其他就不多说了，有些人立马猜测是自杀。 其实这个FAA 6年前就有warning/alert (但不是mandatory)，这包含Model 787-8 所以还是别jump the gun, 等调查下来再下结论。 摘录如下， Background: The Boeing Company (Boeing) received reports from operators of Model 737 airplanes that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged. The fuel control switches (or engine start switches) are installed on the control stand in the flight deck and used by the pilot to supply or cutoff fuel to the engines. The fuel control switch has a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation that could result in unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions. In order to move the switch from one position to the other under the condition where the locking feature is engaged, it is necessary for the pilot to lift the switch up while transitioning the switch position. If the locking feature is disengaged, the switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting the switch during transition, and the switch would be exposed to the potential of inadvertent operation. Inadvertent operation of the switch could result in an unintended consequence, such as an in-flight engine shutdown. Boeing informed the FAA that the fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models. The table below identifies the affected airplane models and related part numbers (P/Ns) of the fuel control switch, which is manufactured by Honeywell. Recommendations： The FAA recommends that all owners and operators of the affected airplanes incorporate the following actions at the earliest opportunity: 1) Inspect the locking feature of the fuel control switch to ensure its engagement. While the airplane is on the ground, check whether the fuel control switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting up the switch. If the switch can be moved without lifting it up, the locking feature has been disengaged and the switch should be replaced at the earliest opportunity. 2) For Boeing Model 737-700, -700C, -800, and -900ER series airplanes and Boeing Model 737- 8 and -9 airplanes delivered with a fuel control switch having P/N 766AT613-3D: Replace the fuel control switch with a switch having P/N 766AT614-3D, which includes an improved locking feature. We request that owners and operators report any failure of the locking feature of the fuel control switch to Boeing (see contact information provided below). The report should include the date the failure occurred, the fuel control switch P/N, airplane model, airplane serial number, and airplane registration number. Under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection contained in this SAIB, and assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0731.
重点： The fuel control switch has a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation that could result in unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions. 也就是说有可能无意把供油的开关关掉的。
Dadaobz 发表于 2025-07-12 18:24 重点： The fuel control switch has a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation that could result in unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions. 也就是说有可能无意把供油的开关关掉的。
报告上讲到两个开关关掉之间是一秒钟但是这也有可能是1/10秒因为1秒是最小计时单位吧？ 有个飞行员贴了自己亲身经历（take it with a grain of salt)，一块挡太阳的塑料板把一个发动机给关了。如果locking mechanism坏了的话，真有可能一下就不小心把2个引擎都关了，对吧？ I’m a retired airline pilot, having over 30 years experience flying both the 747 and 777 models. I can attest that the over the centre “lift and move” feature on the fuel control switches require deliberate inputs by the pilot to activate. On one occasion on the 747 I was the Relief Commander on a long transfer Pacific flight. Approaching the destination I had just climbed out of the left seat and moved to the centre seat for the Captain to climb into his seat and prepare for landing. It was an early morning arrival and the sun was rising directly in front of us, casting harsh sunlight through the windshield. It was common practice (a normalisation of deviance) for pilots to lodge the plastic clip board between the top of the instrument panel and the windshield frame below the magnetic compass in an effort to block the sunlight. A few minutes later we passed some light turbulence. I was relaxing in the centre seat when I heard a series of three loud beeps (the aural warning system) and the first officer shout “Oh, sh*t!!!”. The plastic clip board had dislodged and fallen precisely on the #4 fuel control switch. As it fell onto the switch it flexed and lifted the switch up and over the mechanical centre feature and into the cut off position causing the engine to flame out. The captain and first officer flew into action and frantically tried to restart the engine; however, at 37,000’ we were above the max relight altitude where the air was too thin, so the engine would not relight. The airplane was slowing down and we could not hold altitude for much longer so a drift down was necessary. We were luckily approaching our normal descent point anyway, so a descent was requested and approved by ATC. Passing 30,000 the engine relit successfully and a normal four engine landing was carried out. They say that with age comes wisdom. I retired after nearly 50 years of flying. Throughout that time I never stopped learning from my own mistakes, and those made by other pilots.
其实这个FAA 6年前就有warning/alert (但不是mandatory)，这包含Model 787-8
所以还是别jump the gun, 等调查下来再下结论。
摘录如下，
Background:
The Boeing Company (Boeing) received reports from operators of Model 737 airplanes that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged. The fuel control switches (or engine start switches) are installed on the control stand in the flight deck and used by the pilot to supply or cutoff fuel to the engines. The fuel control switch has a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation that could result in unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions. In order to move the switch from one position to the other under the condition where the locking feature is engaged, it is necessary for the pilot to lift the switch up while transitioning the switch position. If the locking feature is disengaged, the switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting the switch during transition, and the switch would be exposed to the potential of inadvertent operation. Inadvertent operation of the switch could result in an unintended consequence, such as an in-flight engine shutdown. Boeing informed the FAA that the fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models. The table below identifies the affected airplane models and related part numbers (P/Ns) of the fuel control switch, which is manufactured by Honeywell.
Recommendations：
The FAA recommends that all owners and operators of the affected airplanes incorporate the following actions at the earliest opportunity: 1) Inspect the locking feature of the fuel control switch to ensure its engagement. While the airplane is on the ground, check whether the fuel control switch can be moved between the two positions without lifting up the switch. If the switch can be moved without lifting it up, the locking feature has been disengaged and the switch should be replaced at the earliest opportunity. 2) For Boeing Model 737-700, -700C, -800, and -900ER series airplanes and Boeing Model 737- 8 and -9 airplanes delivered with a fuel control switch having P/N 766AT613-3D: Replace the fuel control switch with a switch having P/N 766AT614-3D, which includes an improved locking feature. We request that owners and operators report any failure of the locking feature of the fuel control switch to Boeing (see contact information provided below). The report should include the date the failure occurred, the fuel control switch P/N, airplane model, airplane serial number, and airplane registration number. Under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection contained in this SAIB, and assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0731.
完整的文件： https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/NM-18-33.pdf/SIB_NM-18-33_1
The fuel control switch has a locking feature to prevent inadvertent operation that could result in unintended switch movement between the fuel supply and fuel cutoff positions.
也就是说有可能无意把供油的开关关掉的。
可是是两个开关呢，两个开关的locking feature 同时坏了，然后飞行员不小心把两个都关掉了？这个概率….
所以说要继续看么，如果没有这个锁坏掉的先例那可能性就更小了。本来就是非常小的概率。
关于开关距离的问题，事实上飞机上各种开关实在是很多，即使是计算机控制的，往往也有手动备份，如果这些开关不集中放置，紧急状况下也会增加飞行员寻找时间。很多事情有利有弊，不能因为这次这个部件出了问题，只专注这一个问题解决。重新排布飞机上所有开关也必须注意 efficiency 的综合考量。
另外我觉得有必要在机仓装摄像头，数据储存在黑匣子里。过去几年飞行员故意坠机的事件发生了不少次：马航，海航，Germanwings， 这次Air India。有影像数据，很多问题就会容易很多。
我看了有人尝试关闭了，但是只需要4，5秒，可以两个都关掉。 应该这两个东西有盖子。 太容易被关掉了。
I’m a retired airline pilot, having over 30 years experience flying both the 747 and 777 models. I can attest that the over the centre “lift and move” feature on the fuel control switches require deliberate inputs by the pilot to activate.
On one occasion on the 747 I was the Relief Commander on a long transfer Pacific flight. Approaching the destination I had just climbed out of the left seat and moved to the centre seat for the Captain to climb into his seat and prepare for landing. It was an early morning arrival and the sun was rising directly in front of us, casting harsh sunlight through the windshield. It was common practice (a normalisation of deviance) for pilots to lodge the plastic clip board between the top of the instrument panel and the windshield frame below the magnetic compass in an effort to block the sunlight.
A few minutes later we passed some light turbulence. I was relaxing in the centre seat when I heard a series of three loud beeps (the aural warning system) and the first officer shout “Oh, sh*t!!!”.
The plastic clip board had dislodged and fallen precisely on the #4 fuel control switch. As it fell onto the switch it flexed and lifted the switch up and over the mechanical centre feature and into the cut off position causing the engine to flame out. The captain and first officer flew into action and frantically tried to restart the engine; however, at 37,000’ we were above the max relight altitude where the air was too thin, so the engine would not relight. The airplane was slowing down and we could not hold altitude for much longer so a drift down was necessary. We were luckily approaching our normal descent point anyway, so a descent was requested and approved by ATC. Passing 30,000 the engine relit successfully and a normal four engine landing was carried out.
They say that with age comes wisdom. I retired after nearly 50 years of flying. Throughout that time I never stopped learning from my own mistakes, and those made by other pilots.