回复 9楼xizzhu的帖子 细查还是有区别，主要是起源的问题，Europe的语境是特指经济困难的。当然作者是不是完全了解背景，或者有没有放狗搜，就不清楚了。 Sick man of Europe. "Sick man of Europe" is a label given to a European country experiencing a time of economic difficulty or impoverishment. The term was first used in the mid-19th century to describe the Ottoman Empire. The phrase "sick man of Asia" or "sick man of East Asia" (Chinese: 東亞病夫; pinyin: Dōngyà bìngfū) originally referred to China in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when it was driven by internal divisions and taken advantage of by the great powers.
China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia Its financial markets may be even more dangerous than its wildlife markets. By Walter Russell Mead Feb. 3, 2020 6:47 pm ET SAVE SHARE TEXT 229 A Chinese woman wears a protective mask in Beijing, Feb. 3. PHOTO: KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES The mighty Chinese juggernaut has been humbled this week, apparently by a species-hopping bat virus. While Chinese authorities struggle to control the epidemic and restart their economy, a world that has grown accustomed to contemplating China’s inexorable rise was reminded that nothing, not even Beijing’s power, can be taken for granted. We do not know how dangerous the new coronavirus will be. There are signs that Chinese authorities are still trying to conceal the true scale of the problem, but at this point the virus appears to be more contagious but considerably less deadly than the pathogens behind diseases such as Ebola or SARS—though some experts say SARS and coronavirus are about equally contagious. China’s initial response to the crisis was less than impressive. The Wuhan government was secretive and self-serving; national authorities responded vigorously but, it currently appears, ineffectively. China’s cities and factories are shutting down; the virus continues to spread. We can hope that authorities succeed in containing the epidemic and treating its victims, but the performance to date has shaken confidence in the Chinese Communist Party at home and abroad. Complaints in Beijing about the U.S. refusing entry to noncitizens who recently spent time in China cannot hide the reality that the decisions that allowed the epidemic to spread as far and as fast as it did were all made in Wuhan and Beijing. The likeliest economic consequence of the coronavirus epidemic, forecasters expect, will be a short and sharp fall in Chinese economic growth rates during the first quarter, recovering as the disease fades. The most important longer-term outcome would appear to be a strengthening of a trend for global companies to “de-Sinicize” their supply chains. Add the continuing public health worries to the threat of new trade wars, and supply-chain diversification begins to look prudent. Events like the coronavirus epidemic, and its predecessors—such as SARS, Ebola and MERS—test our systems and force us to think about the unthinkable. If there were a disease as deadly as Ebola and as fast-spreading as coronavirus, how should the U.S. respond? What national and international systems need to be in place to minimize the chance of catastrophe on this scale? Epidemics also lead us to think about geopolitical and economic hypotheticals. We have seen financial markets shudder and commodity prices fall in the face of what hopefully will be a short-lived disturbance in China’s economic growth. What would happen if—perhaps in response to an epidemic, but more likely following a massive financial collapse—China’s economy were to suffer a long period of even slower growth? What would be the impact of such developments on China’s political stability, on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to the global balance of power? China’s financial markets are probably more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets. Given the accumulated costs of decades of state-driven lending, massive malfeasance by local officials in cahoots with local banks, a towering property bubble, and vast industrial overcapacity, China is as ripe as a country can be for a massive economic correction. Even a small initial shock could lead to a massive bonfire of the vanities as all the false values, inflated expectations and misallocated assets implode. If that comes, it is far from clear that China’s regulators and decision makers have the technical skills or the political authority to minimize the damage—especially since that would involve enormous losses to the wealth of the politically connected. We cannot know when or even if a catastrophe of this scale will take place, but students of geopolitics and international affairs—not to mention business leaders and investors—need to bear in mind that China’s power, impressive as it is, remains brittle. A deadlier virus or a financial-market contagion could transform China’s economic and political outlook at any time. Many now fear the coronavirus will become a global pandemic. The consequences of a Chinese economic meltdown would travel with the same sweeping inexorability. Commodity prices around the world would slump, supply chains would break down, and few financial institutions anywhere could escape the knock-on consequences. Recovery in China and elsewhere could be slow, and the social and political effects could be dramatic. If Beijing’s geopolitical footprint shrank as a result, the global consequences might also be surprising. Some would expect a return of unipolarity if the only possible great-power rival to the U.S. were to withdraw from the game. Yet in the world of American politics, isolation rather than engagement might surge to the fore. If the China challenge fades, many Americans are likely to assume that the U.S. can safely reduce its global commitments. So far, the 21st century has been an age of black swans. From 9/11 to President Trump’s election and Brexit, low-probability, high-impact events have reshaped the world order. That age isn’t over, and of the black swans still to arrive, the coronavirus epidemic is unlikely to be the last to materialize in China.
根据维基，Sick Man of ××××是用来指出一个国家的衰败和体制的弊病，本身非但与中国人的身体素质毫无关系，而且不存在所谓的“讥讽”、“嘲笑”的意味。後來經梁啟超等人的宣傳與曲解，誕生“东亚病夫”，成了在華人自我想像裡外國人對中國人的贬称，让国人产生屈辱感，来激發中國民族主義情緒的用詞。所以咱们对这个词产生的强烈情绪实际来自从小的教育。
我们上周发文章老板就想用 when China got sick, whole world will sneeze作标题，专门来问了问我们这个听起来politically是不是correct... 我说这个有点敏感，你永远不会知道会被拿去怎么解读，或者被断章取义，还是不要把China写标题里。最后就没有用这个标题。
我们上周发文章老板就想用 when China got sick, whole world will sneeze作标题，专门来问了问我们这个听起来politically是不是correct... 我说这个有点敏感，你永远不会知道会被拿去怎么解读，或者被断章取义，还是不要把China写标题里。最后就没有用这个标题。 chainshore 发表于 2/6/2020 9:32:43 AM
这次瘟疫的确让我觉得中国千疮百孔病入膏肓，上上下下烂得流脓。翻译成＂东亚病夫＂那是别有用心，the real sick man in Asian 直译就是＂亚洲病人＂。 purplebasil 发表于 2/6/2020 10:34:08 AM
文章讲的是体制问题还有这次事件带来的经济后果，个人觉得没啥问题，the sick man of 是指something or some place that is particularly unsound, untenable, or doomed to fail, especially among or in comparison to its peers. 这是字典的解释
China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia Its financial markets may be even more dangerous than its wildlife markets.
By Walter Russell Mead Feb. 3, 2020 6:47 pm ET SAVE SHARE TEXT 229
A Chinese woman wears a protective mask in Beijing, Feb. 3. PHOTO: KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES The mighty Chinese juggernaut has been humbled this week, apparently by a species-hopping bat virus. While Chinese authorities struggle to control the epidemic and restart their economy, a world that has grown accustomed to contemplating China’s inexorable rise was reminded that nothing, not even Beijing’s power, can be taken for granted.
We do not know how dangerous the new coronavirus will be. There are signs that Chinese authorities are still trying to conceal the true scale of the problem, but at this point the virus appears to be more contagious but considerably less deadly than the pathogens behind diseases such as Ebola or SARS—though some experts say SARS and coronavirus are about equally contagious.
China’s initial response to the crisis was less than impressive. The Wuhan government was secretive and self-serving; national authorities responded vigorously but, it currently appears, ineffectively. China’s cities and factories are shutting down; the virus continues to spread. We can hope that authorities succeed in containing the epidemic and treating its victims, but the performance to date has shaken confidence in the Chinese Communist Party at home and abroad. Complaints in Beijing about the U.S. refusing entry to noncitizens who recently spent time in China cannot hide the reality that the decisions that allowed the epidemic to spread as far and as fast as it did were all made in Wuhan and Beijing.
The likeliest economic consequence of the coronavirus epidemic, forecasters expect, will be a short and sharp fall in Chinese economic growth rates during the first quarter, recovering as the disease fades. The most important longer-term outcome would appear to be a strengthening of a trend for global companies to “de-Sinicize” their supply chains. Add the continuing public health worries to the threat of new trade wars, and supply-chain diversification begins to look prudent.
Events like the coronavirus epidemic, and its predecessors—such as SARS, Ebola and MERS—test our systems and force us to think about the unthinkable. If there were a disease as deadly as Ebola and as fast-spreading as coronavirus, how should the U.S. respond? What national and international systems need to be in place to minimize the chance of catastrophe on this scale?
Epidemics also lead us to think about geopolitical and economic hypotheticals. We have seen financial markets shudder and commodity prices fall in the face of what hopefully will be a short-lived disturbance in China’s economic growth. What would happen if—perhaps in response to an epidemic, but more likely following a massive financial collapse—China’s economy were to suffer a long period of even slower growth? What would be the impact of such developments on China’s political stability, on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to the global balance of power?
China’s financial markets are probably more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets. Given the accumulated costs of decades of state-driven lending, massive malfeasance by local officials in cahoots with local banks, a towering property bubble, and vast industrial overcapacity, China is as ripe as a country can be for a massive economic correction. Even a small initial shock could lead to a massive bonfire of the vanities as all the false values, inflated expectations and misallocated assets implode. If that comes, it is far from clear that China’s regulators and decision makers have the technical skills or the political authority to minimize the damage—especially since that would involve enormous losses to the wealth of the politically connected.
We cannot know when or even if a catastrophe of this scale will take place, but students of geopolitics and international affairs—not to mention business leaders and investors—need to bear in mind that China’s power, impressive as it is, remains brittle. A deadlier virus or a financial-market contagion could transform China’s economic and political outlook at any time.
Many now fear the coronavirus will become a global pandemic. The consequences of a Chinese economic meltdown would travel with the same sweeping inexorability. Commodity prices around the world would slump, supply chains would break down, and few financial institutions anywhere could escape the knock-on consequences. Recovery in China and elsewhere could be slow, and the social and political effects could be dramatic.
If Beijing’s geopolitical footprint shrank as a result, the global consequences might also be surprising. Some would expect a return of unipolarity if the only possible great-power rival to the U.S. were to withdraw from the game. Yet in the world of American politics, isolation rather than engagement might surge to the fore. If the China challenge fades, many Americans are likely to assume that the U.S. can safely reduce its global commitments.
So far, the 21st century has been an age of black swans. From 9/11 to President Trump’s election and Brexit, low-probability, high-impact events have reshaped the world order. That age isn’t over, and of the black swans still to arrive, the coronavirus epidemic is unlikely to be the last to materialize in China. nypapaya 发表于 2/6/2020 3:07:28 AM
China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia Its financial markets may be even more dangerous than its wildlife markets.
By Walter Russell Mead Feb. 3, 2020 6:47 pm ET SAVE SHARE TEXT 229
A Chinese woman wears a protective mask in Beijing, Feb. 3. PHOTO: KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES The mighty Chinese juggernaut has been humbled this week, apparently by a species-hopping bat virus. While Chinese authorities struggle to control the epidemic and restart their economy, a world that has grown accustomed to contemplating China’s inexorable rise was reminded that nothing, not even Beijing’s power, can be taken for granted.
We do not know how dangerous the new coronavirus will be. There are signs that Chinese authorities are still trying to conceal the true scale of the problem, but at this point the virus appears to be more contagious but considerably less deadly than the pathogens behind diseases such as Ebola or SARS—though some experts say SARS and coronavirus are about equally contagious.
China’s initial response to the crisis was less than impressive. The Wuhan government was secretive and self-serving; national authorities responded vigorously but, it currently appears, ineffectively. China’s cities and factories are shutting down; the virus continues to spread. We can hope that authorities succeed in containing the epidemic and treating its victims, but the performance to date has shaken confidence in the Chinese Communist Party at home and abroad. Complaints in Beijing about the U.S. refusing entry to noncitizens who recently spent time in China cannot hide the reality that the decisions that allowed the epidemic to spread as far and as fast as it did were all made in Wuhan and Beijing.
The likeliest economic consequence of the coronavirus epidemic, forecasters expect, will be a short and sharp fall in Chinese economic growth rates during the first quarter, recovering as the disease fades. The most important longer-term outcome would appear to be a strengthening of a trend for global companies to “de-Sinicize” their supply chains. Add the continuing public health worries to the threat of new trade wars, and supply-chain diversification begins to look prudent.
Events like the coronavirus epidemic, and its predecessors—such as SARS, Ebola and MERS—test our systems and force us to think about the unthinkable. If there were a disease as deadly as Ebola and as fast-spreading as coronavirus, how should the U.S. respond? What national and international systems need to be in place to minimize the chance of catastrophe on this scale?
Epidemics also lead us to think about geopolitical and economic hypotheticals. We have seen financial markets shudder and commodity prices fall in the face of what hopefully will be a short-lived disturbance in China’s economic growth. What would happen if—perhaps in response to an epidemic, but more likely following a massive financial collapse—China’s economy were to suffer a long period of even slower growth? What would be the impact of such developments on China’s political stability, on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to the global balance of power?
China’s financial markets are probably more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets. Given the accumulated costs of decades of state-driven lending, massive malfeasance by local officials in cahoots with local banks, a towering property bubble, and vast industrial overcapacity, China is as ripe as a country can be for a massive economic correction. Even a small initial shock could lead to a massive bonfire of the vanities as all the false values, inflated expectations and misallocated assets implode. If that comes, it is far from clear that China’s regulators and decision makers have the technical skills or the political authority to minimize the damage—especially since that would involve enormous losses to the wealth of the politically connected.
We cannot know when or even if a catastrophe of this scale will take place, but students of geopolitics and international affairs—not to mention business leaders and investors—need to bear in mind that China’s power, impressive as it is, remains brittle. A deadlier virus or a financial-market contagion could transform China’s economic and political outlook at any time.
Many now fear the coronavirus will become a global pandemic. The consequences of a Chinese economic meltdown would travel with the same sweeping inexorability. Commodity prices around the world would slump, supply chains would break down, and few financial institutions anywhere could escape the knock-on consequences. Recovery in China and elsewhere could be slow, and the social and political effects could be dramatic.
If Beijing’s geopolitical footprint shrank as a result, the global consequences might also be surprising. Some would expect a return of unipolarity if the only possible great-power rival to the U.S. were to withdraw from the game. Yet in the world of American politics, isolation rather than engagement might surge to the fore. If the China challenge fades, many Americans are likely to assume that the U.S. can safely reduce its global commitments.
So far, the 21st century has been an age of black swans. From 9/11 to President Trump’s election and Brexit, low-probability, high-impact events have reshaped the world order. That age isn’t over, and of the black swans still to arrive, the coronavirus epidemic is unlikely to be the last to materialize in China. nypapaya 发表于 2/6/2020 3:07:28 AM
🔥 最新回帖
谁是轮子？包子能代表国家吗？wm今天拿了几块钱了？
🛋️ 沙发板凳
别自欺欺人了，封闭管理的城市越来越多，确诊的人数也越来越多，资源不足的问题到处都是，大理居然从重庆手里硬抢口罩。这不叫严重什么叫严重。其他城市的患者是不如武汉比例高，但非得各个城市弄到武汉那个惨状才算严重吗？
你这种人就恨不得自己变成老美别忘了你就算移民到美国
你还是中国人种
战争时代的话你这种人第一个去做汉奸
这位ID，跟我签名拍个照。
历史上是比喻，现在是实况。
政治正确从来就不包括亚裔啊。。。
仔细看内容，即更以为然了。 中国的经济也是病得不轻。
严重怀疑，如果美国发生这样的疫情，以老中的思维，肯定幸灾乐祸！
这种标题是要掀起反华潮流，楼里居然这么多人称是
国内的傻逼个人言论能跟一个具有世界影响力的媒体相提并论?wsj可以评论中国做的各种不好，但是使用历史敏感词屈辱词来形容中国，跟说黑人是黑鬼有什么区别?在美华人居然还能深以为然，小心有一天在学校里面你的孩子被人这么形容。
较之我天朝外交部发言人宣称美帝没有实质性援助、撤侨是散布恐慌情绪、带头封锁中国又如何？
美华只能对天朝政府说一句求放过了。
说China sick 又没说Chinese sick
都是轮子。立场早已昭然若揭
人家对你诛九族，你一定会跪地磕头道谢是吧。
你愿意把自己绑在土共的战车上，是你自己的选择。
Re 词本身没问题 中国人自卑所以过分解读 还把这份自卑不安夸大一代代往下传
你接受不了现实 但媒体的责任就是要报truth
东亚病夫在中国对中国人是历史敏感词屈辱词 sick man of East asia is not 他们如果说chink 那才是等同于说nig
人家犯不上惯着你们这些巨婴 求疼爱找你党妈去
其实东亚病夫是中国人批判中国人的是时候最先使用的，并不是外国人发明的。
你这显然有病 WSJ骂得就是好
Ccp没病，它就是个大病毒，中国有病，中国人也都有病，快死了还不让说有病。你们这群离岸爱国的不但有病而且有毒。
china病了为什么要把不在china的人拉上做陪？真希望有人替天行道收了china这个病人
我觉得你老板这个还好啊……
还要怎么夸大？本世纪两次把全世界拖入恐慌，还他妈自己天天吹牛逼厉害了我的国。难道不是病人？both physical and mental.
翻译问题，这题目就翻译成亚洲病人就完了。翻译成东亚病夫的都是反贼，想啥呐。
政治正确是对本国人而言
人家说的难道不是事实，中国没病吗？现在难道不是全国一级响应？
你党指着美帝鼻子骂的时候多了。
而且翻译问题，翻成亚洲病人不就完了，自己非要往东亚病夫上靠，那别人也没法拦
可以google一下，两个英文phrase是可以互换的
大家记住这几个携带ccp病毒的粉毛，不该死的已经死了，该死的还不死，呵呵
文章讲的是体制问题还有这次事件带来的经济后果，个人觉得没啥问题，the sick man of 是指something or some place that is particularly unsound, untenable, or doomed to fail, especially among or in comparison to its peers. 这是字典的解释
如果入籍美国必须效忠美帝，何来汉奸一说？不要混淆国籍和人种，Chinese American和其他老美一样是American。如果你是没入籍的绿卡，无论你做了什么，回到中国肯定会是里通外国的汉奸间谍。
你这人真是莫名其妙 你觉得WSJ骂你了你找WSJ去呀 跟我这儿耍什么横 我可没那么大脸说China就是我 你们是强国我不占你们这个光 WSJ骂你了啊 你不去找回场子你就是大loser
mark
感觉中共越来越不要脸了，根本没人能压得了它。。。
从没要过脸 那些高叫祖流我放的粉红们好好enjoy
知耻而后勇
厉害国现在连“耻”都丝毫不觉得呢，“勇”的踪影不知道啥时候能看见。
通篇看下来，无非就是中国奔溃论的翻版。跟猫猫的论调如出一辙。没什么新意啊。