一直觉得WSJ三观歪，有的人还觉得读它家高冷到不行是什么脑回路？去年Walter Russell Mead评中国东亚病夫的评论也是发在WSJ上，今日社评又开眼了 https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-defense-budget-squeeze-11618781173 Biden’s Defense Budget Squeeze More money for the welfare state means less for the Pentagon. President Biden’s budget proposal includes record spending for nearly every corner of government, but there’s one big exception: national defense. Even as global threats rise, notably from China, Mr. Biden is squeezing the Pentagon. Few in the media have noticed, but the White House is proposing a fiscal 2022 Pentagon budget of $715 billion. That’s a 1.6% increase from 2021’s $704 billion, but it’s a cut in the military’s spending power assuming likely inflation of more than 2%. Non-defense domestic discretionary spending will surge 16%, with the Education Department rising 41%, Health and Human Services 23% and the Environmental Protection Agency 21%. With Mr. Biden proposing a separate $2.3 trillion for “infrastructure,” you’d think the Pentagon would be included. Aircraft and naval ships are certainly more justified as public works than subsidies to buy Teslas. Mr. Biden is making a conscious statement about his party’s political priorities: butter and more butter, but less for guns. This marks a return to the downward defense spending trend of the Obama years. Defense spending as a share of GDP fell to 3.1% in fiscal 2017 from 4.7% in 2010, even as the military’s missions increased. Shrinking defense led to a readiness crisis that was showing up in more accidents and deficiencies in deployable ships and air units. The Trump Administration and GOP Congress stopped the decline, and 2020’s defense outlays were estimated at 3.3% of GDP before the pandemic shock. But the Biden budget will again force risky trade-offs between military readiness and investment in the technology and weapons of the future. The U.S. hasn’t spent less than 3% of its economic output on defense since before the September 11 attacks. But in the 1990s the U.S. military did not face peer competitors. Now the U.S. national defense strategy rightly sees an era of resurgent great power competition, but without the resources to meet the challenge. This mismatch increases the risk of miscalculation and war, as China seeks regional military dominance. Russia, Iran and lesser powers like North Korea also threaten allies and the U.S. homeland with missiles and cyber hacking. The gap between strategy and resources is most evident in the naval challenge in the Western Pacific. China has scaled up its navy to more than 350 modern ships, while the U.S. is stuck in the water at roughly 300. The Chinese figure doesn’t include a sizable covert maritime militia that is an extension of its navy. The Biden budget says the Administration will make “executable and responsible” investments in the fleet, but the ostensibly bipartisan goal of 355 ships remains remote. Perhaps the Administration will wring money from the Army after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the modest savings aren’t enough to compensate for an overall spending decline. The current fleet simply can’t meet U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific in addition to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. The Navy has aging submarines to upgrade and the Congressional Budget Office said last month that “required maintenance is projected to exceed the capacity of the Navy’s shipyards in 25 of the next 30 years.” To its credit, the White House budget outline mentions money for long-range weapons “to bolster deterrence and improve survivability and response timelines.” One of the People’s Liberation Army’s assets is its large arsenal of precision missiles designed to destroy American ships in the Pacific. More American long-range fires—especially if they are portable and ground-launched—can help the balance of power at relatively low cost. Yet some of the Pentagon funds will also go to “mitigate impacts of climate change.” That leaves even fewer resources for core fighting capabilities. Washington can’t ask the military to deter emboldened great powers and fight climate change on a declining real budget. The blunt truth is that the U.S. is no longer certain to win a great-power war. Russia is surging forces near Ukraine and China’s military maneuvers in the Western Pacific are at a new level of intensity. “The signal given by the military drills is that we are determined to stop Taiwan independence, and stop Taiwan from working with the U.S. We are doing it with action,” a Chinese government spokesman said last week. If American defense investment stagnates as China’s grows, the U.S. will lose a war over Taiwan. That would be costly in ways Americans can’t imagine, as Asian allies recalibrate decades-long defense and trading relationships with the U.S., and American bases in Okinawa and Guam are put at risk. Barack Obama never financed his pivot to the Asia-Pacific, and Mr. Biden may make the same mistake. The President anticipates immediate political benefits from gigantic domestic social spending, but the perils of shortchanging defense could become apparent sooner than he thinks. Fortunately Congress gets a vote, and it can protect the national interest by overriding his short-sighted plan.
其它NYT, Washington Post, CNBC, CNN, 这种取决于具体新闻，大多数扫一眼标题也就是了。
看平时发言，这版上貌似大多数人都是看中文新闻为主。。。
The Economist有解决一切问题的良方，就是民主和自由市场资本主义。
所有媒体当然都有自己的观点和角度，问题不在于某个媒体是否完美客观，而在于读者/受众是否有渠道能看到有不同角度的各个媒体，然后自己从中分辨获得需要的信息。
不重要的事，比如这里发生个枪击案啊（别告诉我枪击案是影响全世界的大事），那儿的明星出轨啦，自然是你对啥有兴趣就看啥。如果没兴趣，当然不如自个儿多学习提高或者花时间在其他娱乐上面。
我每天都看，每天邮箱都会收到一大堆提示， 挑着来看
“我就想臆测一下，美华是不是95%都跟我一样不看呢?所以我们的信息渠道难免就是，大纪元？小红书？国内的网易新闻？或者更严肃一些，华人网? “ “那我猜测也差不多，就那么5%的人.”
stupid assumptions! 你確定考過托福/GRE然後在美國求過學?
有认识的人，当年GRE全级最高，口语语感好， 现在除了上班自己业务用英文，看雅虎财经， 其余时间就是刷国内各种电视剧，综艺，头条，抖音。 我只能确定是高智商的人才那么放肆。
所以在美帝的斗胆大部分看国内报纸和综艺的 是多么自信自己的英语水平 两种语言呼唤自如
Biden’s Defense Budget Squeeze More money for the welfare state means less for the Pentagon. President Biden’s budget proposal includes record spending for nearly every corner of government, but there’s one big exception: national defense. Even as global threats rise, notably from China, Mr. Biden is squeezing the Pentagon.
Few in the media have noticed, but the White House is proposing a fiscal 2022 Pentagon budget of $715 billion. That’s a 1.6% increase from 2021’s $704 billion, but it’s a cut in the military’s spending power assuming likely inflation of more than 2%. Non-defense domestic discretionary spending will surge 16%, with the Education Department rising 41%, Health and Human Services 23% and the Environmental Protection Agency 21%.
With Mr. Biden proposing a separate $2.3 trillion for “infrastructure,” you’d think the Pentagon would be included. Aircraft and naval ships are certainly more justified as public works than subsidies to buy Teslas. Mr. Biden is making a conscious statement about his party’s political priorities: butter and more butter, but less for guns.
This marks a return to the downward defense spending trend of the Obama years. Defense spending as a share of GDP fell to 3.1% in fiscal 2017 from 4.7% in 2010, even as the military’s missions increased. Shrinking defense led to a readiness crisis that was showing up in more accidents and deficiencies in deployable ships and air units.
The Trump Administration and GOP Congress stopped the decline, and 2020’s defense outlays were estimated at 3.3% of GDP before the pandemic shock. But the Biden budget will again force risky trade-offs between military readiness and investment in the technology and weapons of the future.
The U.S. hasn’t spent less than 3% of its economic output on defense since before the September 11 attacks. But in the 1990s the U.S. military did not face peer competitors. Now the U.S. national defense strategy rightly sees an era of resurgent great power competition, but without the resources to meet the challenge. This mismatch increases the risk of miscalculation and war, as China seeks regional military dominance. Russia, Iran and lesser powers like North Korea also threaten allies and the U.S. homeland with missiles and cyber hacking.
The gap between strategy and resources is most evident in the naval challenge in the Western Pacific. China has scaled up its navy to more than 350 modern ships, while the U.S. is stuck in the water at roughly 300. The Chinese figure doesn’t include a sizable covert maritime militia that is an extension of its navy. The Biden budget says the Administration will make “executable and responsible” investments in the fleet, but the ostensibly bipartisan goal of 355 ships remains remote.
Perhaps the Administration will wring money from the Army after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the modest savings aren’t enough to compensate for an overall spending decline. The current fleet simply can’t meet U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific in addition to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. The Navy has aging submarines to upgrade and the Congressional Budget Office said last month that “required maintenance is projected to exceed the capacity of the Navy’s shipyards in 25 of the next 30 years.”
To its credit, the White House budget outline mentions money for long-range weapons “to bolster deterrence and improve survivability and response timelines.” One of the People’s Liberation Army’s assets is its large arsenal of precision missiles designed to destroy American ships in the Pacific. More American long-range fires—especially if they are portable and ground-launched—can help the balance of power at relatively low cost.
Yet some of the Pentagon funds will also go to “mitigate impacts of climate change.” That leaves even fewer resources for core fighting capabilities. Washington can’t ask the military to deter emboldened great powers and fight climate change on a declining real budget.
The blunt truth is that the U.S. is no longer certain to win a great-power war. Russia is surging forces near Ukraine and China’s military maneuvers in the Western Pacific are at a new level of intensity. “The signal given by the military drills is that we are determined to stop Taiwan independence, and stop Taiwan from working with the U.S. We are doing it with action,” a Chinese government spokesman said last week.
If American defense investment stagnates as China’s grows, the U.S. will lose a war over Taiwan. That would be costly in ways Americans can’t imagine, as Asian allies recalibrate decades-long defense and trading relationships with the U.S., and American bases in Okinawa and Guam are put at risk.
Barack Obama never financed his pivot to the Asia-Pacific, and Mr. Biden may make the same mistake. The President anticipates immediate political benefits from gigantic domestic social spending, but the perils of shortchanging defense could become apparent sooner than he thinks. Fortunately Congress gets a vote, and it can protect the national interest by overriding his short-sighted plan.
这些其实就是读者来信，并不是有些人想的那种社论。 Opinions are like assholes, everyone has one. 我基本上不看opinions
洗地多少也是个技术活，没看文章张嘴就是就读者来信，还是看不懂by the editorial board？mead可以google一下扫个盲。yes everyone has opinion. but theirs matter while yours not.
好吧，了解了。 我看报纸就是了解一些事实，没时间每一栏都看，WSJ Opinon那一栏。我从来都不看的，所以他洗脑也洗不到我。 如果要看深度报道和分析我会去找周刊(The Economist, New Yorker) 或者月刊 (The Atlantic), 或者看书。日刊里只有NYT还行。
关注opinion只是关注一种具有一定程度代表性甚至可能产生政策影响力的舆论风向，仅仅关注就会被洗脑只能说太欠缺信息筛选能力和批判性思维。。。这三个magazine真没到深度分析的程度，尤其economist一直被当成精英刊物来追捧我真是诧异
The Ecomist的Special Report还是可以的吧，广度深度都有些。 再说了凡事都是比较而言的，我们又没有美国的内参可以看。 拜你的贴，我第一次看了Mead这个人的贴子，确实很扯淡。你要能写篇反驳的文章，我支持你哈。
一年苦练可以看懂全部美国报纸杂志，但是要写到the WSJ 这个级别的文章，要苦练好多年才有可能，而且这程度GRE作文肯定满分啊，这个论坛要是有英文这么好的人，我会很讶异。
WSJ一直是偏右的，论深度和专业性都不如FT，WSJ优势在于cover的topic还是比较广泛的，作为读英文媒体的入门版最合适
跟学历年龄无关，这个就是在美国生活，人躲不过去英文信息渠道。要了解美国发生的事情尤其是本地的新闻，要买美国股票在美国投资理财，要打理屋子打理院子，大多数信息知识只能去看英文媒体包括英文论坛上的文章获取啊，运气好的话有时候能找着中文资源。另外美国新闻如果只靠中文渠道的话，跟公司同事闲聊的时候还得默默在脑子里做一遍翻译，然后还不能保证翻译的对😢