回楼上一位妹子的要求，拷贝过来原文，也许有些许遗漏混乱 对不住，将就看吧。 文中明确说明了撤军没有采用前任的部署 导致了目前的局面 摘自 八月二十一日 经济学人 周刊 第十一页 Biden’s debacle The fiasco in Afghanistan is a huge and unnecessary blow to America’s standing If the propagandists of America’s 20year mission to reshape Afghanistan, they of the Taliban had scripted the collapse could not have come up with more harrowing images. As insurgents swept into Kabul, desperate Afghans, terrified about what the victorious zealots might do, chased departing American cargo planes down the runway, trying to clamber into the landing gear and inevitably falling to their deaths. The American backed government had surrendered without a fight—something that American officials were insisting would not happen only days before. Afghans were left in such a horrifying bind that clinging to the wheels of a hurtling aircraft seemed their best option. America has spent $2trn in Afghanistan; more than 2,000 American lives have been lost, not to mention countless Afghan ones. And yet, even if Afghans are more prosperous now than when America invaded, Afghanistan is back to square one. The Taliban control more of the country than they did when they lost power, they are better armed, having seized the weapons America showered on the Afghan army, and they have now won the ultimate affirmation: defeating a superpower. The insurgents have made a show of magnanimity, pledging that they will not take revenge on those who worked for the toppled government and insisting that they will respect women’s rights, within their interpretation of Islamic law. But that interpretation kept most girls out of school and most women confined to their homes when the group was last in power, in the 1990s. Brutal punishments—floggings, stonings, amputations—were common. The freedoms that urban Afghans took for granted over the past 20 years have just gone up in smoke. It is an appalling outcome for Afghanistan’s 39m people, and deeply damaging for America (see Briefing). It is not surprising that America failed to turn Afghanistan into a democracy. Nationbuilding is difficult, and few imagined that it could become Switzerland. Nor was it unreasonable for Joe Biden, America’s president, to want to draw the conflict to a close. America has spent 20 years in a place of only modest strategic importance about which most American voters have long since ceased to care. The original reason for the invasion—to dismantle alQaeda’s main base of operations—was largely achieved, though that achievement could now be reversed. The claim that America is showing itself to be a fickle ally by allowing the Afghan government to fall is also overblown, given the duration, scale and expense of the American deployment. The defunct regime in Kabul was not an ally in the way that Germany or Japan is. It was far weaker, more corrupt and completely dependent on America for its survival. But none of that absolved America of the responsibility to withdraw in an orderly fashion. Mr Biden failed to show even a modicum of care for the welfare of ordinary Afghans (see Lexington). The irony is that America had a plan to do just that, which had been in the works for several years. It had hugely scaled down its garrison, from around 100,000 troops in 2011 to fewer than 10,000 by 2017, along with a similar number from other nato countries. They were not supposed to defeat the Taliban, but prevent the Afghan army’s collapse, largely through air power, and so force the Taliban to the negotiating table. Apologists for Mr Biden argue that his predecessor, Donald Trump, had already scuppered this plan by trying to rush it to a conclusion before last year’s presidential election in America. It is true that Mr Trump was so desperate to strike a quick deal that he accepted preposterous terms, agreeing to end America’s deployment without even securing a ceasefire, let alone a clear plan to end the civil war. He had already reduced the American presence to little more than 2,000 soldiers by the time Mr Biden took office, and had promised to get the rest out by May 1st. But Mr Biden did not have to stick to this agreement. In fact, he didn’t entirely, refusing to keep to the original timetable. The Taliban were clearly not holding up their end of the bargain, pressing their advantage on the battlefield instead of negotiating in good faith with the Afghan government. That could have been grounds to halt or reverse the American withdrawal. There was little political pressure within America to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Yet Mr Biden was working to an arbitrary and flippant deadline of his own, seeking to end the war by the 20th anniversary of 9/11. Although the speed of the Afghan government’s implosion surprised most observers, including this newspaper, America’s soldiers and politicians were among the most naively optimistic, insisting that a total collapse was a vanishingly remote prospect. And when it became clear that the Afghan army was melting away, Mr Biden pressed on intransigently, despite the likely consequences. As a result, America’s power to deter its enemies and reassure its friends has diminished. Its intelligence was flawed, its planning rigid, its leaders capricious and its concern for allies minimal. That is likely to embolden jihadists everywhere, who will take the Taliban’s victory as evidence that God is on their side. It will also encourage adventurism on the part of hostile governments such as Russia’s or China’s (see Chaguan), and worry America’s friends. Mr Biden has defended the withdrawal by arguing that Afghanistan was a distraction from more pressing problems, such as America’s rivalry with China. But by leaving Afghanistan in such a chaotic fashion, Mr Biden will have made those other problems harder to deal with. After the fall The shambolic withdrawal does not reduce the obligation of America and its allies to ordinary Afghans, but increases it. They should use what leverage they still have to urge moderation on the Taliban, especially in their treatment of women. The displaced will need humanitarian aid. Western countries should also admit more Afghan refugees, the ranks of whom are likely to swell, and provide generous assistance to Afghanistan’s neighbours to look after those who remain in the region. The haste of European leaders to declare that they cannot take in many persecuted Afghans even as violent zealots seize control is almost as lamentable as America’s botched exit. It is too late to save Afghanistan, but there is still time to help its people. By Invitation On Economist.com we begin a series on the future of American power. Francis Fukuyama looks at the forces shaping the country''s global standing in the 20 years since 9/11, from the rise of China to the withdrawal from Afghanistan
这些change 都是08当总统后引起，美国变成南非日子不会太遥远。
奥巴马就是美国的曼德拉
非常同意！
比起南非化，拉美化更明显一些，毕竟老墨人多一倍。洛杉矶感觉有一半是老墨区域，感觉挺南美的，有的地方看着热热闹闹还挺喜欢的。到现在为止，老墨还都安定平和。老黑大闹至少两回了吧，如果再闹我就跟着去商场搬大彩电了，我家缺这个，😄😄😄
借你吉言，我只要日子太平就满足。我觉得美国维稳是第一要务，听起来挺逗。美国现在地大人少，关起门来内卷可以过得很舒服，招惹那些穆斯林干嘛，撤军是对的。美国在海外一兵一卒都是浪费纳税人的钱。
嗯嗯。还是很thought provoking的。
为什么要change心里没数？？不是布什把搞砸了，大家要过得开心要啥change？
美国从建国初就是极化的…只是成为世界老大之后目前最极化。
现在有了tg这个对手 美国感到了危机，是好事儿。
你是在说梦话吗？那些基建的钱不是印出来分给几个主党大佬的吗，还有他吸毒的儿子，华尔街的七大姑八大姨。
给个链接吧。所有的消亡都始于兄弟阋墙
在你眼里共和党都是sb啊，一点监督力都没有？哈哈
我一直都在纳闷呢，不是共和党最喜爱基建吗？简直给地产商川普送大礼呢？
看翻墙吸NC粉的粉红油罐综合症吧，有你说的实锤合党不乐死了lol
你是在说梦话吗？那些基建的钱不是印出来分给几个主党大佬的吗，还有他吸毒的儿子，华尔街的七大姑八大姨。
华尔街的七大姑八大姨都和中国有很深的利益关联，所以他们都希望中国能赢
没错！如果那时像现在网络时代，大家都会觉得美国要亡国了吧。
期盼有个好总统的出现，美国不缺人才。
no, no, no,
Barack Hussein Obama 就是肯尼亚的Barry Soetoro
拜登连印钱发福利都做得一塌糊涂。钱来的容易，谁还去上班？
同仇敌忾一致对外是什么鬼？现在这些闹的跟60年代民权运动反战运动比根本就是过家家。
基建就算了吧，社区一条小路都能修3年呢，别劳民伤财了。
凝聚力这个东西很奇妙的 到底要怎么provoke我也不知道
同仇敌忾 一致对外打了伊拉克，然后毁了美国。呵呵 还是算了吧
真能扯，奥巴马除了皮是黑的，他内心就是个白人
想维稳的，赶快滚回国
希望如此吧。但现在教育新闻全面左倾，那时也没有这么多非移缠头，人口结构的改变最不可逆。
能贴出来他的文章吗？
支持非法移民越多越好 先把白人弄到50%以下
林肯是美国的啥？内战打了一场，死了60万人，烧了亚特兰大，把南方摧毁了。
关起门来过一个世纪也过得去 啥资源不缺 还可以和加拿大合作取暖
同仇敌忾，一致对外 只是因为911 没有911也不会有 看看六七十年代
和内战死了60万年轻人，亚特兰大烧光，现在是啥p事？
这个网站的人历史知识好贫乏！
最后一句暴露龙虾党本质，看来在去领食品券的路上挨黑哥们的打还是挨少了
精神黑人绞尽脑汁挑了这么几个“白人至上”的例子，比起今年猪党治下城市亚裔收到的伤害案件，连个零头不到
对的，少数民族越多越好, 亚裔越多越好。不喜欢的人，为啥总是在这个少数民族100%的网站上？真是匪夷所思。
他们完全可以在主流网站上呆着，Oops，主流网站没人喜欢她们。
这位说的是真的吗？ 我们看后续吧
Biden’s debacle
The fiasco in Afghanistan is a huge and unnecessary blow to America’s standing If the propagandists of America’s 20year mission to reshape Afghanistan, they of the Taliban had scripted the collapse could not have come up with more harrowing images. As insurgents swept into Kabul, desperate Afghans, terrified about what the victorious zealots might do, chased departing American cargo planes down the runway, trying to clamber into the landing gear and inevitably falling to their deaths. The American backed government had surrendered without a fight—something that American officials were insisting would not happen only days before. Afghans were left in such a horrifying bind that clinging to the wheels of a hurtling aircraft seemed their best option. America has spent $2trn in Afghanistan; more than 2,000 American lives have been lost, not to mention countless Afghan ones. And yet, even if Afghans are more prosperous now than when America invaded, Afghanistan is back to square one. The Taliban control more of the country than they did when they lost power, they are better armed, having seized the weapons America showered on the Afghan army, and they have now won the ultimate affirmation: defeating a superpower. The insurgents have made a show of magnanimity, pledging that they will not take revenge on those who worked for the toppled government and insisting that they will respect women’s rights, within their interpretation of Islamic law. But that interpretation kept most girls out of school and most women confined to their homes when the group was last in power, in the 1990s. Brutal punishments—floggings, stonings, amputations—were common. The freedoms that urban Afghans took for granted over the past 20 years have just gone up in smoke. It is an appalling outcome for Afghanistan’s 39m people, and deeply damaging for America (see Briefing). It is not surprising that America failed to turn Afghanistan into a democracy. Nationbuilding is difficult, and few imagined that it could become Switzerland. Nor was it unreasonable for Joe Biden, America’s president, to want to draw the conflict to a close. America has spent 20 years in a place of only modest strategic importance about which most American voters have long since ceased to care. The original reason for the invasion—to dismantle alQaeda’s main base of operations—was largely achieved, though that achievement could now be reversed. The claim that America is showing itself to be a fickle ally by allowing the Afghan government to fall is also overblown, given the duration, scale and expense of the American deployment. The defunct regime in Kabul was not an ally in the way that Germany or Japan is. It was far weaker, more corrupt and completely dependent on America for its survival. But none of that absolved America of the responsibility to withdraw in an orderly fashion. Mr Biden failed to show even a modicum of care for the welfare of ordinary Afghans (see Lexington). The irony is that America had a plan to do just that, which had been in the works for several years. It had hugely scaled down its garrison, from around 100,000 troops in 2011 to fewer than 10,000 by 2017, along with a similar number from other nato countries. They were not supposed to defeat the Taliban, but prevent the Afghan army’s collapse, largely through air power, and so force the Taliban to the negotiating table. Apologists for Mr Biden argue that his predecessor, Donald Trump, had already scuppered this plan by trying to rush it to a conclusion before last year’s presidential election in America. It is true that Mr Trump was so desperate to strike a quick deal that he accepted preposterous terms, agreeing to end America’s deployment without even securing a ceasefire, let alone a clear plan to end the civil war. He had already reduced the American presence to little more than 2,000 soldiers by the time Mr Biden took office, and had promised to get the rest out by May 1st. But Mr Biden did not have to stick to this agreement. In fact, he didn’t entirely, refusing to keep to the original timetable. The Taliban were clearly not holding up their end of the bargain, pressing their advantage on the battlefield instead of negotiating in good faith with the Afghan government. That could have been grounds to halt or reverse the American withdrawal. There was little political pressure within America to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Yet Mr Biden was working to an arbitrary and flippant deadline of his own, seeking to end the war by the 20th anniversary of 9/11. Although the speed of the Afghan government’s implosion surprised most observers, including this newspaper, America’s soldiers and politicians were among the most naively optimistic, insisting that a total collapse was a vanishingly remote prospect. And when it became clear that the Afghan army was melting away, Mr Biden pressed on intransigently, despite the likely consequences. As a result, America’s power to deter its enemies and reassure its friends has diminished. Its intelligence was flawed, its planning rigid, its leaders capricious and its concern for allies minimal. That is likely to embolden jihadists everywhere, who will take the Taliban’s victory as evidence that God is on their side. It will also encourage adventurism on the part of hostile governments such as Russia’s or China’s (see Chaguan), and worry America’s friends. Mr Biden has defended the withdrawal by arguing that Afghanistan was a distraction from more pressing problems, such as America’s rivalry with China. But by leaving Afghanistan in such a chaotic fashion, Mr Biden will have made those other problems harder to deal with. After the fall The shambolic withdrawal does not reduce the obligation of America and its allies to ordinary Afghans, but increases it. They should use what leverage they still have to urge moderation on the Taliban, especially in their treatment of women. The displaced will need humanitarian aid. Western countries should also admit more Afghan refugees, the ranks of whom are likely to swell, and provide generous assistance to Afghanistan’s neighbours to look after those who remain in the region. The haste of European leaders to declare that they cannot take in many persecuted Afghans even as violent zealots seize control is almost as lamentable as America’s botched exit. It is too late to save Afghanistan, but there is still time to help its people.
By Invitation On Economist.com we begin a series on the future of American power. Francis Fukuyama looks at the forces shaping the country''s global standing in the 20 years since 9/11, from the rise of China to the withdrawal from Afghanistan
这就是典型偷换概念。亚裔或者华裔多当然是好事，为啥非得说“少数族裔”？ 你是不知道哪些才算是真正的有政治话语权的“少数族裔”吗？
不说“华裔”却说“少数族裔”，精黑无疑
那为啥还移民美国？亚非拉很多国家都是白人在50%以下
问题是，现在是亚裔越来越多吗？还是其它的少数族裔越来越多？
当今情形下，这是我为二订阅的杂志，里面有很多中立的文章，算不上左媒。
美国一直就是这样，每个年代人都觉得好分裂好糟糕，回头一看都不是个事。
南北战争南方挑起来的 废奴是历史必然，北方推动不管从道德上还是现实出发都没有错
作恶最大就是这个