1947-1991冷战期间，根本没有什么visa 给前苏联人的；只有外交人员。 1991-2014 恢复期，这时候有大量的学生，博士后，旅游，以及做生意的visa给俄罗斯人。现在生活中遇到的定居在美国的俄罗斯人大都应该是那个时候来的！ 2014 入侵克米里亚后，变难了；与政府或军队有联系的办不了签证；有一些军工相关的技术方面稍稍的禁了。 2016大选干预后，学生和工作签证受到更多限制； 2022入侵乌克兰后，关闭了在俄罗斯的签证服务，只能到第三国去签证。 中国的现状应该相当于俄罗斯的2014后；美国国务院要将现状提高到2016年对俄罗斯的那种状态或更严！ ChapGPT: “Under President Trump’s leadership, the U.S. State Department will work with the Department of Homeland Security to aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields. We will also revise visa criteria to enhance scrutiny of all future visa applications from the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong.” Question: Did similar measures happened towards Russia immigrants before when US and Russia were in conflict?
Yes, similar visa restrictions and scrutiny measures have been imposed by the U.S. government on Russian nationals—particularly during times of heightened tension between the two countries—but not always as broadly or explicitly as proposed in the quote regarding Chinese students. Here are some key historical examples of how the U.S. has treated Russian (or Soviet) visa applicants during conflicts or rivalries:
1. Cold War Period (1947–1991)
General Restrictions: The U.S. placed severe limits on visas for Soviet citizens. Only a small number of Soviet officials, diplomats, or select professionals could enter. Exchange programs were tightly controlled—often used as tools of soft diplomacy, but heavily monitored for espionage risks. Student visas were rare for Soviet citizens. When issued, recipients were closely watched by U.S. intelligence.
2. Post-Cold War (1991–2014)
Relaxation: After the Soviet Union collapsed, visa access for Russians improved. Many students, tourists, and businesspeople were allowed in under more typical scrutiny.
3. After 2014 – Crimea Annexation and Ukraine Conflict
Heightened scrutiny: After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the U.S. did not issue a blanket visa ban but increased background checks and visa denials for individuals: Linked to the Russian government or military. On sanctions lists or associated with oligarchs close to Putin. Some academic and tech collaborations were quietly restricted, particularly in sensitive fields like aerospace and cybersecurity.
4. Post-2016 Election Interference Allegations
Targeted Restrictions: U.S. closed Russian consulates (e.g., in San Francisco in 2017). Expelled diplomats who were alleged to be spies. Student and work visas were more scrutinized, especially for individuals connected to state-run institutions or intelligence-linked entities. In some cases, Russian graduate students in sensitive fields (e.g., nuclear science, AI) faced delays or denials.
5. Post-2022 Invasion of Ukraine
Visa services for Russians were drastically reduced: U.S. suspended routine visa services in Russia. Russians were told to apply for visas in third countries (e.g., Poland). Sanctions and export controls were expanded to universities, tech sectors, and military-linked research centers. No formal blanket ban on Russian students, but visa approval became significantly harder for any applicants tied to dual-use technology, defense, or state-sponsored education.
中国的现状应该相当于俄罗斯的2014后；美国国务院要将现状提高到2016年对俄罗斯的那种状态或更严！ ChapGPT: “Under President Trump’s leadership, the U.S. State Department will work with the Department of Homeland Security to aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields. We will also revise visa criteria to enhance scrutiny of all future visa applications from the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong.”
Question: Did similar measures happened towards Russia immigrants before when US and Russia were in conflict?
Yes, similar visa restrictions and scrutiny measures have been imposed by the U.S. government on Russian nationals—particularly during times of heightened tension between the two countries—but not always as broadly or explicitly as proposed in the quote regarding Chinese students. Here are some key historical examples of how the U.S. has treated Russian (or Soviet) visa applicants during conflicts or rivalries:
1. Cold War Period (1947–1991)
General Restrictions: The U.S. placed severe limits on visas for Soviet citizens. Only a small number of Soviet officials, diplomats, or select professionals could enter. Exchange programs were tightly controlled—often used as tools of soft diplomacy, but heavily monitored for espionage risks. Student visas were rare for Soviet citizens. When issued, recipients were closely watched by U.S. intelligence.
2. Post-Cold War (1991–2014)
Relaxation: After the Soviet Union collapsed, visa access for Russians improved. Many students, tourists, and businesspeople were allowed in under more typical scrutiny.
3. After 2014 – Crimea Annexation and Ukraine Conflict
Heightened scrutiny: After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the U.S. did not issue a blanket visa ban but increased background checks and visa denials for individuals: Linked to the Russian government or military. On sanctions lists or associated with oligarchs close to Putin.
Some academic and tech collaborations were quietly restricted, particularly in sensitive fields like aerospace and cybersecurity.
4. Post-2016 Election Interference Allegations
Targeted Restrictions: U.S. closed Russian consulates (e.g., in San Francisco in 2017). Expelled diplomats who were alleged to be spies. Student and work visas were more scrutinized, especially for individuals connected to state-run institutions or intelligence-linked entities.
In some cases, Russian graduate students in sensitive fields (e.g., nuclear science, AI) faced delays or denials.
5. Post-2022 Invasion of Ukraine
Visa services for Russians were drastically reduced: U.S. suspended routine visa services in Russia. Russians were told to apply for visas in third countries (e.g., Poland). Sanctions and export controls were expanded to universities, tech sectors, and military-linked research centers.
No formal blanket ban on Russian students, but visa approval became significantly harder for any applicants tied to dual-use technology, defense, or state-sponsored education.