Majority opinion里的几段: It is difficult to read the dissent and conclude we are looking at the same case. Much of it focuses on the evolution of public accommodations laws … and the strides gay Americans have made towards securing equal justice under law … And, no doubt, there is much to applaud here. But none of this answers the question we face today: Can a State force someone who provides her own expressive services to abandon her conscience and speak its preferred message instead? When the dissent finally gets around to that question—more than halfway into its opinion—it reimagines the facts of this case from top to bottom. If [Ms. Smith] wishes to speak, she must either speak as the State demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs, sanctions that may include compulsory participation in ‘remedial . . . training,’ filing periodic compliance reports as officials deem necessary, and paying monetary fines. … Under our precedents, that ‘is enough,’ more than enough, to represent an impermissible abridgment of the First Amendment’s right to speak freely. In some places, the dissent gets so turned around about the facts that it opens fire on its own position. For instance: While stressing that a Colorado company cannot refuse ‘the full and equal enjoyment of [its] services’ based on a customer’s protected status … the dissent assures us that a company selling creative services ‘to the public’ does have a right ‘to decide what messages to include or not to include’ … But if that is true, what are we even debating? The First Amendment extends to all persons engaged in expressive conduct, including those who seek profit (such as speechwriters, artists, and website designers). … If anything is truly dispiriting here, it is the dissent’s failure to take seriously this Court’s enduring commitment to protecting the speech rights of all comers, no matter how controversial—or even repugnant—many may find the message at hand. Today, however, the dissent abandons what this Court’s cases have recognized time and time again: A commitment to speech for only some messages and some persons is no commitment at all. By approving a government’s effort to'[e]liminat[e]’ disfavored ‘ideas,’ … today’s dissent is emblematic of an unfortunate tendency by some to defend First Amendment values only when they find the speaker’s message sympathetic. Of course, abiding the Constitution’s commitment to the freedom of speech means all of us will encounter ideas we consider ‘unattractive,’ … ‘misguided, or even hurtful’ … But tolerance, not coercion, is our Nation’s answer. The First Amendment envisions the United States as a rich and complex place where all persons are free to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands. The opportunity to think for ourselves and to express those thoughts freely is among our most cherished liberties and part of what keeps our Republic strong. This Court has also recognized that no public accommodations law is immune from the demands of the Constitution. In particular, this Court has held, public accommodations statutes can sweep too broadly when deployed to compel speech. … When a state public accommodations law and the Constitution collide, there can be no question which must prevail.
Majority opinion里的几段: It is difficult to read the dissent and conclude we are looking at the same case. Much of it focuses on the evolution of public accommodations laws … and the strides gay Americans have made towards securing equal justice under law … And, no doubt, there is much to applaud here. But none of this answers the question we face today: Can a State force someone who provides her own expressive services to abandon her conscience and speak its preferred message instead? When the dissent finally gets around to that question—more than halfway into its opinion—it reimagines the facts of this case from top to bottom. If [Ms. Smith] wishes to speak, she must either speak as the State demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs, sanctions that may include compulsory participation in ‘remedial . . . training,’ filing periodic compliance reports as officials deem necessary, and paying monetary fines. … Under our precedents, that ‘is enough,’ more than enough, to represent an impermissible abridgment of the First Amendment’s right to speak freely. In some places, the dissent gets so turned around about the facts that it opens fire on its own position. For instance: While stressing that a Colorado company cannot refuse ‘the full and equal enjoyment of [its] services’ based on a customer’s protected status … the dissent assures us that a company selling creative services ‘to the public’ does have a right ‘to decide what messages to include or not to include’ … But if that is true, what are we even debating? The First Amendment extends to all persons engaged in expressive conduct, including those who seek profit (such as speechwriters, artists, and website designers). … If anything is truly dispiriting here, it is the dissent’s failure to take seriously this Court’s enduring commitment to protecting the speech rights of all comers, no matter how controversial—or even repugnant—many may find the message at hand. Today, however, the dissent abandons what this Court’s cases have recognized time and time again: A commitment to speech for only some messages and some persons is no commitment at all. By approving a government’s effort to'[e]liminat[e]’ disfavored ‘ideas,’ … today’s dissent is emblematic of an unfortunate tendency by some to defend First Amendment values only when they find the speaker’s message sympathetic. Of course, abiding the Constitution’s commitment to the freedom of speech means all of us will encounter ideas we consider ‘unattractive,’ … ‘misguided, or even hurtful’ … But tolerance, not coercion, is our Nation’s answer. The First Amendment envisions the United States as a rich and complex place where all persons are free to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands. The opportunity to think for ourselves and to express those thoughts freely is among our most cherished liberties and part of what keeps our Republic strong. This Court has also recognized that no public accommodations law is immune from the demands of the Constitution. In particular, this Court has held, public accommodations statutes can sweep too broadly when deployed to compel speech. … When a state public accommodations law and the Constitution collide, there can be no question which must prevail. baifumei 发表于 2023-07-02 18:37
Lorie Smith, who runs a company called 303 Creative, sought to expand her business into the area of weddings and wrote a webpage explaining why she won’t create websites for same-sex couple. 原告是不愿意为same sex couple设计wedding 网页。州法认为这是歧视，是非法。 我只是指出，这个州法合理与否，与前面那一大段说的啥言论自由，艺术家的创作自由啥的，毫无关系。这法律又没要求你必须制作出符合客户要求的东西。具体产品是你与客户交流的结果，艺术家完全可以希望在创作中表达她想表达的东西，就看客户买不买而已。客户想celebrate，你不想，只想describe，甚至criticise，可以啊，客户接受就做这笔生意，不接受就不做呗。你连客户具体想做什么都不管，事先就恶意的先把与gay wedding的设计关死，这合不合法我说不过高法，但那一段创作自由之类的废话实在是可笑。
Lorie Smith, who runs a company called 303 Creative, sought to expand her business into the area of weddings and wrote a webpage explaining why she won’t create websites for same-sex couple. 原告是不愿意为same sex couple设计wedding 网页。州法认为这是歧视，是非法。 我只是指出，这个州法合理与否，与前面那一大段说的啥言论自由，艺术家的创作自由啥的，毫无关系。这法律又没要求你必须制作出符合客户要求的东西。具体产品是你与客户交流的结果，艺术家完全可以希望在创作中表达她想表达的东西，就看客户买不买而已。客户想celebrate，你不想，只想describe，甚至criticise，可以啊，客户接受就做这笔生意，不接受就不做呗。你连客户具体想做什么都不管，事先就恶意的先把与gay wedding的设计关死，这合不合法我说不过高法，但那一段创作自由之类的废话实在是可笑。 VMC 发表于 2023-07-02 20:10
你至少读读原告的原话：“Smith said that she is willing to work with all people, regardless of their sexual orientation, but she refuses to create websites that celebrate same-sex marriage.”
我的理解，这个判决恰恰不是“宗教信仰是不是能高过歧视的问题”。 “宗教信仰能高过歧视” 是少数派的意见，而且被媒体夸张了。多数派的说的是 政府不能强迫”coerce“ speech. "As this Court has long held, the opportunity to think for ourselves and to express those thoughts freely is among our most cherished liberties and part of what keeps our Republic strong." 如果按少数派的说法。政府可以 sensor speech。用多数派的话： ”is emblematic of an unfortunate tendency by some to defend First Amendment values only when they find the speaker’s message sympathetic.“。Gorsuch 的话解释了判决的原因。““Abiding the Constitution’s commitment to the freedom of speech means all of us will encounter ideas” that are unattractive or even hurtful, as Justice Gorsuch says. “But tolerance, not coercion, is our Nation’s answer.”
今天跟小孩讨论这个话题，小孩说this is bad ruling, what if a store owner says in my religion, women are lower creatures so I refuse to serve you, you know people now can use religion as an excuse to justify all sorts of discrimination. 我觉得有点道理 gongmaa 发表于 2023-06-30 20:31
你打住吧，小孩比我们想象的聪明，我一开始还跟他辩论，好比不能去Kosher店买ham, 他说kosher店本来就不卖ham，这种不是同类比，说你就是心里没有平等看待LGBTQ的人，才会认同religion over human rights，那你赞同禁止abortion吗，宗教也不让abortion，这点我的确无法反驳，我支持妇女有abortion的权利。歧视妇女的宗教还需要创造吗，绿教就是。 gongmaa 发表于 2023-06-30 20:51
这里为什么是religion vs human rights?买家的human rights 是买东西，卖家也有human rights，就是宗教自由。没有绝对的自由，美国人现在强调的自由往往侵犯了别人的自由。层主完全支持同性和同性婚姻，同性和同性没有侵犯其他人的自由
不想表态，高院可以不受理。 The Supreme Court has its own set of rules. According to these rules, four of the nine Justices must vote to accept a case. Five of the nine Justices must vote in order to grant a stay, e.g., a stay of execution in a death penalty case.
我当然只能说自己见过的事情，难道还要凭空编个故事吗？或者是听朋友的朋友说的？
你要是见过男的念女校，天天骚扰女性还受法律保护的，欢迎分享。
没错给个reference嘛，总不能张口故事会，有这种事早上fox news了。还把transgender叫transformer，笑死了，全世界都知道transformer是变形金刚。
It is difficult to read the dissent and conclude we are looking at the same case. Much of it focuses on the evolution of public accommodations laws … and the strides gay Americans have made towards securing equal justice under law … And, no doubt, there is much to applaud here. But none of this answers the question we face today: Can a State force someone who provides her own expressive services to abandon her conscience and speak its preferred message instead? When the dissent finally gets around to that question—more than halfway into its opinion—it reimagines the facts of this case from top to bottom.
If [Ms. Smith] wishes to speak, she must either speak as the State demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs, sanctions that may include compulsory participation in ‘remedial . . . training,’ filing periodic compliance reports as officials deem necessary, and paying monetary fines. … Under our precedents, that ‘is enough,’ more than enough, to represent an impermissible abridgment of the First Amendment’s right to speak freely.
In some places, the dissent gets so turned around about the facts that it opens fire on its own position. For instance: While stressing that a Colorado company cannot refuse ‘the full and equal enjoyment of [its] services’ based on a customer’s protected status … the dissent assures us that a company selling creative services ‘to the public’ does have a right ‘to decide what messages to include or not to include’ … But if that is true, what are we even debating?
The First Amendment extends to all persons engaged in expressive conduct, including those who seek profit (such as speechwriters, artists, and website designers). … If anything is truly dispiriting here, it is the dissent’s failure to take seriously this Court’s enduring commitment to protecting the speech rights of all comers, no matter how controversial—or even repugnant—many may find the message at hand.
Today, however, the dissent abandons what this Court’s cases have recognized time and time again: A commitment to speech for only some messages and some persons is no commitment at all. By approving a government’s effort to'[e]liminat[e]’ disfavored ‘ideas,’ … today’s dissent is emblematic of an unfortunate tendency by some to defend First Amendment values only when they find the speaker’s message sympathetic.
Of course, abiding the Constitution’s commitment to the freedom of speech means all of us will encounter ideas we consider ‘unattractive,’ … ‘misguided, or even hurtful’ … But tolerance, not coercion, is our Nation’s answer. The First Amendment envisions the United States as a rich and complex place where all persons are free to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands.
The opportunity to think for ourselves and to express those thoughts freely is among our most cherished liberties and part of what keeps our Republic strong.
This Court has also recognized that no public accommodations law is immune from the demands of the Constitution. In particular, this Court has held, public accommodations statutes can sweep too broadly when deployed to compel speech. … When a state public accommodations law and the Constitution collide, there can be no question which must prevail.
这段文字才是真的扯言论自由的大旗，把旗子耍的哗哗响，大伙儿看着特漂亮，于是就没意识到实际上这与真正的问题不完全是一回事。
州法要求艺术家不能因为这样那样的原因歧视特定团体拒绝服务，这哪里有限制他们的言论自由？如果客户怎么要求，设计者就必须怎么做，那不管有没有类似的州法，也根本没有啥艺术家的言论自由可言。
但现实显然不是这样。这种设计服务本来就是设计者与客户商量的结果，反映的是双方的共识，而不是一方100%的支配。设计者可以充分表达你的自由想法啊。比如你可以坚持网页就必须是一男一女，不能是两男或两女。你怎么知道LGBT客户要求你设计的内容就一定与你的信仰不符呢？你怎么知道你们就不能做出个既与你信仰无冲突，对方也可接受的网站呢？大家如果商量不得共识，自然可以不做这生意。但事先明显恶意的把门关死，意思不是很清楚么- 我就是根本厌恶LGBT，不愿意和他们讨论而已。
那是transexual，目標就是要動手術的人群，transgender只要自認就成，crossdresser是女裝癖，你定義都沒弄懂好嗎...
人家不愿‘celebrate' 你不能强迫别人吧。 你混淆成怎么去‘celebrate’。
那個游泳隊的自稱男變女的就是在女更衣室大咧咧的露JJ，據說還硬了，他同隊的都爆出來了好嗎，真夠噁心人的，你是以正常人的心態推斷，但是能在一群女人中間露下體的能是正常的吧? 是變態
有個男女同校的，男的自稱是女，在在廁所把女同學的強了的吧，然後爆出來之後沒怎麼處理，就轉校，然後到新地方再幹一筆的，詳情忘了，大致是這樣
還有男囚自稱女的去了女子監獄把人搞懷孕了...
這些個爛人死變態不枉死裡譴責受害的只能是整個少數團體
这是你说的，不是我说的。设计，自然什么都可以谈。我可没说是要怎么celebrate，我说的是要怎么设计。
对方要求你celebrate，你不愿意的话，可以拒绝啊，说我只能做中性不celebrate的，当然你要不客气，想说我想做谴责你们的，也行。没法律规定大家一定要谈拢啊。
你要是就是因为对方是LGBT，所以就任何设计都不愿意为对方做，连对方的具体需求也不愿意听，那这一大段就难以拿来遮丑了。
原告不愿‘celebrate‘ gay wedding。 不是因为对方是gay。
理论上客户进了店， initiate a conversation， 那就是已经有“商量”了。 难道你非得规定多长时间多详细的要求才算是“商量”？
Lorie Smith, who runs a company called 303 Creative, sought to expand her business into the area of weddings and wrote a webpage explaining why she won’t create websites for same-sex couple.
原告是不愿意为same sex couple设计wedding 网页。州法认为这是歧视，是非法。
我只是指出，这个州法合理与否，与前面那一大段说的啥言论自由，艺术家的创作自由啥的，毫无关系。这法律又没要求你必须制作出符合客户要求的东西。具体产品是你与客户交流的结果，艺术家完全可以希望在创作中表达她想表达的东西，就看客户买不买而已。客户想celebrate，你不想，只想describe，甚至criticise，可以啊，客户接受就做这笔生意，不接受就不做呗。你连客户具体想做什么都不管，事先就恶意的先把与gay wedding的设计关死，这合不合法我说不过高法，但那一段创作自由之类的废话实在是可笑。
我当然不规定啥。
我只是说，完全有能不违反这个州法，也不影响艺术家创作自由的方法，就是，我不排除啥群体，但我坚持我设计的东西。所以那一长段扯啥创作自由的，纯属煽情的废话。
你至少读读原告的原话：“Smith said that she is willing to work with all people, regardless of their sexual orientation, but she refuses to create websites that celebrate same-sex marriage.”
说白了，正方给出很多理由，无非想显得自个儿更有理而已。我没打算反驳正方的所有理由，但至少前面那种冠冕堂皇的大话，我觉得还是可以一驳的。
事实就是，这个自称的wedding web designer， 还没有接过一笔生意，不管是同性恋还是异性恋， 也没有人找过她谈生意，她官司中说的那个同性恋顾客并不存在。
她只是说， 我要在科罗拉多州开这个买卖（还没开张）， 然后如果自己不接同性恋的生意，按照科罗拉多法律就是违法， 所以她要上诉。
gay couple 要求在蛋糕上明确表达出这是gay wedding的时候，比如“张三先生和李四先生的婚礼”，店主可以因为宗教理由拒绝服务
但如果gay couple订的蛋糕是“张三和李四的婚礼”，和非gay couple的蛋糕没有区别，那么店主可以因为来订蛋糕的人是两个男性而拒绝吗
我的理解，这个判决恰恰不是“宗教信仰是不是能高过歧视的问题”。 “宗教信仰能高过歧视” 是少数派的意见，而且被媒体夸张了。多数派的说的是 政府不能强迫”coerce“ speech. "As this Court has long held, the opportunity to think for ourselves and to express those thoughts freely is among our most cherished liberties and part of what keeps our Republic strong." 如果按少数派的说法。政府可以 sensor speech。用多数派的话： ”is emblematic of an unfortunate tendency by some to defend First Amendment values only when they find the speaker’s message sympathetic.“。Gorsuch 的话解释了判决的原因。““Abiding the Constitution’s commitment to the freedom of speech means all of us will encounter ideas” that are unattractive or even hurtful, as Justice Gorsuch says. “But tolerance, not coercion, is our Nation’s answer.”
你说到重点了。
上回那个蛋糕店的案子， 两党大法官们达成的共识， 认为两个权利冲突的时候， 大家互相尊重，商量着办。 虽然是和稀泥，但却是正解。
这次这个web designer的案子， 大法官简单粗暴的明确表示， 说店主有言论自由的权利， that's it and that's all.
除了特别想找茬的人，没人会去清真店买猪肉产品
我觉得以后商店可以直接标明自己的宗教立场，like 基督教蛋糕店， 佛教蛋糕店
拒绝的理由呢？我看你不顺眼？
就跟餐廳商場不想服務某些客人一樣吧，天天有，理由隨便找
实际上和气生财的店家，一般这种情况都是好言好语随便找个借口拒绝。 顾客怀疑暗搓搓受到了歧视，但是没有证据，只好悻悻而走。
蛋糕店那个案子，是和气生财的店家，在社区的声誉很好， 没有歧视前科，没有过不愿意出售蛋糕给同性恋， 也表示货架上的成品你随便买。。。 他是被逼到了墙角，退无可退，所以大家的同情心都在店家这边。
然后保守派就照猫画虎（也是科罗拉多州，也是婚礼，也是同性恋）， 制造出了这个web designer的案件， 目的就是要坐实，我有言论自由的权利， 可以直接因为我的宗教信仰拒绝你，不需要和你沟通，不需要互相理解尊重。
法律总是有灰色地带的，各种权利也有互相冲突的时候，
这也是高院在蛋糕案中强调的，两个权利发生碰撞时，大家通过互相尊重来解决问题。
真是小孩说话的口气，上来就是，这个坏。如果真的有大爱，那没有必要对宗教带着这么大的偏见，怀着最大的恶意用虚构的事实去赋予罪名。
这个case 本身就是个fraud。提告的那位女士撒谎了，她案子里用来引用的 的人被查到根本不是gay，
这里为什么是religion vs human rights?买家的human rights 是买东西，卖家也有human rights，就是宗教自由。没有绝对的自由，美国人现在强调的自由往往侵犯了别人的自由。层主完全支持同性和同性婚姻，同性和同性没有侵犯其他人的自由
本来不想打你脸，说个方向让你自己去看。没想到你是如此高傲自大，非要抬杠。那就好吧。
中国古代对同性恋要比解放后要宽容许多。同性恋在社会各个阶层，上至皇帝，下至庶民，都公开存在。特别是在僧侣，武士阶层，有许多同性恋。那么自然在文学中多有描述同性之间可歌可泣的爱情故事。是不是毁了你三观？
著名中国古典小说《红楼梦》、《金瓶梅》对于当时同性恋有所描写，此外还出版专门叙述男男欢好性事的中篇小说集《宜春香质》、《弁而钗》、《龙阳逸史》，文雅赞美男风情谊的小说《品花宝鉴》。冯梦龙《情史·情外类》选录了历代的同性爱情故事，记载的人物上自帝王将相，下至歌伶市民。
《太平广记》记载春秋战国时代的著名美男潘章与楚国的王仲先同性恋殉情事件。两人一起死去后，家人十分悲哀，把他们合葬在罗浮山。坟墓上长出一棵树，枝条树叶全都相互拥抱缠绕在一起。人们都感觉奇特，就把这棵树称为“共枕树”。
明代王同轨的《耳谈》记载一起同性恋负情，后殉情的故事。故事发生在北京的通州，是当地一个青年与驻军的一个小兵的故事。
中国历史，文学博大精深。没有见到过像你如此狂妄之人，自以为知道中国文学作品之中有什么，没有什么。更可况是在名著中描写过的东西。不要显摆了！
我都不稀的再说了，你自己看看你找出来的这些东西，有正面描述同性恋，歌颂同性恋的么？ 都是些猎奇啊，精怪，色情之类的作品。
品花宝鉴，不就是前面四匹教授举出的，古代玩弄娈童的色情读物么。
就好比现在有child porn存在，你就能说现代社会能够容忍甚至赞同child porn？
这也是我的想法，高院其实不想表态的，因为双方都对，也都不对。但是既然弄成个案子，他们就必须给个 yes or no 的答案，烦恼啊
一个自己满脑子色的人，看什么都色。
上届高院不想表态，蛋糕店案件上捣糨糊和稀泥。
这届高院就是完全不同的故事了～～
现在美国的政治生态就是，共和党在高院节节胜利，民主党偷着乐， 每个争议性的官司保守派强行判下，都是民主党选举时的抢票武器～～
相對於
古代一夫一妻制的關係來說
古代同性戀關係 還真沒有對等的 所以寫成 品花保健 chrome 自己這樣抓字 也沒有太偏離現實啊
還有 殘桃獻君 斷袖之癖 都是上下之別
一夫一妻 制 有個例子 老公對老婆說 我現在也當上侍郎了 你不能不要再對我又打又罵了 老婆說 水漲船高 你是侍郎 我就是侍郎夫人 地位平等 沒問題的 照打照罵
另一個例子
先序君臣禮 再序夫妻情 都結婚了 不搞女男平等 還得先序君臣禮 這樣男方怎麼硬得起來啊...
不想表态，高院可以不受理。 The Supreme Court has its own set of rules. According to these rules, four of the nine Justices must vote to accept a case. Five of the nine Justices must vote in order to grant a stay, e.g., a stay of execution in a death penalty case.
简直胡扯。 男游泳运动员变性成女运动员（仅仅是服用荷尔蒙药，没有割jj) 去参加女性游泳比赛拿金牌的事情还在昨天。女游泳运动员发声控诉男“变性” 在更衣室脱光给她们造成的心理伤害还历历在目呢。
一两个极端案例不说明什么问题，都是组织者立法没有跟上，被人钻空子。
关于变性运动员，各大sports governing body都有保证公平的规定在试行中， 正规的国际比赛中，目前还没有出现变性运动员占据优势的情况， 在明显不公平的变性运动员拿到几枚奥运会奖牌之前，谈论这个问题毫无意义， 都是恶意树个不存在的靶子自己打而已。
你也是胡扯