Winship contends that the negative effects of trade with China have been significantly exaggerated and that populist narratives blaming this trade for US economic decline aren't supported by rigorous evidence.
Winship gives the example of two hypothetical commuting zones with 200,000 working-age residents and 20,000 manufacturing workers. Data from the theory's proponents indicate that moving from low (10th percentile) to high (90th percentile) exposure to Chinese imports would result in a loss of roughly 2,700 manufacturing jobs—just a 1.4-percentage-point drop in overall manufacturing employment.
这样的数据不足以解释归咎于中国的社区衰退、社会动荡和民粹主义反弹。
This does not convincingly explain the community decline, social disruption, and populist backlash often blamed specifically on Chinese trade.
Further research revealed that job losses in exposed areas were often offset or even outweighed by employment gains in other sectors. Firms with greater Chinese import exposure increased manufacturing employment, reallocating jobs to more efficient domestic production lines enabled by cheaper imports.
Moreover, the steady decline in US manufacturing employment began decades before China's WTO entry. Between the late 1970s and 2000, factory employment had already decreased substantially, mostly because of technological advances and shifting consumer demand.
Furthermore, former manufacturing workers generally did not face permanent unemployment. In fact, unemployment rates among this group were lower in recent years compared to the late 1990s, before the peak of Chinese imports. Many workers transitioned successfully into other sectors.
解决之道不是孤立和关税，而是让美国工人适应变化（empower US workers to adapt to economic changes）。
经济学家指出，工人未能从冲击中恢复，往往是因为政府设置了重重障碍，导致他们难以调整。
Economists have shown that to the extent that workers sometimes don't recover from shocks, it tends to be a failure to adjust because of obstacles erected by government.
该文章总结出核心观点：中国进口对美国制造业的影响实际上非常有限（limited role Chinese imports have played in manufacturing-employment trend）。
The real "shock" America faces in 2025 is not from Chinese imports but from a resurgence of misguided protectionism based on a misdiagnosed problem. The path forward harnesses trade's real benefits rather than chasing economic illusions.
美国杂志Reason6月5日文章，原题：与中国贸易并不会摧毁美国经济（No, Trade With China Did Not Kill the US Economy）
2015年以来，美国政府宣扬所谓“中国冲击（"China shock"）”叙事，他们认为“中国崛起摧毁了美国制造业，使美国无数蓝领工人失业”。这一“理论”为美国保护主义、加征关税提供了完美的铺垫和借口。
提出这一“理论”的几位经济学家们认为，与中国进口接触较多的美国地区，制造业岗位的损失明显大于与中国接触较少的地区。民粹主义者借此大做文章，辩称2001年中国加入世贸组织导致了美国数百万个工作岗位的流失与社会瓦解。
近日，美国Reason杂志援引美国企业研究所学者斯科特·温希普（Scott Winship）的研究指出，该理论的准确性有待商榷。
温希普指出，中国贸易的负面影响被显著夸大了，许多将美国经济困境归咎于与中国进行贸易的民粹叙事，实际上缺乏严谨的数据支持。
Winship contends that the negative effects of trade with China have been significantly exaggerated and that populist narratives blaming this trade for US economic decline aren't supported by rigorous evidence.
首先，“中国冲击”理论聚焦于特定区域，未能代表全美，并不能证实中国贸易对美国经济全局的影响。即便姑且接受这一设定，其显示的结果也仅是相对温和的就业影响（only relatively modest employment effects）。
为此，他通过两个拥有20万劳动人口和2万制造业岗位的社区来举例：处于最少影响的10%地区和最受冲击的10%地区，二者在制造业岗位上的差距大概是2700个，相当于总就业的1.4个百分点。
Winship gives the example of two hypothetical commuting zones with 200,000 working-age residents and 20,000 manufacturing workers. Data from the theory's proponents indicate that moving from low (10th percentile) to high (90th percentile) exposure to Chinese imports would result in a loss of roughly 2,700 manufacturing jobs—just a 1.4-percentage-point drop in overall manufacturing employment.
这样的数据不足以解释归咎于中国的社区衰退、社会动荡和民粹主义反弹。
This does not convincingly explain the community decline, social disruption, and populist backlash often blamed specifically on Chinese trade.
其次，温希普还指出了多项“中国冲击”理论方法论上的问题。
受中国贸易影响较大的地区的制造业岗位损失，往往被其他行业的就业增长所抵消，甚至超过。与中国进口接触更多的企业反而增加了制造业就业，因为廉价进口商品使其能将岗位重新配置到更高效的本土生产线上。
Further research revealed that job losses in exposed areas were often offset or even outweighed by employment gains in other sectors. Firms with greater Chinese import exposure increased manufacturing employment, reallocating jobs to more efficient domestic production lines enabled by cheaper imports.
美国制造业就业的下降早在中国加入WTO之前就已持续几十年。上世纪70年代末到2000年，制造业就业人数就已大幅减少，主要原因是技术进步和消费需求变化。
Moreover, the steady decline in US manufacturing employment began decades before China's WTO entry. Between the late 1970s and 2000, factory employment had already decreased substantially, mostly because of technological advances and shifting consumer demand.
中国加入WTO之后，美国就业率下降趋势并未加速。制造业岗位减少的速度与之前一致，这更削弱了“中国贸易摧毁美国制造业”的论点。
此外，大多数的制造业工人并非永久失业。实际上，近年来制造业工人失业率甚至低于1990年代末中国进口高峰期前的水平，许多人成功转向其他行业。
Furthermore, former manufacturing workers generally did not face permanent unemployment. In fact, unemployment rates among this group were lower in recent years compared to the late 1990s, before the peak of Chinese imports. Many workers transitioned successfully into other sectors.
值得注意的是，如今美国制造业仍有大约50万个岗位空缺。
文章指出，尽管事实如此，“中国冲击”这一被夸大的叙事仍具有政治影响力。特朗普的关税政策不仅无助于经济稳定，反而伤害了美国制造商。
解决之道不是孤立和关税，而是让美国工人适应变化（empower US workers to adapt to economic changes）。
经济学家指出，工人未能从冲击中恢复，往往是因为政府设置了重重障碍，导致他们难以调整。
Economists have shown that to the extent that workers sometimes don't recover from shocks, it tends to be a failure to adjust because of obstacles erected by government.
该文章总结出核心观点：中国进口对美国制造业的影响实际上非常有限（limited role Chinese imports have played in manufacturing-employment trend）。
2025年，美国面临的真正“冲击”并非来自中国，而是错误判断带来的保护主义回潮。真正的出路，应是善用国际贸易，而非沉迷于经济幻象。
The real "shock" America faces in 2025 is not from Chinese imports but from a resurgence of misguided protectionism based on a misdiagnosed problem. The path forward harnesses trade's real benefits rather than chasing economic illusions.
编辑：焦洁