https://www.princeton.edu/~wxiong/papers/Speculation.pdf Housing Speculation Hypothesis: When home buyers purchased more non-owner-occupied homes in an area during the U.S. housing boom, either for investment or vacation purposes, the area experienced a greater house price increase and economic expansion during the boom period, and suffered a greater price drop and a more ...
“Household balance sheets can be repaired over time. But you can’t unmake a house.” — Michael Sockin
这边有个dumbed down version https://medium.com/texas-mccombs/housing-speculators-could-bring-on-repeat-crash-cb906225115f Bigger Booms, Deeper Recessions Beyond housing costs, the effects of speculation rippled into broader economies — both for better and for worse: • In the same ZIP codes, employment rates were 8% higher than average during the boom and 15% lower during the bust. • Per capita income was 14% higher during the boom and 15% lower during the bust. Inflated housing prices pumped up local economies, Sockin says, because more people had construction jobs and more took money out of their houses through home equity loans. But they also made recessions deeper because both construction jobs and credit dried up more than in the average locale. Those economies also took longer to recover because of supply overhangs of empty houses. “If you built too much in the boom, you’re left with it in the bust,” Sockin says. Looking at today’s housing markets, Sockin says he’s afraid of new speculative bubbles. Nationwide, prices have risen at more sustainable rates during the past decade. But they’re overheating in scattered places — like small towns where big-city dwellers have gone to flee COVID-19 hotspots. In those areas, he suggests, policymakers might take measures to discourage speculation, such as raising capital gains tax rates and limiting mortgage deductions for second homes. Such steps could rein in speculators’ enthusiasm. “If you lower their returns, you lower their appetites,” Sockin says.
这段很有趣 uber driver just became a real estate agent Lenders in such markets could do their part, he says. When a borrower is buying a second home, lenders could require more financial documentation and a higher down payment. Above all, Sockin advises homeowners to watch for signs that speculation is swelling in their areas. “When your Uber driver says he just became a real estate agent,” he says, “start to wonder whether your housing market is due for a correction.”
谢谢大牛现身！我孤陋寡闻 粗看了一下 熊教授用到了instrumental variable 我还没看完 猜测这个是可以推causal effect的？ at the very least 用空房率来测speculative activities听上去靠谱 你说的花街的也不知道避险挺有意思的 有空我要去看看 edit：找到了 https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/03/24/mortgage-securitizers-didnt-know-housing-was-going-bust/ A popular explanation for why the housing bubble happened says that unbalanced incentives within the financial system were to blame. Financial-sector workers reaped huge bonuses for gambling on home prices continuing to climb, but knew that they bore little personal risk if things went awry. But new research suggests that financial workers involved in the mortgage-securitization business -- ground zero for the misaligned incentives that are supposed to have helped inflate the bubble -- were true believers in the housing boom.
Housing Speculation Hypothesis: When home buyers purchased more non-owner-occupied homes in an area during the U.S. housing boom, either for investment or vacation purposes, the area experienced a greater house price increase and economic expansion during the boom period, and suffered a greater price drop and a more ...
这边有个dumbed down version
https://medium.com/texas-mccombs/housing-speculators-could-bring-on-repeat-crash-cb906225115f
Bigger Booms, Deeper Recessions Beyond housing costs, the effects of speculation rippled into broader economies — both for better and for worse:
• In the same ZIP codes, employment rates were 8% higher than average during the boom and 15% lower during the bust. • Per capita income was 14% higher during the boom and 15% lower during the bust. Inflated housing prices pumped up local economies, Sockin says, because more people had construction jobs and more took money out of their houses through home equity loans. But they also made recessions deeper because both construction jobs and credit dried up more than in the average locale. Those economies also took longer to recover because of supply overhangs of empty houses. “If you built too much in the boom, you’re left with it in the bust,” Sockin says. Looking at today’s housing markets, Sockin says he’s afraid of new speculative bubbles. Nationwide, prices have risen at more sustainable rates during the past decade. But they’re overheating in scattered places — like small towns where big-city dwellers have gone to flee COVID-19 hotspots. In those areas, he suggests, policymakers might take measures to discourage speculation, such as raising capital gains tax rates and limiting mortgage deductions for second homes. Such steps could rein in speculators’ enthusiasm. “If you lower their returns, you lower their appetites,” Sockin says.
Lenders in such markets could do their part, he says. When a borrower is buying a second home, lenders could require more financial documentation and a higher down payment. Above all, Sockin advises homeowners to watch for signs that speculation is swelling in their areas. “When your Uber driver says he just became a real estate agent,” he says, “start to wonder whether your housing market is due for a correction.”
Not sure if that will be the case this time... foreclosures happen too in tech hubs :/
谢谢大牛现身！我孤陋寡闻 粗看了一下 熊教授用到了instrumental variable 我还没看完 猜测这个是可以推causal effect的？
at the very least 用空房率来测speculative activities听上去靠谱
你说的花街的也不知道避险挺有意思的 有空我要去看看
edit：找到了 https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/03/24/mortgage-securitizers-didnt-know-housing-was-going-bust/
A popular explanation for why the housing bubble happened says that unbalanced incentives within the financial system were to blame. Financial-sector workers reaped huge bonuses for gambling on home prices continuing to climb, but knew that they bore little personal risk if things went awry. But new research suggests that financial workers involved in the mortgage-securitization business -- ground zero for the misaligned incentives that are supposed to have helped inflate the bubble -- were true believers in the housing boom.