是的，在一个你摸不到政策规律的社会，底层和中层人靠运气和摸索才积攒，赚点小钱。那些政策由他们定的人，想怎么赚就怎么赚，普通人永远比不了。 这里把中国人投资的理念背后的原因解释的很好。 The Chinese Live, Work, and Invest Like Westerners China’s recent history means that Chinese people and the state approach decisions very differently from Westerners—in both the time frames they use and the risks they worry about most. But because human beings tend to believe that other humans make decisions as they do, this may be the most difficult assumption for Westerners to overcome. Let’s imagine the personal history of a Chinese woman who is 65 today. Born in 1955, she experienced as a child the terrible Great Leap Forward famine in which 20 million Chinese starved to death. She was a Red Guard as a teenager, screaming adoration for Chairman Mao while her parents were being re-educated for being educated. By the 1980s she was in the first generation to go back to university, and even took part in the Tiananmen Square demonstration. Then, in the 1990s, she took advantage of the new economic freedoms, becoming a 30-something entrepreneur in one of the new Special Economic Zones. She bought a flat—the first time anyone in her family’s history had owned property. Eager for experience, she took a job as an investment analyst with a Shanghai-based foreign asset manager, but despite a long-term career plan mapped out by her employer, she left that company for a small short-term pay raise from a competitor. By 2008 she was making the most of the rise in disposable incomes by buying new consumer goods that her parents could only have dreamt about. In the early 2010s she started moderating her previously outspoken political comments on Weibo as censorship tightened up. By 2020 she was intent on seeing her seven-year-old grandson and infant granddaughter (a second child had only recently become legal) do well. Had she been born in 1955 in almost any other major economy in the world, her life would have been much, much more predictable. But looking back over her life story, one can see why even many young Chinese today may feel a reduced sense of predictability or trust in what the future holds—or in what their government might do next. 重点在这下面几段 When life is (or has been within living memory) unpredictable, people tend to apply a higher discount rate to potential long-term outcomes than to short-term ones—and a rate materially higher than the one applied by people living in more-stable societies. That means not that these people are unconcerned with long-term outcomes but, rather, that their risk aversion increases significantly as the time frame lengthens. This shapes the way they make long-term commitments, especially those that entail short-term trade-offs or losses. Thus many Chinese consumers prefer the short-term gains of the stock market to locking their money away in long-term savings vehicles. As market research consistently tells us, the majority of individual Chinese investors behave more like traders. For example, a 2015 survey found that 81% of them trade at least once a month, even though frequent trading is invariably a way to destroy rather than create long-term fund value. That figure is higher than in all Western countries (for example, only 53% of U.S. individual investors trade this frequently); it’s also even higher than in neighboring Hong Kong—another Han Chinese society with a predilection for gambling and a similar, capital-gains-tax-free regime. This suggests that something distinctive to mainland China influences this behavior: long-term unpredictability that’s sufficiently recent to have been experienced by or passed on to those now buying stocks. That focus on securing short-term gain is why the young asset manager in Shanghai left a good long-term job for a relatively small but immediate pay raise—behavior that still plagues many businesses trying to retain talent and manage succession pipelines in China. People who do take long-term career risks often do so only after fulfilling their primary need for short-term security. For example, we’ve interviewed couples in which the wife “jumps into the sea” of starting her own business—becoming one of China’s many female entrepreneurs—because her husband’s stable but lower-paid state-sector job will provide the family with security. The one long-term asset class in which increasing numbers of Chinese are invested—that is, residential property, ownership of which grew from 14% of 25-to-69-year-olds in 1988 to 93% by 2008—is driven also by the need for security: Unlike all other assets, property ensures a roof over one’s head if things go wrong, in a system with limited social welfare and a history of sudden policy changes. In contrast, the government’s discount rate on the future is lower—in part because of its Leninist emphasis on control—and explicitly focused on long-term returns. The vehicles for much of this investment are still the CCP’s Soviet-style five-year plans, which include the development of what Xi has termed an “eco-civilization” built around solar energy technology, “smart cities,” and high-density, energy-efficient housing. Ambition like that can’t be realized without state intervention—relatively fast and easy but often brutal in China. By comparison, progress on these issues is for Western economies extremely slow. Decisions—by both individuals and the state—about how to invest all serve one purpose: to provide security and stability in an unpredictable world. Although many in the West may believe that China sees only opportunity in its 21st-century global plans, its motivation is very different. For much of its turbulent modern history, China has been under threat from foreign powers, both within Asia (notably Japan) and outside it (the UK and France in the mid 19th century). China’s rulers, therefore, see foreign engagement as a source less of opportunity than of threat, uncertainty, and even humiliation. They still blame foreign interference for many of their misfortunes, even if it occurred more than a century ago. For example, the British role in the Opium Wars of the 1840s kicked off a 100-year period that the Chinese still refer to as the Century of Humiliation. China’s history continues to color its view of international relations—and in large part explains its current obsession with the inviolability of its sovereignty. That history also explains the paradox that the rulers and the ruled in China operate on very different time frames. For individuals, who’ve lived through harsh times they could not control, the reaction is to make some key choices in a much more short-term way than Westerners do. Policy makers, in contrast, looking for ways to gain more control and sovereignty over the future, now play a much longer game than the West does. This shared quest for predictability explains the continuing attractiveness of an authoritarian system in which control is the central tenet. https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china
楼主觉得不舒服的是，自己的父母明明有能力，但不愿意像周围的同学父母那样花钱让孩子过得轻松一点。我觉得她的感觉没啥不对的。有的家长就是比较自私，自己的钱攥得很紧，不愿意多在孩子身上投资。我建议楼主的就是，既然看清了这一点，以后自己也对自己更好一点，也自私一点，对父母也尽到本份就行了，不用go extra miles.
不是家长不操心值得自豪 是小孩不用操心，意思就是说命好赶上了自推娃，父母不用操心，自己学习生活都安排的很好，这样的孩子当然值得家长自豪了 用现在流行语就是“别人家的孩子”，如果你家有，当然父母会自豪了
我本来想回楼主的，不小心引用了你的帖子。总之每个人解读的角度不同吧。我父母没有那么极端，但我还挺能理解楼主的心情的。不是说父母怎么不负责任了，但就是没他们嘴上说的那么好听。有些父母能提供的条件很有限，但是他们能认识到这一点，甚至主动和孩子坦言这一点，孩子会更加理解和感激父母仅有的提供。
读大学不给生活费，每次来美国你出钱买机票……不是说你不可以出钱买机票，而是每次的话……这两点 是有点奇怪- 他们是不是没多少钱啊？
lz父母完全是被眼界所限，跟爱不爱你真的没什么关系。我爹妈在我12岁的时候带我来美国，后来也是为了前途回国了，回国当然是有他自己的理由，也有人劝他说让女儿在美国读书压力轻太多了，我爸也是说，我女儿学习好，不需要。后来我在美国读了七八个月的中学就自己回国了，因为我爸妈怕我在美国待太久回国跟不上，他们继续在美国待了有一两年吧也回国了。但是我就从来没想过如果爹妈把我留在美国我肯定能轻松上名校，回国还要承受那么重的高考压力，虽然最后也上了个还不错的大学，不是top 2，是版上常规大吵top3中那几所学校的一个。我从来没有因为父母的人生选择而怀疑过他们对我的爱。
很少，但不是没有，我们高中平均每班3-5个，但不一定都去美国，澳洲加拿大英国也很多。那时候有个叫太傻还是什么的论坛，常年泡着一群申请美本的人。
而且两代人不要在一起生活，这会有很多矛盾。
他们拿了学费后还剩很多钱 也没见买什么房子 都攥在手里贬值了
你父母居然不是比尔盖子，太可恨了。
谢谢你
不至于 那时候小钢牙是很普遍的事情了 不至于很少
我觉得楼主简直奇葩，那年头能有多少父母送一个已经考上南大的成绩优秀的孩子出来自费读美本？ 比起我们这些国内读了本科，要靠拿奖学金才能出来读火坑专业的人来说，她已经远远站在起跑线前边了，居然还不满足，还怨恨父母没能做的更好。
楼主说了 她爸妈做生意的 那说明不在体制内 那他们有钱又想要男孩的话 那会儿生完全没有什么问题。别没事就往重男轻女带。不是所有父母都重男轻女的 。
是我没说清楚，他们送我出国的初衷是因为他们想移民，但又不想自己移民（因为要花钱+学英语+来美国从头开始），所以要求我出国然后给他们办父母移民。其实最省钱的路子是国内本科毕业后全奖去美国读博士，但他们觉得早点去读本科可以早点工作（那时候还不了解EB1和EB3的区别）。 父母移民就是捆绑在读美本的条件上的，我根本没有读完书回国的选项
懂楼主的点 就是父母自己选择不在深圳奋斗了就不奋斗了 但是规定好女儿必须出国奋斗，还得搞定移民
是的，在一个你摸不到政策规律的社会，底层和中层人靠运气和摸索才积攒，赚点小钱。那些政策由他们定的人，想怎么赚就怎么赚，普通人永远比不了。
这里把中国人投资的理念背后的原因解释的很好。
The Chinese Live, Work, and Invest Like Westerners China’s recent history means that Chinese people and the state approach decisions very differently from Westerners—in both the time frames they use and the risks they worry about most. But because human beings tend to believe that other humans make decisions as they do, this may be the most difficult assumption for Westerners to overcome.
Let’s imagine the personal history of a Chinese woman who is 65 today. Born in 1955, she experienced as a child the terrible Great Leap Forward famine in which 20 million Chinese starved to death. She was a Red Guard as a teenager, screaming adoration for Chairman Mao while her parents were being re-educated for being educated. By the 1980s she was in the first generation to go back to university, and even took part in the Tiananmen Square demonstration.
Then, in the 1990s, she took advantage of the new economic freedoms, becoming a 30-something entrepreneur in one of the new Special Economic Zones. She bought a flat—the first time anyone in her family’s history had owned property. Eager for experience, she took a job as an investment analyst with a Shanghai-based foreign asset manager, but despite a long-term career plan mapped out by her employer, she left that company for a small short-term pay raise from a competitor. By 2008 she was making the most of the rise in disposable incomes by buying new consumer goods that her parents could only have dreamt about. In the early 2010s she started moderating her previously outspoken political comments on Weibo as censorship tightened up. By 2020 she was intent on seeing her seven-year-old grandson and infant granddaughter (a second child had only recently become legal) do well.
Had she been born in 1955 in almost any other major economy in the world, her life would have been much, much more predictable. But looking back over her life story, one can see why even many young Chinese today may feel a reduced sense of predictability or trust in what the future holds—or in what their government might do next.
重点在这下面几段 When life is (or has been within living memory) unpredictable, people tend to apply a higher discount rate to potential long-term outcomes than to short-term ones—and a rate materially higher than the one applied by people living in more-stable societies. That means not that these people are unconcerned with long-term outcomes but, rather, that their risk aversion increases significantly as the time frame lengthens. This shapes the way they make long-term commitments, especially those that entail short-term trade-offs or losses.
Thus many Chinese consumers prefer the short-term gains of the stock market to locking their money away in long-term savings vehicles. As market research consistently tells us, the majority of individual Chinese investors behave more like traders. For example, a 2015 survey found that 81% of them trade at least once a month, even though frequent trading is invariably a way to destroy rather than create long-term fund value. That figure is higher than in all Western countries (for example, only 53% of U.S. individual investors trade this frequently); it’s also even higher than in neighboring Hong Kong—another Han Chinese society with a predilection for gambling and a similar, capital-gains-tax-free regime. This suggests that something distinctive to mainland China influences this behavior: long-term unpredictability that’s sufficiently recent to have been experienced by or passed on to those now buying stocks.
That focus on securing short-term gain is why the young asset manager in Shanghai left a good long-term job for a relatively small but immediate pay raise—behavior that still plagues many businesses trying to retain talent and manage succession pipelines in China. People who do take long-term career risks often do so only after fulfilling their primary need for short-term security. For example, we’ve interviewed couples in which the wife “jumps into the sea” of starting her own business—becoming one of China’s many female entrepreneurs—because her husband’s stable but lower-paid state-sector job will provide the family with security. The one long-term asset class in which increasing numbers of Chinese are invested—that is, residential property, ownership of which grew from 14% of 25-to-69-year-olds in 1988 to 93% by 2008—is driven also by the need for security: Unlike all other assets, property ensures a roof over one’s head if things go wrong, in a system with limited social welfare and a history of sudden policy changes.
In contrast, the government’s discount rate on the future is lower—in part because of its Leninist emphasis on control—and explicitly focused on long-term returns. The vehicles for much of this investment are still the CCP’s Soviet-style five-year plans, which include the development of what Xi has termed an “eco-civilization” built around solar energy technology, “smart cities,” and high-density, energy-efficient housing. Ambition like that can’t be realized without state intervention—relatively fast and easy but often brutal in China. By comparison, progress on these issues is for Western economies extremely slow.
Decisions—by both individuals and the state—about how to invest all serve one purpose: to provide security and stability in an unpredictable world. Although many in the West may believe that China sees only opportunity in its 21st-century global plans, its motivation is very different. For much of its turbulent modern history, China has been under threat from foreign powers, both within Asia (notably Japan) and outside it (the UK and France in the mid 19th century). China’s rulers, therefore, see foreign engagement as a source less of opportunity than of threat, uncertainty, and even humiliation. They still blame foreign interference for many of their misfortunes, even if it occurred more than a century ago. For example, the British role in the Opium Wars of the 1840s kicked off a 100-year period that the Chinese still refer to as the Century of Humiliation. China’s history continues to color its view of international relations—and in large part explains its current obsession with the inviolability of its sovereignty.
That history also explains the paradox that the rulers and the ruled in China operate on very different time frames. For individuals, who’ve lived through harsh times they could not control, the reaction is to make some key choices in a much more short-term way than Westerners do. Policy makers, in contrast, looking for ways to gain more control and sovereignty over the future, now play a much longer game than the West does. This shared quest for predictability explains the continuing attractiveness of an authoritarian system in which control is the central tenet. https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china
说的精辟，其实说到底爱子女的确还是不够多
当年上美本的expectation就是日后可以给父母办绿卡，因为当时投资移民的路子已经锁死了。没有别的选项。我成家立业了转头不给他们办绿卡了？不可能的，那才叫真正的白眼狼，站在道德制高点就能骂晕我
论迹不论心不懂吗？ 你父母送你来美国也许有自己的小算盘。但客观上难道不是让你本科就来了美国，难道不是自己支付了你在美国的大半学费？难道不是让你少了自己打工赚生活费的烦恼？ 比起我们这些本科后一路GRE，然后完全靠自己一路打拼，父母除了喊666其他也帮不了什么的人来说，你难道不是远远站在起跑线上？
原文好像是
百善孝为先，论心不论迹，论迹贫家无孝子。 万恶淫为首，论迹不论心，论心世上无好人！
往下比没个底，那我是不是还要感恩没生在非洲国家，不用天天在枪林弹雨里讨口饭吃？楼上某位mm说的好，人天生只跟自己相近的那些人比。你也之会跟与你站在同一起跑线的人比，而不会回头看看比你起跑线低的（比如没钱上大学只能出来打工的）人群比。
楼主你爸妈做的真的不怎么样，我理解你的心情，别听那帮站着说话不腰疼的乱骂，有好孩子却不好好疼爱的父母，你就不要委屈自己回报了，你对他们的怨念不会那么容易消退的，特别是在自己有孩子之后，只会越来越生气
那往上比是不是也没底。 马云出来搞淘宝时是个英文老师。按这个标准，中国50%的孩子都可以骂自己的父母：你丫当时起点比马云还高，为啥没做到首富？ 你自己达到了大学同学的最高事业成就了吗？你们大学毕业起点差不多，为啥人家事业成就比你高？ 你的起跑线在中国已经是TOP10%了，你现在无非埋怨父母没把你推到TOP1%。 你自己做的了同龄人TOP10%了吗？ 自己不知足就直接说，别给自己贴金！
说到了重点。楼主抱怨的是父母躺平但是push楼主奋斗。可怜的楼主。。。
是眼界不行，比较小农，不想做没有确定回报的投资。
我觉得楼主父母没什么做错的 在老家好好过日子，可以和家人亲戚在一起 人生苦短，这样挺好的
我觉得唯一做错的可能就是，既然自己这么豁达，为什么一定要push楼主， 但凡和楼主说你好好生活，不要压力太大 今天楼主可能就不回来发这个帖子了
楼主的父母不是靠楼主移民了吗？哪里在老家。
楼主小时候…从深圳回老家了
我自己没做到大学同学的最高点，但估计比层主你还是高的绰绰有余。
喜欢老家然后催着楼主给他们办移民？
自己喜欢去哪儿就去哪儿，想回老家了，找一个高考难考的地方让女儿去读书。然后想移民了，就催女儿给自己办。这生活得可真任性呀。一切决定以自己的喜好为中心，完全不考虑对孩子的影响。多自私的父母。
我觉得，女儿得跟着回去高考难，属于常理是吧。小时候也不能和爸爸妈妈分开，考试难那么多人都过来了，正常。
后面push楼主一定要办移民就不太好了，来读书的也不是谁都能留下来的，opt h1b一路坑
自私本来就是正常的。但是把自私说成无私伟大给人恩惠就不正常了。
是的。不过好像楼主爸妈也没这么说。 他们说的是，我女儿读书好……
主楼不是说了，天大的恩惠。
啊没看到。 不管什么情况 父母要自己对子女出口说这种话的 就挺悲哀
那你直说你就是来凡尔赛的好了。 看你回帖就知道你有怎样的玻璃心了。同意你的就贴上去，反驳你的就开始阴阳怪气。有这种玻璃心怪不到对父母这么不知足。 自己自哀自怨去吧。这是公共论坛，没人惯着你。
这个帖子里我唯一正儿八经反驳的就是你，因为你说话真是太冲了，吃了枪药似的。你得条件多差才能从这么一个普通帖子里读出凡尔赛的味道？不会好好说话就少说点，这是公共论坛，没人惯着你。
别的不说，反正我是不会为了小孩子“高考轻松一点”勉强自己在不那么喜欢的地方工作生活的…
喔，感情这论坛你家开的？你管天管地还管别人论坛发言。 公共论坛我爱说就说，你也大可以反驳。我不像楼主这么玻璃心。既然在公共论坛发言。我完全可以承受别人的反驳, 也不需要别人惯着。
非常同意
问题是，为了父母一定要留在某个地方行不行………
楼主这种人的存在就是我基本上不想养个小孩的原因…爹妈赚的钱怎么没全花楼主身上？爹妈不应该想回小城市享受生活，应该为了楼主考试简单一点违背自己的意愿留在大城市…
这是怎么失败的爹妈，养出这种小孩？到老了说不定还要发帖子抱怨“别人的爹妈工作到最后一分，我爹妈怎么还要花钱养着？”
别管那些说你是白眼狼的人，他们太幸福，没有机会体验到被骨肉至亲忽视利用当成投资工具的感觉。 你父母是不爱你的，意识到父母不爱你并且承认是一个很痛苦的事情。 你父母不爱你的原因，可能有很多，也许是他们自私爱自己超过你，也许是他们重男轻女，也许是他们自己也没有被爱过，不知道怎么爱别人，但是没有一条原因是因为你不好，他们不爱你，不是你的错。你很棒，很优秀，你的优秀也不是他们的功劳，是你自努力打拼出来的。加油！
随着父母的衰老，有谁能坦言一点儿都不嫌弃父母呢？继续不嫌弃父母有两个动力，一是封建礼教伦理孝道，二是想起父母年轻的时候对自己的爱，但是楼主找不到。
只有 爱，才能换来爱。前提，真正的爱，非 喊口号。
人心都是肉长的。真正得到父母爱的孩子，看到父母衰老而痛心，必然会给予父母以真正的关爱。
对孩子不好的父母，最好祈祷 自己的孩子永远不要醒悟。一旦这孩子醒悟，他们就真正失去孩子了。道德绑架，可以把他们的孩子日日绑在身边，然而，并没有半点真挚的感情交流。没 有 爱。
那时候出国读本科的也不少，我好多朋友都是出国读的本科，都是79年80年生的。
说服自己父母不爱你你就也不用爱父母了，也不用管父母了，你自己棒棒哒什么都好，都是父母的错，就心安理得了是不是？ 除非父母真的身体或精神虐待你了，否则只是付出得不够就要被嫌弃，妥妥的白眼狼。
抱抱楼主。你不是一个人。我小的时候爸妈不带我旅游，说“那有什么意思”。现在说“趁老人还能走动，子女应该多带他们旅游”。
我小时候他们总说“攀比吃穿是虚荣”，给我买地摊的衣服。现在我妈拿着名牌的单子让我买，说“子女就应该打扮父母”
我父母由于工作关系帮很多人为子女高考转户口。我高考时我妈说好多人转了户口却考砸了，所以不给我转了。
我曾经竭尽全力回报父母，哪怕自己节衣缩食。我也快不惑了，也想了很多。不认为你是白眼狼。觉得你一直努力很辛苦很优秀，也已经帮了父母很多了。没法改变过去，没法改变别人。我们能做的就是让自己努力开心快乐
还有那个投资移民，你也是只看见贼吃肉没看见贼挨打。投资的钱不是钱？会不会打水漂？最终不还是跟没花钱的结果一样。
这个真是脑子有问题了。
对 最讨厌的是爸妈从来不承认自己错了 做错了决定 而是要说 他们是没办法 他们有没有办法我们还不知道？明明就是故意没办法 他们要是老农民真没办法 lz也不会吐槽 就是明明有实力却选择躺平
最坑的父母表面扮演独生子女everything is for u 到现实生活 心里又是别的小算盘
说的不是真的吧，上海的蓝印户口那是几十年前的事了，和流行出国留学当中差了几十年吧
就普通父母,不算极品
希望将来你的孩子不要一堆不满，然后来和你一一计较。希望你能完美，让孩子上最好的私立小学、高中，捐五千万$以上，保证把孩子送入大藤，或者你做不到这些，你家孩子能宽恕你
我做不到这些，同时我也不对子女有啥期待，无论经济上还是精神上。一年能来看我一两次就可以了。
现在的孩子就是greedy，好像父母所有打算都要围着你转，还老和其他父母比较。父母不欠你，给你多少就拿多少吧。
楼主父母Top1%的富有，楼主都很不满。赞同楼主，可以啊！父母可以很穷，可以都做不到，孩子来不来看父母，就是孩子的自由了
楼主父母当年把给楼主留学的钱，和当时所有钱，拿去深圳买房，对楼主一毛不拔，但是现在手上有十套房子，结果就是楼主现在会跪舔父母！
生儿子生女儿不重要，当父母的要自强，这是普遍真理，当老婆，当婆婆，当老公都得自强。刚看完“理想之城”，观林小北的结局有感！
楼主觉得不舒服的是，自己的父母明明有能力，但不愿意像周围的同学父母那样花钱让孩子过得轻松一点。我觉得她的感觉没啥不对的。有的家长就是比较自私，自己的钱攥得很紧，不愿意多在孩子身上投资。我建议楼主的就是，既然看清了这一点，以后自己也对自己更好一点，也自私一点，对父母也尽到本份就行了，不用go extra miles.
高考那个暑假才开始申请，开学就能上美本了？？
对父母要求真高，对父母不满了，还能找不出错？比渣男挑老婆错，还差劲
如果不高标准要求父母对自己好，也就不高标准要求自己对父母好，这公平吧？对父母养育子女要求低（在父母自身情况下衡量），而对自己回报父母要求高，这个要求本身就不合理，非道德绑架做不到。
好笑，楼主是top1%富有，又全心对待父母？楼主目前为止，父母留学的钱，花了也就花了吧！真象真的，哈哈哈哈哈
楼主要是帮父母办了移民，自己讨厌美国，跑回国去了，那还真是为父母办移民了。现在自己想在美国生活，顺手替父母办个移民，这么计较，还拿网上贴父母大字报，也真是醉了
楼主父母想移民，走投资移民的路得花几十万到一百万，楼主帮他们办了移民，难道帮她父母省的钱抵不上两年本科学费？
你真能在亲情里算计，那我就来帮你算。我周围朋友一堆投移的，听说也就押个二、三年五十万，一百万而已，谁象学费这么拿不回来的？
同意，楼主你要想开些，对他人不要太多期望要求，即使是你的最亲的人，相比很多有毒的父母，你父母算是不错的了。
移民申请人须投资50万美元于区域中心内的投资项目，为期5年。另有3-5万美元不等的发行费用。另外什么叫投资？投资就意味着有亏钱的风险，不止是损失5年利息。很多办投资移民的最后都亏钱了，只不过办的人不在乎，就当花钱买绿卡了。
什么叫在亲情里计算？楼主爸妈没计算吗？楼主爸妈周围朋友办高考移民，办美国移民的时候，他们自己心里没计算过？没衡量过？爸妈花在子女身上的钱花不花可以计算，子女就不能计算了？计算了就成不孝了？
我也不是在怂恿楼主不管父母了，其实相反我觉得楼主父母做得没啥不对的。各尽本份之余，每个人把自己生活过好，自己小家为重，不要当孩子奴，也不要当父母奴。
什么事情是事先有保证的？象真的一样，付了学费，楼主好象保证能拿到绿卡？风险不比投够低。懒得跟你说了，一看你这种人就活得累，还没几个钱，全把劲花在计较上了。穷人就是思路不对头，楼主和你都是穷，然后怨气就重。
这都能嫌父母对自己还是不够好，确实无语了。 楼主的问题是，父母没有按照她的愿望最大程度为她铺路，觉得和别的熟人比，吃亏了。楼主认定，她觉得最好的那条路，才是最佳的，才配得上自己，否则委屈了，开始怀疑父母是否自私，对自己的爱有所保留。
我孩子都工作了。别说父母，我公婆都是长期我们养着，而且没给我带过一天孩子。就冲我公婆把我老公养大，我就感恩。
我咋觉得读书工作拿绿卡比投资靠谱多了呢，，，至少比中概股靠谱多了。😂