Login ArticleMediaAdditional InfoHomeWorld HistoryWars, Battles & Armed Conflicts Battle of the Chosin Reservoir Korean War Cite Share More WRITTEN BY Allan R. Millett Allan R. Millett, Ph.D., served 37 years as a history professor at The Ohio State University (1969-2005), Allan R. Millett came to the University of New Orleans in January 2006 to be the Ambrose Professor... See Article History Alternative Titles: Battle of the Chōsen Reservoir, Battle of the Changjin Reservoir
Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, Chosin also called Changjin, campaign early in the Korean War, part of the Chinese Second Offensive (November–December 1950) to drive the United Nations out of North Korea. The Chosin Reservoir campaign was directed mainly against the 1st Marine Division of the U.S. X Corps, which had disembarked in eastern North Korea and moved inland in severe winter weather to a mountainous area near the reservoir. The campaign succeeded in forcing the entire X Corps to evacuate to South Korea, but the Chinese did not achieve their particular objective of isolating and destroying the 1st Marine Division. Instead, in a deliberate retrograde movement that has become one of the most-storied exploits in Marine Corps lore, the Marines turned and fought their way down a narrow vulnerable road through several mountain passes and a bridged chasm until they reached transport ships waiting at the coast.
Men and armour of the U.S. 1st Marine Division during the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, North Korea, December 1950. Photo by Corporal Peter McDonald/U.S. Marine Corps Battle of the Chosin Reservoir QUICK FACTS DATE November 1950 - December 1950 LOCATION North Korea PARTICIPANTS ChinaUnited States CONTEXT Korean War KEY PEOPLE Chesty Puller Crossing Into North Korea
Following the successful landing of the X Corps at Inch’?n in September 1950, the United Nations Command (UNC), under the direction of U.S. Pres. Harry S. Truman’s administration and the UN General Assembly, pursued the remnants of the communist Korean People’s Army into North Korea. On the orders of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of all allied forces in the UNC, the U.S. Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel (the prewar border) on October 7 and advanced up the western side of the Korean peninsula toward P’y?ngyang, the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the same time, MacArthur redeployed the X Corps on amphibious ships around the peninsula to Korea’s east coast. The X Corps (commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond) included the 1st Marine Division (Maj. Gen. Oliver P. [“O.P.”] Smith), the 7th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. David G. Barr), and the 3rd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Robert H. Soule). The corps also had control of the Capital and 3rd divisions of the South Korean I Corps, which was already crossing the 38th parallel on the east coast highway.
What MacArthur did not know was that the Chinese had feared such an offensive since the Inch’?n landing. The Chinese began preparations to enter the war by sending supplies and support troops into North Korea. Meanwhile, Chinese combat divisions, some 21 in number but expanding to 33 by December, remained in Manchuria ready to move against the UNC ground forces. On October 18–19, Chinese leader Mao Zedong, after considerable debate, ordered the Chinese People’s Volunteers Force (CPVF), under the command of General Peng Dehuai, to move against the Eighth Army, whose lead elements had advanced beyond P’y?ngyang and were marching along two separate routes toward the border with China at the Yalu River.
The Chinese First Offensive of October 25–November 6 staggered the Eighth Army, damaging one American division and four South Korean divisions in the battle of Onj?ng-Unsan. To the east, two American divisions of the X Corps had landed on October 26 and 29, and the South Korean I Corps was heading north up the coast road toward the Sino-Soviet border. The wide separation of these units made them a tempting objective for the Chinese. On November 2–4, the South Koreans and U.S. Marines fought their first engagement against the Chinese at Sudong, inland from the port city of H?ngnam. There a Marine regiment defeated an attacking division, killing at least 662 Chinese soldiers.
Korean War: Battle of the Chosin Reservoir Men of the 7th Regiment, U.S. 1st Marine Division, wearing and carrying cold weather gear, moving toward the Chosin Reservoir, North Korea, November 1, 1950. U.S. Marine Corps/National Archives and Records Administration Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content.Subscribe Now Advancing To Chosin
Underestimating the fighting ability of the CPVF, MacArthur ordered Almond to advance inland with the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry divisions to the Chosin Reservoir. From there the two divisions would move west toward Kanggye, a mountain mining town where the Chinese and North Korean armies seemed to be concentrating—a maneuver that would place the X Corps north of and behind the CPVF armies facing the Eighth Army. MacArthur’s scheme required an 88-km (55-mile) advance over a single unpaved road through the heart of the T’aebaek Mountains in freezing weather and blinding snowstorms. Smith told Almond the plan was rash, but Almond, operating directly under MacArthur, ordered the Marines forward.
Men of the 7th Regiment, U.S. 1st Marine Division, during the advance toward the Chosin Reservoir, North Korea, early November 1950. U.S. Department of Defense
The X Corps’ first objective, the village of Hagaru-ri, rested near the southern tip of the reservoir, a narrow mountain lake that provided hydroelectric power to the mining industries of northern Korea. The lake’s proper name is the Changjin Reservoir, but, during Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910–45), its name had been changed to Chōsen, the Japanese name for Korea. Through successive translations and hurried mapmaking, the reservoir became known as Chosin and remains so to this day for American veterans of the Korean War. By any name it was a cold barren battleground where deep foxholes could be dug into the frozen earth only with the help of explosives and bulldozers.
A U.S. Marine camp at Hagaru-ri, North Korea, during the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, November–December 1950. Photo by Sgt. Frank C. Kerr/U.S. Marine Corps/National Archives and Records Administration
With its supplies moving by truck, the 1st Marine Division established battalion-sized bases at Chinh?ng-ni and Kot’o-ri, villages along the Main Supply Route (MSR), the X Corps’ name for the road to the reservoir. The division began its final march to the reservoir on November 13, with two of its reinforced regiments, the 7th and 5th Marines, in column and moving cautiously. Each regiment was a regimental combat team with attached artillery battalions, a tank company, engineers, and headquarters and service units. On November 15 lead elements of the 7th Marines reached Hagaru-ri. From there the regiment prepared for its next advance, west of the reservoir to Yudam-ni, 22 km (14 miles) away, while the 5th Marines moved cautiously up the reservoir’s right bank.
General Smith, unhappy with this risky deployment, persuaded Almond to allow the Marines to concentrate at Hagaru-ri and replace the eastern force with a unit from the 7th Infantry Division. Almond ordered General Barr to form a regimental combat team of two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and other troops. The 31st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Allan D. MacLean and known as Task Force MacLean, numbered 3,200 Americans and Koreans. It replaced the Marines east of the reservoir on November 25. Smith used this operational pause to strengthen the defenses of Hagaru-ri and build a rough airfield for emergency resupply and medical evacuations. A battalion of Marines manned the most vulnerable part of the perimeter, but much of the position had to be manned by noninfantry units. The Marine Corps’ investment in making “every Marine a rifleman” would soon pay dividends.
The Chinese Strike
As the 1st Marine Division advanced, Peng ordered the uncommitted Ninth Army Group (commanded by General Song Shilun) to leave Manchuria and destroy it. Song’s army group (12 divisions in 3 armies) numbered 150,000 soldiers—mostly infantry with mortars and machine guns but not much artillery, since the Chinese lacked guns, shells, and trucks and feared UNC air strikes on road-bound columns. Moreover, the army group had not prepared for winter war. Still, Mao found the X Corps too tempting a target to resist, and the Chinese believed they had found an effective formula for fighting the UNC: stealth, nighttime attacks, ambushes, local surprise, and superiority in numbers. The Ninth Army Group moved into positions on either side of the reservoir with five divisions, and it moved three more divisions to cut the road south of Hagaru-ri and attack Kot’o-ri. Smith, benefiting from aggressive intelligence operations, knew the Chinese had massed around his division, but Almond did not share his alarm.
In the last week of November the Ninth Army Group launched simultaneous division-level attacks on the 1st Marine Division at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Kot’o-ri and on Task Force MacLean east of the reservoir. The 7th and 5th Marines, having met major Chinese forces in a daylight attack on November 27, quickly prepared a perimeter defense for night action. The enclaves at Hagaru-ri and Kot’o-ri were even better prepared, though the Hagaru-ri perimeter had too much critical hill terrain to defend with the available troops. Halfway between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, one Marine rifle company defended T?ktong Pass, where the Chinese 59th Division had placed a major roadblock. Task Force MacLean, meanwhile, was strung out along the east shoreline road in seven different locations.
In three days of intense night battles and daylight probes starting on the night of November 27–28, all of the major Marine positions held, but Task Force MacLean did not. By the time the surviving soldiers (minus their commanding officer, who went missing in action en route and was never recovered) managed to struggle on foot and in small, disorganized groups around the frozen reservoir or directly across the ice to Hagaru-ri, they numbered only 670, and only half of them were fit for duty. The Marine regiments, on the other hand, though reduced by one-third to one-half in their rifle companies, managed to halt or curb the Chinese attacks, aimed at penetrating the perimeters and overrunning artillery positions, the airfield, and command posts. Artillery fire around the clock and air strikes during the day also punished the Chinese. The only real misstep in the defensive battle was a decision by Smith and the 1st Marine Regiment commander, Col. Lewis B. (“Chesty”) Puller, to send a convoy of tanks and supply trucks from Kot’o-ri to Hagaru-ri on November 29. Task Force Drysdale, commanded by Lieut. Col. Douglas B. Drysdale, 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines, in addition to service and headquarters troops, included a Marine infantry company, an army infantry company, and Drysdale’s British raiding battalion. The task force was ambushed en route. One-third of the force (tanks and infantry) fought through to Hagaru-ri, and another third fought its way back to Kot’o-ri. The remainder (162 officers and men) died or became captives.
你无非是想说志愿军不行,澳军牛,他爸美军就更牛了. 要知道那时中美根本不是一个量级,那是小孩打大人,
打的大人连连后退,还说什么,你怎么来了,我又没想怎么你,我只是去鸭绿江旅游一下,本可灭了北韩,我仁慈,
我这不撤了吗,还打,别来劲啊,汉城都给你了,再来,再来,我可不客气了,看看,180师没了吧,
得了,双方在38线对峙,大人说,我看你敢过来,小孩也打清醒了,我就在这了,你呀过来试试, 那就只好谈了,
这大人那个气啊,臭小子,给你点教训,让你知道爷还是爷,不想费了吃奶的劲,也没攻下上甘岭,只好在战俘上
找点面子,看看, 他们服软了. 这也吹? 被一支衣衫褴褛,饮雪炒面的部队追着打,还吹,你看,那么多人围着我打,
我不也完美撤出,炸我桥,我马上就建上,再炸,我空降一个,土八路,你见过吗? 我靠,是你在逃,人家在追,
人家在炸,如果不是巨大的实力差别, 你还能活在世上吗? 你灭不了我一个建制, 天啊,要是灭了,
你还好意思在这世上混吗? 也许,只是看不惯你老共瞎吹, 你不是要赶我下海吗, 那么样. 这也吹?
让小孩追着打产生了幻觉, 丢脸的是谁啊? 你也来个5次战役,打回去. 什么没那想法,你去鸭绿江边
真是旅游? 那办个签证不就没那么多事了. 大人还是气不过,你没赢,你说赢了, 那就是吹, 吹?
吹,吹,吹,就是吹,怎么着吧, 百年来总在家被揍,这次打到外国去了,还文明占领首都, 不吹,还是正常人吗?
(抗日的什么把侵略者赶出家门,听着就憋屈,打到它家去)
这是让人肃然起敬的军队,令人心潮澎湃的壮举,怎么吹都不为过,总比美军吹势如破竹伊拉克,长驱直人阿富汗强吧.
说这些,是想说,反华舔美,没问题,况且还是一本万利的事,不过善意提醒一下, 这个题目选的不好,换点别的,
美军强大不容置疑. 我来给你想想,炸馆,牛,不过好像给他们炸醒了,军队不从商了,改搞军备了.
抵近侦察, 说王伟自不量力, 不厚道, ok,什么厚道不厚道, 不过飞机迫降,大卸八块, 老共一气,
歼16,歼20, ..., 这 ...；再换一个, 台海危机,航母一出,土共就老实了,这个牛,不对,老
共开始研究打航母了,这是帮到忙啊；再来,南海危机,中共海军倾巢出动,老实讲,还不够美国强大的海军
塞牙缝的, 嗯,强大的美国海军别跑,别跑啊... 这是怎么了? ...懂了,你们爱和平,民主斗争,
香港动乱, 烧它砸它,你看他屁都不敢放一个,
虽然在这我早就一枪嘣了他, 民主的号角已经吹响, 冲啊, 不对,这是什么,一纸公文,港独就烟销灰灭,外势滚球,
万恶的共党现在居然要民主地,自由地选举他妈的共党, 这,这亏大幅了. 小瞧他们了吧,
他们可不是选举大会出来的人,那是枪林弹雨杀出来的,你还真以为他们怂,他们装起孙子比真孙子还像.
接着想,有点难啊,想体面地反华舔美不易啊,
看来想在家轻松挣钱只能做个不要脸的恨国党了,不对,怎么这个恨国党恨那个恨国党, 我参加那个啊....
让我不由想起杜鹃山, 唉！吐不尽满腹苦水，一腔冤仇...
有兴趣的可以访问我的博客，或者用版面搜索搜索我的文章。
thrawn和我交流过近一个多月，再也没有能继续反驳我的论据论点和论证过程。
你如果不想看，你尽管自说自话。如果你想认真讨论，请先去看我的博客。里面都是有理有据的，而且使用的主要依据是中共官方志愿军战史，人民日报，中国政府声明，以及联合国决议，李奇微回忆录等，全部都是中国大陆正式官方出版物，没有什么港台垃圾。
So happy to seeu here
You r Right
Deception by
Half truth
Is worse than the stories put up as total lies sometimes
DSo good of u to put forward ur thoughts and share w/everyone
All the Best to u Sir
因为当时美国的威胁是苏联，所以当时美国的战略重心在欧洲，不该在朝鲜扩大战端。事实上，美军在朝鲜就是几个军，从没有大规模征兵调往朝鲜，志愿军的主要对手一直就是美八军，陆战一师等。
Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, Chosin also called Changjin, campaign early in the Korean War, part of the Chinese Second Offensive (November–December 1950) to drive the United Nations out of North Korea. The Chosin Reservoir campaign was directed mainly against the 1st Marine Division of the U.S. X Corps, which had disembarked in eastern North Korea and moved inland in severe winter weather to a mountainous area near the reservoir. The campaign succeeded in forcing the entire X Corps to evacuate to South Korea, but the Chinese did not achieve their particular objective of isolating and destroying the 1st Marine Division. Instead, in a deliberate retrograde movement that has become one of the most-storied exploits in Marine Corps lore, the Marines turned and fought their way down a narrow vulnerable road through several mountain passes and a bridged chasm until they reached transport ships waiting at the coast.
Following the successful landing of the X Corps at Inch’?n in September 1950, the United Nations Command (UNC), under the direction of U.S. Pres. Harry S. Truman’s administration and the UN General Assembly, pursued the remnants of the communist Korean People’s Army into North Korea. On the orders of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of all allied forces in the UNC, the U.S. Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel (the prewar border) on October 7 and advanced up the western side of the Korean peninsula toward P’y?ngyang, the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the same time, MacArthur redeployed the X Corps on amphibious ships around the peninsula to Korea’s east coast. The X Corps (commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond) included the 1st Marine Division (Maj. Gen. Oliver P. [“O.P.”] Smith), the 7th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. David G. Barr), and the 3rd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Robert H. Soule). The corps also had control of the Capital and 3rd divisions of the South Korean I Corps, which was already crossing the 38th parallel on the east coast highway.
What MacArthur did not know was that the Chinese had feared such an offensive since the Inch’?n landing. The Chinese began preparations to enter the war by sending supplies and support troops into North Korea. Meanwhile, Chinese combat divisions, some 21 in number but expanding to 33 by December, remained in Manchuria ready to move against the UNC ground forces. On October 18–19, Chinese leader Mao Zedong, after considerable debate, ordered the Chinese People’s Volunteers Force (CPVF), under the command of General Peng Dehuai, to move against the Eighth Army, whose lead elements had advanced beyond P’y?ngyang and were marching along two separate routes toward the border with China at the Yalu River.
The Chinese First Offensive of October 25–November 6 staggered the Eighth Army, damaging one American division and four South Korean divisions in the battle of Onj?ng-Unsan. To the east, two American divisions of the X Corps had landed on October 26 and 29, and the South Korean I Corps was heading north up the coast road toward the Sino-Soviet border. The wide separation of these units made them a tempting objective for the Chinese. On November 2–4, the South Koreans and U.S. Marines fought their first engagement against the Chinese at Sudong, inland from the port city of H?ngnam. There a Marine regiment defeated an attacking division, killing at least 662 Chinese soldiers.
Underestimating the fighting ability of the CPVF, MacArthur ordered Almond to advance inland with the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry divisions to the Chosin Reservoir. From there the two divisions would move west toward Kanggye, a mountain mining town where the Chinese and North Korean armies seemed to be concentrating—a maneuver that would place the X Corps north of and behind the CPVF armies facing the Eighth Army. MacArthur’s scheme required an 88-km (55-mile) advance over a single unpaved road through the heart of the T’aebaek Mountains in freezing weather and blinding snowstorms. Smith told Almond the plan was rash, but Almond, operating directly under MacArthur, ordered the Marines forward.
The X Corps’ first objective, the village of Hagaru-ri, rested near the southern tip of the reservoir, a narrow mountain lake that provided hydroelectric power to the mining industries of northern Korea. The lake’s proper name is the Changjin Reservoir, but, during Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910–45), its name had been changed to Chōsen, the Japanese name for Korea. Through successive translations and hurried mapmaking, the reservoir became known as Chosin and remains so to this day for American veterans of the Korean War. By any name it was a cold barren battleground where deep foxholes could be dug into the frozen earth only with the help of explosives and bulldozers.
With its supplies moving by truck, the 1st Marine Division established battalion-sized bases at Chinh?ng-ni and Kot’o-ri, villages along the Main Supply Route (MSR), the X Corps’ name for the road to the reservoir. The division began its final march to the reservoir on November 13, with two of its reinforced regiments, the 7th and 5th Marines, in column and moving cautiously. Each regiment was a regimental combat team with attached artillery battalions, a tank company, engineers, and headquarters and service units. On November 15 lead elements of the 7th Marines reached Hagaru-ri. From there the regiment prepared for its next advance, west of the reservoir to Yudam-ni, 22 km (14 miles) away, while the 5th Marines moved cautiously up the reservoir’s right bank.
General Smith, unhappy with this risky deployment, persuaded Almond to allow the Marines to concentrate at Hagaru-ri and replace the eastern force with a unit from the 7th Infantry Division. Almond ordered General Barr to form a regimental combat team of two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and other troops. The 31st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Allan D. MacLean and known as Task Force MacLean, numbered 3,200 Americans and Koreans. It replaced the Marines east of the reservoir on November 25. Smith used this operational pause to strengthen the defenses of Hagaru-ri and build a rough airfield for emergency resupply and medical evacuations. A battalion of Marines manned the most vulnerable part of the perimeter, but much of the position had to be manned by noninfantry units. The Marine Corps’ investment in making “every Marine a rifleman” would soon pay dividends.
The Chinese StrikeAs the 1st Marine Division advanced, Peng ordered the uncommitted Ninth Army Group (commanded by General Song Shilun) to leave Manchuria and destroy it. Song’s army group (12 divisions in 3 armies) numbered 150,000 soldiers—mostly infantry with mortars and machine guns but not much artillery, since the Chinese lacked guns, shells, and trucks and feared UNC air strikes on road-bound columns. Moreover, the army group had not prepared for winter war. Still, Mao found the X Corps too tempting a target to resist, and the Chinese believed they had found an effective formula for fighting the UNC: stealth, nighttime attacks, ambushes, local surprise, and superiority in numbers. The Ninth Army Group moved into positions on either side of the reservoir with five divisions, and it moved three more divisions to cut the road south of Hagaru-ri and attack Kot’o-ri. Smith, benefiting from aggressive intelligence operations, knew the Chinese had massed around his division, but Almond did not share his alarm.
In the last week of November the Ninth Army Group launched simultaneous division-level attacks on the 1st Marine Division at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Kot’o-ri and on Task Force MacLean east of the reservoir. The 7th and 5th Marines, having met major Chinese forces in a daylight attack on November 27, quickly prepared a perimeter defense for night action. The enclaves at Hagaru-ri and Kot’o-ri were even better prepared, though the Hagaru-ri perimeter had too much critical hill terrain to defend with the available troops. Halfway between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, one Marine rifle company defended T?ktong Pass, where the Chinese 59th Division had placed a major roadblock. Task Force MacLean, meanwhile, was strung out along the east shoreline road in seven different locations.
In three days of intense night battles and daylight probes starting on the night of November 27–28, all of the major Marine positions held, but Task Force MacLean did not. By the time the surviving soldiers (minus their commanding officer, who went missing in action en route and was never recovered) managed to struggle on foot and in small, disorganized groups around the frozen reservoir or directly across the ice to Hagaru-ri, they numbered only 670, and only half of them were fit for duty. The Marine regiments, on the other hand, though reduced by one-third to one-half in their rifle companies, managed to halt or curb the Chinese attacks, aimed at penetrating the perimeters and overrunning artillery positions, the airfield, and command posts. Artillery fire around the clock and air strikes during the day also punished the Chinese. The only real misstep in the defensive battle was a decision by Smith and the 1st Marine Regiment commander, Col. Lewis B. (“Chesty”) Puller, to send a convoy of tanks and supply trucks from Kot’o-ri to Hagaru-ri on November 29. Task Force Drysdale, commanded by Lieut. Col. Douglas B. Drysdale, 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines, in addition to service and headquarters troops, included a Marine infantry company, an army infantry company, and Drysdale’s British raiding battalion. The task force was ambushed en route. One-third of the force (tanks and infantry) fought through to Hagaru-ri, and another third fought its way back to Kot’o-ri. The remainder (162 officers and men) died or became captives.
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Average Rating:(4.0)out of5stars Hastings hopes to reme... January 29, 2007 Hastings hopes to remedy the neglect with which historians have treated the Korean War. He contends that, "above all, perhaps, Korea merits close consideration as a military rehearsal for the subsequent disaster in Vietnam." Indeed, in his detailed history of the conflict, he draws many parallels to the ill-fated war in Indochina. (Especially poignant: the reference to "the ferocious struggles that cost thousands of men on both sides their lives in pursuit of hill numbers or map references.") The book is well-written and stays interesting; his minute-by-minute eyewitness recollections from the front are as riveting as they are grim. The Korean War was accompanied by some critically important side-dramas: Truman versus MacArthur, the Allies' fears of both McArthur and McCarthy, China versus the Soviet Union, the questionable fate of Formosa, and the decision to use -or not to use - atomic weapons in tactical maneuvers. All of these issues are given illuminating coverage by Hastings. Among his sobering conclusions was the observation that in spite of many examples of personal bravery, the performance of the U.S. Army - at least in the first year of fighting - "ranged between moderate and deplorable." Behavior of Army prisoners of war was not much better. Furthermore, many Americans exhibited arrogance, insensitivity, and paternalism in their treatment of Koreans. In fact, he suggests, Americans had much more respect for the Chinese, whose infantrymen were considered to be excellent fighters. Hastings is scrupulously fair in his assessment of both U.S. and Chinese motives for fighting in Korea. Although he tries to convey fully the frustration Americans felt by having political limits placed on their military power, he does not hesitate to express his own gratitute that nuclear weapons were not used. He deplores the behavior of Syngman Rhee and his support by the U.S., but declares him and his regime "infinitely better than anything attainable under Kim Il Sung." One minor quibble would be that the scanty maps are inadequate. A recommended companion piece while reading this very good book is the Oxford Atlas of American Military History. (JAF) See more
Reviewed by nbmarsnbmars
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Average Rating:(4.0)out of5stars Excellent narrative hi... February 21, 2015 Excellent narrative history of the Korean War. The author uses "first-hand" accounts of those who fought in that conflict on both sides to arrive at a re-assessment of this war. He naturally "highlights" some actions of British troops including the stand of the" Gloucesters" on the Imjin in 1951. He is full of praise for the fighting retreat of the US Marines from the Chosin reservoir ,while scathing of the actions of the 8th Army leadership in failing to comprehend the Chinese threat of "intervention" in the conflict. A good read. See more
Reviewed by tbrennan1tbrennan1
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Average Rating:(4.0)out of5stars Max Hastings is a very... October 2, 2014 Max Hastings is a very good writer. In this book, he writes about the experiences of those involved in the Korean war. Talking about on-the-ground experiences is something this author does so well, really bringing the feel of the battle to the reader. He provides just enough background for the general reader about the reasons for and consequences of the war, but does not provide this in great depth. See more
Reviewed by LynnBLynnB
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Average Rating:(3.0)out of5stars An extremely readable ... February 14, 2014 An extremely readable history of the conflict. The strength here is the inclusion of his interviews with 200 people including some Chinese, British soldiers and Korean non combatants. The book is fairly compressed however and feels rushed at times. Hastings writes for those who are more familiar with military nomenclature and consequently some of the descriptions of battles are confusing. The action is not well blocked and we realize that things are being summarized to an extent that robs us a real understanding of what the experience was like. Also through no fault of the author the book is dated not only because he skips over the McArthur dismissal (because everyone knows about it) but also because he is writing during a period in which the Soviet Union still existed and previous to the Chinese adoption of the capitalist/communist hybrid. So discussions about whether our not it was a good decision not to nuke China are terrifying. However, the book is very good on outlining the way the Korean conflict set up Vietnam. Hastings is very clear about the lessons not learned and he is scrupulously fair when it comes to outlining what went wrong in Korea. I was, or had forgotten just how despicable Rhee was and how much he contributed to the quagmire. It is also an extraordinary window into the early bellicosity of the GOP - a trait we still have swirling around us even after Iraq. See more
Reviewed by HebephreneHebephrene
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Average Rating:(3.0)out of5stars I stopped listening ab... December 31, 2012 I stopped listening about a third of the way through. While there were many great incites into the war and politics that surrounded it he went into way too much detail of the actual day to day fighting to keep me interested. See more
Reviewed by GShukGShuk
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[null] Feedback "A vivid and meticulous assessment of one of the most misunderstood episodes in recent history, this is a look back to the first war we could not win--not just the big picture, but also a look inside the experience of soldiers in the battle. 76 black-and-white photos"
https://www.walmart.com/ip/The-Korean-War-Paperback-9780671668341/24361220