During the early morning hours of 29 November, the Division command post moved to a new location six miles south of Kunu-ri.
Throughout the morning every unit of the Division was under heavy attack by the numerically superior enemy. At about 1000 hours, the 2d Reconnaissance Company reported an enemy roadblock had been set-up approximately ten miles south of Kunu-ri on the CANARY-Sunchon road, the lifeline of the Division and the only escape route in the Division zone. First estimates placed the strength of the enemy at a reinforced company, At 1240 hours, after the Reconnaissance Company had failed to reduce the block, “C“ Company of the 38th Infantry reinforced by tanks from “C“ Company of the 72d Tank Battalion were on route to assist the 2d Recon. At 1350 hours, a battery of 155 howitzers from the 503d Field Artillery was directed to support the attack on the roadblock. The 38th sent its trains south by way of Anju and they arrived in Sunchon intact.
......
Back at the roadblock, frantic efforts to push back the enemy failed. At 1630 hours, Major General Keiser relayed a message for help to IX Corps “Serious roadblock to South. Estimate enemy battalion or more. Air strikes, artillery and infantry company attacks have failed. Road jammed with vehicles prevents movement North or South. Request immediate assistance from the south to relieve situation. Please notify action taken as all infantry elements definitely engaged.“
Ten minutes later at 1640 hours, the commanding officer of the 38th Infantry reported his right battalion under attack by the Chinese from the north, northeast, east and south with the Turks unable to hold on his right. At 1655, the 23d Infantry relayed a message to Division headquarters indicating the entire 38th Infantry under attack from the north and northeast and the 3d ROK also under attack. The Turks were giving ground to the east and south. A few minutes passed and the situation in the 38th sector became critical. The Third Battalion was surrounded and attempts were being made to establish a defense on the high ground east of the 38th CP.
The Turks reported at 1700 hours that their elements which had been withdrawing down the road were under attack and their escape route to Kunu-ri was blocked.
The roadblock in the south was still “in“ and the enemy force grew stronger., The 23rd and 38th Regiments holding below Kunu-ri were ordered to pull back. The 23rd was to pull back first except for one company which was to guard the bridge over the Kaechon River which flowed just south of Kunu-ri and over which the 38th was required to move.
The Third Battalion of the 23rd barely escaped annihilation as a burning ammunition truck blocked its escape and forced the remnants to move out by foot, leaving the vehicles behind.
The 23rd completed its withdrawal by 0130 hours except for the company guarding the bridge. However, the remnants of the Second and Third Battalions of the 38th had not reached the 38th perimeter held by the First Battalion and the 3rd ROK Regiment so Colonel Peploc, the regimental commander, waited until 0430 when all that was left of the two I Corps. battalions had reached safety and the withdrawal was completed.
Neither of the two regiments would have been able to make their moves had it not been for the exceptionally artillery support on all likely positions and routes the enemy could be using.
The 3rd ROK Regiment was reported not in position after the two regiments had withdrawn. As it was the only organized force of any strength left in the 38th Regiment, its absence caused great consternation for it was to occupy positions south of the Kaechon on the right of the 23rd and as dawn broke there were no friendly troops on the 23rd’s right flank. Immediately the remnants of the Second and Third Battalions of the 38th were assembled and prepared to occupy positions on the 23rd’s right. South of the mounting confusion, all efforts to break the roadblock met with failure. A crisis faced the 2d Division for annihilation was certain if it stayed in Kunu-ri and the only escape route in its sector was blocked. A request went out to IX Corps for permission to take the Division out of the trap by way of the Kunu-ri Anju-Sinanju Road, still open and offering an escape through the I Corps sector. IX Corps stated it would have to clear the request through I Corps. In the meantime, the shocked and tattered remnants of the 9th Infantry, less the First Battalion, were thrown against the roadblock. The Second and Third Battalions were down to ap-xxx
In the meantime, the shocked and tattered throughout the night together with the 2d Recon, elements of the 72d Tank Battalion and the remains of the 2d Engineers.
During the night of 29-30 November an attack on the 2d Division command post was repulsed.
No story of the withdrawal from Kunu-ri will ever be complete. Records of many of the units were either lost or not kept at all. Many of the men who could tell the story have not returned. There were countless instances of in dividual and unit heroism which will forever go unrecognized but without which many thousands more lives would been lost. No one single unit should be singled out for to do so would be an injustice to the others but special mention must be made of the elements of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion and “A“ Battery, 503d who held the hills near the Division CP while other units moved out. Not a man escaped from the northernmost of the two hills. The men of “A“ Battery fired their massive 155 guns point blank at the onrushing enemy until they were completely overwhelmed. They stayed to the death so that others might escape.
1) The Korean War started at the 38th paralell, and ended at there;
2) Casualties of both sides almost equalled - in details if further looking into, that the UN troops led by the USA was slighty higher than the China Volunteer Army plus the N Korea army;
3) There has Not been any war in the Korean Penisula for over 66 years so far.
Conclusion: At the most, the war was draw. There was No winner at least, because of too many died.
Not true! The poorly equipped CVA performed much better.
The USA general Clark admitted that he was the sole USA general who inked his signature on an agreement without winning the war in the entire history of the US Army.
You may feel what he meant when signing the document.
38军的一个连在松骨峰真的打退2000美军进攻打死300？实际情况是全连牺牲换来消灭30名美军，并未阻碍美二师的撤退（转载天涯）
各位看官先看此文的出处
顽强截击在松骨峰
http://202.84.17.11/world/htm/20001004/155999.htm
新华网首页 ＝国际舞台 ＝专题报道集 ＝新华网专题报道
2000/09
抗美援朝大回放
为纪念中国人民志愿军抗美援朝出国作战５０周年，新华社２０多位军事记者分赴全国各地，寻访一批健在的战功卓著的高级将领；新华网特设《战将访问记》、《亲历抗美援朝》、《见证重要战事》等专栏，刊载这组系列专访。本网站所刊登的新华社及新华网各种新闻﹑信息和各种专题专栏资料，均为新华通讯社版权所有，经协议授权，禁止下载使用。
请看原文，50年代鼓舞人心的文宣是这样讲述松骨峰之战的
顽强截击在松骨峰
http://202.84.17.11/world/htm/20001004/155999.htm
在朝鲜的每一天。我都被一些东西感动着，我的思想感情的潮水，在放纵奔流着。它使我想把一切东西，都告诉给我祖国的朋友们。但我最急于告诉你们的，是我思想感情的一段重要经历，这就是，我越来越深刻地感觉到谁是我们最可爱的人！”这是广为流传、激动过亿万人心的通讯《谁是最可爱的人》的开篇。这篇通讯，就是著名作家魏巍战地采访了志愿军第３８军第３３５团第３连在松骨峰战斗中那可歌可泣的英雄事迹后写下的。
“反击没有得逞的美军又出动８架战斗机、８辆坦克、几十门榴弹炮。。。。。。。３００多具尸体和大量趴窝的汽车将几百辆４轮汽车被阻在公路上不得前进。。。。。。２０００余美军在３２架飞机、１８辆坦克、几十门榴弹炮掩护下，发动第五次冲锋。。。。。。毙伤其５００余人。。。。。。３００多具尸体和大量趴窝的汽车将几百辆４轮汽车被阻在公路上不得前进”
***********************************
我对美军动用武器装备和参战兵力之强感到吃惊，这是在和一个连交手吗？带着这些疑问，查了一些资料，
查了一下美国陆军纪念50周年的官方网站，
http://korea50.army.mil/history/index.shtml
长津湖突围是个专题，第二师的突围提都没提，
第二师网站上倒是有详细记载
http://www.2id.org/kunuri-history.htm
提到的美军进攻力量是第二师38步兵团的C连，在一个坦克连（72坦克营的C连），以及后来加入的一个炮兵连的支援下进攻，中国军队兵力起初估计是一个加强连，后来认为似乎在一个营以上
During the early morning hours of 29 November, the Division command post moved to a new location six miles south of Kunu-ri.
Throughout the morning every unit of the Division was under heavy attack by the numerically superior enemy. At about 1000 hours, the 2d Reconnaissance Company reported an enemy roadblock had been set-up approximately ten miles south of Kunu-ri on the CANARY-Sunchon road, the lifeline of the Division and the only escape route in the Division zone. First estimates placed the strength of the enemy at a reinforced company, At 1240 hours, after the Reconnaissance Company had failed to reduce the block, “C“ Company of the 38th Infantry reinforced by tanks from “C“ Company of the 72d Tank Battalion were on route to assist the 2d Recon. At 1350 hours, a battery of 155 howitzers from the 503d Field Artillery was directed to support the attack on the roadblock. The 38th sent its trains south by way of Anju and they arrived in Sunchon intact.
......
Back at the roadblock, frantic efforts to push back the enemy failed. At 1630 hours, Major General Keiser relayed a message for help to IX Corps “Serious roadblock to South. Estimate enemy battalion or more. Air strikes, artillery and infantry company attacks have failed. Road jammed with vehicles prevents movement North or South. Request immediate assistance from the south to relieve situation. Please notify action taken as all infantry elements definitely engaged.“
Ten minutes later at 1640 hours, the commanding officer of the 38th Infantry reported his right battalion under attack by the Chinese from the north, northeast, east and south with the Turks unable to hold on his right. At 1655, the 23d Infantry relayed a message to Division headquarters indicating the entire 38th Infantry under attack from the north and northeast and the 3d ROK also under attack. The Turks were giving ground to the east and south. A few minutes passed and the situation in the 38th sector became critical. The Third Battalion was surrounded and attempts were being made to establish a defense on the high ground east of the 38th CP.
The Turks reported at 1700 hours that their elements which had been withdrawing down the road were under attack and their escape route to Kunu-ri was blocked.
The roadblock in the south was still “in“ and the enemy force grew stronger., The 23rd and 38th Regiments holding below Kunu-ri were ordered to pull back. The 23rd was to pull back first except for one company which was to guard the bridge over the Kaechon River which flowed just south of Kunu-ri and over which the 38th was required to move.
The Third Battalion of the 23rd barely escaped annihilation as a burning ammunition truck blocked its escape and forced the remnants to move out by foot, leaving the vehicles behind.
The 23rd completed its withdrawal by 0130 hours except for the company guarding the bridge. However, the remnants of the Second and Third Battalions of the 38th had not reached the 38th perimeter held by the First Battalion and the 3rd ROK Regiment so Colonel Peploc, the regimental commander, waited until 0430 when all that was left of the two I Corps. battalions had reached safety and the withdrawal was completed.
Neither of the two regiments would have been able to make their moves had it not been for the exceptionally artillery support on all likely positions and routes the enemy could be using.
The 3rd ROK Regiment was reported not in position after the two regiments had withdrawn. As it was the only organized force of any strength left in the 38th Regiment, its absence caused great consternation for it was to occupy positions south of the Kaechon on the right of the 23rd and as dawn broke there were no friendly troops on the 23rd’s right flank. Immediately the remnants of the Second and Third Battalions of the 38th were assembled and prepared to occupy positions on the 23rd’s right. South of the mounting confusion, all efforts to break the roadblock met with failure. A crisis faced the 2d Division for annihilation was certain if it stayed in Kunu-ri and the only escape route in its sector was blocked. A request went out to IX Corps for permission to take the Division out of the trap by way of the Kunu-ri Anju-Sinanju Road, still open and offering an escape through the I Corps sector. IX Corps stated it would have to clear the request through I Corps. In the meantime, the shocked and tattered remnants of the 9th Infantry, less the First Battalion, were thrown against the roadblock. The Second and Third Battalions were down to ap-xxx
In the meantime, the shocked and tattered throughout the night together with the 2d Recon, elements of the 72d Tank Battalion and the remains of the 2d Engineers.
During the night of 29-30 November an attack on the 2d Division command post was repulsed.
军事网上的介绍也证实了美军的出战人数，
http://www.unitedcn.com/01ZGZZ/24kangmeiyuanchao/new_page_1813.htm
“美军以一个连的兵力，10余架飞机，6辆坦克”“尔后美军又增加兵力，以300余人在猛烈炮火掩护下”这非常接近美军的参战人数，可见魏巍的打退2000敌军的描述实在可信度不高，3连的阻击实际上没有阻碍美二师的撤退，美军并没有动用全部兵力来试图解决这股部队
徐京跃《日出日落三八线》 中的描述可能更加接近事实
http://www.mypcera.com/book/jun/sunrise/005.htm
“这个连的官兵全部牺牲了......”
辽沈晚报?http://news.tom.com/1006/20050309-1928634.html
更证实了当时3连是全部“阵亡”了，而非有7人尚存
×××××××××××××××××××××××
魏巍笔下抗美援朝烈士未阵亡 英雄大连生活30年
辽沈晚报??
在“二次战役”中，胡传久所在三连的任务是阻止敌人军车逃跑。三连占领了公路边一个光秃秃的小山岗，敌人向三连的阵地发动了猛烈的攻击，三连战士激战了8个小时。在战斗中，胡传久用刺刀与敌人展开了肉搏战，他的腿受了重伤，倒在血泊中不省人事。后来，人们以为这个连的全体将士都已经阵亡了，上级领导授予这个连“松骨峰战斗特等功臣连”、“英雄部队”等光荣称号，而胡传久也被当成烈士。
在多种中方的记录中，美军的伤亡都是留下300具尸体,那么事实呢？
查了权威的美军伤亡统计网站，http://www.koreanwar.org/html/korean_war_databases.html
检索1950年11月29日美军阵亡记录，直接参战的美二师38步兵旅当日阵亡只有30人（这其中还有从下去16：40开始遭到其他中国军队攻击的在内，反狙击的C连的阵亡人数不知会不会超过20人），而数万人在多个战场同时开战的整个第二师11月29日的阵亡人数也只有70人（可以查到每个阵亡士兵的姓名），中美的记录都没有提到松骨峰战斗有联合国军或南韩军队参与，美军的阵亡只有几十人，不知这阵地上300具尸体都是谁的？
美军30人阵亡的松骨峰与此形成鲜明对比的是血战长津湖从15万中国军队包围中突围的陆战一师当天则有87人阵亡
1950年11月29日美陆军第二师38步兵旅阵亡名单
38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - JAMES ADAMS - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - CHARLES ALBRIGHT - 38 - ART BN (105MM) - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - EARNEST BOMAN - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - GERARD COTTER - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - J DAUGHERTY - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - CHARLES FUSON - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - ROBERT HOLLAND - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - EARL HOLLAND - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - RAY HULSEY - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - FRANK JOHNSON - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - JAMES LARSEN - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - ALFONSO MENDOZA - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - ROBERT MILLER - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - LINUS MITCHELL - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - EDWIN MITCHELL - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - DONALD MORAN - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - BYRON OTWELL - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - FRANKLIN OWENS - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - RICHARD PADEN - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - GARY PARKER - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - CARL PARSONS - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - TROY PENLAND - 38 - ART BN (105MM) - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - CLAUDE RINER - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - JAMES ROSE - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - LEFF ROYAL - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - ROBERT SIGGINS - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - KENNETH SWENSON - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - JACK TAYLOR - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - CECIL WATTERS - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
November 29, 1950 - ROBERT WRIGHT - 38 - INF RGT - 2 INF DIV
美二师38步兵旅整个朝鲜战争3年中WIA+KIA+MIA(伤＋亡＋失踪）为598人（可以查到每个士兵的名字伤亡失踪情况）http://www.2id.org/2-casnav.htm
1950年11月29日一天38步兵旅就被“毙伤５００余人”，后来几百天打仗一个人都没有伤亡吗？
*****************************************************
美军第二师的战史:
No story of the withdrawal from Kunu-ri will ever be complete. Records of many of the units were either lost or not kept at all. Many of the men who could tell the story have not returned. There were countless instances of in dividual and unit heroism which will forever go unrecognized but without which many thousands more lives would been lost. No one single unit should be singled out for to do so would be an injustice to the others but special mention must be made of the elements of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion and “A“ Battery, 503d who held the hills near the Division CP while other units moved out. Not a man escaped from the northernmost of the two hills. The men of “A“ Battery fired their massive 155 guns point blank at the onrushing enemy until they were completely overwhelmed. They stayed to the death so that others might escape.
没有一个从Kunu-ri撤退 故事会是完整的。许多战斗单位的纪录要么丢失了要么根本就没有保存下来。 许多能讲述当时战斗情况的人都没有回来。 一定有不计其数的个人和集体英雄主义事例永远在没有被承认的情况下被完全淡忘，但如果不是他们，成千更多的人将丧命。单独列出一个战斗单位的英勇事迹，对其他单位来说是不公平的，但是需要特别提及的是第2工程作战营和503d A炮兵连的士兵们，当其他部队撤退的时候，他们坚守靠近师部的山头。这两座山头最北面的士兵没有一个回来。A炮兵连的士兵们用他们巨大的155口径的榴弹炮点射冲上来的敌军，直到被完全淹没。 他们坚守到死，以便其他人有机会逃脱。
********************************************
中国版:
这个连的官兵全部牺牲了
后来，人们以为这个连的全体将士都已经阵亡了，上级领导授予这个连“松骨峰战斗特等功臣连”、“英雄部队”等光荣称号，而胡传久也被当成烈士。七班长潘志忠头被炸伤，鲜血在脸上凝成血冰，但他心中燃烧着仇恨的火焰，口中只有一名话：“我是共产党员，不能下去。”当美国兵要跑时，他甩出了最后一颗手榴弹，炸死了逃兵。当他奄奄一息之时，手伸向衣兜，告诉排长： “兜里有个信封，胜利了，向毛主席报个喜吧！”他闭上了双眼，留下了一脸的坚毅。仅配属第３连战斗的机枪１连两个班就有５人被烧伤；陈宝贵排长眼睛被烧得看不见了，仍然鼓励战士们：“共产党员、共青团员们！共产党的队伍是经得起考验的！”朱顺发、熊席泉等与美国兵厮打在一起，最后同归于尽。李玉安负重伤，也被人们误认为是牺牲了，直至３０年后，才重被发现。邢玉喜、严佐政刺死几个美国兵，又与几个美国兵扭打着滚下山坡。……胡长久从敌尸上摘下４颗手榴弹，打退了冲上来的美军。当汽油弹在战士邢玉堂身边炸开后，他完全被大火吞没了，就地打滚，可火势太大，他就带着呼呼上窜的火苗，扑向美国兵。战士主动接替。指导员杨少成的子弹打光了，就同美国兵拼刺刀，当好几个美国兵包围他时，他临危不惧，高喊着：“同志们，守住阵地！”毅然拉响了手榴弹。在这生与死的决战中，第３连的战士高喊着：“为指导员报仇！”“为祖国争光！”“有我们，就有阵地！”纷纷跳出弹坑，杀向美国兵
*********************************************
松骨峰一战，即使38军3连以全连牺牲的代价只打死3，40名美军，但是战略和战术意义都是巨大的，美军的战史也明确趁认中国军人的顽强，但是用对精神力量过度的吹嘘和对后勤武器装备甚至是士兵生命的漠视，导致后来5次战役的整个师被围血染汉江就不稀奇了.50年代吹过也罢，2000年把一篇基本事实吹牛的“鼓舞人心的文宣”堂而皇之得贴在新华社纪念朝鲜战争50周年的专题网站,是什么意思呢?
历史不是宣传机器可以随意涂改的
志愿军发起的针对美军的行动基本上都没达到战役预想的目的。比如这个二次战役中38军最著名的穿插，也并未能达到战前志愿军指挥机关设想的围歼几个美军师的目的。美军顺利撤回去了，达到了其战役目的。
这里要注意定语：美军针对志愿军的行动。所谓联合国军圣诞节回家攻势的组织本来就是以没有中国军队参战为前提的，所以不能以中国军队参战后美军放弃原定战役设想作为所谓志愿军胜利的依据。因为美军发起这个战役根本不是为了消灭入朝中国军队，所以不是针对志愿军的战役行动。美军稍后的南撤才是美军面对志愿军的作战行动。这一行动毫无疑问地获得了成功。
1) The Korean War started at the 38th paralell, and ended at there;
2) Casualties of both sides almost equalled - in details if further looking into, that the UN troops led by the USA was slighty higher than the China Volunteer Army plus the N Korea army;
3) There has Not been any war in the Korean Penisula for over 66 years so far.
Conclusion: At the most, the war was draw. There was No winner at least, because of too many died.
谁胜谁败，一目了然。
最后的停火协议也是以共产党方面单方面接受了联合国军坚持的战俘自愿遣返条件而达成的。
The USA general Clark admitted that he was the sole USA general who inked his signature on an agreement without winning the war in the entire history of the US Army.
You may feel what he meant when signing the document.
就松骨峰战斗而言，美军并没有打算从该处突围，美军实际是经没有志愿军干扰的顺川肃川公路和平撤离的（按计划，志愿军42军应该穿插到该处切断美军退路，然而42军没能穿插到位）。实际上美军在松骨峰地区的战斗对其生死存亡没有多大关系，可以说不过是一种与敌接触的武装侦察行动，所以其伤亡并不大。
从后来4，5次战役和东线美军的表现看，拥有强大火力的美军，志愿军靠自己的步兵轻武器和野战工事，是根本拦不住的。即便42军能穿插到位，第8集团军依旧是可以用自己的力量打破志愿军的包围的。
这就是他说那段话的内心含义。
人只有能赢而未能赢得时候才觉得遗憾，如果是侥幸没输光，那该是谢天谢地谢人了。
Escaping wholesale slaughter, trying not to freeze
American forces were surrounded, vastly outnumbered and facing mass slaughter in brutally cold mountains near the Chinese border.
另外，人民军也是军，苏军也是军。严格意义来说，朝鲜战争就是共产党阵营和自由世界之间的对抗，不是中美单挑。
战争后期，联合国军编成内的韩军一个师可以挡住志愿军一个主力军的进攻。白马山之战就是证明。
到底谁有心魔你嘴上不认但心里清楚。