就是这些人在制定对中国的政策。MIT著名教授，商学院副院长黄亚生谈上海： Q：Indians are enamoured of Shanghai, but your most recent book has an entire chapter detailing Shanghai’s failings as an economic model. What is wrong with Shanghai? A： A successful economic model creates value for everybody, rather than for some at the expense of others. Shanghai didn’t do that. In Shanghai, the government intervened to acquire land as the sole buyer, without competition, from rural households, and gave it to domestic and international real estate developers. That creates value on huge infrastructure projects and impressive high-rises, but the average Shanghainese people’s household income has not grown relative to the rest of the country.
My hunch about Shanghai — even though I couldn’t find the data to support it — is that its growth was subsidised by the rest of China. I’ve heard that when Pudong (the Special Economic Zone in Shanghai) was built, virtually every Chinese province was required to invest there. There’s a fundamental difference between Shanghai in the 1990s and Shenzhen in the 1980s. Shenzhen’s development was a bottom-up, bootstraps model: in the 1980s, Shenzhen too drew entrepreneurs from the rest of the country, but it didn’t receive subsidies from the central government the rest of China. And my biggest concern going forward is that the Shanghai model is being repeated for the whole country. China’s model of reckless urbanisation is also distorted. Migrant workers are denied entitlements in cities, and so urban areas get a labour contribution but they don’t have to pay for it. I’m not against urbanisation; but urbanisation implies certain responsibilities and costs that are not currently reflected in the way China is urbanising itself. In China today, there’s a phrase that reflects mainstream view: political aesthetics, that is, beautiful cities for political reasons. There is a view that economic growth means gleaming airports, high-rises, six-lane highways… That’s not productive.
就是这些人在制定对中国的政策。MIT著名教授，商学院副院长黄亚生谈上海：
Q：Indians are enamoured of Shanghai, but your most recent book has an entire chapter detailing Shanghai’s failings as an economic model. What is wrong with Shanghai? A： A successful economic model creates value for everybody, rather than for some at the expense of others. Shanghai didn’t do that. In Shanghai, the government intervened to acquire land as the sole buyer, without competition, from rural households, and gave it to domestic and international real estate developers. That creates value on huge infrastructure projects and impressive high-rises, but the average Shanghainese people’s household income has not grown relative to the rest of the country.
My hunch about Shanghai — even though I couldn’t find the data to support it — is that its growth was subsidised by the rest of China. I’ve heard that when Pudong (the Special Economic Zone in Shanghai) was built, virtually every Chinese province was required to invest there. There’s a fundamental difference between Shanghai in the 1990s and Shenzhen in the 1980s. Shenzhen’s development was a bottom-up, bootstraps model: in the 1980s, Shenzhen too drew entrepreneurs from the rest of the country, but it didn’t receive subsidies from the central government the rest of China. And my biggest concern going forward is that the Shanghai model is being repeated for the whole country.
China’s model of reckless urbanisation is also distorted. Migrant workers are denied entitlements in cities, and so urban areas get a labour contribution but they don’t have to pay for it. I’m not against urbanisation; but urbanisation implies certain responsibilities and costs that are not currently reflected in the way China is urbanising itself. In China today, there’s a phrase that reflects mainstream view: political aesthetics, that is, beautiful cities for political reasons. There is a view that economic growth means gleaming airports, high-rises, six-lane highways… That’s not productive.