I am under no illusion that our present strategy of using means short of total war to achieve our ends and oppose communism is a guarantee that a world war will not be thrust upon us. But a policy of patience and determination without provoking a world war, while we improve our military power, is one which we believe we must continue to follow….
Under present circumstances, we have recommended against enlarging the war from Korea to also include Red China. The course of action often described as a limited war with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.
Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
— From testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, May 15, 1951.—Military Situation in the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, p. 732 (1951).
I am under no illusion that our present strategy of using means short of total war to achieve our ends and oppose communism is a guarantee that a world war will not be thrust upon us. But a policy of patience and determination without provoking a world war, while we improve our military power, is one which we believe we must continue to follow….
Under present circumstances, we have recommended against enlarging the war from Korea to also include Red China. The course of action often described as a limited war with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.
Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
— From testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, May 15, 1951.—Military Situation in the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, p. 732 (1951).
Omar Bradley是美国的参谋长联席会议主席，五星上将。他在国会作证时说过“The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy”。
中国很多网文，或许是有意的，或许是无知，断章取义的引用这句话来证明中国军队牛逼，或者来证明美国人后悔卷入朝鲜战争等等。这句话，也就因此成了很多小粉红们韩战鸡血的来源之一。
其实，稍微懂一点相关史实的人都清楚，Bradley这句话，不是论证“卷入朝鲜战争”错误，而是针对“把朝鲜战争扩大到中国本土”的观点进行批驳。将军的意思是，如果我们把朝鲜战争扩大到中国本土，那么就是“错误时间，错误的地点，错误的敌人，错误的战争”。为什么不应该把战争扩大到中国本土呢---因为参谋长联席会议研判，中国是个弱国，还没有足够的能力去统治世界，美国不值得为了红色中国耗费过多的国力。
下面是Wiki的英文全文：
红色中国不是寻求统治世界的强大国家。 坦率地说，参谋长联席会议认为，这一战略将使我们卷入一场错误的战争，在错误的地方，错误的时间，错误的敌人。
我毫不幻想，我们目前的使用战略意味着完全战争不足以实现自己的目标并反对共产主义，这是不会发动世界大战的保证。但是，在我们提高军事实力的同时，不挑起世界大战的耐心和决心的政策是我们认为必须继续遵循的一种政策。
在目前情况下，我们建议不要扩大朝鲜战争，也不要将红色中国也包括在内。经常被形容为与红色中国的有限战争的行动方针，是通过在不是关键战略奖品的领域投入过多力量来增加我们承担的风险。
红色中国不是寻求统治世界的强大国家。坦率地说，参谋长联席会议认为，这一战略将使我们卷入一场错误的战争，在错误的地方，错误的时间，错误的敌人。
-摘自1951年5月15日参议院武装部队和对外关系委员会的证词。——《远东军事形势》，第82d国会听证会，第一届会议，第2部分，第132页。 732（1951）。
I am under no illusion that our present strategy of using means short of total war to achieve our ends and oppose communism is a guarantee that a world war will not be thrust upon us. But a policy of patience and determination without provoking a world war, while we improve our military power, is one which we believe we must continue to follow….
Under present circumstances, we have recommended against enlarging the war from Korea to also include Red China. The course of action often described as a limited war with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.
Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
— From testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, May 15, 1951.—Military Situation in the Far East, hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, p. 732 (1951).
我的核心是：布莱德雷的所谓“四错误”，不是针对已经在朝鲜半岛发生的“韩战”(注意这段证词的时间点，1951年5月15日），而是要不要扩大战争规模把红色中国包括进来。也就是说，布莱德雷这些证词，并不表示美国军方对于发生在“1951年5月15日之前的‘韩战’”表示后悔----以上是核心，至于其他细节，不影响我对于这个史实的基本解读。
还有，对于阿富汗和伊拉克--咋说呢，如果按照清朝对待准噶尔的模式，美国打得赢，但是这就违背了国际人道准则对吧？
最后，如果您跟在我的主贴下回帖，请不要把话题转移到阿富汗和伊拉克。
算是正本清源
美国打伊朗就是“错误的时间，错误的地点，错误的战争，错误的敌人"。
探讨班农和郭文贵的关系，郭文贵到底是不是间谍，为什么多家机构联合调查（FBI,纽约东区联邦检察院，地方检察院，好像还有金融机构）等等。
班农的事儿，水不浅，但是不适合在这个论坛来讨论。历史论坛吗，就事论事是比较恰当的讨论方式。