Lz更新一下帖子内容吧，08年选举是11月4号，信件是10月29号 October 29, 2008 TO: Senator Obama FROM: Transition Board SUBJECT: Transition Engagement with the Outgoing Administration on Financial and Housing Issues
SUBJECT:Transition Engagement with the Outgoing Administration on Financial and Housing Issues Immediately after the election Secretary Paulson and other members of the Administration will likely seek to involve you and your transition team in their ongoing policy responses to the financial and housing crises. We also expect relentless interest from the press and public about your intended level of engagement with the Administration on these matters during the transition. There is inevitably some tension among the desirable aims of providing confidence to the markets, demonstrating involvement in the most critical immediate challenge facing the American people, assuring the best-advised policy choices during the transition, avoiding ownership of the Bush Administration’s policies (and the resulting economic conditions –e.g., unemployment rates), and facilitating a confidence-inspiring clean break with past policies. We present below three options for the basic stance you could adopt following the election. On balance, we recommend an initial course of action that indicates your intention to be deeply engaged with the problems while preserving, both publicly and privately, a clear distinction between the incumbent Administration and your own. Background As you have observed in your interactions with Secretary Paulson, he is apparently eager to involve you and your transition team extensively in his policy choices following the election. His inclination doubtless arises in part from a desire to share responsibility for the important decisions he will be making. But we believe he also respects you and your economic advisors, and that he sincerely wants to facilitate a smooth transition in these very challenging circumstances. Paulson and his subordinates do not believe they can responsibly defer until after January 20 significant decisions concerning both the use of TARP funds and other potential stabilizing measures. Notwithstanding Secretary Paulson’s sincerity, given Treasury’s relative performance to date in predicting problems or designing processes that address them successfully, it is not obvious that engagement by you or your team can overcome their limitations. Moreover, given market perceptions that government policy responses have generally been too slow and too tentative, a restoration of market confidence may best be achieved by emphasizing the fresh approach your Administration will take, rather than a sense of continuity with the current Administration. Finally, it is important to prevent any confusion about the lines of authority especially in a rapidly evolving environment. Three sets of personnel issues are of importance going forward. First is the question of how we will structure interactions with Treasury and, as needed, other parts of the current Administration. We contemplate that the primary interlocutors will be the NEC director-designate (or, if an NEC Director is not in place immediately after the election, an economic director for the transition), a transition team member who will be the regular contact with Treasury on the TARP and other operational issues, and a Treasury Secretary-designate. The Treasury Secretary-designate may be somewhat constrained in interacting with officials outside the transition team by the tradition of limiting such contacts prior to Senate confirmation, though there may be a more flexible attitude in the present exigent circumstances. Second, there have been specific suggestions with respect to key personnel decisions during the transition. For example, Secretary Paulson has indicated he would like to have you choose among a list of candidates he will develop for the new position of an Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, who will manage the TARP and related programs. He envisages this individual being confirmed by the Senate in a lame duck session. Along similar lines, Senator Dodd has suggested that President Bush nominate, and the Senate confirm, a Treasury Secretary of your choosing. As indicated in our recommended course of action, we think such steps would be at best premature in the immediate aftermath of the election. Third, we will need early decisions on numerous government positions, some of which would normally be filled well after Inauguration Day. These obviously include several sub-cabinet positions in Treasury and one or more members of the Council of Economic Advisors, as well as three governors of the Federal Reserve Board. In addition, we will need relatively early decisions on whether we will want certain incumbent regulators (FDIC chair, Comptroller of the Currency, Director of Office of Thrift Supervision) to remain in their jobs after January 20. Goals We believe that your posture should seek to achieve the following objectives: • Leave yourself freedom of movement given the speed with which the economic situation is evolving. • Maintain a distinction between engagement with the Bush Administration (at whatever level you choose) and identification with its policies • Without raising unrealistic expectations and while framing current and prospective conditions, provide badly needed confidence to the markets and the public by making clear that you will be setting a new course with strong economic leadership. • Provide you and your team with full access to information in order to ensure the smoothest possible transition upon your team assuming office. • Provide the opportunity for your team to weigh in on actions that would undermine the recovery or restrict your freedom of action upon becoming President. • Demonstrate urgency and awareness. • Avoid taking responsibility without authority for any administration policies. Options We believe that you should be prepared to make a statement soon after the election that will set the general posture for your engagement, but leave yourself the flexibility to adapt that posture if required. On the scale of disengagement to full engagement, the statement we propose tries to steer a middle course, though it can of course be modified to communicate a somewhat greater or lesser intended degree of initial involvement. Given the rapid pace of financial market and economic developments, it is very difficult now to predict the circumstances we will face during the transition period. A relatively cautious posture at the outset will give you the necessary flexibility to adjust to these developments in the weeks ahead. You would certainly be able to increase the involvement of your team in Treasury affairs if circumstances during the transition warrant. It would be more difficult to extricate transition personnel from activities in which they had been involved, at least without awkwardness and – potentially – public perception of conflict between the incumbent and elected administrations. Put differently, even if you are inclined towards a more active role, we would suggest not making that explicit until you have had a chance to gain access to better information and the benefit of the advice of your economic team appointees in the period following the election. While we have frequently been skeptical of the steps taken by the Administration over the last year and a half, we should not underestimate the time and analysis that will be required to formulate a comprehensive set of alternatives. Among other things, we do not yet have access to the confidential financial information of troubled firms. While the statement clearly matters and will be closely parsed, of perhaps even greater importance is a series of decisions concerning your engagement level. We have therefore started with the framing statement and followed it with three options for the initial mode of engagement your transition will adopt. Each option bundles specific forms of interaction with the current administration and other relevant actors, such as foreign governments. The second option presented is the modulated approach we suggest, preceded by an option for a largely hands-off approach and followed by one for substantial integration with Bush Administration activities. Proposed Statement
“Beginning in the first hour after I become President, I will confront this economic crisis head-on. I will take all steps necessary to return credit markets to more normal operation and to get the American economy moving again, so that it will restore growth for ordinary, hard-working Americans. We will of course honor all the public commitments made by the U.S Government in addressing the crisis in financial markets.
“But until January 20 the United States can have only one government, and that government is the current Administration. I deeply appreciate President Bush’s declared willingness in our conversation today to do everything possible to ensure that his economic policy team keeps us fully informed as economic developments unfold. During this transition period, it is essential to have a decisive and resolute response.”
“For the next two and half months we will be consulting with Members of Congress, business and labor leaders, the financial community, state and local government officials, the Federal Reserve, Secretary Paulson, and other members of the Administration. It is crucial that we all work together to meet the great economic challenges facing the American people.” The following options are listed in increasingly levels of engagement. We are supportive of the Option 2: Option 1: Hands-Off Approach. If you chose to have a more hands-off approach, this option would entail actions such as the following: − Receipt by transition team of briefings by current Administration officials, but no suggestions, endorsements, etc. − No involvement by you in G-20 summit − Limited, discrete consultations with foreign governments. − Almost complete concentration on preparing for the first days of your Administration Option 2: Modulated Approach. In operational terms, this option would entail actions such as the following: − Behind-the-scenes discussions by your transition team with government officials, but no public appearances with them − No statements approving or, commenting upon, Treasury steps to implement TARP or other rescue programs (tactical decisions) − Endorsement by you of any genuinely major new actions, such as the bailout of a non-financial firm (strategic decisions) − Indication to Treasury that you would prefer to appoint your own Assistant Secretary to run TARP − No effort to have your selection for Treasury Secretary nominated by President Bush and confirmed during a lame duck Congressional session − Discreet, and generally non-committal, consultations with foreign governments − High degree of focus on preparing for the first few days after your Inauguration. − Circumscribed or no involvement by you in Nov. 15 G-20 meeting Option 3: Substantial integration with Treasury. If you chose to have a more substantial and visible involvement, this option would entail actions such as the following: − Publicly named members of transition team working and consulting actively with Treasury − Coordination of statements with Secretary Paulson to convey continuity in policy being developed during transition − Presence of transition team members in key discussions on significant matters such as rescue package for a troubled institution − Selection of individual to be confirmed as Assistant Secretary during lame duck and begin working at Treasury − Active policy dialogue by transition and named members of incoming Administration with Federal Reserve officials − Statements by you endorsing significant, as well as major, Treasury decisions – i.e., more such statements − Active consultation with foreign governments by transition team − Active and visible presence for you at the Nov. 15 G-20 meeting − Possible legislative package in lame duck (e.g., statutory resolution regime for financial holding companies, authority for Fed to guarantee debt)
A presidential transition or presidential interregnum refers to the period of time between the end of a presidential election and the inauguration of a new President of a country. During this time the incoming President usually designates new government personnel, including selecting new Cabinet positions and government department or agency heads.
Transition period 是这样定义的： A presidential transition or presidential interregnum refers to the period of timebetween the end of a presidential election and the inaugurationof a new President of a country. During this time the incoming President usually designates new government personnel, including selecting new Cabinet positions and government department or agency heads.
http://forums.huaren.us/showtopic.aspx?topicid=2080037
如果这个情况属实， 那我相信，911是布什政府导演的。我记得刚来美国的时候在YouTube上看到过很多科学家用很多实验，信息分析认为世贸大楼不是被飞机炸倒的，二是定向爆破造成的。
谢啦
对。。。。
☆ 发自 iPhone 华人一网 1.11.08
11/4, 经济危机中，当年民主党谁上谁躺赢。也不算作弊了
彼时美国在布什八年之后 急切寻求新面孔 奥巴马的change口号 极其蛊惑人心
加上他确实形象鲜明又新鲜 比起希拉里是更好人选
而且美国人有legend情节 一个黑人总统 恰好符合此意 所以民主党必定与希拉里谈好交易 让奥巴马顺利上台 四年后再次说服希拉里做做样子让奥巴马顺利过渡 但今年要让希拉里得到补偿
所以奥巴马上台 是得了民主党一力保驾护航的 有无舞弊 就要看以后被揭露的证据了
今年又想搞个女总统的传奇来迎合美国人的legend情结
现在就看美国人民行不行了 实在不行 舞弊也是个备用方案
囧
早上10点30分吗，那说明美式民主是个joke已经很久了
October 29, 2008
TO: Senator Obama
FROM: Transition Board
SUBJECT: Transition Engagement with the Outgoing Administration on Financial and Housing Issues
http://vocaroo.com/i/s1xzw9DeNsof
☆ 发自 iPhone 华人一网 1.11.08
☆ 发自 iPhone 华人一网 1.11.08
2008, 布什已经把经济弄的不能更糟了，当年o8是躺赢，结局大家提前都知道，都明白。
美国跟中国古代的皇帝继位有啥区别 改一改遗诏就好 何必去讨好皇上 同理 直接选票作弊 何必去讨好选民～
October 29, 2008
TO:Senator Obama
FROM:Transition Board
SUBJECT:Transition Engagement with the Outgoing Administration on Financial and Housing Issues
Immediately after the election Secretary Paulson and other members of the Administration will likely seek to involve you and your transition team in their ongoing policy responses to the financial and housing crises. We also expect relentless interest from the press and public about your intended level of engagement with the Administration on these matters during the transition.
There is inevitably some tension among the desirable aims of providing confidence to the markets, demonstrating involvement in the most critical immediate challenge facing the American people, assuring the best-advised policy choices during the transition, avoiding ownership of the Bush Administration’s policies (and the resulting economic conditions –e.g., unemployment rates), and facilitating a confidence-inspiring clean break with past policies. We present below three options for the basic stance you could adopt following the election. On balance, we recommend an initial course of action that indicates your intention to be deeply engaged with the problems while preserving, both publicly and privately, a clear distinction between the incumbent Administration and your own.
Background
As you have observed in your interactions with Secretary Paulson, he is apparently eager to involve you and your transition team extensively in his policy choices following the election. His inclination doubtless arises in part from a desire to share responsibility for the important decisions he will be making. But we believe he also respects you and your economic advisors, and that he sincerely wants to facilitate a smooth transition in these very challenging circumstances. Paulson and his subordinates do not believe they can responsibly defer until after January 20 significant decisions concerning both the use of TARP funds and other potential stabilizing measures.
Notwithstanding Secretary Paulson’s sincerity, given Treasury’s relative performance to date in predicting problems or designing processes that address them successfully, it is not obvious that engagement by you or your team can overcome their limitations. Moreover, given market perceptions that government policy responses have generally been too slow and too tentative, a restoration of market confidence may best be achieved by emphasizing the fresh approach your Administration will take, rather than a sense of continuity with the current Administration. Finally, it is important to prevent any confusion about the lines of authority especially in a rapidly evolving environment.
Three sets of personnel issues are of importance going forward. First is the question of how we will structure interactions with Treasury and, as needed, other parts of the current Administration. We contemplate that the primary interlocutors will be the NEC director-designate (or, if an NEC Director is not in place immediately after the election, an economic director for the transition), a transition team member who will be the regular contact with Treasury on the TARP and other operational issues, and a Treasury Secretary-designate. The Treasury Secretary-designate may be somewhat constrained in interacting with officials outside the transition team by the tradition of limiting such contacts prior to Senate confirmation, though there may be a more flexible attitude in the present exigent circumstances.
Second, there have been specific suggestions with respect to key personnel decisions during the transition. For example, Secretary Paulson has indicated he would like to have you choose among a list of candidates he will develop for the new position of an Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability, who will manage the TARP and related programs. He envisages this individual being confirmed by the Senate in a lame duck session. Along similar lines, Senator Dodd has suggested that President Bush nominate, and the Senate confirm, a Treasury Secretary of your choosing. As indicated in our recommended course of action, we think such steps would be at best premature in the immediate aftermath of the election.
Third, we will need early decisions on numerous government positions, some of which would normally be filled well after Inauguration Day. These obviously include several sub-cabinet positions in Treasury and one or more members of the Council of Economic Advisors, as well as three governors of the Federal Reserve Board. In addition, we will need relatively early decisions on whether we will want certain incumbent regulators (FDIC chair, Comptroller of the Currency, Director of Office of Thrift Supervision) to remain in their jobs after January 20.
Goals
We believe that your posture should seek to achieve the following objectives:
• Leave yourself freedom of movement given the speed with which the economic situation is evolving.
• Maintain a distinction between engagement with the Bush Administration (at whatever level you choose) and identification with its policies
• Without raising unrealistic expectations and while framing current and prospective conditions, provide badly needed confidence to the markets and the public by making clear that you will be setting a new course with strong economic leadership.
• Provide you and your team with full access to information in order to ensure the smoothest possible transition upon your team assuming office.
• Provide the opportunity for your team to weigh in on actions that would undermine the recovery or restrict your freedom of action upon becoming President.
• Demonstrate urgency and awareness.
• Avoid taking responsibility without authority for any administration policies.
Options
We believe that you should be prepared to make a statement soon after the election that will set the general posture for your engagement, but leave yourself the flexibility to adapt that posture if required. On the scale of disengagement to full engagement, the statement we propose tries to steer a middle course, though it can of course be modified to communicate a somewhat greater or lesser intended degree of initial involvement.
Given the rapid pace of financial market and economic developments, it is very difficult now to predict the circumstances we will face during the transition period. A relatively cautious posture at the outset will give you the necessary flexibility to adjust to these developments in the weeks ahead. You would certainly be able to increase the involvement of your team in Treasury affairs if circumstances during the transition warrant. It would be more difficult to extricate transition personnel from activities in which they had been involved, at least without awkwardness and – potentially – public perception of conflict between the incumbent and elected administrations.
Put differently, even if you are inclined towards a more active role, we would suggest not making that explicit until you have had a chance to gain access to better information and the benefit of the advice of your economic team appointees in the period following the election. While we have frequently been skeptical of the steps taken by the Administration over the last year and a half, we should not underestimate the time and analysis that will be required to formulate a comprehensive set of alternatives. Among other things, we do not yet have access to the confidential financial information of troubled firms.
While the statement clearly matters and will be closely parsed, of perhaps even greater importance is a series of decisions concerning your engagement level. We have therefore started with the framing statement and followed it with three options for the initial mode of engagement your transition will adopt. Each option bundles specific forms of interaction with the current administration and other relevant actors, such as foreign governments. The second option presented is the modulated approach we suggest, preceded by an option for a largely hands-off approach and followed by one for substantial integration with Bush Administration activities.
Proposed Statement
“Beginning in the first hour after I become President, I will confront this economic crisis head-on. I will take all steps necessary to return credit markets to more normal operation and to get the American economy moving again, so that it will restore growth for ordinary, hard-working Americans. We will of course honor all the public commitments made by the U.S Government in addressing the crisis in financial markets.
“But until January 20 the United States can have only one government, and that government is the current Administration. I deeply appreciate President Bush’s declared willingness in our conversation today to do everything possible to ensure that his economic policy team keeps us fully informed as economic developments unfold. During this transition period, it is essential to have a decisive and resolute response.”
“For the next two and half months we will be consulting with Members of Congress, business and labor leaders, the financial community, state and local government officials, the Federal Reserve, Secretary Paulson, and other members of the Administration. It is crucial that we all work together to meet the great economic challenges facing the American people.”
The following options are listed in increasingly levels of engagement. We are supportive of the Option 2:
Option 1: Hands-Off Approach. If you chose to have a more hands-off approach, this option would entail actions such as the following:
− Receipt by transition team of briefings by current Administration officials, but no suggestions, endorsements, etc.
− No involvement by you in G-20 summit
− Limited, discrete consultations with foreign governments.
− Almost complete concentration on preparing for the first days of your Administration
Option 2: Modulated Approach. In operational terms, this option would entail actions such as the following:
− Behind-the-scenes discussions by your transition team with government officials, but no public appearances with them
− No statements approving or, commenting upon, Treasury steps to implement TARP or other rescue programs (tactical decisions)
− Endorsement by you of any genuinely major new actions, such as the bailout of a non-financial firm (strategic decisions)
− Indication to Treasury that you would prefer to appoint your own Assistant Secretary to run TARP
− No effort to have your selection for Treasury Secretary nominated by President Bush and confirmed during a lame duck Congressional session
− Discreet, and generally non-committal, consultations with foreign governments
− High degree of focus on preparing for the first few days after your Inauguration.
− Circumscribed or no involvement by you in Nov. 15 G-20 meeting
Option 3: Substantial integration with Treasury. If you chose to have a more substantial and visible involvement, this option would entail actions such as the following:
− Publicly named members of transition team working and consulting actively with Treasury
− Coordination of statements with Secretary Paulson to convey continuity in policy being developed during transition
− Presence of transition team members in key discussions on significant matters such as rescue package for a troubled institution
− Selection of individual to be confirmed as Assistant Secretary during lame duck and begin working at Treasury
− Active policy dialogue by transition and named members of incoming Administration with Federal Reserve officials
− Statements by you endorsing significant, as well as major, Treasury decisions – i.e., more such statements
− Active consultation with foreign governments by transition team
− Active and visible presence for you at the Nov. 15 G-20 meeting
− Possible legislative package in lame duck (e.g., statutory resolution regime for financial holding companies, authority for Fed to guarantee debt)
2
显然这是屁民和权力中心的战斗，只是每次权力中心都胜出，选上了能让他们继续为非作歹的总统罢了。我们还以为这是靠民众的选票改变的。
还有关于奥8的"change"
现在看来所有的change都成真了
估计现在这帮人都恨不得川普死五无葬身之地，就是不敢下手，时间太敏感。
这个解释合理。而且父子两前后当总统是不是美国史上唯一啊？父子完了，现在开始夫妻两轮流当总统，绝了。
普金一次采访不是直接说了嘛：你们美国老标榜自己民主，可你们不也是曾经两次挑出一个选票最少的选手当总统吗？
哈哈哈
中国是共党公然专制
谁也没资格笑话谁
redsalt
2016-10-20 20:57
回复
美国以后别再骂中国独裁专制了，美国只是幕后大佬给马仔们取两个名字一个叫民主党一个叫共和党，中国的就一个名字。。大家其实都是一样的玩法.
当天结果出来很多人都去BAR欢呼的。2012年大家的情绪已经冷静很多。
所以现在也觉得不可能哪一个人就是救世主的。
☆ 发自 iPhone 华人一网 1.11.08
哎。
靠谱。
我天，美国这么做是有历史的。当年珍珠港，美国政府得到了中国的情报，装不知道，让那么多可怜无辜的美国人死于战火，就是为了促使国会通过参战。
☆ 发自 iPhone 华人一网 1.11.08
就是已经知道恐怖分子要劫机了，本来可以阻止，但是假装不知道，让他们撞了世贸，最后出兵伊拉克
是这样子的，一直是这样。老川和希婆都已经早开始了交接。天啊，这个版是怎么了，真是太让人失望了，完全不在乎事实，满版都是可笑无知的阴谋论。唉
真像你这么说 那这种邮件 希拉里也有一封一摸一样的 让西婆证明🐷党是清白
A presidential transition or presidential interregnum refers to the period of time between the end of a presidential election and the inauguration of a new President of a country. During this time the incoming President usually designates new government personnel, including selecting new Cabinet positions and government department or agency heads.
我随手狗了一篇报道，比较了今年这两位和08年的transition stage
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/trump-clinton-presidential-transition-obama-227701
这个看过《白宫风云》的应该都知道。 美国人应该也都知道吧。
这只能说明，出来混，总要还的。。。
这个阴谋论好多年了。
我对你共既无好感也无恶感，说土共走运是因为美国现在力不从心内政混乱，给了土共很好的发展机会，确实比当年日本运气好
拜托你正常点别为了你主子乱喷唾沫
就好比当年白宫实习生跟总统有染，莱温斯基算聪明的，保留证据，再加上把事情闹得人尽皆知，至少命是保下来了，不然哪天人间蒸发都不知道怎么回事