看起来是被这几天关于gain-of-function研究的大讨论给炸出来的，认为新冠的自然起源和实验室事故两种可能需要得到同样认真的对待。这些可不是什么无名之辈，基本上都是大佬，我直接把名单和affliliation列在下面了。这里面有研究冠状病毒多年的Ralph Baric，他最出名的身份应该是石正丽的合作者，一起研究怎么让蝙蝠冠状病毒通过ACE2受体感染人的细胞。然后还有Jesse Bloom, Ravi Gupta, Pamela Bjorkman, Akiko Iwasaki这些新冠病毒研究第一线的大人物（肯定还有我没认出来的，欢迎补充），一年多以来大量关于新冠病理、诊断、免疫、进化的工作都是他们的实验室搞出来的，说实话在这个世界上很难找到比这帮人更了解新冠病毒的人了。
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/372/6543/694.1 Jesse D. Bloom1,2, Yujia Alina Chan3, Ralph S. Baric4, Pamela J. Bjorkman5, Sarah Cobey6, Benjamin E. Deverman3, David N. Fisman7, Ravindra Gupta8, Akiko Iwasaki9,2, Marc Lipsitch10, Ruslan Medzhitov9,2, Richard A. Neher11, Rasmus Nielsen12, Nick Patterson13, Tim Stearns14, Erik van Nimwegen11, Michael Worobey15, David A. Relman16,17,* 1Basic Sciences and Computational Biology, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA. 2Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Chevy Chase, MD 20815, USA. 3Stanley Center for Psychiatric Research, Broad Institute of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA. 4Department of Epidemiology and Department of Microbiology & Immunology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. 5Division of Biology and Biological Engineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. 6Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA. 7Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1A8, Canada. 8Cambridge Institute of Therapeutic Immunology & Infectious Disease, Cambridge, UK. 9Department of Immunobiology, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06519, USA. 10Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases and Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Department of Epidemiology, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA. 11Biozentrum, University of Basel and Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics, Basel, Switzerland. 12Department of Integrative Biology and Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. 13Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 14Department of Biology and Department of Genetics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. 15Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA. 16Department of Medicine and Department of Microbiology & Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. 17Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. 公开信原文如下：
On 30 December 2019, the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases notified the world about a pneumonia of unknown cause in Wuhan, China (1). Since then, scientists have made remarkable progress in understanding the causative agent, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), its transmission, pathogenesis, and mitigation by vaccines, therapeutics, and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Yet more investigation is still needed to determine the origin of the pandemic. Theories of accidental release from a lab and zoonotic spillover both remain viable. Knowing how COVID-19 emerged is critical for informing global strategies to mitigate the risk of future outbreaks. In May 2020, the World Health Assembly requested that the World Health Organization (WHO) director-general work closely with partners to determine the origins of SARS-CoV-2 (2). In November, the Terms of Reference for a China–WHO joint study were released (3). The information, data, and samples for the study's first phase were collected and summarized by the Chinese half of the team; the rest of the team built on this analysis. Although there were no findings in clear support of either a natural spillover or a lab accident, the team assessed a zoonotic spillover from an intermediate host as “likely to very likely,” and a laboratory incident as “extremely unlikely” [(4), p. 9]. Furthermore, the two theories were not given balanced consideration. Only 4 of the 313 pages of the report and its annexes addressed the possibility of a laboratory accident (4). Notably, WHO Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus commented that the report's consideration of evidence supporting a laboratory accident was insufficient and offered to provide additional resources to fully evaluate the possibility (5). As scientists with relevant expertise, we agree with the WHO director-general (5), the United States and 13 other countries (6), and the European Union (7) that greater clarity about the origins of this pandemic is necessary and feasible to achieve. We must take hypotheses about both natural and laboratory spillovers seriously until we have sufficient data. A proper investigation should be transparent, objective, data-driven, inclusive of broad expertise, subject to independent oversight, and responsibly managed to minimize the impact of conflicts of interest. Public health agencies and research laboratories alike need to open their records to the public. Investigators should document the veracity and provenance of data from which analyses are conducted and conclusions drawn, so that analyses are reproducible by independent experts. Finally, in this time of unfortunate anti-Asian sentiment in some countries, we note that at the beginning of the pandemic, it was Chinese doctors, scientists, journalists, and citizens who shared with the world crucial information about the spread of the virus—often at great personal cost (8, 9). We should show the same determination in promoting a dispassionate science-based discourse on this difficult but important issue.
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/372/6543/694.1
Jesse D. Bloom1,2, Yujia Alina Chan3, Ralph S. Baric4, Pamela J. Bjorkman5, Sarah Cobey6, Benjamin E. Deverman3, David N. Fisman7, Ravindra Gupta8, Akiko Iwasaki9,2, Marc Lipsitch10, Ruslan Medzhitov9,2, Richard A. Neher11, Rasmus Nielsen12, Nick Patterson13, Tim Stearns14, Erik van Nimwegen11, Michael Worobey15, David A. Relman16,17,* 1Basic Sciences and Computational Biology, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, WA 98109, USA. 2Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Chevy Chase, MD 20815, USA. 3Stanley Center for Psychiatric Research, Broad Institute of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA. 4Department of Epidemiology and Department of Microbiology & Immunology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. 5Division of Biology and Biological Engineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. 6Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA. 7Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1A8, Canada. 8Cambridge Institute of Therapeutic Immunology & Infectious Disease, Cambridge, UK. 9Department of Immunobiology, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06519, USA. 10Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases and Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Department of Epidemiology, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA. 11Biozentrum, University of Basel and Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics, Basel, Switzerland. 12Department of Integrative Biology and Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. 13Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 14Department of Biology and Department of Genetics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. 15Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA. 16Department of Medicine and Department of Microbiology & Immunology, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. 17Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
公开信原文如下：
On 30 December 2019, the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases notified the world about a pneumonia of unknown cause in Wuhan, China (1). Since then, scientists have made remarkable progress in understanding the causative agent, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), its transmission, pathogenesis, and mitigation by vaccines, therapeutics, and non-pharmaceutical interventions. Yet more investigation is still needed to determine the origin of the pandemic. Theories of accidental release from a lab and zoonotic spillover both remain viable. Knowing how COVID-19 emerged is critical for informing global strategies to mitigate the risk of future outbreaks.
In May 2020, the World Health Assembly requested that the World Health Organization (WHO) director-general work closely with partners to determine the origins of SARS-CoV-2 (2). In November, the Terms of Reference for a China–WHO joint study were released (3). The information, data, and samples for the study's first phase were collected and summarized by the Chinese half of the team; the rest of the team built on this analysis. Although there were no findings in clear support of either a natural spillover or a lab accident, the team assessed a zoonotic spillover from an intermediate host as “likely to very likely,” and a laboratory incident as “extremely unlikely” [(4), p. 9]. Furthermore, the two theories were not given balanced consideration. Only 4 of the 313 pages of the report and its annexes addressed the possibility of a laboratory accident (4). Notably, WHO Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus commented that the report's consideration of evidence supporting a laboratory accident was insufficient and offered to provide additional resources to fully evaluate the possibility (5).
As scientists with relevant expertise, we agree with the WHO director-general (5), the United States and 13 other countries (6), and the European Union (7) that greater clarity about the origins of this pandemic is necessary and feasible to achieve. We must take hypotheses about both natural and laboratory spillovers seriously until we have sufficient data. A proper investigation should be transparent, objective, data-driven, inclusive of broad expertise, subject to independent oversight, and responsibly managed to minimize the impact of conflicts of interest. Public health agencies and research laboratories alike need to open their records to the public. Investigators should document the veracity and provenance of data from which analyses are conducted and conclusions drawn, so that analyses are reproducible by independent experts.
Finally, in this time of unfortunate anti-Asian sentiment in some countries, we note that at the beginning of the pandemic, it was Chinese doctors, scientists, journalists, and citizens who shared with the world crucial information about the spread of the virus—often at great personal cost (8, 9). We should show the same determination in promoting a dispassionate science-based discourse on this difficult but important issue.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2021-05/13/c_1127441793.htm
今天的发言，表面是针对新疆问题，我感觉一语双关啊
哪位版主现在随心所欲，无视版规，应当作出解释，不要引起公愤。