The next internment: Would Chinese in the U.S. be rounded up during a war?
Present U.S. leadership seems both to make war more likely through its bellicose rhetoric and to heighten the risk that the conflict would lead to violence against the American-Chinese population.
By Giacomo Bagarella Best Defense office of future operations
As the title of one recent book on the subject has it, the United States and China could be “destined for war.” This eventuality has received ample coverage in the media, in academia, and among statesmen, and both militaries have planned for a possible Sino-American conflict.
Not so the Chinese in America. The unspoken consequences of such a war would bring suspicion, surveillance, and possibly persecution against the hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals who live in the U.S. With knowledge of some of American history’s worst excesses in mind, is there a possibility that some, or all, of the country’s foreign-born Chinese will be interned?
Estimating the size of the affected population proves difficult. A Department of Homeland Security study calculates that, on average, 240,000 Chinese nationals resided within the U.S. on any given day in fiscal year 2014. Summing this figure to the estimated 268,000 unauthorized Chinese immigrants yields a lower bound of roughly half-a-million Chinese citizens living in the U.S. The upper bound might be closer to one million, if one halves the 2.3 million foreign-born Chinese in the country in 2015 to account for naturalized citizens — who constitute 48 percent of foreign-born residents — and lawful permanent residents. (Chinese law generally prohibits its citizens from holding dual nationality.)
Such numbers are likely to feed fears of “bad Fu Manchus,” saboteurs and fifth-columnists ready to take Beijing’s fight to the U.S. This would not be the first instance of homegrown anti-Chinese prejudice: Following decades of racism, China’s “fall” to Communism during the Cold War further enflamed American paranoia on the Chinese. Iris Chang concludes her history of the Chinese diaspora, The Chinese in America, by noting ruefully that, even in the 21st century, the acceptance of Chinese-Americans “was linked to the ever-shifting relations between the United States and China rather than to their own particular behavior.”
Worryingly, present U.S. leadership seems both to make war more likely through its bellicose rhetoric and to heighten the risk that the conflict would lead to violence against the American-Chinese population. As a candidate and president-elect, Donald Trump accused China of “raping” the U.S. and spoke approvingly of the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. His surrogates have repeated this reasoning, and senior advisers such as Stephen Bannon and Peter Navarro are transparent in their animosity towards Beijing.
In this toxic context, how plausible is it that Sino-American war would lead to massive retaliation? Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government used its power against the designated domestic foe, leading to the forced relocation and internment of more than 120,000 American Japanese during World War II. The recipe for this outcome, which the writer Richard Reeves describes in Infamy, entailed a mixture of racism, incompetent or power-hungry leaders in politics and the military, an enabling media and civil society, greed from those who stood to benefit economically from the response, and a widespread feeling of threat, whether real or imagined.
Tempted as they may be, the president and his sycophants would run into various obstacles. Only some of Reeves’s preconditions exists, though the media and civil society seem poised to be strong watchdogs of government excesses. The Chinese population today is also much larger, in both relative and in absolute terms, than the Japanese one in 1940. Additionally, Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the United States Code prohibits members of the armed forces from conducting searches, seizures, and arrests unless “otherwise authorized by law.” The threat of internment thus rests on the executive’s ability to mobilize citizens and key institutions into a systematic anti-Chinese policy.
However, in the shadow of great-power war, the equilibrium between restraint and reprisal leans heavily towards the latter. A threatened nation is more likely to lash out, as when the machinery of government and the public’s worst instincts responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by targeting Arabs, Muslims, and those mistaken as members of those groups.
History shows that racist reactions in times of war are not just a bug in the American system — they are an unavoidable feature. Trapped between two superpowers and rapacious leaders, the ethnic Chinese population in the U.S. faces significant uncertainty and travails in the looming duel between Washington and Beijing.
Giacomo Bagarella (@PerpetualPeace) holds a degree in Government from Harvard and a joint Master of Public Policy from the London School of Economics and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He currently works as a policy advisor for digital services for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. All views expressed are his own.
The next internment: Would Chinese in the U.S. be rounded up during a war?
Present U.S. leadership seems both to make war more likely through its bellicose rhetoric and to heighten the risk that the conflict would lead to violence against the American-Chinese population.
By Giacomo Bagarella Best Defense office of future operations
As the title of one recent book on the subject has it, the United States and China could be “destined for war.” This eventuality has received ample coverage in the media, in academia, and among statesmen, and both militaries have planned for a possible Sino-American conflict.
Not so the Chinese in America. The unspoken consequences of such a war would bring suspicion, surveillance, and possibly persecution against the hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals who live in the U.S. With knowledge of some of American history’s worst excesses in mind, is there a possibility that some, or all, of the country’s foreign-born Chinese will be interned?
Estimating the size of the affected population proves difficult. A Department of Homeland Security study calculates that, on average, 240,000 Chinese nationals resided within the U.S. on any given day in fiscal year 2014. Summing this figure to the estimated 268,000 unauthorized Chinese immigrants yields a lower bound of roughly half-a-million Chinese citizens living in the U.S. The upper bound might be closer to one million, if one halves the 2.3 million foreign-born Chinese in the country in 2015 to account for naturalized citizens — who constitute 48 percent of foreign-born residents — and lawful permanent residents. (Chinese law generally prohibits its citizens from holding dual nationality.)
Such numbers are likely to feed fears of “bad Fu Manchus,” saboteurs and fifth-columnists ready to take Beijing’s fight to the U.S. This would not be the first instance of homegrown anti-Chinese prejudice: Following decades of racism, China’s “fall” to Communism during the Cold War further enflamed American paranoia on the Chinese. Iris Chang concludes her history of the Chinese diaspora, The Chinese in America, by noting ruefully that, even in the 21st century, the acceptance of Chinese-Americans “was linked to the ever-shifting relations between the United States and China rather than to their own particular behavior.”
Worryingly, present U.S. leadership seems both to make war more likely through its bellicose rhetoric and to heighten the risk that the conflict would lead to violence against the American-Chinese population. As a candidate and president-elect, Donald Trump accused China of “raping” the U.S. and spoke approvingly of the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. His surrogates have repeated this reasoning, and senior advisers such as Stephen Bannon and Peter Navarro are transparent in their animosity towards Beijing.
In this toxic context, how plausible is it that Sino-American war would lead to massive retaliation? Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government used its power against the designated domestic foe, leading to the forced relocation and internment of more than 120,000 American Japanese during World War II. The recipe for this outcome, which the writer Richard Reeves describes in Infamy, entailed a mixture of racism, incompetent or power-hungry leaders in politics and the military, an enabling media and civil society, greed from those who stood to benefit economically from the response, and a widespread feeling of threat, whether real or imagined.
Tempted as they may be, the president and his sycophants would run into various obstacles. Only some of Reeves’s preconditions exists, though the media and civil society seem poised to be strong watchdogs of government excesses. The Chinese population today is also much larger, in both relative and in absolute terms, than the Japanese one in 1940. Additionally, Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the United States Code prohibits members of the armed forces from conducting searches, seizures, and arrests unless “otherwise authorized by law.” The threat of internment thus rests on the executive’s ability to mobilize citizens and key institutions into a systematic anti-Chinese policy.
However, in the shadow of great-power war, the equilibrium between restraint and reprisal leans heavily towards the latter. A threatened nation is more likely to lash out, as when the machinery of government and the public’s worst instincts responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by targeting Arabs, Muslims, and those mistaken as members of those groups.
History shows that racist reactions in times of war are not just a bug in the American system — they are an unavoidable feature. Trapped between two superpowers and rapacious leaders, the ethnic Chinese population in the U.S. faces significant uncertainty and travails in the looming duel between Washington and Beijing.
Giacomo Bagarella (@PerpetualPeace) holds a degree in Government from Harvard and a joint Master of Public Policy from the London School of Economics and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He currently works as a policy advisor for digital services for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. All views expressed are his own.
https://forums.huaren.us/showtopic.aspx?topicid=2530735
1. 为什么需要阻止中国
中国社会的发展方向已经义无反顾走向1984奥威尔社会，不是人类发展的正确方向。 它从外部系统吸取营养后，反过来要消灭吞噬这个系统，如同病毒杀死宿主。结果是大家消亡。 它做大一个产业，即摧毁一个产业，因为它本身无法创新。它无法创新的主要原因是，党需要统一思想才能领导一切，书记需要说假话空话才能统一思想。在这样的气氛下，不仅央视姓党，院士姓党，国际专业组织也姓党。坚持共产党领导和创新是一对矛盾体；坚持共产党领导和科学也是一对矛盾体。
2. 美国在美中关系中应该采取什么态度
迅速终止以前的绥靖政策，不要像对待二战德国国家社会主义一样养虎为患。迅速在外交、金融、能源、粮食、军事领域全面从守势转换为攻势，充分利用自己所有的优势。在这个过程中，最主要的是做好高贸易壁垒下生活水平下降的心理准备，因为现在不主动做出牺牲，将来就会被动被牺牲。这个心理准备对普通美国民众来说往往需要一个痛苦的触发，例如珍珠港死了几千人；911也死了几千人。
3. 美国现在还能赢得和共产党的斗争吗？
南北战争时，南方对北方乃至世界有更多的顺差，有更长的铁路基建，奴隶制度在很多产业上有更高的生产效率。然而南方却最终失败了，因为北方站在先进生产力这边。美国目前仍然站在更先进的技术和生产力这边。美国也有更好的自然环境和社会环境吸引全球的人才和资源。但有的东西需要重视和改变了。低人权效率是共产党手中的一张2；制造业现有产业链是共产党手中另外一张2。但外面还有两个王两个2都在美国手上。共党已经出牌了，人类命运共同体是准备打全世界一个春天。
4. 在美华人大妈大叔在美中斗争中应该是什么立场
就只需要问一个问题：你愿意儿女将来在什么样的环境下生活。 最短视的好消息是，2020年藤校对ABC的录取率显著上升。脱钩之后这个趋势更明显。
5.谁能领导美国在美中竞争中胜出
特朗普不是最好的人选，因为他在外交、在团结美国国内各方力量方面做的很差。他有一定认识能力，但大量精力会被牵制。而拜登则既无精力，也无能力，更无认识和动机。相比之下应该选择特朗普。和中国共产党的斗争是一个长期的过程，在这个过程中世界各国的保守力量将会逐渐做大。现在是胡佛时代，期待特朗普之后的下任总统。
这朴实的文风不像是“彰我出优”的源朝写的。
有妻如此，夫复何求
有点像援朝早期风格。
唯一能肯定的就是也是逃难过来的锁男
真是疯了，在美华人大叔大妈鼓吹美国跟中国打三战。为了消灭邪恶的中共，不惜赔上自己与儿女。这是怎样的国际主义精神呐。
这是外交政策2017 年的一篇穿越文
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/29/the-next-internment-would-chinese-in-the-u-s-be-rounded-up-during-a-war/
The next internment: Would Chinese in the U.S. be rounded up during a war?
Present U.S. leadership seems both to make war more likely through its bellicose rhetoric and to heighten the risk that the conflict would lead to violence against the American-Chinese population.
By Giacomo Bagarella
Best Defense office of future operations
As the title of one recent book on the subject has it, the United States and China could be “destined for war.” This eventuality has received ample coverage in the media, in academia, and among statesmen, and both militaries have planned for a possible Sino-American conflict.
Not so the Chinese in America. The unspoken consequences of such a war would bring suspicion, surveillance, and possibly persecution against the hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals who live in the U.S. With knowledge of some of American history’s worst excesses in mind, is there a possibility that some, or all, of the country’s foreign-born Chinese will be interned?
Estimating the size of the affected population proves difficult. A Department of Homeland Security study calculates that, on average, 240,000 Chinese nationals resided within the U.S. on any given day in fiscal year 2014. Summing this figure to the estimated 268,000 unauthorized Chinese immigrants yields a lower bound of roughly half-a-million Chinese citizens living in the U.S. The upper bound might be closer to one million, if one halves the 2.3 million foreign-born Chinese in the country in 2015 to account for naturalized citizens — who constitute 48 percent of foreign-born residents — and lawful permanent residents. (Chinese law generally prohibits its citizens from holding dual nationality.)
Such numbers are likely to feed fears of “bad Fu Manchus,” saboteurs and fifth-columnists ready to take Beijing’s fight to the U.S. This would not be the first instance of homegrown anti-Chinese prejudice: Following decades of racism, China’s “fall” to Communism during the Cold War further enflamed American paranoia on the Chinese. Iris Chang concludes her history of the Chinese diaspora, The Chinese in America, by noting ruefully that, even in the 21st century, the acceptance of Chinese-Americans “was linked to the ever-shifting relations between the United States and China rather than to their own particular behavior.”
Worryingly, present U.S. leadership seems both to make war more likely through its bellicose rhetoric and to heighten the risk that the conflict would lead to violence against the American-Chinese population. As a candidate and president-elect, Donald Trump accused China of “raping” the U.S. and spoke approvingly of the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. His surrogates have repeated this reasoning, and senior advisers such as Stephen Bannon and Peter Navarro are transparent in their animosity towards Beijing.
In this toxic context, how plausible is it that Sino-American war would lead to massive retaliation? Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government used its power against the designated domestic foe, leading to the forced relocation and internment of more than 120,000 American Japanese during World War II. The recipe for this outcome, which the writer Richard Reeves describes in Infamy, entailed a mixture of racism, incompetent or power-hungry leaders in politics and the military, an enabling media and civil society, greed from those who stood to benefit economically from the response, and a widespread feeling of threat, whether real or imagined.
Tempted as they may be, the president and his sycophants would run into various obstacles. Only some of Reeves’s preconditions exists, though the media and civil society seem poised to be strong watchdogs of government excesses. The Chinese population today is also much larger, in both relative and in absolute terms, than the Japanese one in 1940. Additionally, Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the United States Code prohibits members of the armed forces from conducting searches, seizures, and arrests unless “otherwise authorized by law.” The threat of internment thus rests on the executive’s ability to mobilize citizens and key institutions into a systematic anti-Chinese policy.
However, in the shadow of great-power war, the equilibrium between restraint and reprisal leans heavily towards the latter. A threatened nation is more likely to lash out, as when the machinery of government and the public’s worst instincts responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by targeting Arabs, Muslims, and those mistaken as members of those groups.
History shows that racist reactions in times of war are not just a bug in the American system — they are an unavoidable feature. Trapped between two superpowers and rapacious leaders, the ethnic Chinese population in the U.S. faces significant uncertainty and travails in the looming duel between Washington and Beijing.
Giacomo Bagarella (@PerpetualPeace) holds a degree in Government from Harvard and a joint Master of Public Policy from the London School of Economics and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He currently works as a policy advisor for digital services for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. All views expressed are his own.
Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons
你家儿子闺女的好坏跟你没有任何关系吗？还是你根本就不在北美？
这些事情对下一代是好是坏真说不清 好坏不是脱了钩就行的
华人大妈基本都是 “在美国生活这么多年了，这次彻底失望了”
TOP2 还有一宿死值
你老婆和我应该谈得来。
嗯，反正好坏都跟你无关，是隔壁老王应该操心的事
拿篇英文当圣旨呢。拿2020年对比二战吓唬谁呢？你也太看不起美国这四十年努力的政治正确了。都他妈的进步到2020年了，又被你共产党给带地狱里去了，还他妈的把全世界给带进去了。
top2了
哈哈，T2 群里也是你看我SB 我看你SB的吵个不停，拿个T2 出来糊弄，以为自己不是SB了。
没错，这样来挖坑。
而且拿胡佛来比大统领真是太好玩啦。
胡佛就是一届总统，刚好是the great depression 黯然下台，然后换了对手民主党的罗斯福，罗斯福新政很重要的是扩大社会福利保护劳工~~~
不过估计回帖叫好的川粉不清楚这段历史。
你老婆明事理。赞！
知道政治正确毕竟是好事了，是吗？歧视别人的时候很嗨，歧视到自己头上才知道政治正确？
另外嘴巴干净点。不是讲粗话就有理的。
作为美国公民，最核心的问题根本不是中国。只不过因为是华裔，才关心。
抓不住重点，核心错了，资源分配就会错，人生就荒废了。
手动点赞。。
同感。二十年前读书的时候我跟朋友聊天就担心中国强大以后成为下一个纳粹德国。那时也就是随口一说，没想到不幸而言中。中国现在的走向确实是1984里描述的那种国家
Top 2. 指清华和北大之一（非校际坑）
我不是李源潮。
是的，有点吃着自己家的饭，还在想着邻居是不是开锅了的感觉。
不知是为了说明吃的比邻居好满足一下呢，还是凡是有饭吃的都是敌人那种零和游戏心理。好好做好自己的饭吃好不就行了，还要看着邻居的锅下饭
不考虑华裔而考虑中美，你老婆的大旗举错了。
娶这个老婆都不如隔壁楼里会做脆皮酥饼的丫头
其实你说了半天，就是要大家投共和党的票。
你先关心自己家能不能完整幸免于病毒，幸免于后面的种族主义的报复，或者恶意伤害吧。。。
我们还是先关心美国的事吧。美国不对付中国，对华人没有什么坏处。美国处处对付中国，对华人看不到任何好处。而美国是不是要对付中国，这是政治家应当思考的，不是普通一代华人应当关心的。
华人应当关心的是：
1. 能不能美国活着。
2. 能不能在美国更好的活着。
3.能不能在美国最好的活着，一家人过着别处不会有的日子。
任何阻碍上面三条的，都不应当投票给他！
指桑骂槐？不知你说的是谁啊，我也没有骂人的意思啊，就是个比方
正确的。活在美国，更应该立足本地求发展
RE
适合华人受众嘛
我也有这种感觉
这个楼主一会儿扮演老婆一会儿扮演自己，这个精分的劲头不知道是哪一路的川粉。还说什么选Trump对美华的好处是2020年ABC爬藤率高了，是和2019年比么，可这几年都是Trump当政啊，根本看不出楼主的逻辑在哪。除此之外，选Trump对美华的好处一点都说不出来了。倒是说起把中国打垮说得口沫横飞的。
华人能不能在美国好好活着，取决于中国。虽远必诛你以为是指诛谁啊？还不就是海外华人？用得着你的时候金钱美色勾着你，让你在国外连偷带拿帮着他们“弯道超车”，用不着你的时候抬脚一踹，说我不认识你。这些人要不就在国内吃香喝辣，要不就在这边锒铛入狱，但是不管怎样都是在这边老老实实做事的华人跟着一块背锅。以后谁敢雇佣华人？