: fundamental research)项目。对每一个我组里的国际学生盘问他们有没有跟本国的任
: 何人联系，对于中国学生，还会问他们有没有跟国内的以前的导师联系过。现在的项目
: 都做过什么内容，有没有把这些内容跟国内的仍和人说起过。把这些学生搞得惶惶不安。
: 我现在只知道本系的另外一个教授的组也受到了这种莫名其妙的调查。我们想找到更多
: ...................
只是想把这种根本不在乎学术和学生发展的官僚机构从学校这个单纯的环境里面剔除
不过你了解下，搞这个的office的头儿，
还真不一定是红脖子极右，白左或其它皮色的左蜜的可能不小
【 在 justicefight () 的大作中提到: 】
: 只是想把这种根本不在乎学术和学生发展的官僚机构从学校这个单纯的环境里面剔除
这种情况一般都是FBI给学校名单，让学校调查的。说明你上FBI名单了。是不是和国内学校有合作？
【 在 justicefight () 的大作中提到: 】
: 俄亥俄州立大学的research compliance office让联邦调查局随意access学校任何人的
: 工作,因此还拿了一个奖。
: https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/partnerships_and_outreach/
: community_outreach/dcla/2014/cincinnati
: 不仅如此，学校export control office还对我的组和本系的另外一个教授做了非常歧
: 视的审查。仅仅因为我组里国际学生多，随意调查我的NIH和DOD资助的基础研究(
: fundamental research)项目。对每一个我组里的国际学生盘问他们有没有跟本国的任
: 何人联系，对于中国学生，还会问他们有没有跟国内的以前的导师联系过。现在的项目
: 都做过什么内容，有没有把这些内容跟国内的仍和人说起过。把这些学生搞得惶惶不安。
: 我现在只知道本系的另外一个教授的组也受到了这种莫名其妙的调查。我们想找到更多
: ...................
我没有跟国内有任何的合作。而且我也问过他们，他们没有收到政府的通知，他们自称是volunteer做这样的调查.
如果有时间和精力的话，我支持一定要闹，起诉，等等。
就好比上次东部那个学校的教授实验室被一锅端，中国人都没见群体性游行抗议，目的不是要挽回损失，而是要让外界知道真相，不是所有的中国裔的学术人士都是贼。
如果你不闹，外界民众都只相信政府或者官媒的一些说辞，美国这个国度虽说民主，但是大部分民众也是没有思考能力的随大流的盲众。
这样的事情，合理组织，搞出声音来，让外界知道是怎么回事，要不然这个群体经过一个又一个这样的事件，基本在民众心理就定型了。
而且闹起来之后，那些屁股不干净的，自己也不会肆无忌惮。
【 在 justicefight () 的大作中提到: 】
: 俄亥俄州立大学的research compliance office让联邦调查局随意access学校任何人的
: 工作,因此还拿了一个奖。
: https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/partnerships_and_outreach/
: community_outreach/dcla/2014/cincinnati
: 不仅如此，学校export control office还对我的组和本系的另外一个教授做了非常歧
: 视的审查。仅仅因为我组里国际学生多，随意调查我的NIH和DOD资助的基础研究(
: fundamental research)项目。对每一个我组里的国际学生盘问他们有没有跟本国的任
: 何人联系，对于中国学生，还会问他们有没有跟国内的以前的导师联系过。现在的项目
: 都做过什么内容，有没有把这些内容跟国内的仍和人说起过。把这些学生搞得惶惶不安。
: 我现在只知道本系的另外一个教授的组也受到了这种莫名其妙的调查。我们想找到更多
: ...................
有没有国内来的访问学者/学生，文章挂名时访问学者/学生是国内学校还是美国学校？我知道有人被FBI约谈是因为国内来的访问学者文章上只挂国内的名。还有是因为
招的学生中有北航，哈工大等美国认为和国家军工有关的。如果这些都没有，可能
是因为你有DOD的grant. 有没有外国学生被DOD grant support?
如果没有上面所说的，是可以告了。那些两边通吃的把很多遵守规矩的国人faculty
也牵连了。
【 在 justicefight (justicefight) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我没有跟国内有任何的合作。而且我也问过他们，他们没有收到政府的通知，他们自称
: 是volunteer做这样的调查.
我和我的同事都认为他们就跟警察抓超速罚单一样有个名额目标。用假定有罪原则毫无根据的去做审查。他们花了这么大力气，最后自己打自己的脸。
你们被调查可能和下面这个新闻有关（今年6月的），针对有defense application 和
bio-medical的项目，你有NIH和DOD，刚好在这个范畴内。新闻说学校有软件自动
找出可能会violate export control的项目，以确保export control不会被violate.
可能
调查的target是你的学生，不是你。我认得一个白人被FBI约谈，是因为他招了个从
中国过来的访问学生。FBI明确告诉他注意IP，学生在美国做的工作要挂美国学校。
被约谈的都是功成名就了的。
U.S. intelligence agencies are encouraging American research universities to develop protocols for monitoring students and visiting scholars from
Chinese state-affiliated research institutions, as U.S. suspicion toward
China spreads to academia.
Since last year, FBI officials have visited at least 10 members of the
Association of American Universities, a group of 62 research universities,
with an unclassified list of Chinese research institutions and companies.
Universities have been advised to monitor students and scholars associated
with those entities on American campuses, according to three administrators briefed at separate institutions. FBI officials have also urged universities to review ongoing research involving Chinese individuals that could have
defense applications, the administrators say.
"We are being asked what processes are in place to know what labs they are
working at or what information they are being exposed to," Fred Cate, vice
president of research at Indiana University, tells NPR. "It's not a question of just looking for suspicious behavior — it's actually really targeting
specific countries and the people from those countries."
In a statement responding to NPR's questions, the FBI said it "regularly
engages with the communities we serve. As part of this continual outreach,
we meet with a wide variety of groups, organizations, businesses, and
academic institutions. The FBI has met with top officials from academia as
part of our ongoing engagement on national security matters."
While law enforcement agents have discussed university monitoring of other
nationalities as well, these FBI briefings addressed visitors from China in particular who are involved in science, technology, engineering and math.
Such FBI requests are advisory, not mandatory. Administrators say the
universities briefed by the FBI have not yet implemented additional
monitoring protocols. They say they have pushed back because of skepticism
of the threat level and because the FBI requests lack specificity in
implementation.
Separately, intelligence officers have also briefed hundreds of American
CEOs, investors and think tank experts on Chinese cybersecurity and
espionage threats. "What we provide them is the classified information that we get from the collection priorities of China specifically: What they're
trying to collect on, what they're interested in our campuses," William
Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center,
told NPR.
This March, U.S. intelligence officials briefed about 70 college
administrators of the American Council on Education, according to university participants. The officials said the presidents should increase oversight
of Chinese researchers and avoid research funding from Chinese firms like
Huawei.
The presidents were "skeptical of many of the claims, but many of them
receive U.S. government research money," says a participant briefed at the
meeting and who is not authorized to speak publicly.
The nation's primary biomedical research agency, the National Institutes of Health, is now investigating grant recipients for not disclosing
collaboration or funding from China and for sharing peer-review grant
material with Chinese researchers. "Foreign entities have mounted systematic programs to influence NIH researchers and peer reviewers," warned NIH
Director Francis Collins in a memo sent to more than 10,000 research
institutions last August.
In May, the Commerce Department put Huawei on a trade blacklist, which
prevents U.S. companies from selling products to the Chinese telecom firm
without federal authorization. But the pressure to divest from research
collaborations with Huawei and ZTE, another telecom company, began early
last year, said three university administrators.
"For months up until [May], government officials were saying, 'We really don't think you should be doing business with Huawei,' " says Cate. "We said, 'Why don't you put them on a list and then we won't do business?' And they're like, 'Oh, the list process is way too slow.' "
The FBI visits have caused uncertainty among U.S. academics about whether to accept federal grants for research that may involve Chinese scholars. "We
don't say you can't, because we don't have any legal authority to say they
can't," Cate says. "But we say you should be aware there may be some
sensitivity about this."
Several university presidents have issued statements this year reaffirming
their commitment to Chinese researchers and students.
Last month, Yale University's president, Peter Salovey, said he was "working with my presidential colleagues in the Association of American Universities (AAU) to urge federal agencies to clarify concerns they have about
international academic exchanges. The AAU has encouraged agencies to use the tools already in place, such as export controls, while affirming the
principle of open academic exchange for basic research."
Salovey's office declined to comment further when contacted by NPR.
Universities and companies use software that automatically reviews
international research collaborations, commercial transactions and other
exchanges and then matches them up with existing blacklists to ensure they
do not violate export control laws.
Numerous universities, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University and the University of Illinois, have already cut off
research collaborations with Huawei.
Besides Huawei, no other Chinese entities singled out to universities by the FBI are currently on a trade blacklist, according to the three university
administrators.
That means any monitoring of specific Chinese individuals at the university level would have to be done manually, when admitting or employing them,
possibly leaving a wide margin of error during evaluation.
"You're really looking at compliance systems that have to be rolled out on a department-by-department basis and person-by-person level to see if you're sticking research data in an envelope and mailing it to China," Cate says.
The Trump administration has long accused China of stealing American
technology, a key factor behind the trade war between the two countries.
FBI Director Christopher Wray addresses the Council on Foreign Relations on April 26 in Washington, D.C. Wray spoke about "the FBI's role in protecting the United States from today's global threats."
As the mood in Washington, D.C., becomes more aggressive toward China,
intelligence agencies have been visiting not just universities but also
American tech companies to dissuade them from collaborations with Chinese
entities.
"We have to wake this country up to what China is doing," Sen. Mark Warner, Va.-D, said at the Brookings Institution last month. "For this reason, I
have been convening meetings between the intelligence community and outside stakeholders in business and academia to ensure they have the full threat
picture and, hopefully, make different decisions about Chinese partnerships."
Chinese students have come under particular suspicion. More than 340,000
were studying in the U.S. last year, according to the Department of Homeland Security. Since last July, Chinese students studying, in particular,
science and technology fields must undergo additional screening, resulting
in delayed visas for hundreds of students.
In May, Republicans introduced legislation in the House and Senate that
would deny visas to Chinese researchers affiliated with Chinese military
institutions.
"The Chinese intelligence services strategically use every tool at their
disposal — including state-owned businesses, students, researchers and
ostensibly private companies — to systematically steal information and
intellectual property," FBI Director Christopher Wray said at the Council on Foreign Relations in April.
Former FBI agents say the bureau's recent visits to universities are merely an extension of long-running efforts to collaborate with the private sector and academia on national security issues.
"What the FBI has been doing is really more of an outreach and education
program," says Todd K. Hulsey, a former counterintelligence official who
retired from the FBI in 2014. Hulsey explained that such meetings began as
early as two decades ago over concerns that Chinese student associations
were fronts for Chinese intelligence recruiting: "It's to let these
universities know that there is an existing threat to our economy."
National security concerns at universities increased after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which sent a wave of former Soviet bloc researchers to the U.S., says Edward Shaw, a former FBI special agent who retired in 2014.
Even back then, however, government agencies contacted universities with
specific individuals of concern rather than presenting a broad list of
institutions.
"It's casting a wide net," says Shaw. "When you're getting information from various government agencies and other trusted sources that a specific person is in the country and you are more targeted, you're using your resources
better."
【 在 justicefight (justicefight) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我和我的同事都认为他们就跟警察抓超速罚单一样有个名额目标。用假定有罪原则毫无
: 根据的去做审查。他们花了这么大力气，最后自己打自己的脸。