Friday the Trump administration announced it will impose a 25 percent tariff on up to $50 billion in Chinese goods in an effort to protect U.S. intellectual property and technology. The decision brought an immediate backlash from Beijing. China in retaliation said it will introduce taxation measures of the same scale and strength. As the world's two superpowers inch closer to a trade war, market experts are asking: Is this a game the United States can win? I suspect the real answer is twofold: In part, the president wants to be seen as reversing the loss of jobs and intellectual property to China between 2001 and, say, 2010. But since that horse has left the barn, he needs some other animals to round up. His stated objective is to reduce the size of the U.S–China trade deficit from an estimated $370 billion to $200 billion by 2020.
Fred Dufour | AFP | Getty Images China's President Xi Jinping (L) and US President Donald Trump. As the world's two superpowers inch closer to a trade war, market experts are asking if this is a game the United States can win. There are two obvious ways to play this: (1) China could buy more U.S. goods and services, and/or (2) America could buy fewer Chinese goods and services. Both come with drawbacks for the U.S. economy and the American people. It is hard for U.S. companies to ramp up to export more to China when they are operating at full capacity and have close to no unemployment. But before evaluating the policy prescriptions for this problem, we must first consider the starting point, which is flawed. The current $370 billion deficit estimate does not account for value-added. When looking at the value-added content of Chinese exports, the U.S. deficit with China is actually only half of what it seems. And if we then add back the U.S. surplus in "invisibles" and how much money the United States brings back from investments in China, the U.S.–China deficit shrinks from 2 percent of U.S. GDP to 0.8 percent, a report from Oxford Economics revealed. More from Global Investing Hot Spots: China determined to steal A.I. crown from US Trade war with US could be a tipping point for China In the case of the Apple iPhone, this means that China's exports balance accounts for the full $500 iPhone value, when China adds only approximately $15 to $30 of the value to the phone. Most of the iPhone value accretes to Samsung in Korea ($150) and to Apple — the brand owner and engineer. This highlights how the normal accounting of trade flows is inherently distorted under the current trade-deficit estimates. So maybe the deck has only 25 not 52 cards. The iPhone example also points to an area of weakness in the president's policy prescription: If the United States introduces tariffs on China's high-tech goods, U.S. companies and consumers could indirectly end up footing part of the bill. This is because the high-tech industries that Trump's tariffs are focused on is where Chinese value-added has the lowest share. If Trump were really interested in impacting the true trade imbalance and not just the misleading headline estimate, he would introduce tariffs on those sectors where China's value-added is highest. This would include sectors like textiles, where 75 percent of value-added is really "made in China." This brings us back to the president's other objective, which is to gain political credit by addressing historical areas of imbalance in the U.S.– China trade relationship. A key area of focus here is China's appropriation of the intellectual property (IP) of American businesses. This comes from three activities: corporate espionage, cybertheft and technology in exchange for market access. The latter results from a longstanding Chinese policy that requires any foreign company wishing to do business in China to first form a joint venture with a Chinese firm. A common complaint about these joint ventures is that they open the door for Chinese companies potentially to steal trade secrets and then use that IP to build and grow Chinese industries in everything from cars and phones to medicine. The U.S. government estimates that these alleged IP appropriations, along with direct corporate espionage, which go back as far as the 1990s, have cost the U.S. economy a lot, somewhere between $225 billion to $600 billion a year. China indeed appears to have been the better poker player. While these are valid concerns that should be addressed, it's too little too late. The truth is, China no longer needs these joint-venture rules in many industries, with several sectors and companies already competitive with their counterparts in the United States. In fact, in April 2018 China agreed to ease its rules on foreign auto companies operating in China, a clear signal that the quality of Chinese cars, including autonomous and electric vehicles, is rapidly increasing. It also just announced that foreigners would no longer need specific permissions to invest; they would just be prohibited from investing in a "negative list" of industries. What is China trying to accomplish? For China a trade war with the United States is likely to be more like the loss of a five-of-spades than the queen-of-hearts. China exports more than $2 trillion of goods a year, only about $400 to $500 billion of which goes to the United States. (On a value-added basis, only two-thirds of that is " made in China".) While the United States is indeed China's biggest trading partner, China has plenty of other markets to sell to, including the increasingly wealthy regions of Southeast Asia and India. China also has made significant inroads into Latin America and Africa via its funding of major government-sponsored and private infrastructure projects, an investment that could pay significant dividends down the road, since these potential consumers would already be familiar with many Chinese brands. "China exports more than $2 trillion of goods a year, only about $400 to $ 500 billion of which goes to the United States." President Xi Jinping has a longer-term vision for China 2025, which includes a blueprint for moving China up the value chain and increasing the domestic content of core materials in Chinese products. The goal is to lead the world in advanced technologies, like artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, electric cars, green technologies and biotechnology. The early results show this plan is paying off and China is already emerging as a global leader in AI, renewable energy and electric vehicles, among other sectors. This technological advancement is tied to the recent trade talks in that China is increasingly incentivized to protect its own IP rather than trying to steal foreign IP. We are reaching the critical crossover point in China where the return on IP theft is falling toward zero and the return on IP protection may soon rise above zero. The reality is that many of the Trump administration's articulated demands are things that China is already doing, albeit at a somewhat slower pace. The United States wants China to buy more American goods and services — and so does China. Trump wants to impose stiff tariffs to prevent China from flooding the American market with increasingly less expensive technological products, like smartphones, computers and related accessories, which collectively comprise China's biggest exports to the United States. And China agrees — they want to export higher value-added goods, especially those with a high innovation content. Interests are much more aligned than either country wants to admit. The Chinese government believes the problem they are trying to solve is how to be a vibrant economy over the next 20-plus years and to be the global leader in dynamic industries with technology self-sufficiency. On the other hand, the United States has not acted as if the problem they are trying to solve is how to create a dynamic economy based on innovation that keeps the United States vibrant over the next 20 or 30 years. It looks a bit more like the United States is trying to improve domestic polling numbers before the midterm elections in November 2018. Above all else, the Trump–Xi trade shenanigans seem to underscore the different agendas at play here: one oriented toward political posturing and "winning" against a dubious scorecard, and the other focused on economic realities and a long-term development strategy. While the United States will undoubtedly declare victory, China seems to hold all the aces. —By Teresa Barger, co-founder and CEO of emerging markets activist fund Cartica Management 【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】 : 因为时机掌握的非常好。 : 虽然贸易战互相伤害，是双输，但贸易战总有结束的一天，一般也比较快，结束的时候 : ，谁better off,谁就是最后的赢家，从目前来看，美国一定会得到大部分她想要的。 : 尼玛看看贸易战的这些美国对手 : 欧洲经济刚刚复苏，但意大利这个欧盟第三大国出现黑天鹅事件，欧洲还很脆弱。中国 : 股市今天已经创下了20个月的新低，大批股票“闪崩”已经成为常态，实体经济乏力， : 房地产经济对国民经济的绑架越发明显，泡沫化严重。加拿大，墨西哥这些严重依赖美 : 国的就不说了。 : 而美国不仅现在经济形势一片大好，而且降税政策的红利都还远远没有显现。相比以上 : 这些国家严重依赖外贸，特别是对美国这个最大消费市场的依赖，美国的经济增长主要 : ...................
虽然贸易战互相伤害，是双输，但贸易战总有结束的一天，一般也比较快，结束的时候，谁better off,谁就是最后的赢家，从目前来看，美国一定会得到大部分她想要的。
尼玛看看贸易战的这些美国对手
欧洲经济刚刚复苏，但意大利这个欧盟第三大国出现黑天鹅事件，欧洲还很脆弱。中国股市今天已经创下了20个月的新低，大批股票“闪崩”已经成为常态，实体经济乏力，房地产经济对国民经济的绑架越发明显，泡沫化严重。加拿大，墨西哥这些严重依赖美国的就不说了。
而美国不仅现在经济形势一片大好，而且降税政策的红利都还远远没有显现。相比以上这些国家严重依赖外贸，特别是对美国这个最大消费市场的依赖，美国的经济增长主要来自投资和内需。如果真打起贸易战来，美国会有损失，但这些国家的损失很有可能是无法承受的。
所以别看这些国家叫得响，最后都会色厉内荏，和美国妥协的。美国现在用打贸易战来胁迫这些长期占美国便宜的国家修改贸易条款，可谓抓住了时机。
这些傻逼叫得响，其实根本没有抵抗之力，被川普全部按倒干翻。
【 在 dlc (dalaocu) 的大作中提到: 】
: 属实。
: 这些傻逼叫得响，其实根本没有抵抗之力，被川普全部按倒干翻。
【 在 arayashiki (alaya) 的大作中提到: 】
: 不奇怪，老将在心里面赢了土鳖几亿次了
如果他们倒向中国，美国一人挑全球，他能赢个屁呀？
如果他们中立，中美单挑，大家两败俱伤；
如果他们紧跟美国，中国估计要吃大亏。
这次的贸易战，中国赢得可能性很小，就看能不能控制损失了。
你倒是心里赢了无数回了吧，这是生活在梦里
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美国不是总赢，但根据你们的宣传，你鳖从没输过好伐。
【 在 awaydream (昆仑天下) 的大作中提到: 】
: 那要看欧洲还有美国的其他伙伴，比如加拿大，墨西哥等往哪边倒。
: 如果他们倒向中国，美国一人挑全球，他能赢个屁呀？
: 如果他们中立，中美单挑，大家两败俱伤；
: 如果他们紧跟美国，中国估计要吃大亏。
: 这次的贸易战，中国赢得可能性很小，就看能不能控制损失了。
美国以前可能输过很多回，但我看这次赢的几率很大。
【 在 arayashiki (alaya) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我从来没说土鳖赢了
: 你倒是心里赢了无数回了吧，这是生活在梦里
就德国来说，丫的在中国赚到的利益肯定比在美国搞到的多。
很多文章可以做的，就看能不能做好了。
当然了，天天在家里吹牛逼，“厉害了，我的国！”，肯定是不行的。
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美国的大多数伙伴和中国的矛盾其实更大，和中美矛盾类似，都担心中国抢蛋糕。况且
: 人家是家里人内部矛盾，指望他们和中国一起对付美国，一厢情愿罢了。
胡乱吹捧就是小人作风，看你这文风，要是在土鳖那边估计就跟媒体那些无耻文人差不多吧
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 别谦虚了，你鳖从来就是从胜利走向胜利好不好
: 美国以前可能输过很多回，但我看这次赢的几率很大。
【 在 microyu (yu) 的大作中提到: 】
: 输赢且不论，西方人心散了。没个十年弥合不了
他可以给你印成一文不值。你说欠债的牛逼，还是债主的牛逼？
【 在 foofy (不才) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美国债务是最后的胜利者
【 在 BroncosFan(野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 色厉内荏，特别是像加拿大这样的国家，最近大家拿左派还搞了个什么“抵制美国产品
: ”的运动，挺他们那个声名狼藉的总理小土豆，也不想想自己几斤几两。
【 在 awaydream (昆仑天下) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美国有印钞机，可以无限印钞，你花真金白银换来的绿钞票，
: 他可以给你印成一文不值。你说欠债的牛逼，还是债主的牛逼？
【 在 arayashiki (alaya) 的大作中提到: 】
: 今天15号了，今天不推出500亿关税你说是赢了吗？
: 胡乱吹捧就是小人作风，看你这文风，要是在土鳖那边估计就跟媒体那些无耻文人差不
: 多吧
【 在 dlc (dalaocu) 的大作中提到: 】
: 属实。
: 这些傻逼叫得响，其实根本没有抵抗之力，被川普全部按倒干翻。
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我支持你。妈的北美国也像蝗虫国一样，因为房价高涨都忘了自己几斤几两了。只有让
: 北美国货币跌成屎，北美国才能找回自我。
:
: 色厉内荏，特别是像加拿大这样的国家，最近大家拿左派还搞了个什么“抵制美
: 国产品
:
: ”的运动，挺他们那个声名狼藉的总理小土豆，也不想想自己几斤几两。
:
“局长，您真是英明神武啊”
“局长，您这讲话真是高屋建瓴”
“局长，您要好好保重身体多为人民服务啊”
“局长, ...”
以下自己脑补
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 厉害了你的国铺天盖地不见小将你抨击。发个帖子就被你上纲上线，小将你可真有脸哈。
【 在 offlimit (nothing) 的大作中提到: 】
: 老汉奸很喜欢发表这样的言论，不论真假。 不知道是什么样的混蛋爹妈养出来的。
当你把东西换成美元的时候，你就已经受美联储管，处于被动地位了。
这就是为什么中国一直想推人民币国际化，但是，人民币连只有兑换都做不到，
国际化就是空中楼阁！
【 在 foofy (不才) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美元最大持有者是美国人自己
【 在 BroncosFan(野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 你现在在哪儿，听说你安大略也待不下去了，因为选了保守党
【 在 arayashiki (alaya) 的大作中提到: 】
: 国内怎么铺天盖地我又不去看，看了你这帖子我立即浮现了经典场景：
: “局长，您真是英明神武啊”
: “局长，您这讲话真是高屋建瓴”
: “局长，您要好好保重身体多为人民服务啊”
: “局长, ...”
: 以下自己脑补
: 哈。
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 天天发表厉害了我的国，人类命运共同体，习主席中国梦，一带一路大发展才是正常爹
: 妈养出来的？
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 在欧洲。安大略主要是因为蝗虫入侵太多，房价炒高，所以选出保守党驱赶蝗虫。
:
: 你现在在哪儿，听说你安大略也待不下去了，因为选了保守党
:
倒是你，在国内那肯定是舔将一枚
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 厉害国帖子让你开心，这种帖子让你不舒服，承认一下有多难？
【 在 BroncosFan(野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 像你这样的，适合在北欧生活，经金发碧眼的帅哥多，又比较开放不保守。
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 因为时机掌握的非常好。
: 虽然贸易战互相伤害，是双输，但贸易战总有结束的一天，一般也比较快，结束的时候
: ，谁better off,谁就是最后的赢家，从目前来看，美国一定会得到大部分她想要的。
: 尼玛看看贸易战的这些美国对手
: 欧洲经济刚刚复苏，但意大利这个欧盟第三大国出现黑天鹅事件，欧洲还很脆弱。中国
: 股市今天已经创下了20个月的新低，大批股票“闪崩”已经成为常态，实体经济乏力，
: 房地产经济对国民经济的绑架越发明显，泡沫化严重。加拿大，墨西哥这些严重依赖美
: 国的就不说了。
: 而美国不仅现在经济形势一片大好，而且降税政策的红利都还远远没有显现。相比以上
: 这些国家严重依赖外贸，特别是对美国这个最大消费市场的依赖，美国的经济增长主要
: ...................
【 在 offlimit (nothing) 的大作中提到: 】
: 就你这逻辑思维确实是SB 养出来的。
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 冬天太长。老板要我搬欧洲很久了，我觉得还是就夏天来3个月还可以。
:
: 像你这样的，适合在北欧生活，经金发碧眼的帅哥多，又比较开放不保守。
:
【 在 doublefishII (水鬼归来) 的大作中提到: 】
: 傻帽一个，美国战略上的赢根本不可实现，战术上的小赢完全没有意义，而且将来弄不
: 好被报复死得会很惨，参见匈奴，更重要的是这都不大可能
: 你这种小将，屁都说不出来几个，就知道上来谩骂。问题是，你骂有个鸟用哦。你鳖骂
: 了美国几十年，最后还不是建立新型大国关系才过上好日子。你多学学业务，少一些谩
: 骂，对你是好事。
属实，你憋操了美国30年算输
在贸易的天平不平衡了，你鳖人口红利耗尽，美国不想让蛋糕，所以要通过贸易战博弈。
【 在 lsunspot (小手) 的大作中提到: 】
: 属实，你憋操了美国30年算输
【 在 cameross (CameroSS) 的大作中提到: 】
: 美国还没强到栓条狗都能统治世界的程度…
【 在 awaydream (昆仑天下) 的大作中提到: 】
: 这只是印钞而已，还可以像制裁伊朗一样，冻结中国的美元资产。
: 当你把东西换成美元的时候，你就已经受美联储管，处于被动地位了。
: 这就是为什么中国一直想推人民币国际化，但是，人民币连只有兑换都做不到，
: 国际化就是空中楼阁！
【 在 awaydream (昆仑天下) 的大作中提到: 】
: 这只是印钞而已，还可以像制裁伊朗一样，冻结中国的美元资产。
: 当你把东西换成美元的时候，你就已经受美联储管，处于被动地位了。
: 这就是为什么中国一直想推人民币国际化，但是，人民币连只有兑换都做不到，
: 国际化就是空中楼阁！
【 在 foofy (不才) 的大作中提到: 】
: 中国可以冻结美国公司在中国资产，例如大众汽车，intel芯片厂
【 在 foofy (不才) 的大作中提到: 】
: 中国可以冻结美国公司在中国资产，例如大众汽车，intel芯片厂
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我的天，你不会真是廊坊的吧?大众汽车是美国资产？
【 在 greendot (清风抚山岗) 的大作中提到: 】
: 那就离打仗不远了吧，人生要完整了？
【 在 BroncosFan(野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 你这种小将，屁都说不出来几个，就知道上来谩骂。问题是，你骂有个鸟用哦。你鳖骂
: 了美国几十年，最后还不是建立新型大国关系才过上好日子。你多学学业务，少一些谩
: 骂，对你是好事。
土财主计较眼前利益，饮鸩止渴，短期利好，长期就是美国死亡之路。
高盛首席经济师说减税红利见顶，美联储主席辞职。就是知道特朗普傻逼太计较眼前小利。
这些所谓经济学家脸都肿得不能看了
【 在 classicfree (free) 的大作中提到: 】
: 特朗普和疮粉鸡巴就是鼠目寸光，爷爷开妓院，他爹地产商，
: 土财主计较眼前利益，饮鸩止渴，短期利好，长期就是美国死亡之路。
: 高盛首席经济师说减税红利见顶，美联储主席辞职。就是知道特朗普傻逼太计较眼前小
: 利。
【 在 classicfree (free) 的大作中提到: 】
: 特朗普和疮粉鸡巴就是鼠目寸光，爷爷开妓院，他爹地产商，
: 土财主计较眼前利益，饮鸩止渴，短期利好，长期就是美国死亡之路。
: 高盛首席经济师说减税红利见顶，美联储主席辞职。就是知道特朗普傻逼太计较眼前小
: 利。
【 在 ragged (ragged) 的大作中提到: 】
: 狗汉奸就是说你这种狗
:
: 你这种小将，屁都说不出来几个，就知道上来谩骂。问题是，你骂有个鸟用哦。
: 你鳖骂
:
: 了美国几十年，最后还不是建立新型大国关系才过上好日子。你多学学业务，少
: 一些谩
:
: 骂，对你是好事。
:
中国向美国服软是不可能的，美国要阻止德就是中国崛起，中国政府的中国梦都给P民
吹出去了，下不来台。
【 在 Shotgun1984 (喷子) 的大作中提到: 】
: 其他西方六国向美国服软是可能的，因为本来美国要求的也不高。
: 中国向美国服软是不可能的，美国要阻止德就是中国崛起，中国政府的中国梦都给P民
: 吹出去了，下不来台。
下。天黑的也早。欧洲冬天不能呆。
【 在 BroncosFan(野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 冬天去南欧度假就行了嘛。
【 在 quovadis (My shit is your gourmet) 的大作中提到: 】
: 南欧冬天也冷死。最南面的直布罗陀，冬天最高温度也就15度，晚上很冷，能到5度以
: 下。天黑的也早。欧洲冬天不能呆。
:
: 冬天去南欧度假就行了嘛。
:
【 在 awaydream (昆仑天下) 的大作中提到: 】
: 那要看欧洲还有美国的其他伙伴，比如加拿大，墨西哥等往哪边倒。
: 如果他们倒向中国，美国一人挑全球，他能赢个屁呀？
: 如果他们中立，中美单挑，大家两败俱伤；
: 如果他们紧跟美国，中国估计要吃大亏。
: 这次的贸易战，中国赢得可能性很小，就看能不能控制损失了。
【 在 BroncosFan(野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 去希腊
: 中国可以冻结美国公司在中国资产，例如大众汽车，intel芯片厂
大众是德国的公司。
疮普能感受到你对他比你爹还亲吗。会不会赏你全家一泡黄金雨golden shower。
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 你这个小将躲在阴暗的角落骂川普祖宗八代，他听得到吗？
疮普能感受到你对他比你爹还亲吗。会不会赏你全家一泡黄金雨golden shower。
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 你这个小将躲在阴暗的角落骂川普祖宗八代，他听得到吗？
【 在 classicfree (free) 的大作中提到: 】
: 你傻逼应该问的是你这么远程给疮普舔肛，屎糊了一嘴，
: 疮普能感受到你对他比你爹还亲吗。会不会赏你全家一泡黄金雨golden shower。
中必赢
【 在 higerg (higerg) 的大作中提到: 】
: 现在趋势就是美国被其他国家隔离了，加拿大，欧洲和中国准备一起玩。
【 在 higerg (higerg) 的大作中提到: 】
: 现在趋势就是美国被其他国家隔离了，加拿大，欧洲和中国准备一起玩。
这就是美国的不可替代性。
说白了，各国都是乙方，只有美国是甲方。乙方无法倒向另一个乙方。
【 在 awaydream (昆仑天下) 的大作中提到: 】
: 那要看欧洲还有美国的其他伙伴，比如加拿大，墨西哥等往哪边倒。
: 如果他们倒向中国，美国一人挑全球，他能赢个屁呀？
: 如果他们中立，中美单挑，大家两败俱伤；
: 如果他们紧跟美国，中国估计要吃大亏。
: 这次的贸易战，中国赢得可能性很小，就看能不能控制损失了。
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 别谦虚了，你鳖从来就是从胜利走向胜利好不好
: 美国以前可能输过很多回，但我看这次赢的几率很大。
【 在 pinnacleman (33) 的大作中提到: 】
: 要有多傻才相信美国经济现在好。明年美国就会衰退。现在和2007年太像了。
【 在 awaydream (昆仑天下) 的大作中提到: 】
: 那要看欧洲还有美国的其他伙伴，比如加拿大，墨西哥等往哪边倒。
: 如果他们倒向中国，美国一人挑全球，他能赢个屁呀？
: 如果他们中立，中美单挑，大家两败俱伤；
: 如果他们紧跟美国，中国估计要吃大亏。
: 这次的贸易战，中国赢得可能性很小，就看能不能控制损失了。
【 在 Shotgun1984 (喷子) 的大作中提到: 】
: 其他西方六国向美国服软是可能的，因为本来美国要求的也不高。
: 中国向美国服软是不可能的，美国要阻止德就是中国崛起，中国政府的中国梦都给P民
: 吹出去了，下不来台。
美國總統川普宣布對中國輸美價值500億美元商品課徵關稅，北京旋即以同等規模回敬
。...
美國總統川普宣布對中國輸美價值500億美元商品課徵關稅，北京旋即以同等規模回敬
。不過，北京也表示，將對美國能源產品課徵關稅，分析師認為此舉出人意表，因為之前的關稅目標集中在農產品和汽車。美聯社
北京今天揚言對美國出口到中國的原油、天然氣和其他能源產品課徵關稅，讓石油市場錯愕，因為中國已成為美國石油最大進口國。
美國總統川普宣布對中國輸美價值500億美元商品課徵關稅，北京旋即以同等規模回敬
。不過，北京也表示，將對美國能源產品課徵關稅，分析師認為此舉出人意表，因為之前的關稅目標集中在農產品和汽車。
路透社報導，ClipperData商品研究主任史密斯（Matt Smith）說：「這下不得了，中
國現在基本上是美國原油的最大客戶，因此對原油來說，這是個問題，更別說還牽涉到煉油產品。局勢顯然出現重大變化。」
根據美國能源部數據，目前中國從美國進口約每日36萬3000桶原油，和加拿大等量齊觀，並列美國原油最大進口國。中國還進口丙烷等其他煉油產品每日20萬桶。
在頁岩油田的產量帶動下，美國能源產業整體原油產量攀升至破紀錄的每日1090萬桶，而美國目前出口約每日200萬桶，川普曾宣稱美國在能源產量的優勢和出口是美國全球
影響力的關鍵。
美國也呼籲中國等國，擴大向美國採購石油，並在華府退出2015年簽訂的伊朗核子協議後，對於向伊朗採購原油祭出限制。中國是伊朗原油的最大買主，今年第一季採購每日65萬桶原油，目前還不清楚，北京是否計畫減少向伊朗採購。
一旦實施關稅將降低中國煉油業者向美國進口原油的意願。
而中國揚言對美國能源出口課徵關稅的時間點，就在沙烏地阿拉伯和俄羅斯等主要產油國尋求在下週石油輸出國家組織（OPEC）和其他非會員國家開會中提議增產。
丹佛Drillinginfo副總裁強生（Bernadette Johnson）表示，中國也是丙烷等其他產品主要進口國，關稅會造成丙烷和多種其他產品價格上揚。她說，液化天然氣銷售業者也擔心關稅措施。
強生說：「關稅措施這樣反覆不定，造成很多市場不穩定，使得貨咪N售困難，長期（
貿易）合約難以簽訂。」
美国宣称赢了,但是所有Ace都在中国手里.
对高科技产品征税是打错了筋 中国附加值并不高，以为惩罚中国，其实惩罚美国韩国
中国贸易对美国盈利不是想象那么大，制裁效果也没这么大
中国合资企业技术转移过程已经完成，美国已经无能为力。中国企业世界做大。
美国25年没有科技突破，能被剽窃的不多。中国已经连蒙带骗把世界大部分技术集中到自己国家。
中国在许多领域经济不落后，甚至领先，美国不是考虑中国剽窃，而是需要担忧中国对技术保护
美国只是中国贸易伙伴中一个，中国2万亿外贸里，美国4000亿只是1/5，中国还有非洲，南美，亚洲，印度等许多市场。
Friday the Trump administration announced it will impose a 25 percent
tariff on up to $50 billion in Chinese goods in an effort to protect U.S.
intellectual property and technology. The decision brought an immediate
backlash from Beijing. China in retaliation said it will introduce taxation measures of the same scale and strength. As the world's two superpowers inch closer to a trade war, market experts are asking: Is this a game the United States can win?
I suspect the real answer is twofold: In part, the president wants to be
seen as reversing the loss of jobs and intellectual property to China
between 2001 and, say, 2010. But since that horse has left the barn, he
needs some other animals to round up.
His stated objective is to reduce the size of the U.S–China trade deficit
from an estimated $370 billion to $200 billion by 2020.
Fred Dufour | AFP | Getty Images
China's President Xi Jinping (L) and US President Donald Trump. As the world's two superpowers inch closer to a trade war, market experts are asking if this is a game the United States can win.
There are two obvious ways to play this: (1) China could buy more U.S. goods and services, and/or (2) America could buy fewer Chinese goods and services. Both come with drawbacks for the U.S. economy and the American people. It is hard for U.S. companies to ramp up to export more to China when they are operating at full capacity and have close to no unemployment.
But before evaluating the policy prescriptions for this problem, we must
first consider the starting point, which is flawed. The current $370 billion deficit estimate does not account for value-added. When looking at the
value-added content of Chinese exports, the U.S. deficit with China is
actually only half of what it seems. And if we then add back the U.S.
surplus in "invisibles" and how much money the United States brings back
from investments in China, the U.S.–China deficit shrinks from 2 percent of U.S. GDP to 0.8 percent, a report from Oxford Economics revealed.
More from Global Investing Hot Spots:
China determined to steal A.I. crown from US
Trade war with US could be a tipping point for China
In the case of the Apple iPhone, this means that China's exports balance
accounts for the full $500 iPhone value, when China adds only approximately $15 to $30 of the value to the phone. Most of the iPhone value accretes to
Samsung in Korea ($150) and to Apple — the brand owner and engineer. This
highlights how the normal accounting of trade flows is inherently distorted under the current trade-deficit estimates. So maybe the deck has only 25 not 52 cards.
The iPhone example also points to an area of weakness in the president's
policy prescription: If the United States introduces tariffs on China's high-tech goods, U.S. companies and consumers could indirectly end up footing
part of the bill. This is because the high-tech industries that Trump's
tariffs are focused on is where Chinese value-added has the lowest share. If Trump were really interested in impacting the true trade imbalance and not just the misleading headline estimate, he would introduce tariffs on those
sectors where China's value-added is highest. This would include sectors
like textiles, where 75 percent of value-added is really "made in China."
This brings us back to the president's other objective, which is to gain
political credit by addressing historical areas of imbalance in the U.S.–
China trade relationship. A key area of focus here is China's appropriation of the intellectual property (IP) of American businesses. This comes from
three activities: corporate espionage, cybertheft and technology in exchange for market access.
The latter results from a longstanding Chinese policy that requires any
foreign company wishing to do business in China to first form a joint
venture with a Chinese firm. A common complaint about these joint ventures
is that they open the door for Chinese companies potentially to steal trade secrets and then use that IP to build and grow Chinese industries in
everything from cars and phones to medicine.
The U.S. government estimates that these alleged IP appropriations, along
with direct corporate espionage, which go back as far as the 1990s, have
cost the U.S. economy a lot, somewhere between $225 billion to $600 billion a year. China indeed appears to have been the better poker player.
While these are valid concerns that should be addressed, it's too little too late. The truth is, China no longer needs these joint-venture rules in many industries, with several sectors and companies already competitive with
their counterparts in the United States. In fact, in April 2018 China agreed to ease its rules on foreign auto companies operating in China, a clear
signal that the quality of Chinese cars, including autonomous and electric
vehicles, is rapidly increasing. It also just announced that foreigners
would no longer need specific permissions to invest; they would just be
prohibited from investing in a "negative list" of industries.
What is China trying to accomplish?
For China a trade war with the United States is likely to be more like the
loss of a five-of-spades than the queen-of-hearts. China exports more than $2 trillion of goods a year, only about $400 to $500 billion of which goes to the United States. (On a value-added basis, only two-thirds of that is "
made in China".) While the United States is indeed China's biggest trading
partner, China has plenty of other markets to sell to, including the
increasingly wealthy regions of Southeast Asia and India.
China also has made significant inroads into Latin America and Africa via
its funding of major government-sponsored and private infrastructure
projects, an investment that could pay significant dividends down the road, since these potential consumers would already be familiar with many Chinese brands.
"China exports more than $2 trillion of goods a year, only about $400 to $
500 billion of which goes to the United States."
President Xi Jinping has a longer-term vision for China 2025, which includes a blueprint for moving China up the value chain and increasing the domestic content of core materials in Chinese products. The goal is to lead the
world in advanced technologies, like artificial intelligence, autonomous
vehicles, electric cars, green technologies and biotechnology.
The early results show this plan is paying off and China is already emerging as a global leader in AI, renewable energy and electric vehicles, among
other sectors. This technological advancement is tied to the recent trade
talks in that China is increasingly incentivized to protect its own IP
rather than trying to steal foreign IP. We are reaching the critical
crossover point in China where the return on IP theft is falling toward zero and the return on IP protection may soon rise above zero.
The reality is that many of the Trump administration's articulated demands
are things that China is already doing, albeit at a somewhat slower pace.
The United States wants China to buy more American goods and services — and so does China. Trump wants to impose stiff tariffs to prevent China from
flooding the American market with increasingly less expensive technological products, like smartphones, computers and related accessories, which
collectively comprise China's biggest exports to the United States. And
China agrees — they want to export higher value-added goods, especially
those with a high innovation content. Interests are much more aligned than
either country wants to admit.
The Chinese government believes the problem they are trying to solve is how to be a vibrant economy over the next 20-plus years and to be the global
leader in dynamic industries with technology self-sufficiency.
On the other hand, the United States has not acted as if the problem they
are trying to solve is how to create a dynamic economy based on innovation
that keeps the United States vibrant over the next 20 or 30 years. It looks a bit more like the United States is trying to improve domestic polling
numbers before the midterm elections in November 2018.
Above all else, the Trump–Xi trade shenanigans seem to underscore the
different agendas at play here: one oriented toward political posturing and "winning" against a dubious scorecard, and the other focused on economic
realities and a long-term development strategy. While the United States will undoubtedly declare victory, China seems to hold all the aces.
—By Teresa Barger, co-founder and CEO of emerging markets activist fund
Cartica Management
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 因为时机掌握的非常好。
: 虽然贸易战互相伤害，是双输，但贸易战总有结束的一天，一般也比较快，结束的时候
: ，谁better off,谁就是最后的赢家，从目前来看，美国一定会得到大部分她想要的。
: 尼玛看看贸易战的这些美国对手
: 欧洲经济刚刚复苏，但意大利这个欧盟第三大国出现黑天鹅事件，欧洲还很脆弱。中国
: 股市今天已经创下了20个月的新低，大批股票“闪崩”已经成为常态，实体经济乏力，
: 房地产经济对国民经济的绑架越发明显，泡沫化严重。加拿大，墨西哥这些严重依赖美
: 国的就不说了。
: 而美国不仅现在经济形势一片大好，而且降税政策的红利都还远远没有显现。相比以上
: 这些国家严重依赖外贸，特别是对美国这个最大消费市场的依赖，美国的经济增长主要
: ...................
美国出口加拿大贸易额是中国一倍多，和整个欧盟相当，美国。而加拿大从贸易中获利并不多，这还是美国公布数字，其实还要少。美国出口加拿大是一个大头。
特朗普想钱想疯了，一万亿减税窟窿没法填补，狂犬病乱吠乱咬。现在死怼四个经济体占了美国出口的70%。作死。
【 在 BroncosFan (野马奔驰) 的大作中提到: 】
: 色厉内荏，特别是像加拿大这样的国家，最近大家拿左派还搞了个什么“抵制美国产品
: ”的运动，挺他们那个声名狼藉的总理小土豆，也不想想自己几斤几两。