Prosecuting the Chinese Huawei executive is an idiotic way to hold China in check
By Zachary Karabell Zachary Karabell is the author of several books, including “The Leading Indicators: A Short History of the Numbers That Rule Our World.” December 8
The U.S.-China relationship seemed to improve last week at the G-20 summit in Argentina, where President Trump announced he had reached an important agreement with President Xi Jinping. Then, an ominous development: American authorities asked Canada to arrest the chief financial officer of one of China’s largest technologies companies for alleged sanctions fraud and violations of U.S. export controls. Meng Wanzhou isn’t just a top leader at Huawei, which makes phones and other gadgets; she is also the daughter of the company’s founder and chairman, which makes her arrest somewhat like the Chinese arresting the daughter of Steve Jobs if she had helped run Apple. It would be an understatement to say that Beijing did not react well: It demanded her release and accused the U.S. government of violating the rights of a Chinese citizen.
The timing could hardly be worse, and from what can be told, it reflects the overall chaos of the Trump administration. National security adviser John Bolton claimed he was informed of the pending arrest by the Justice Department but did not pass that information to the president. That no one in the White House considered the implications of her arrest on the tenuous trade truce between China and the United States is itself rather astonishing.
The case against Huawei and its executives may be legitimate under U.S. law, but it is nonetheless a hideous political mistake. Perhaps Huawei used American-made components in equipment it sold to Iran, violating U.S. sanctions. But even in less ambiguous cases, there is always such a thing as prosecutorial discretion. Not every case that can be brought should be brought, and not every case should be prosecuted to the full letter of the law. In international cases, that is doubly true. If the United States wants to respond to China’s rise and manage the changing role of the United States in the international system, it could hardly have picked a dumber tactic.
Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou, left, appears at a bail hearing in Vancouver, B.C. (Jane Wolsak/Reuters) (Stringer/Reuters)
Huawei is not exactly a noble avatar of social responsibility. Since at least 2016, when President Barack Obama was in office, the Commerce Department has been investigating Huawei for export violations to Iran and North Korea. In the spring of 2017, the Treasury Department opened its own inquiry.
Even before that, though, Huawei operated on the margins of legality. In 2003, Cisco sued it for copying some of the code used in its routers. (Huawei admitted as much before the trial and promised to stop.) In 2012, a House committee named the company as a potential threat to U.S. national security because of its ties to the Chinese government, its legacy of intellectual property theft and its ability to embed spyware in its phones. The United States, Australia and New Zealand have already blocked Huawei from being part of the initial build-out of the next generation 5G telecom networks.
Even if everything alleged is correct, however, the quest against Huawei is a ridiculous overreach — predicated on an assumption that the United States can dictate how foreign competitors conduct business. Yes, the company has deep ties with the Chinese Communist Party, though it’s worth mulling whether those are any more pernicious than the close bonds that connect defense contractors such as Boeing and Lockheed with the Pentagon.
More important, global supply chains are now deeply interconnected and touch multiple countries and numerous companies. Samsung, for instance, is the second largest cellphone provider in Iran, behind Huawei, while the Swedish telecom company Ericsson has been selling equipment to Iran even under the sanctions. Those companies may have done a better job not using American components for products sold to those countries, though with the complexity of global component sourcing, it is unlikely that no American intellectual property has been used by Iranian consumers. Yet U.S. prosecutors are not trying to curtail the work of those mega-technology giants, or aggressively investigating where every component originated.
Samsung and Ericsson, of course, are domiciled in countries that are American allies, whereas Huawei is tightly connected to what is now being seen by many as a prime American adversary. The initial reaction in China, judging by the social media flow and some interviews, is that the Americans are using their legal system to advance political interests in an ongoing contest with China.
There is a long and debated legacy on how far American laws extend. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has recognized a “presumption against extraterritoriality,” which holds that U.S. laws should not be enforced outside the United States. On the other, there are statutes such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which punishes bribery by foreign entities. Sanctions occupy a zone of their own, whereby the U.S. government has acted against other countries by threatening foreign companies that do business with them, if they also do business in the U.S. To the degree that the United States has enjoyed dominant economic power relative to any one country that might object, it has been able to use law enforcement as one tool among many to achieve policy objectives.
That works, however, primarily where there are stark power imbalances, which is clearly not the case with China. Arresting the No. 2 executive of one of the world’s largest technology companies is an ineffective way to achieve policy aims — and a very effective way to complicate negotiations that matter rather more. It’s one thing to ban Huawei’s 5G components from the U.S. market, a defensible response to a perceived threat. That’s an unassailable invocation of American sovereignty (which would still carry a steep economic and political cost).
It’s something else entirely to arrest a very senior executive and potentially try her for evading U.S. export controls. Using law enforcement against individuals for corporate actions of this sort risks backfiring spectacularly. It is easily painted as a crude attempt by the Trump administration to put pressure on Beijing in the coming trade negotiations, even if that is not the actual intent. It exposes American executives to potential retaliation in China and abroad in a tit-for-tat that will chill an already frosty business climate, with direct effects on the domestic American economy and markets. And it may succeed only in pushing technology even further into national camps that compete and develop their own protocols, which appears to be happening with the evolution of artificial intelligence. We can hope to win that competition, but it will prove costlier than the mutual dependence that defined much of the past two decades.
Prosecuting the Chinese Huawei executive is an idiotic way to hold China in check
By Zachary Karabell Zachary Karabell is the author of several books, including “The Leading Indicators: A Short History of the Numbers That Rule Our World.” December 8
The U.S.-China relationship seemed to improve last week at the G-20 summit in Argentina, where President Trump announced he had reached an important agreement with President Xi Jinping. Then, an ominous development: American authorities asked Canada to arrest the chief financial officer of one of China’s largest technologies companies for alleged sanctions fraud and violations of U.S. export controls. Meng Wanzhou isn’t just a top leader at Huawei, which makes phones and other gadgets; she is also the daughter of the company’s founder and chairman, which makes her arrest somewhat like the Chinese arresting the daughter of Steve Jobs if she had helped run Apple. It would be an understatement to say that Beijing did not react well: It demanded her release and accused the U.S. government of violating the rights of a Chinese citizen.
The timing could hardly be worse, and from what can be told, it reflects the overall chaos of the Trump administration. National security adviser John Bolton claimed he was informed of the pending arrest by the Justice Department but did not pass that information to the president. That no one in the White House considered the implications of her arrest on the tenuous trade truce between China and the United States is itself rather astonishing.
The case against Huawei and its executives may be legitimate under U.S. law, but it is nonetheless a hideous political mistake. Perhaps Huawei used American-made components in equipment it sold to Iran, violating U.S. sanctions. But even in less ambiguous cases, there is always such a thing as prosecutorial discretion. Not every case that can be brought should be brought, and not every case should be prosecuted to the full letter of the law. In international cases, that is doubly true. If the United States wants to respond to China’s rise and manage the changing role of the United States in the international system, it could hardly have picked a dumber tactic.
Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou, left, appears at a bail hearing in Vancouver, B.C. (Jane Wolsak/Reuters) (Stringer/Reuters)
Huawei is not exactly a noble avatar of social responsibility. Since at least 2016, when President Barack Obama was in office, the Commerce Department has been investigating Huawei for export violations to Iran and North Korea. In the spring of 2017, the Treasury Department opened its own inquiry.
Even before that, though, Huawei operated on the margins of legality. In 2003, Cisco sued it for copying some of the code used in its routers. (Huawei admitted as much before the trial and promised to stop.) In 2012, a House committee named the company as a potential threat to U.S. national security because of its ties to the Chinese government, its legacy of intellectual property theft and its ability to embed spyware in its phones. The United States, Australia and New Zealand have already blocked Huawei from being part of the initial build-out of the next generation 5G telecom networks.
Even if everything alleged is correct, however, the quest against Huawei is a ridiculous overreach — predicated on an assumption that the United States can dictate how foreign competitors conduct business. Yes, the company has deep ties with the Chinese Communist Party, though it’s worth mulling whether those are any more pernicious than the close bonds that connect defense contractors such as Boeing and Lockheed with the Pentagon.
More important, global supply chains are now deeply interconnected and touch multiple countries and numerous companies. Samsung, for instance, is the second largest cellphone provider in Iran, behind Huawei, while the Swedish telecom company Ericsson has been selling equipment to Iran even under the sanctions. Those companies may have done a better job not using American components for products sold to those countries, though with the complexity of global component sourcing, it is unlikely that no American intellectual property has been used by Iranian consumers. Yet U.S. prosecutors are not trying to curtail the work of those mega-technology giants, or aggressively investigating where every component originated.
Samsung and Ericsson, of course, are domiciled in countries that are American allies, whereas Huawei is tightly connected to what is now being seen by many as a prime American adversary. The initial reaction in China, judging by the social media flow and some interviews, is that the Americans are using their legal system to advance political interests in an ongoing contest with China.
There is a long and debated legacy on how far American laws extend. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has recognized a “presumption against extraterritoriality,” which holds that U.S. laws should not be enforced outside the United States. On the other, there are statutes such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which punishes bribery by foreign entities. Sanctions occupy a zone of their own, whereby the U.S. government has acted against other countries by threatening foreign companies that do business with them, if they also do business in the U.S. To the degree that the United States has enjoyed dominant economic power relative to any one country that might object, it has been able to use law enforcement as one tool among many to achieve policy objectives.
That works, however, primarily where there are stark power imbalances, which is clearly not the case with China. Arresting the No. 2 executive of one of the world’s largest technology companies is an ineffective way to achieve policy aims — and a very effective way to complicate negotiations that matter rather more. It’s one thing to ban Huawei’s 5G components from the U.S. market, a defensible response to a perceived threat. That’s an unassailable invocation of American sovereignty (which would still carry a steep economic and political cost).
It’s something else entirely to arrest a very senior executive and potentially try her for evading U.S. export controls. Using law enforcement against individuals for corporate actions of this sort risks backfiring spectacularly. It is easily painted as a crude attempt by the Trump administration to put pressure on Beijing in the coming trade negotiations, even if that is not the actual intent. It exposes American executives to potential retaliation in China and abroad in a tit-for-tat that will chill an already frosty business climate, with direct effects on the domestic American economy and markets. And it may succeed only in pushing technology even further into national camps that compete and develop their own protocols, which appears to be happening with the evolution of artificial intelligence. We can hope to win that competition, but it will prove costlier than the mutual dependence that defined much of the past two decades. northernpike 发表于 12/11/2018 12:59:09 AM
前言
基于同等的价格与质量，峰哥首选国货，所以用了多年的华为。
走遍全球上千家企业，华为一直是峰哥眼中最优秀的中国企业，任总也是最优秀的中国企业家。珠三角和长三角有很多优秀企业，之所以说华为最优秀，因为：
大多优秀企业只在国内称王，少数能在近海转转，而华为不同，早就冲出国门，一直在全球市场的蓝海中竞争，且成绩斐然；在各种泡末经济的喧嚣中，在触手可及的挣快钱的巨大诱惑面前，华为数十年一直坚守基础制造业，其恒心难得；和单一产品制造商不同，华为是通讯基础设施的整体供应商，这需要超凡的系统管理、踏实的技术积累和持久的商业信誉，这正是国内企业所稀缺的。
孟女士加拿大被拘，非常值得关注。我们需要了解事情的来龙去脉，摆事实、讲道理，理清思路。亚舟先生的信息简洁明了：
加拿大的保释听证会提供了很多信息，本案确实与出口管制设备给伊朗有关，但孟女士被拘押起诉并非出口违规的事情，而是美方指控华为公司为出口设备给伊朗，欺骗金融机构，掩盖华为和它的白手套公司Skycom之间的真实关系。
首先需要了解，
美国的出口管制规则
游戏规则大概是这样的，美国并不关心谁和伊朗做生意，但美国禁止把美国产品卖给伊朗。所以你不能把美国的东西买过来，然后转卖给伊朗。这在你买东西的时候会签订保证函，保证不会卖给伊朗。但即使你签了字，然后把东西卖给伊朗，美国也没撤，自认倒霉被骗。当然，虽然美国没有办法处罚你，但就会把你列入黑名单，不会再卖东西给你。但是如果你想继续这个游戏，还要继续买美国东西，那美国政府就会开出罚单，如果你不认罚，那就一拍二散，你走你的阳关道，我走我的独木桥，各玩各的。这就是中兴的案子。
如果你更聪明，为了绕开美国的管制规定，想既把东西卖给禁运国，但又不让美国发现，于是就成立一家空壳公司，出了问题就甩包给空壳公司。但交易都需要通过银行进行，如果中间公司通过欺骗在美国营业的银行来完成交易，这就从普通违规行为，变成了“欺诈金融机构”的刑事犯罪。在美国，欺骗银行是联邦重罪，刑期可达30年。所以，同样违反出口管制，中兴只是行政处罚，而孟女士面临坐牢的刑事指控。
比较中兴和华为。中兴比较“笨”，什么都自己干，直接出口给伊朗。华为更“聪明”，搞了个白手套挡在前面，以为可以避开管制，结果升级为刑案指控，并要公司负责人担责。在中兴法务部印发的学习材料里面详细描述了华为如何规避管制通过Skycom出口（文件贴在美国商务商的网站上）的策略，中兴本来是要照华为的葫芦画自己的瓢，结果瓢还没画成就被处罚了，幸亏如此，中兴仅被罚款了事。但中兴法务的这份材料成为美方调查的重要线索，某个角度，华为给中兴坑了。
继续追溯到，
美国的出口管制法案
一、《出口管理条例》(简称EAR)
本条例对大范围的原产于美国的商品、软件和技术的出口、转出口和视同出口做出规定，包括民用、军民两用或有扩散应用特性的商品、软件和技术。EAR管制的所有物项列在《商业管制清单》(下称CCL)中。BIS 负责监管出口管制系统，包括出口许可证的审批、行政处罚、刑事犯罪调查，司法部负责刑事处罚。几乎所有参与管制物项相关交易的个人或公司都有责任遵守《出口管理条例》。
二、《国际军火交易条例》(简称ITAR)
ITAR禁止从美国或美国境外出口或转出口在 《美国军火清单》(下称USML)中所列主要适用于军用、原产于美国的防务产品和服务。国务院国防贸易管制局(下称DDTC)负责清单所列物项的许可证审批和行政处罚，国土安全调查部门(HSI)或美国联邦调查局(FBI)负责刑事犯罪调查，司法部负责刑事处罚。从事USML 所列防务产品和服务的制造商、出口商及代理商必须在DDTC备案。任何个人或公司从事防务
产品和服务出口或临时进口业务必须获得DDTC 许可。
三、《国际紧急经济权力法案》(简称IEEPA)
IEEPA授权美国总统，在美国的国家安全、外交政策或美国经济遭受异常或特别威胁时，可以阻止相关交易并冻结财产。财政部海外资产管理办公室(下称OFAC )，依据 IEEPA监管美国的多项经济和贸易制裁，通过发布一系列制裁清单来禁止与诸如伊朗和朝鲜等国的贸易，同时在《特别指定国民名单》(下称“SDN 名单”)中还列出了很多被禁的个人和实体的名单。
四、其它专项法案
所有参与原产于美国的商品、软件、 技术和服务交易的个人和实体必须密切关注和遵守美国制裁与出口管制法律。一旦违反，将导致非常严厉的刑事或民事惩罚。根据出口管制法案，任何公司向古巴、伊朗、叙利亚、朝鲜和苏丹五大禁运国直接或间接出口管制产品都必须申请出口许可证，如果违反管制法规，公司有可能受到三个严重处罚：
1、高额民事赔偿
2、高管被判监禁
3、公司被列入黑名单，一定时期内不能购买美国产品。
当时中兴受到的处罚是1、3项
特别提示！根据《出口管理条例》EAR规定，将受管制的高科技技术披露给位于美国境内的一个外国人，被视为向该个人的国籍所属国的出口，披露方在披露之前有义务获得出口许可。通常情况下，从事高科技、生化、医疗、计算机和其它科学研究和开发活动的大学、研究机构是视同出口许可的申请人，特别是当它们需要向位于美国境内的外国学生或访问者披露管制信息时。
美国法律的适用性问题
关于美国凭什么用国内法来管外国人和外国公司做生意，是不是手伸得太长了，这就牵扯到所谓的“域外管辖”概念。美国出口管制的法律基础是“属物管理”，也就是说只管东西，只要你签了合规协议，买了我的东西，我就要管。对于中兴的行政处罚就是依据这个来的。
那么刑事司法管辖呢？这就要看事情发生在哪里，也就是说，如果外国人在美国犯了事，那美国就要管。其实各国的法律都差不多，比如说一个美国人在中国犯了法，中国当然能管。
美方现在指控华为在美国买美国产品，欺骗美国银行说最终用户是Skycom，然后又通过Skycom转卖给伊朗，并且通过美国的银行完成了交易。美国拿到的证据，包括孟女士的PPT、华为和Skycom（人员、员工邮箱，连信纸都是华为的）实际是一家公司，于是美国起诉抓人。可是嫌疑人不在美国，美国就通过有引渡条约的国家请求帮忙拘捕。加拿大同意抓人，所以孟女士在温哥华被拘。假如中美之间有引渡条约，那美国就会请中方帮忙抓人，当然基于互惠原则，美方也有义务帮中国抓捕那些跑到美国的贪官。可惜中美之间还没有引渡条约。
出口管制案例
2015年年初，美国司法部公布了一份长达96页的文件，标题为“美国出口执法、经济间谍、商业秘密和与禁运有关的重要刑事案件概要”（Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and Embargo-Related Criminal Cases）。该文列出了案发时间从2008年1月至2015年1月的248件违反美国出口管制法规的案件，其中有78个案子与伊朗有关。这些案件分别由国土安全局、联邦调查局、商业部工业和安全局BIS以及五角大楼国防刑事调查局DCIS等执法机构侦办。
2018年年1月，美国司法部再次公布了同类案件的最新文件，列举了自2015年以来的96件违法出口案，涉及伊朗的案件有27个，其中就包括2017年裁决的、与中伊都有关联的中兴案。
出口管制案件的涉案主体是外国公民和企业，包括持有绿卡的侨民，但是也有不少美国公民，甚至包括曾经在美军服役的军人。涉案最多的国家就是伊朗，包括战机部件和材料、与核武研发有关的离心泵器材、导航和信息技术等。
2013年1月，得克萨斯州西区法院判处乔尔·斯通（Joel Stone）入狱24个月。斯通的罪名是把军级激光瞄准具非法出口到美国的紧邻友邦加拿大。
2014年7月，兰迪·鲍勃（Randy Barber）和共犯约翰·塔利（John Talley）在佛罗里达州中区法院受审，罪名是违反《国际紧急经济权力法》IEEPA和《伊朗交易法规》（Iranian Transaction Regulations），向伊朗出口和转出口先进计算机设备并提供信息技术支持。上述两项法规都是因为伊朗违反国际核不扩散条约而制定的。鲍勃和塔利分别被判处60个月和30个月的刑期和40多万美元罚款。
2014年7月，美国指控法国巴黎银行（BNP）为苏丹等黑名单国家转移资金，被罚89亿美元。
2015年3月，纽约州指控德国商业银行帮助伊朗和苏丹等国转移资金等问题，被罚17亿美元。
小结
1、华为依然是合规问题。本次被诉的，是逃避出口管制引发的“金融欺诈”罪名。孟女士面临刑事指控，问题比中兴的更严重。
2、本案走的是司法程序，这是美国政治的另一极权力。想川普去年在推特上拉黑骂他的平民，竟被法庭判处违法，可见川普并不能给司法系统作批示。
3、纽约东区检方实力很强，历史上起诉定罪的成功率极高。
面对美国的强势，怎么办？
有二个思路。
Ａ、如果你坚信现在的美国，是从林霸权。那就按照斗争思维来，在能打败强者之前，应当保持低调，一心一意谋发展，也就是国人熟悉的“深挖洞、广积粮、缓称王”。
Ｂ、如果你判断现在的美国，是文明霸权。那就按照协商规则来，向文明靠拢，和美国搞好关系。
也就是说，不管怎么样的思维方式，最佳博弈都应该尽量避免和美国冲突。
期望华为和任总早日走出困境。
不忘初心，砥砺前行。
华为也太大意了，这种事被其他公司变成学习资料，恐怕都已经是行业内的公开秘密了。美国不抓你，也咽不下这囗气呀
我就不明白一件事，中国这些大公司前赴后继的违规出口给伊朗，是暴利驱使还是为了政治利益？
☆ 发自 iPhone 华人一网 1.14.01
聪明人，问道点子上了
个人觉得后者 肯定是背后有人
难道三星手机和Ericsson器材都不含美国元件？
企业做这么大，肯定少不了政府的帮忙，政策倾斜，税收优惠，各种部门少找麻烦之类的。
政府需要你帮国家干点事，你敢说不吗？
电影电视里都是这个套路啊
+1
华为卖给伊朗的是HP的设备
麻烦多读书再发言 最讨厌你这种自己一知半解，还要出来质疑的
歪个楼，其实希拉里通伊朗们比trump的通俄们要实锤得多。 美国的政治腐败政治迫害和天朝有一拼。
我觉得政治利益是主要的，当然抢占市场这也是一个绝好的机会了。也不能什么都按老美的规矩来，不然他会把你的顺从当成理所当然。
这类似你follow traffic被警察抓了，你抗议说为嘛前面那个人也超速了你不抓他？只要你也超速了他就可以抓你。这些个事情，就是这样，美国一直知道，睁只眼闭只眼，就看他想不想整你。华为中兴卖给伊朗都好些年了，之前都没有咋地。现在想整你了就拿来说事，但你确实也卖了，也欺诈了对吧。你说他是霸权？是。不过这世界上有完全公平的事末？人家的霸权地位也是努力挣来的。你若挣得了那霸权地位了也会一样。
政治斗争尔虞我诈，这个事件中没一个好人，全是从自己利益出发。
说这没用，还是比谁游戏规则玩的好，中国这方面落后西方人几百年，不是懂个技术就行的
谁强谁定游戏规则。美国说了算，根本不带中国玩。
这种思维方式就是中国玩不了游戏规则的主要原因，从根本上就没尊重过规则，更不会费心去研究
写手们才用小号
这么说嗨挺同情华为的。当然他的发展肯定有政府的扶持。
在中国做实业不容易，不像比倒卖土地房地产的那么轻易就发横财。国人又崇洋。
华为是少数的能作大做好的国内的牌子，我个人希望他能持续发展。
但是在这件事上，应该是没被冤枉。
非常同意啊，我们公司跟华为法务交手多年，虽然他们全世界到处打官司，但感觉风格还是很中国，不信任专业人士或是不愿意在事前多花钱多花时间把事情做干净点，宁可后头花大价钱来擦
华为起步表明了是国安系统的。不被盯上才怪呢。
美国早都知道华为偷盗技术了，但是以前中共还弱没有必要较真，现在这个处境，中共经济兰金黄已经深入到美国心脏花街，间谍量子新技术已经超越美国，华为给美国敌人输送技术帮助美国敌人建立核武器，新鸦片战争芬太尼让美国中下层民不聊生，还天天忽悠口号美帝国主义亡我之心不死挑起民愤，美国再不反击要亡国了。
写的挺好。可以再写写美国的司法体系，根据现有的证据来分析一下后续的可能走势。
美国的立法(国会)、行政(政府)、司法(法院)三权独立，理论上法院不归政府管，但向法院提出指控的检查官在行政体系下，所以检查官的指控有可能受行政体系影响。因此还有个特别角色叫独立检察官，针对行政部门进行检控。总统川普目前就是被独立检察官穆勒调查中....
美国检察官都是律师出身，他们在法庭上的对手也是律师(检察官要争取给被告定罪，被告律师要争取帮被告脱罪)，检察官和律师互怼的武器是什么？证据。为什么证据这么重要呢？因为最后是由陪审团定罪，陪审团12人临时组团，必须意见一致才能定罪，因此证据基本上要是铁证才可能让12个人意见一致。
定罪时法官会不断的提醒陪审团，他们的决定必须基于事实独立判断，而不能基于推理、猜测、印象。在无法确认时，那只能选择无罪。所以美国法律体系基本上是比较容易让人脱罪的。统计数据美国联邦检察官的定罪率在80%左右，这个数据并不高。相比而言，中国是99.9%，日本是99%。
从目前检察官披露的证据来看，指控孟晚舟欺诈银行的证据还没有达到铁证的程度。刑事欺诈对证据的要求是"proved beyond reasonable doubt"，就这个指控来看，检查官的证据需要证明 a）华为违规 b）孟晚舟知道华为违规 c）孟晚舟知道某信息与事实不符 d）孟晚舟将该信息传递给银行 d）银行因该信息导致违规。目前检察官展示的证据是一份ppt，以及银行的人证和一些报道，ppt和银行人证可证明孟晚舟将特定信息传递给银行。而路透社等媒体的报道和猜测，都只算是resonable doubt，缺乏事实依据。
检察官是否还有更多的实锤证据？我个人觉得不太可能。华为在欧美有专业律师，这么多年的贸易合规工作，相信在书面证据上是非常严谨的。否则也不会让美国商务部调查了这么多年无功而返。
所以在美国的司法体系下，加上大律师的加持，孟晚舟应该能平安回到祖国怀抱，继续为中华民族的伟大复兴而奋斗：）
当所谓程序正义，法律的实施是有选择性的时候，就是政治工具。是霸权的体现。
Prosecuting the Chinese Huawei executive is an idiotic way to hold China in check
By Zachary Karabell
Zachary Karabell is the author of several books, including “The Leading Indicators: A Short History of the Numbers That Rule Our World.”
December 8
The U.S.-China relationship seemed to improve last week at the G-20 summit in Argentina, where President Trump announced he had reached an important agreement with President Xi Jinping. Then, an ominous development: American authorities asked Canada to arrest the chief financial officer of one of China’s largest technologies companies for alleged sanctions fraud and violations of U.S. export controls. Meng Wanzhou isn’t just a top leader at Huawei, which makes phones and other gadgets; she is also the daughter of the company’s founder and chairman, which makes her arrest somewhat like the Chinese arresting the daughter of Steve Jobs if she had helped run Apple. It would be an understatement to say that Beijing did not react well: It demanded her release and accused the U.S. government of violating the rights of a Chinese citizen.
The timing could hardly be worse, and from what can be told, it reflects the overall chaos of the Trump administration. National security adviser John Bolton claimed he was informed of the pending arrest by the Justice Department but did not pass that information to the president. That no one in the White House considered the implications of her arrest on the tenuous trade truce between China and the United States is itself rather astonishing.
The case against Huawei and its executives may be legitimate under U.S. law, but it is nonetheless a hideous political mistake. Perhaps Huawei used American-made components in equipment it sold to Iran, violating U.S. sanctions. But even in less ambiguous cases, there is always such a thing as prosecutorial discretion. Not every case that can be brought should be brought, and not every case should be prosecuted to the full letter of the law. In international cases, that is doubly true. If the United States wants to respond to China’s rise and manage the changing role of the United States in the international system, it could hardly have picked a dumber tactic.
Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou, left, appears at a bail hearing in Vancouver, B.C. (Jane Wolsak/Reuters) (Stringer/Reuters)
Huawei is not exactly a noble avatar of social responsibility. Since at least 2016, when President Barack Obama was in office, the Commerce Department has been investigating Huawei for export violations to Iran and North Korea. In the spring of 2017, the Treasury Department opened its own inquiry.
Even before that, though, Huawei operated on the margins of legality. In 2003, Cisco sued it for copying some of the code used in its routers. (Huawei admitted as much before the trial and promised to stop.) In 2012, a House committee named the company as a potential threat to U.S. national security because of its ties to the Chinese government, its legacy of intellectual property theft and its ability to embed spyware in its phones. The United States, Australia and New Zealand have already blocked Huawei from being part of the initial build-out of the next generation 5G telecom networks.
Even if everything alleged is correct, however, the quest against Huawei is a ridiculous overreach — predicated on an assumption that the United States can dictate how foreign competitors conduct business. Yes, the company has deep ties with the Chinese Communist Party, though it’s worth mulling whether those are any more pernicious than the close bonds that connect defense contractors such as Boeing and Lockheed with the Pentagon.
More important, global supply chains are now deeply interconnected and touch multiple countries and numerous companies. Samsung, for instance, is the second largest cellphone provider in Iran, behind Huawei, while the Swedish telecom company Ericsson has been selling equipment to Iran even under the sanctions. Those companies may have done a better job not using American components for products sold to those countries, though with the complexity of global component sourcing, it is unlikely that no American intellectual property has been used by Iranian consumers. Yet U.S. prosecutors are not trying to curtail the work of those mega-technology giants, or aggressively investigating where every component originated.
Samsung and Ericsson, of course, are domiciled in countries that are American allies, whereas Huawei is tightly connected to what is now being seen by many as a prime American adversary. The initial reaction in China, judging by the social media flow and some interviews, is that the Americans are using their legal system to advance political interests in an ongoing contest with China.
There is a long and debated legacy on how far American laws extend. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has recognized a “presumption against extraterritoriality,” which holds that U.S. laws should not be enforced outside the United States. On the other, there are statutes such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which punishes bribery by foreign entities. Sanctions occupy a zone of their own, whereby the U.S. government has acted against other countries by threatening foreign companies that do business with them, if they also do business in the U.S. To the degree that the United States has enjoyed dominant economic power relative to any one country that might object, it has been able to use law enforcement as one tool among many to achieve policy objectives.
That works, however, primarily where there are stark power imbalances, which is clearly not the case with China. Arresting the No. 2 executive of one of the world’s largest technology companies is an ineffective way to achieve policy aims — and a very effective way to complicate negotiations that matter rather more. It’s one thing to ban Huawei’s 5G components from the U.S. market, a defensible response to a perceived threat. That’s an unassailable invocation of American sovereignty (which would still carry a steep economic and political cost).
It’s something else entirely to arrest a very senior executive and potentially try her for evading U.S. export controls. Using law enforcement against individuals for corporate actions of this sort risks backfiring spectacularly. It is easily painted as a crude attempt by the Trump administration to put pressure on Beijing in the coming trade negotiations, even if that is not the actual intent. It exposes American executives to potential retaliation in China and abroad in a tit-for-tat that will chill an already frosty business climate, with direct effects on the domestic American economy and markets. And it may succeed only in pushing technology even further into national camps that compete and develop their own protocols, which appears to be happening with the evolution of artificial intelligence. We can hope to win that competition, but it will prove costlier than the mutual dependence that defined much of the past two decades.
这玩意儿也就是简单的账号关联。华为以为换ip换地址注册了新马甲就可以玩，结果没想到顾了头不小心屁股露出来了
核武器又跟华为没关系，中国人民的老朋友巴铁干的
这是开车超速，随机抓啊？
那为什么中国买俄国武器也被美国制裁， 印度买俄国武器不被制裁呢？ 也是随机的？
说得好
因为美元霸权啊。国际贸易大部分是美元结算。经过这些国际银行难免会在美国有业务。他们就会被美国要求执行美国对伊朗制裁命令，不能参与对伊贸易。
美国也是通过这个来claim jurisdiction. 其实就是强迫所有国家事实上同意与否，参与对伊制裁。
"@innesfry 随便举个例子：成立三年上市、市值两百多亿美元的拼多多无疑是个奇迹，一般人的视角要不是质次价低野蛮生长，要么就是中国速度互联网精神，但我们可以来看看拼多多后面隐藏着什么东西（小米、美团、爱奇艺和更早的BAT同理）。
拼多多的创始人黄峥，毕业于U of Wisconsin-Madison，毕业后加入美国谷歌。其贵人是长居美国的段永平。成立以来的投资者，从IDG、高榕、光速到红杉、腾讯全部是美元基金，所有的投资协议、股东协议、期权协议都是用英文写的，其VIE架构下的BVI公司、开曼公司、香港公司全部是英美法系。上市承销商是瑞信、高盛和中金（摩根斯坦利一手养出来的中国投行头牌），财务报表按照美国会计准则编制，上市地是纳斯达克，招股书按照美国1933年证券法编制，上市后的机构投资者从Capital Group、Fidelity到Ballie Gifford、Oppenheimer，无一不是在英美法系下运作的老牌基金，这些基金和前面提到的美元VC，后面的出资人又是在英美法系下募集和运作的各种母基金、养老基金、大学捐赠基金... 没有这一整套的英美秩序输入，你以为会有中国的互联网奇迹？Naive"
" 再说明白点吧：没有英美法系下建立起的从风险投资、股权激励到资本市场这一整套制度，就没有中国的互联网产业。BAT创业的年代，会有煤老板或者国企给他们投资么？没有美股市场他们能在国内上市？即使是少数非美国投资人，也大多是英美秩序的产物，例如伯克利毕业的孙正义、腾讯大股东南非的Naspers"
“@学经济家
这条讲没有英美秩序输入，就不会有中国的互联网奇迹，搞不懂为什么很多人喷。（见@innesfry 楼）
秩序相当于编码规则，个体类似于于染色体里的脱氧核糖核酸分子，决定编出一条鱼还是一只熊，主要看代码。
如果没有英美发明改进输入的这套秩序，本土秩序会怎么做？
1）首先是团队搭建，马云先找到两三位兄弟，模仿桃园三结义，分工协作；
2）小有所成之后，投奔之人日多，于是开设聚义堂，分设各路香主坛主，大碗喝酒，大块称金；而马云则忙于周游县官督抚之间，也精明的购置了许多田产庄园，雇了些管家打理收租，也许取了几房妾，也许有年轻好动的不从女德，被打一顿退回去了；
3）周边父母把孩子送来当学徒，前三年不领薪，给老程序员端茶、捏肩、打扇、拿首乌粉按摩头顶，师父骂的对，师父打的好，师父请教我编程；
额，其实我也不知道本土秩序怎么搭建起一所大厦的，想想西风东渐之前，16XX年或15XX年或者更早时的商人企业家，那大概能留下一两座沁园吧？
我觉得不服英美秩序输入的那些人，大概是忘本了，要是大概知道本土秩序是啥样子的，就没这么急眼了。
哎，忘本了，忘本了，不懂的祖宗的成法，怎么可能恰当的评价外来秩序呢。”
多谢科普！
至少有暴利，其他不敢下结论
very funny
看看
英美秩序？英国现在P也不是，就是美国秩序。 国力不行就只能服从别人的秩序。国力强的想怎么改秩序就怎么改。
多读书再发言的应该是你吧，现代的通信设备里用的芯片部件是不可能没有国际化生产的部件的，因为现时没有一个国家能生产通信设备需要的所有芯片，包括中国和美国，就别提欧洲的爱立信之类的。
所以说到底就是想整华为了。
有传闻半年前美伊有过会谈，伊朗方面把华为卖了，给了很多一手资料，不知真假或许正式开庭就知道了
被美国下了逮捕令的人，到了和美国有引渡协议的国家，就可能被当地警方逮捕然后引渡美国，就这么简单。美国每年都有数百起引渡案件，哪里不寻常了？当年snowden在香港也被美国要求引渡，被香港以美方文件不足加以拒绝。
任何国家的警方，在另外的国家都是没有执法权的，抓捕嫌犯必须要当地警方出手。属于没有真正的跨国逮捕这一说，只有跨国绑架。土工在香港好几次抓了商人，法理上就属于绑架。
普通引渡案件需要上报国家最高领导人？而且一般引渡大部分是刑事案好不好。
大叔，这不叫上报，就是打个招呼。不用他批准的。这个跟它是刑事还是民事也没关系。法官发了逮捕令，就拿去执行。你没看老船长那么大嘴巴，对这件事，基本屁都不放一个？他手不够长，管不着。
老中还没回过味来？还游戏规则呢？给了你十几年的时间玩，还不够？现在是要把你踢出去，再望死里整，还谈游戏规则？真是幼稚。
不要谈人家打压你。跟老美混的，都是吃香喝辣，看看日，韩，新，这些以前的小穷国，就是例子。给了你机会你乱来，别怪人家翻脸。
中国称王，凭什么？你看下你现在身边的东西，有那一样不是老美的发明，有那一样是中国的发明？这么跟你讲，中国称王，这辈子没可能。你就完全不是个现代国家。
就是。那些说国家之间就是抄来抄去的人，你給我说一件中国贡献出来让别人抄的现代科技？？？别人抄别人的也給别人抄，就泥马中国只进不出！还称王？！我看，尽管让中国发展2025去，等它发展到最前头去了，看它抄谁的去？还怎么发展去！没别人在前面，tm到时候走路都不会走了！
有天网，长城防火墙，绿坝......
连程序正义都达不到的地方，来说霸权，我也是呵呵了。
拳头大的时候用拳头，拳头不如的时候就开始讲道理了。
前面有人说中国检察官定罪率是99.9%，我是相信的。
美国芯片大厂美光在华被判专利侵权禁售。美光资深副总裁兼总法律顾问Joel Poppen就此做出回应，他对福州中院做出的这一裁决感到失望，且坚信福建晋华与联华电子的专利是无效的，美光的产品也并没侵犯晋华与联华电子的专利；另外，福州中院在尚没有给予美光辩护机会之前，就正式宣布这项临时禁令，该判决结果有违相关的法律程序。而在2017年9月，台湾地方机构就调查出，在台湾的美光，有何姓、王姓员工跳槽到联华电子，并涉嫌将美光的DRAM技术泄漏给了联华电子，帮助联华电子开发32nm DRAM存储芯片技术，而且查出了联华电子与福建晋华之间达成的合作关系。
严格来说，这是两回事。
推特事件，不是政府起诉川总，而司法是独立的，川总无法干涉法院判决，从程序上说，他真的无法“批示”。
这次的案件，起诉方是政府，检察官的任命权（以及罢免权）是行政部门的权力，所以从程序上来说，行政部门当然可以影响本案的进程（比如，不起诉，或者不要求引渡，这些都是行政部门的权力）。当然，政治上这么做好不好，以及联邦与州权/地方权力的分立，那是另外一个问题。
就像印度，我就模仿你的药品，但是，我们的人民可以看得起病，吃得起药的同时，我自己也肥。
中国那帮，偷了人家的东西，还要用偷来的技术拼命压榨底层百姓，看看无名小卒的技术人员和流水线上的工人
好像某某强奸犯，有的钱就为富不仁
她老公Lv皮带金链子，皮肤不错啊
华为是直接转卖HP，跟用美国零部件不是一个性质。
显然是政府行为。这些是民营企业，牟利是第一位的。他们自己也不想和伊朗朝鲜这些国家做生意吧，风险声誉先不说，从这些个国家怎么可能赚到钱。但是在中国，华为这类企业要做大，没有政府各种扶持或者政策上的优惠是不可能的，所以当然政府让干什么，也得老老实实干。
中国的根本方针还应该是和美国亲善，继续发展，不要做梦挑战美国，学渣比学霸差远了，一下就现原形
文里说了 “嫌疑人不在美国，美国就通过有引渡条约的国家请求帮忙拘捕。加拿大同意抓人，所以孟女士在温哥华被拘。假如中美之间有引渡条约，那美国就会请中方帮忙抓人，当然基于互惠原则，美方也有义务帮中国抓捕那些跑到美国的贪官。可惜中美之间还没有引渡条约。”
两虎相争，必有一伤，除非中国以后甘愿做美国的工厂，不发展高科技，只发展代工行业。
否则，无论你再怎么低调，只要敢发展，就是一棍子
☆ 发自 iPhone 华人一网 1.14.02
求科普
修墙领先
艾玛，得亏你厉害国不行（嗯？），如果哪天你们行了全世界都要服从你们的秩序，，不敢想象！
自干五童鞋 历史了解一下，现代金融货币医疗科技哪行哪业也没缺过英国的身影。这世界不是只讲GDP的
巴勒斯坦事全球都反对美国和以色列，也没见其改变作法。